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Fisher Ames.

WORKS

OF

FISHER AMES.

COMPILED BY A NUMBER OF HIS FRIENDS.

TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED,

NOTICES

OF HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER.

NIHIL TETIGIT QUOD NON ORNAVIT.

BOSTON:

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY T. B. WAIT & Co.
COURT-STREET.

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1809.

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1809

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, TO WIT:

BE it remembered, That on the ninth day of February, in the thirty-third year of the Independence of the United States of America, Frances Ames, of the said district, has deposited in this office, the title of a book, the right whereof she claims as proprietor, in the words following, to wit: "Works of Fisher Ames. Compiled by a number of his Friends. To which are prefixed, Notices of his Life and Character. Nihil tetigit quod non ornavit."

In conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States, entitled, "An act for the encouragement of learning by securing the copies of Maps, Charts, and Books to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned;" and also to an act entitled, "An act supplementary to an act, entitled, an act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned; and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of Designing, Engraving, and Etching Historical, and other Prints."

WILLIAM S. SHAW,
Clerk of the District of Massachusetts.

NOTICES

OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF

FISHER AMES.

MR. AMES was distinguished among the eminent men of our country. All admitted, for they felt, his extraordinary powers; few pretended to doubt, if any seemed to deny, the purity of his heart. His exemplary life commanded respect; the charms of his conversation and manners won affection. He was equally admired and beloved.

HIS publick career was short, but brilliant. Called into the service of his country in seasons of her most critical emergency, and partaking in the management of her councils during a most interesting period of her history, he obtained a place in the first rank of her statesmen, legislators, orators, and patriots. By a powerful and original genius, an impressive and uniform virtue he succeeded, as fully perhaps as any political character in a republick agitated by divisions ever did, in surmounting the two pernicious vices, designated by the inimitable biographer of Agricola, insensibility to merit on the one hand, and envy on the other.

BECOMING a private citizen, he still operated extensively upon the publick opinion and feeling by conversation and

writing. When least in the publick eye, he remained the object of enthusiastick regard to his friends, and of fond reliance and hope to those lovers of his country who discern the connection between the agency of a few and the welfare of the many; whilst in the breasts of the community at large he engaged a sentiment of lively tenderness and peculiar respect.

The sickness which diffused an oppressive languor upon his best years, was felt to be a common misfortune; and the news of his death, though not unexpected, gave a pang of distress to the hearts of thousands. Those inhabitants of the capital of Massachusetts who had always delighted to honour him, solicited his lifeless remains for the privilege of indulging their grief, and evincing their admiration by funeral obsequies. The sad rites being performed, those who had cherished his character and talents with such constant regard and veneration, and who felt their own and the publick loss in his death with poignant affliction, demanded a publication of his works. They urged, that it would gratify their affection, reflect honour on his name, and be a voice of instruction and warning to his country.

In compliance with their general and earnest wish this volume is given to the world. Some account of the author's life and character is thought due, if not to his fame, yet to the interest which all have in those "who were born, and who have acted, as though they were born for their country and for mankind."

He needs not our praises; he would be dishonoured by our flattery; but he was our distinguished benefactor. We owe a record of this kind, though imperfectly executed, to our sense of his merits and services, and to our gratitude to heaven who endues some with extraordinary gifts to be employed for the benefit of others. It is the part of justice to afford to those who desire it all practicable lights to guide their judgment of an eminent man living in times and acting in situations, which expose his character to be imperfectly understood. We must pay respect to that natural and laudable curiosity of mankind, which asks an explanation of the causes that may have contributed

to form any peculiar excellence in one of our species, and which takes an interest in the circumstances and events of his life. Examples of great talents diligently exerted, and of shining virtues practised with uniformity should be preserved and displayed as furnishing models in conduct and incentives to excellence. By such exhibitions the timid are encouraged and the inactive roused. Emulation fires generous spirits to endeavour to fill the void made by the loss of the eminent. Are any capable of doing great and durable good to their country and the world, they are stimulated to tread in the fair paths which have been trodden before; and those whom nature and circumstances have confined to a small compass of action are instructed to place their single talent to the best account.

Fisher Ames lived and died in his native place. He was born April 9, 1758, in the old parish of Dedham, a pleasant country town about nine miles south of Boston, and the shire town of Norfolk. He sprung from one of the oldest families in Massachusetts. In the line of his ancestry is the Rev. William Ames, a famous English divine, author of the Medulla Theologiæ and several controversial tracts. He was educated at Christ's College, Cambridge, and to prevent an expulsion in form on account of his strenuous assertion of Calvinistical principles he forsook this college, went abroad, and was chosen by the states of Friesland professor of their university. He was at the synod of Dort, 1618. He had determined to emigrate to New-England, but was prevented by death in November, 1633.

The father of Fisher Ames was a physician and the son of a physician who lived in Bridgewater. His mother was daughter of Jeremiah Fisher, Esq. one of the most respectable farmers in the county. Dr. Nathaniel Ames was a man of acuteness and wit, of great activity, and a cheerful and amiable temper. To his skill in his profession he added a knowledge of natural philosophy, astronomy, and mathematicks. He died in July, 1764, leaving four sons and one daughter.

Fisher was the youngest child. The mother, as if "anticipating the future lustre of the jewel committed to her care,"

early resolved to struggle with her narrow circumstances in order to give this son a literary education; and she has lived to see his eminence and prosperity, to receive the expressions of his filial piety, and to weep over his grave.

It has been observed, that those who are prodigies of infant genius often disappoint the expectations they have raised, whilst minds of no peculiar promise and even of tardy growth in early years have been known at length to bear vigorous and lasting fruit. On the other hand it cannot be denied, that a great proportion of those who display extraordinary powers in mature life give indications of decided superiority in youth. The accounts of Mr. Ames prove the early expansion of his faculties. When he was six years old, he began the study of Latin. From this time till he entered the university he had a variety of instructers in succession. He attended the town school, when the master happened to be capable of teaching him, and at other times recited his lessons to the Rev. Mr. Haven, minister of the parish, a gentleman to whom he always showed much respect and friendship.

His frequent change of instructers and desultory application to the languages were obvious disadvantanges attending his initiation in classical literature. He did not receive that exact and sedulous culture, which such a mind as his deserved and would have fully repaid. His native energies in a good degree supplied these defects and carried him forward in the road of improvement. In July, 1770, soon after the completion of his twelfth year, he was admitted to Harvard college. Previous to his being offered, he was examined by a gentleman accustomed to teach the languages, who expressed admiration of his quickness and accuracy, and pronounced him a youth of uncommon attainments, and bright promise.

During this period he was remarkable for close application in the hours of study, and for animation and gaiety in the intervals of relaxation. He entered the university, indeed, at too tender an age for the mind to grasp the abstract sciences. It is said, however, that in the literary exercises in general he was ready and accurate, and in particular branches distin-

guished. He very soon gained the reputation of shining parts. He was attentive to his studies and regular in his conduct. Young as he was, he did not abuse his power over that portion of his time which the laws of the institution submit to the discretion of the student, by idleness and trifling; nor his liberty of self-direction in the choice of his associates, by consorting with the vicious. At that early period he might say, as he did when he came into life: "I have never sought friends, whom I was not willing and desirous to be known to have."

It was not his fancy or his passion to break through the fences of discipline, or come into collision with the authority of his preceptors. He had a good standing with the government of the college, without losing any part of the friendship and esteem of his fellow-students. His tutors were accustomed to speak of his qualities with emphatick praise. There was a peculiar mildness and modesty in the character of young Ames, joined to a vivacity and pleasantness, that endeared him both to his superiours and equals.

He was a favourite in a society, then recently formed among the students for improvement in elocution. It was early observed, that he coveted the glory of eloquence. In his declamation before this society he was remarked for the energy and propriety, with which he delivered such specimens of impassioned oratory as his genius led him to select. As a task or voluntary trial of his skill, he produced occasionally a theme or oration, and was known sometimes to invoke the muse of poetry, though he affected then, as he did afterwards, to decline the reputation of a poetick talent. Probably he was never satisfied with the success of his attempts in an art, in which want of excellence is want of every thing. His compositions at this time bore the characteristick stamp which has always marked his speaking and writing. They were sententious and full of ornament.

It is especially to be told, that the morals of the young collegian passed the ordeal of a four years residence at the university unhurt. He surmounted the temptations to vice,

of New-England offer to young men of literary education and limited means of support, and which has been the first resort after leaving college of many of our distinguished men in all professions.

This period, however, which engaged his services to the community, was not lost to himself. He improved his leisure by indulging his favourite propensity to books. During this time, as he frequently said, he read with avidity bordering on enthusiasm almost every author within his reach. He revised the Latin classicks, which he had studied at college. He read works illustrating Greek and Roman antiquities and the mythology of the ancients; natural and civil history, and some of the best novels. Poetry was both his food and luxury. He read the principal English poets, and became familiar with Milton and Shakespeare, dwelt on their beauties, and fixed passages of peculiar excellence on his memory. He had a high relish of the works of Virgil, and at this time could repeat considerable portions of the Eclogues and Georgics and most of the splendid and touching passages of the Æneid. This multifarious, though, for want of a guide, indiscriminate, and, probably, in some instances ill-directed reading must have contributed to extend and enrich the mind of the young student. It helped to supply that fund of materials for speaking and writing which he possessed in singular abundance; and hence partly he derived his remarkable fertility of allusion, his ability to evolve a train of imagery adapted to every subject of which he treated.

Mr. Ames was a student at law in the office of William Tudor, Esq. of Boston, and commenced practice at Dedham in the autumn of the year 1781. He had already begun to show the "publick and private sense of a man." The contest of the States with the parent country awakened in him a lively interest. He espoused their cause, and, though too young to take an active part, watched its progress with patriotick concern. In one instance he was selected for a publick trust, which he discharged with an ability beyond his years.

The inconveniences of a depreciated paper currency producing general discontent and in some cases acts of violence, a convention of delegates from every part of the state assembled at Concord with a view to devise a remedy for the evil. They agreed to regulate the prices of articles arbitrarily, and adjourned to the autumn. At the adjourned meeting Mr. Ames attended by delegation from his town. The plan adopted at the prior meeting had failed, as was anticipated by the discerning, though it was still an object with many to continue the experiment.

Mr. Ames displayed the subject in a lucid and impressive speech, shewing the futility of attempting to establish by power that value of things, which depended solely on consent; that the embarrassment was inevitable, and that it must be met by patriotism and patience, and not by attempting to do what was impossible to be done.

Mr. Ames began to be mentioned as a pleader of uncommon eloquence, when his appearance as an essay-writer contributed to raise and extend his reputation. The government of the state of Massachusetts was administered upon the principles of justice, which required that it should enforce the payment of private debts, and that publick credit should be supported. Various causes made these functions of the government distressing or inconvenient to many of the people, whose discontents restless intriguing men artfully and industriously inflamed. The spirit of licentiousness broke out in an insurrection. The revolutionary fervour, which had been kindled in the war with Great Britain, seemed to threaten with destruction our own constitution and laws. Liberty was confounded with license; and those who could not be governed by reason appeared to claim a right not to be governed by force.

Lucius Junius Brutus wrote to animate the government to decision and energy; and when the insurrection was suppressed, Camillus explained the lessons inculcated by the recent dangers and escapes of the country. These pieces were pronounced to be the production of no common mind. It was the light of genius and wisdom darted athwart the

From the commencement of the government the country was believed to be deeply interested in the event of the bill for funding the publick debt. On the introduction of this bill the opposition gained vigour by the junction of one of the framers and most able * supporters of the constitution, who from this time became the leader of the discontented party. He proposed to fund the debt, but in a way in which it was deemed impossible it should be funded. His proposal, therefore, was viewed as tending to defeat the object which it professed to favour. At every stage of this momentous business Mr. Ames employed his resources of argument and eloquence, till the bill was passed into a law.

The famous commercial resolutions of Mr. Madison, founded on a report of the secretary of state, Mr. Jefferson, were apprehended to put in great hazard our prosperity and independence. To subserve the interests of commerce was the pretext; objects purely political, as Mr. Ames thought, were the motives. He insisted, that commerce could not be served by regulations, which should oblige us to "sell cheap and buy dear"; and he inferred, that the effect of the resolutions could only be to gratify partialities and resentments, which all statesmen should discard.

His speech on the appropriation for the British treaty was an era of his political life. For many months he had been sinking under weakness, and though he had attended the long and interesting debate on this question, which involved the constitution and the peace of the United States, it was feared he would be unable to speak. But when the time came for taking a vote so big with consequences, his emotions would not suffer him to be silent. His appearance, his situation, the magnitude of his subject, the force and the pathos of his eloquence gave this speech an extraordinary power over the feelings of the dignified and numerous assembly who heard it. When he had finished, a member in opposition moved to postpone the decision on the question, that they might not vote under

* Mr. Madison.

the influence of a sensibility, which their calm judgment might condemn.

At the close of the session, in the spring of 1796, Mr. Ames travelled into Virginia for his health. He thought he derived partial benefit from drinking of the warm springs in Berkley county, and more from the journey and unremitting attention to regimen. In this visit he was an object of the most friendly and respectful attention, individual and publick. He found many friends of the Washington system in this state, whose representatives had taken the lead in opposition, observing in a letter, "Virginia has been misrepresented to us, as much as the measures of government have been to them; and good men are no where generally hostile to the federal cause."

At this time the college of New-Jersey expressed their estimation of his publick character by conferring on him the degree of Doctor of Laws.

He gained sufficient health to be able to attend the next session of congress, and to enter into business, though not with all his usual spirit. He was chairman of the committee, which reported the answer to the president's speech. This answer contained a most affectionate and respectful notice of the president's declaration, that he now stood for the last time in their presence. In conclusion it said: "for your country's sake, for the sake of republican liberty it is our earnest wish, that your example may be the guide of your successors, and thus, after being the ornament and safeguard of the present age, become the patrimony of our descendants." In the debate on this answer he vindicated, with his accustomed openness and ability, the claim of Washington to the unqualified love and gratitude of the nation.

The session being terminated, Mr. Ames, who had previously declined another election, became a private citizen. He retired to his favourite residence at Dedham, to enjoy repose in the bosom of his family, and to unite with his practice as a lawyer, those rural occupations in which he delighted. He applied to the management of his farm and fruitery a portion

danger to the liberty of the world. The partiality to France in the national feelings of Americans he regarded as having a tendency at all times to corrupt and pervert American politicks. Nothing can exceed the interest with which he watched the efforts of Great Britain against the all-conquering and eccentrick ambition of France; not only because he was just to the British nation and character; but because he saw, that all our hopes of independence were staked upon the issue.

On all these subjects Mr. Ames was awake, while many others slept. What they saw obscurely, he saw clearly. What to them was distant affected him as near. The admission of danger implies duty; and many refuse to be alarmed, because they wish to be at ease. The despondent think nothing *can* be done; the presumptuous nothing *need* be done. Considering these facts and opinions, Mr. Ames's writings will be acknowledged to have produced much effect.

In the year 1804, Mr. Ames was chosen president of Harvard College. His health would not have allowed him to accept the place, had other reasons permitted. Though greatly interested in the education of the young, he did not think his habits adapted to the office, and therefore declined the honour.

From 1795 his health continued to decline, with partial and flattering intermissions, until his death. He was a striking example of magnanimity and patience under suffering. Retaining always the vigour and serenity of his mind, he appeared to make those reflections which became his situation. When speaking of his first attack, he observes, "I trust I realise the value of those habits of thinking, which I have cherished for some time. Sickness is not wholly useless to me. It has increased the warmth of my affection to my friends. It has taught me to make haste in forming the plan of my life, if it should be spared, more for private duties and social enjoyments, and less for the splendid emptiness of publick station, than yet I have done."

At length after an extreme debility for two years, the frame which had so long tottered was about to fall. With composure and dignity he saw the approach of his dissolution. He had

many reasons for wishing to live. The summons came to demand of his noon of life the residue of a day which had been bright and fair; of his love of fame the relinquishment of all that respect and honour, which the world solicited him to receive; of his patriotism the termination of all his cares and labours for a country, which he loved with inextinguishable ardour; of his conjugal affection a separation from an object inexpressibly dear; of his parental tenderness the surrender of his children to the chances and vicissitudes of life without his counsel and care.

But these views of his condition did not sink his heart, which was sustained by pious confidence and hope. He appeared now what he always was, and rose in virtues in proportion to his trial, expressing the tenderest concern for those whom he should leave, and embracing in his solicitude his country and mankind. He expired on the morning of the fourth of July, 1808. When the intelligence reached Boston, a meeting of citizens was held with a view to testify their respect for his character and services. In compliance with their request his remains were brought to the capital for interment, at which a eulogy was pronounced by his early friend Mr. Dexter, and every mark of respectful notice was paid.

Funeral honours to publick characters, being customary offices of decorum and propriety, are necessarily equivocal testimonies of esteem. But Mr. Ames was a private man, who was honoured because he was lamented. He was followed to the grave by a longer procession than has perhaps appeared on any similar occasion. It was a great assemblage, drawn by gratitude and admiration around the bier of one exalted in their esteem by his pre-eminent gifts, and endeared to their hearts by the surpassing loveliness of his disposition.

Having taken notice of the history of Mr. Ames, we are required to present some additional views of his talents, opinions, and character. The reader of his works will, no doubt, concur with those who knew him and who heard him in publick and private, in saying, that he had a mind of high order,

in some particulars of the highest, and that he has a just claim to be classed with the men of genius, that quality which it is so much more easy to discern than to define; "that quality, without which judgment is cold and knowledge inert; that energy, which collects, combines, amplifies, and animates." We observe in Mr. Ames a liberal portion of all the faculties and qualities that enter into this character, understanding, memory, imagination, invention, sensibility, ardour.

As a speaker and as a writer he had the power to enlighten and persuade, to move, to please, to charm, to astonish. He united those decorations that belong to fine talents to that penetration and judgment that designate an acute and solid mind. Many of his opinions have the authority of predictions fulfilled and fulfilling. He had the ability of investigation, and, where it was necessary, did investigate with patient attention, going through a series of observation and deduction, and tracing the links which connect one truth with another. When the result of his researches was exhibited in discourse, the steps of a logical process were in some measure concealed by the colouring of rhetorick. Minute calculations and dry details were employments, however, the least adapted to his peculiar construction of mind. It was easy and delightful for him to illustrate by a picture, but painful and laborious to prove by a diagram. It was the prerogative of his mind to discern by a glance, so rapid as to seem intuition, those truths which common capacities struggle hard to apprehend; and it was the part of his eloquence to display, expand, and enforce them.

His imagination was a distinguishing feature of his mind. Prolific, grand, sportive, original, it gave him the command of nature and art, and enabled him to vary the disposition and the dress of his ideas without end. Now it assembled most pleasing images, adorned with all that is soft and beautiful; and now rose in the storm, wielding the elements and flashing with the most awful splendours.

Very few men have produced more original combinations. He presented resemblances and contrasts which none saw

before, but all admitted to be just and striking. In delicate and powerful wit he was pre-eminent.

The exercise of these talents and accomplishments was guided and exalted by a sublime morality and the spirit of rational piety, was modelled by much good taste, and prompted by an ardent heart.

Mr. Ames was more adapted to the senate than the bar. His speeches in congress, always respectable, were many of them excellent, abounding in argument and sentiment, having all the necessary information, embellished with rhetorical beauties and animated with patriotick fires.

So much of the skill and address of the orator do they exhibit, that, though he had little regard to the rules of the art, they are perhaps fair examples of the leading precepts for the several parts of an oration. In debates on important questions he generally waited before he spoke, till the discussion had proceeded at some length, when he was sure to notice every argument that had been offered. He was sometimes in a minority, when he well considered the temper of a majority in a republican assembly, impatient of contradiction, refutation, or detection, claiming to be allowed sincere in their convictions, and disinterested in their views. He was not unsuccessful in uniting the prudence and conciliation necessary in parliamentary speaking, with lawful freedom of debate and an effectual use of those sharp and massy weapons which his talents supplied, and which his frankness and zeal prompted him to employ.

He did not systematically study the exterior graces of speaking, but his attitude was erect and easy, his gestures manly and forcible, his intonations varied and expressive, his articulation distinct, and his whole manner animated and natural. His written compositions, it will be perceived, have that glow and vivacity which belonged to his speeches.

All the other efforts of his mind, however, were probably exceeded by his powers in conversation. He appeared among his friends with an illuminated face, and with peculiar amenity and captivating kindness displayed all the playful felicity of his

wit, the force of his intellect, and the fertility of his imagination.

On the kind or degree of excellence which criticism may concede or deny to Mr. Ames's productions, we do not undertake with accurate discrimination to determine. He was undoubtedly rather actuated by the genius of oratory, than disciplined by the precepts of rhetorick; was more intent on exciting attention and interest and producing effect, than securing the praise of skill in the artifice of composition. Hence criticks might be dissatisfied, yet hearers charmed. The abundance of materials, the energy and quickness of conception, the inexhaustible fertility of mind, which he possessed, as they did not require, so they forbade a rigid adherence to artificial guides in the disposition and employment of his intellectual stores. To a certain extent, such a speaker and writer may claim to be his own authority.

Image crouded upon image in his mind, he is not chargeable with affectation in the use of figurative language; his tropes are evidently prompted by imagination, and not forced into his service. Their novelty and variety create constant surprise and delight. But they are, perhaps, too lavishly employed. The fancy of his hearers is sometimes overplied with stimulus, and the importance of the thought liable to be concealed in the multitude and beauty of the metaphors. His condensation of expression may be thought to produce occasional abruptness. He aimed rather at the terseness, strength, and vivacity of the short sentence, than the dignity of the full and flowing period. His style is conspicuous for sententious brevity, for antithesis and point. Single ideas appear with so much lustre and prominence, that the connection of the several parts of his discourse is not always obvious to the common mind, and the aggregate impression of the composition is not always completely obtained. In those respects where his peculiar excellencies came near to defects, he is rather to be admired than imitated.

Mr. Ames, though trusting much to his native resources, did by no means neglect to apply the labours of others to his

own use. His early love of books has been mentioned; and he retained and cherished the same propensity through his whole life. He was particularly fond of ethical studies; but he went more deeply into history, than any other branch of learning. Here he sought the principles of legislation, the science of politicks, the causes of the rise and decline of nations, and the character and passions of men acting in publick affairs. He read Herodotus, Thucydides, Livy, Tacitus, Plutarch, and the modern historians of Greece and Rome. The English history he studied with much care. Hence he possessed a great fund of historical knowledge always at command both for conversation and writing. He contemplated the character of Cicero as an orator and statesman with fervent admiration.

He never ceased to be a lover of the poets. Homer, in Pope, he often perused; and read Virgil in the original within two years of his death with increased delight. His knowledge of the French enabled him to read their authors, though not to speak their language. He was accustomed to read the scriptures, not only as containing a system of truth and duty, but as displaying in their poetical parts, all that is sublime, animated, and affecting in composition. His learning seldom appeared as such, but was interwoven with his thoughts and became his own.

In publick speaking he trusted much to excitement, and did little more in his closet than draw the outlines of his speech and reflect on it, till he had received deeply the impressions he intended to make; depending for the turns and figures of language, illustrations and modes of appeal to the passions, on his imagination and feelings at the time. This excitement continued, when the cause had ceased to operate. After debate his mind was agitated, like the ocean after a storm, and his nerves were like the shrouds of a ship, torn by the tempest.

He brought his mind much in contact with the minds of others, ever pleased to converse on subjects of publick interest, and seizing every hint that might be useful to him in writing for the instruction of his fellow-citizens. He justly thought, that persons below him in capacity might have good ideas,

which he might employ in the correction and improvement of his own. His attention was always awake to grasp the materials that came to him from every source. A constant labour was going on in his mind.

He never sunk from an elevated tone of thought and action, nor suffered his faculties to slumber in indolence. The circumstances of the times, in which he was called to act, contributed to elicit his powers, and supply fuel to his genius. The greatest interests were subjects of debate. When he was in the national legislature, the spirit of party did not tie the hands of the publick functionaries; and questions, on which depended the peace or war, the safety or danger, the freedom or dishonour of the country, might be greatly influenced by the counsels and efforts of a single patriot.

The political principles and opinions of Mr. Ames are not difficult to be understood, and should be attentively regarded by those who will estimate the merit of his labours. Mr. Ames was emphatically a republican. He saw, that many persons confounded a republick with a democracy. He considered them as essentially distinct and really opposite. According to his creed, a republick is that structure of an elective government, in which the administration necessarily prescribe to themselves the general good as the object of all their measures; a democracy is that, in which the present popular passions, independent of the publick good, become a guide to the rulers. In the first, the reason and interests of the society govern; in the second, their prejudices and passions. The frame of the American constitution supposes the dangers of democracy. The division of the legislature into two branches and their diverse origin, the long duration of office in one branch, the distinct power of the executive, the independence and permanency of the judiciary are designed to balance and check the democratick tendencies of our polity. They are contrivances and devices voluntarily adopted by the people to restrain themselves from obstructing, by their own mistakes or perversity, the attainment of the publick welfare. They are professed means of insuring to the nation rulers, who will pre-

fer the durable good of the whole to the transient advantage of the whole or a part. When these provisions become ineffectual, and the legislator, the executive magistrate, and the judge become the instruments of the passions of the people, or of the governing majority, the government, whatever may be its form, is a democracy, and the publick liberty is no longer safe. True republican rulers are bound to act, not simply as those who appoint them *would*, but, as they *ought;* democratick leaders will act in subordination to those very passions which it is the object of government to control; but as the effect of this subserviency is to procure them unlimited confidence and devotedness, the powers of society become concentrated in their hands. Then it is, that men, not laws, govern. Nothing can be more inconsistent with the real liberty of the people, than the power of the democracy thus brought into action. For in this case the government is a despotism beyond rule, not a republick confined to rule. It is strong, but its strength is of a terrible sort; strong to oppress, not to protect; not strong to maintain liberty, property, and right, it cannot secure justice nor make innocence safe.

Mr. Ames apprehended, that our government had been sliding down from a true republick towards the abyss of democracy; and that the ambition of demagogues operating on personal, party, and local passions, was attaining its objects. "A quack doctor, a bankrupt attorney, and a renegado from England, by leading the mobs of three cities, become worth a national bribe; and after receiving it, they are not the servants but the betrayers of the state." The only resource against this degeneracy of our affairs and their final catastrophe Mr. Ames considered to be "the correctness of the publick opinion, and the energy that is to maintain it." Hence his zeal to support the federal administration in the constitutional exercise of its powers, and his fervid appeals to enlighten, animate, and combine the friends of republican liberty. Hence the stress he laid on the principles, habits, and institutions that pertain to the New-England state of society. "Constitutions," said he, "are but paper; society is the substratum of government.

men, whose virtues and characters are opened and coloured by the sympathy of united efforts, is no mean compensation." His health and perhaps his life were the costly oblations which he laid on the altar of patriotism. The fine machinery of his system could ill withstand the excitement produced by publick speaking and his keen interest in publick affairs.

It is happy for mankind, when those who engage admiration deserve esteem; for vice and folly derive a pernicious influence from an alliance with qualities that naturally command applause. In the character of Mr. Ames the circle of the virtues seemed to be complete, and each virtue in its proper place.

The objects of religion presented themselves with a strong interest to his mind. The relation of the world to its author, and of this life to a retributory scene in another, could not be contemplated by him without the greatest solemnity. The religious sense was, in his view, essential in the constitution of man. He placed a full reliance on the divine origin of christianity. If there was ever a time in his life, when the light of revelation shone dimly upon his understanding, he did not rashly close his mind against clearer vision, for he was more fearful of mistakes to the disadvantage of a system, which he saw to be excellent and benign, than of prepossessions in its favour. He felt it his duty and interest to inquire, and discovered on the side of faith a fulness of evidence little short of demonstration. At about thirty five he made a publick profession of his belief in the christian religion, and was a regular attendant on its services. In regard to articles of belief, his conviction was confined to those leading principles, about which christians have little diversity of opinion. Subtle questions of theology, from various causes often agitated, but never determined, he neither pretended nor desired to investigate, satisfied that they related to points uncertain or unimportant. He loved to view religion on the practical side, as designed to operate by a few simple and grand truths on the affections, actions, and habits of men. He cherished the sentiment and experience of religion, careful to ascertain the genuineness and value of impres-

sions and feelings by their moral tendency. He insisted much on the distinction between the real and lively, but gentle and unaffected emotions of a pious mind, naturally passing into the life, and that "morbid fanaticism," which consists in inexplicable sensations, internal acts, and artificial raptures, that have no good aspect upon religious obedience. In estimating a sect he regarded more its temper than its tenets; he treated the conscientious opinions and phraseology of others on sacred subjects with tenderness, and approached all questions concerning divine revelation with modesty and awe. His prudence and moderation in these particulars may, possibly, have been misconstrued into an assent to propositions, which he meant merely not to deny, or an adoption of opinions or language, which he chose merely not to condemn. He of all men was the last to countenance exclusive claims to purity of faith, founded on a zeal for peculiar dogmas, which multitudes of good men, approved friends of truth, utterly reject. He was no enemy to improvement, to fair inquiry, and christian freedom; but innovations in the modes of worship and instruction, without palpable necessity or advantage, he discouraged, as tending to break the salutary associations of the pious mind. His conversation and behaviour evinced the sincerity of his religious impressions. No levity upon these subjects ever escaped his lips; but his manner of recurring to them in conversation indicated reverence and feeling. The sublime, the affecting character of Christ he never mentioned without emotion.

Mr. Ames was married July 15th, 1792, to Frances, third daughter of John Worthington, Esq. of Springfield. He left seven children, six of whom are sons; the eldest fifteen years old. He was gratefully sensible of the peculiar felicity of his domestick life. In his beloved home his sickness found all the alleviation, that a judicious and unwearied tenderness could minister; and his intervals of health a succession of every pleasing engagement and heartfelt satisfaction. The complacency of his looks, the sweetness of his tones, his mild and often playful manner of imparting instruction, evinced his ex-

treme delight in the society of his family, who felt that they derived from him their chief happiness, and found in his conversation and example a constant excitement to noble and virtuous conduct. As a husband and father, he was all that is provident, kind, and exemplary. He was riveted in the regards of those who were in his service. He felt all the ties of kindred. The delicacy, the ardour, and constancy, with which he cherished his friends, his readiness to the offices of good neighbourhood, and his propensity to contrive and execute plans of publick improvement, formed traits in his character, each of remarkable strength. He cultivated friendship by an active and punctual correspondence, which made the number of his letters very great, and which are not less excellent than numerous.

When he emerged from comparative obscurity to fill a large space in the eyes of the publick, he lost none of the simplicity of character and modesty of deportment which he had before displayed, and neglected none of the friends of his youth. He never yielded to that aversion to the necessary cares of life, which men, accustomed to high concerns, or fond of letters, sometimes improvidently indulge. Without any particle of avarice, he was strictly economical.

He had no envy, for he felt no personal rivalry. His ambition was of that purified sort, which is rather the desire of excellence than the reputation of it: he aimed more at desert, than at superiority. He loved to bestow praise on those who were competitors for the same kind of publick consideration as himself, not fearing that he should sink by their elevation.

He was tenacious of his rights, but scrupulous in his respect to the rights of others. The obloquy of political opponents, was sometimes the price he paid for not deserving it. But it could hardly give him pain, for he had no vulnerable points in his character. He had a perfect command of his temper; his anger never proceeded to passion, nor his sense of injury to revenge. If there was occasional asperity in his language, it was easy to see there was no malignity in his dis-

position. He tasted the good of his existence with cheerful gratitude; how he received its evil has been already intimated.

His fears concerning publick affairs did not so much depress his spirits, as awaken his activity to prevent or mitigate, by his warnings and counsels, the disorder of the state. He was deeply anxious for the fortunes of his country, but more intent on rendering it all the service in his power; convinced that, however uncertain may be the events of the future, the present duty is never performed in vain.

Mr. Ames in person a little exceeded the middle height, was well proportioned, and remarkably erect. His features were regular, his aspect respectable and pleasing, his eye expressive of benignity and intelligence. His head and face are shown with great perfection in the engraving prefixed to his works. In his manners he was easy, affable, cordial, inviting confidence, yet inspiring respect. He had that refined spirit of society, which observes the forms of a real, but not studied politeness, and paid a most delicate regard to the propriety of conversation and behaviour.

In faint lines we have sketched the character of this man of worth. If the reader ask, why he is represented without blemishes, the answer is, that, though as a man he undoubtedly had faults, yet they were so few, so trivial, or so lost among his virtues, as not to be observed, or not to be remembered.

WORKS

OF

FISHER AMES.

PREFACE.

SOME apology might be necessary for a portion of the following work, if the numerous friends and admirers of its author had not demanded its publication. They had long desired to possess, in a decent and durable form, some of those brilliant and profound thoughts with which they had often been delighted and instructed. A republication of newspaper essays is not generally entitled to extensive publick patronage, but the writings of Mr. AMES are believed to be among the exceptions to this remark. His ardent and unremitted zeal for the welfare of his country induced him at all times to prefer the interest of that country to his own fame; and that genius, which might have immortalized his name by another direction of its powers, was confined to the humble but, perhaps, more useful office of teaching his fellow citizens, in the perishable journals of the day, the nature of liberty and the danger of its loss. Some of those who had been charmed with his eloquence proposed, in his lifetime, to separate the productions of his pen from the less interesting matter with which they were connected; his delicacy forbade them to proceed; but the deep and spontaneous expression of the publick grief at his death gave new life to the proposal which is now carried into effect.

In making a selection from the great mass of his works, the aim has been to furnish a fair specimen of the talents and sentiments of the author, to prefer such pieces as are of the most general nature, to exclude offensive personal allusions, except when the names of persons seem to be inseparable from the subject, and to avoid repetitions. It will be perceived, that the essays and speeches to the 378th page, inclusively, are a republication from newspapers and pamphlets, and that the writings from thence to the end of the volume, are now for the first time published.

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WORKS

OF

FISHER AMES.

LUCIUS JUNIUS BRUTUS.

First published in the Independent Chronicle, at Boston, October 12, 1786.

This political speculation was written after several of the courts of justice had been stopped by the insurgents, and before the marching of the army commanded by general Lincoln, which happily suppressed that rebellion. The writer was then young, and had taken no share in publick affairs. A perusal of the publick journals and newspapers of that period will prove, that no other man had then the boldness to express, and it is believed, that few had the discernment to entertain, so many correct ideas upon the critical state of our country. It is well also to remark, that the principles and opinions of the writer were precisely the same with those, which he so eloquently maintained throughout his whole life. In a man, endowed with a mind so luminous, and of a heart so pure, this uniform adherence to the same opinions will afford no small weight of evidence in favour of their correctness. This piece, written when it was wholly uncertain, whether the republick or its foes would be victorious, is an ample proof of the fortitude, the patriotism, and the ardent zeal of the writer. It evinces, that he was the declared foe of faction and rebellion, and the staunch friend of a firm republican government.

Heu, miseri cives
Non hostes, inimicaque castra,
Vestras spes uritis.

MANY friends of the government seem to think it a duty to practise a little well intended hypocrisy, when conversing on the subject of the late commotions in the commonwealth. They seem to think it prudent and necessary to conceal from the people, and even from themselves, the magnitude of the present danger. They affect to hope, that there is not any real disaffection to government among the rioters, and that reason will soon dispel the delusion which has excited them to arms.

But the present crisis is too important, and appearances too menacing, to admit of pusillanimous councils, and half-way measures. Every citizen has a right to know the truth. It is time to speak out, and to rouse the torpid patriotism of men, who have every thing to lose by the subversion of an excellent constitution.

The members of the general court acquired the esteem of the most respectable part of the community, by their wise and manly conduct during the last session: the task before them is now become arduous indeed; the eyes of their country, and of the world, are upon them, while they resolve, either to surrender the constitution of their country, without an effort, or, by exerting the whole force of the state in its defence, to satisfy their constituents, that its fall (if it must fall) was effected by a force, against which all the resources of prudence and *patriotism* had been called forth in vain.

It will be necessary to consider the nature and probable consequences of the late riots, in order to determine, whether this alternative, to surrender or to defend the constitution, is now the question before the general court.

The crime of high treason has not been always supposed to imply the greatest moral turpitude and corruption of mind; but it has ever stood first on the list of civil crimes. In European states, the rebellion of a small number of persons can excite but little apprehension, and no danger; an armed force is there kept up, which can crush tumults almost as soon as they break out; or if a rebellion prevails, the conqueror succeeds to the power and titles of his vanquished competitor. The head of the government is changed; but the government remains.

The crime of levying war against the state is attended with particular aggravations and dangers in this country. Our government has no armed force; it subsists by the supposed approbation of the majority: the first murmurs of sedition excite doubts of that approbation; timid, credulous, and ambitious men concur to magnify the danger. In such a government, the danger is real, as soon as it is dreaded. No sooner

is the standard of rebellion displayed, than men of desperate principles and fortunes resort to it; the pillars of government are shaken; the edifice totters from its centre; the foot of a child may overthrow it; the hands of giants cannot rebuild it. For if our government should be destroyed, what but the total destruction of civil society must ensue? A more popular form could not be contrived, nor could it stand: one less popular would not be adopted. The people, then, wearied by anarchy, and wasted by intestine war, must fall an easy prey to foreign or domestick tyranny. Besides, our constitution is the free act of the people; they stand solemnly pledged for its defence, and treason against such a constitution implies a high degree of moral depravity.

Such are the aggravations of the crime of high treason against the commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Is it safe, by our timidity, and affected moderation, to afford the principal perpetrators of this atrocious crime the prospect of impunity? There are offences, which wise nations have supposed it unsafe to pardon. For their forgeries, the benevolent Dodd, and the ingenious Ryland, suffered death: the pardon of the one was refused to the tears of a suppliant nation; nor could a monarch's favour save the other from his punishment. This crime against a free commonwealth, which has no standing military force, will be repeated, if it is not punished: witness the increase of insolence and numbers, with which the late riots have succeeded each other. The certainty of punishment is the truest security against crimes: but if a number of individuals are allowed with impunity to support, by arms, their disapprobation of public measures, though the constitution should remain, yet we shall be cursed with a government by men, and not by laws. The plans of an enlightened and permanent national policy may be defeated by, and, in fact, must depend upon the desperate ambition of the worst men in the commonwealth; upon the convenience of bankrupts and sots, who have gambled or slept away their estates; upon the sophisms of wrong headed men of some understanding; and upon the prejudices, caprice, and ignorant enthusiasm of a

multitude of tavern-haunting politicians, who have none at all. The supreme power of the state will be found to reside with such men; and in making laws, the object will not be the general good, but the will and interest of the vile legislators. This will be a government by men, and the worst of men; and such men, actuated by the strongest passions of the heart, having nothing to lose, and hoping, from the general confusion, to reap a copious harvest, will acquire, in every society, a larger share of influence than equal property and abilities will give to better citizens. The motives to refuse obedience to government are many and strong; impunity will multiply and enforce them. Many men would rebel, rather than be ruined; but they would rather not rebel, than be hanged. The English government may sometimes treat insurrections with lenity, for they dare to punish. But who will impute our forbearance either to prudence or magnanimity.

It need not be observed, that it is rebellion to oppose any of the courts of justice; but opposing the supreme court, whose justices are so revered for their great learning and integrity, is known to be high treason by every individual who has mingled with the mob. Many of them have been deluded with the pretence of grievances; but they well know, that the method of redress, which they have sought, is treasonable; they dare to commit the offence, because they believe that government have not the power and spirit to punish them.

This seems, therefore, to be the time, and perhaps the only time, to revive just ideas of the criminality and danger of treason; *for our government to govern; for our rulers to vindicate the violated majesty of a free commonwealth; to convince the advocates of democracy, that the constitution may yet be defended, and that it is worth defending; that the supreme power is really held by the legal representatives of the people; that the county conventions and riotous assemblies of armed men shall no longer be allowed to legislate, and to form an* imperium in imperio; *and that the protection of government shall yet be effectually extended to every citizen of the commonwealth.*

In a free government, the reality of grievances is no kind of justification of rebellion. It is hoped that our rulers will act with dignity and wisdom; that they will yield every thing to reason, and refuse every thing to force; that they will not consider any burdens as a grievance, which it is the duty of the people to bear; but if the burden is too weighty for them to endure, that they will lighten it; *and that they will not descend to the injustice and meanness of purchasing leave to hold their authority, by sacrificing a part of the community to the villany and ignorance of the disaffected.*

It may be very proper to use arguments, to publish addresses, and fulminate proclamations, against high treason: but the man who expects to disperse a mob of a thousand men, by ten thousand arguments, has certainly never been in one. I have heard it remarked, that men are not to be reasoned out of an opinion that they have not reasoned themselves into. The case, though important, is simple. Government does not subsist by making proselytes to sound reason, or by compromise and arbitration with its members; but by the power of the community compelling the obedience of individuals. If that is not done, who will seek its protection, or fear its vengeance. Government may prevail in the argument, and yet we may lose the constitution.

We have been told, that the hatchet of rebellion would be buried, at least till another occasion shall call it forth, provided all publick and private debts be abolished, or, in lieu of such abolition, that a tender act be passed; or an emission of paper money, as a tender for all debts, should be made; or that the courts of justice should be shut, until all grievances are redressed.

Here naturally arise two questions. In strict justice, ought our rulers to adopt either of these measures? And should they adopt either, or all of them, will the energy of government be restored, and the constitution be preserved?

As to the first question, who is there that keeps company with honest men, that will not give scope to the vehement detestation that he bears the idea? Is there a rogue in the

state so hardened against shame and conscience, that he would consent to be, alone, the author of either of those measures? It is to be hoped that the time is not yet arrived, when the government of a *free*, *new* people is worse than the worst man in it.

But should government resolve, that a measure which is morally wrong, is politically right; that it is necessary to sacrifice its friends and advocates to buy a truce from its foes; will those foes, having tasted the sweets of ruling, intermit their enterprises, while there is a remnant of authority left in the state to inflict punishments and to impose taxes, and that authority is no longer formidable by the support of those men, whose rights have been already surrendered? Did cowardice, did injustice, ever save a sinking state? Did any man, by giving up a portion of his just right, because he had not courage to maintain it, ever save the residue? The insolence of the aggressor is usually proportioned to the tameness of the sufferer. Every individual has a right to tell his rulers, *I am one of the parties to the constitutional contract. I promised allegiance, and I require protection for my life and property. I am ready to risk both in your defence. I am competent to make my own contracts; and when they are violated, to seek their interpretation and redress in the judicial courts. I never gave you a right to interpose in them. Without my consent, or a crime committed, neither you, nor any individual, have a right to my property. I refuse my consent; I am innocent of any crime. I solemnly protest against the transfer of my property to my debtor. An act making paper, or swine, a tender, is a confiscation of my estate, and a breach of that compact, under which I thought I had secured protection. If ye say that the people are distressed, I ask, is the proposed relief less destressing? Relieve distress from your own funds; exercise the virtues of charity and compassion at your own charge, as I do. Am I to lose my property, and to be involved in distress, to relieve persons whom I never saw, and who are unworthy of compassion, if they accept the dishonest relief. If your virtues lead you to oppress me, what am I to expect from your vices? But if ye will suffer my life to*

depend upon the mercy of the MOB, *and my property upon their opinion of the expediency of my keeping it, at least restore me the right, which I renounced when I became a citizen, of vindicating my own rights, and avenging my own injuries.*

IN fine, the publick will be convinced, that the designs of the rioters are subversive of government; that they have knowingly incurred the penalties of high treason; that arguments will not reach them; will not be understood; if understood, will not convince them; and after having gone such lengths, conviction will not disarm them; that, if government should reason and deliberate, when they ought to act; should choose committees, publish addresses, and do nothing; we shall see our free constitution expire, the state of nature restored, and our rank among savages taken somewhere below the Oneida Indians. If government should do worse than nothing, should make paper money or a tender act, all hopes of seeing the people quiet, and property safe, are at an end. Such an act would be the legal triumph of treason.

BUT before we make such a sacrifice, let us consider our force to defend the state. And to direct that force, at the head of the government is a magistrate, whose firmness, integrity, and ability, are well known. The senate and house have hitherto deserved the public confidence. Every man of principle and property will give them his most zealous aid. A select corps of militia may easily be formed, of such men as may be trusted; the force of the United States may be relied upon, if needed. The insurgents, without leaders, and without resources, will claim the mercy of the government, as soon as vigorous counsels are adopted.

BUT if the constitution must fall, let us discharge our duty, and attempt its defence. Let us not furnish our enemies with a triumph, nor the dishonoured page of history with evidence, THAT IT WAS FORMED WITH TOO MUCH WISDOM TO BE VALUED, AND REQUIRED TOO MUCH VIRTUE TO BE MAINTAINED BY ITS MEMBERS.

CAMILLUS. N°. I.

First published in the Independent Chronicle, March 1, 1787.

This, and the two following pieces, were written immediately after the suppression of Shays's insurrection, and before any measures had been taken either to guard against a repetition of similar disorders in our own state, or to strengthen the federal government. Two reflections naturally arise in perusing these early productions of Mr. Ames's pen: that he was one of the very first to discern the importance, and to urge the necessity of amending the federal compact. He early saw the evils of the old confederation, and suggested in these essays, before the calling of any convention, the basis of a federal system, in a remarkable degree corresponding with the one which was afterwards adopted. It is also to be observed, that he at this period foresaw the dangers, to which our liberty would be exposed; that he apprehended, (and well he might, from the events of that day) that those hazards were chiefly on the popular side, and that despotism would be much more likely to be introduced by factious leaders, under the garb of patriotism, than by open, direct attacks. He manifests his ardent zeal and anxiety for a republican form of government, and ridicules the idea of the possibility of introducing a monarchy (except an absolute one) in our country. The reader will notice the wonderful coincidence of this part of these early essays with a posthumous piece, now for the first time published, entitled, "The Dangers of American Liberty." These early essays render any explanation of the latter piece unnecessary, as they obviously display the motives of the writer in thus enlarging upon, and depicturing in gloomy colours, the dangers to which a popular government is liable. It was because he loved the republick, and cherished it with unusual warmth and affection, that he was perpetually pointing out its hazards. It was the timely admonition of a fond father to secure the future happiness of a beloved child.

THE late events have been so interesting and so rapid, that the publick mind has been confounded by the magnitude, and oppressed with the variety of the reflections which result from them. The season of the most useful observation for statesmen and philosophers is not yet arrived. Their decisions are made upon facts, as they appear in their simplicity, after faction has ceased to distort, and enthusiasm to adorn them. It is otherwise with the publick. Their judgment is formed while the transactions are recent, while the rage of party gives an acumen to their penetration, and an importance to their discoveries, which, however, are soon cheerfully consigned to oblivion. This seems, therefore, to be the time to reconsider the state of parties, and to examine the opinions, which have lately prevailed. Perhaps some fruit may be gathered from our dear experience; and we may, in some measure, succeed in eradicating the destructive notions which the seditious have infused into the people.

But experience, which makes individuals wise, sometimes makes a publick mad: judging only by their feelings, disastrous events are usually charged to the agency of bad men; and in the bustle, excited by their vindictive zeal, the precious lessons of adversity are lost. It belongs to the sage politician to draw from such events just maxims of policy, for the future benefit of mankind; and it belongs to mankind to keep these maxims accumulating, by repeating the same blunders, and pursuing the same phantoms, with equal ignorance, and equal ardour, to the end of the world. This disposition is so obvious, that proof cannot be needed. But if it be desired, it is furnished so abundantly by the history of every nation, that it requires some taste to select judiciously the most pertinent evidence. It is most useful to advert to our own times.

In spite of national beggary, paper money has still its advocates, and probably, of late, its martyrs. In spite of national dishonour, the continental impost is still opposed with success. Never did experience more completely demonstrate the iniquity of the one, and the necessity of the other. But, in defiance of demonstration, knaves will continue to proselyte fools, and to keep a paper money faction alive. The fear of their success has annihilated credit, as their actual success would annihilate property. For many years we may expect, that our federal government will be permitted to languish, without the powers to extort commercial treaties from rival states, or to establish a national revenue. All this is notorious. It is the common language of the people, not excepting the least informed. But it is vain to expect, that schemes plainly unjust and absurd will, *therefore*, want advocates. Our late experience forbids this confidence. Hitherto invention has not equalled credulity; and the next pretence for rebellion will more probably fail of rousing the disaffected to arms, because it is not monstrous and absurd enough, than because its repugnance to reason and common justice are palpable. The love of novelty and the passion for the marvellous have ever made the multitude more than passive; they have invited imposture, and drunk down deception like water. They will remain as

blind, as credulous, as irritable as ever: ambitious men, and those whose characters and fortunes are blasted, will not be wanting to deceive and inflame them, openly, or by intrigue. The opposition to federal measures, and the schemes of an abolition of debts and an equal distribution of property, with their subdivisions and branches, will be pursued with unremitting industry, till they involve us again in general confusion, unless government, by system, energy, and honesty shall render the laws from this period irresistibly supreme.

But success never fails to produce good humour, and to procure for government a season of popularity. The publick attention is now awake, and this is the favourable moment to induce the people, by a retrospect of their errours, to renounce them, to place confidence in their rulers, and in the permanency and energy of our republick, and to unite in the patriotick sentiment, that it is indispensably necessary to the general prosperity, and to the very existence of government, that the reins should be resumed and held with a firmer hand; and that palliatives and half expedients, and the projects of factious ignorance, will not avail.

To a philosophick observer, indeed, the present confusion will afford an inexhaustible fund of astonishment and concern.

He will behold men, who have been civilized, returning to barbarism, and threatening to become fiercer than the savage children of nature, in proportion to the multitude of their wants, and the cultivated violence of their passions. He will see them weary of liberty, and unworthy of it; arming their sacrilegious hands against it, though it was bought with their blood, and was once the darling pride of their hearts; complaining of oppression, because the law, which has not forbidden, has not also enforced cheating; endeavouring to oppose society against morality, and to associate freemen against freedom. He will call this a chaos of morals and politicks, in which are floating and conflicting, not the first principles and simple elements, out of which systems may be formed, but the fragments which have escaped the wreck of institutions and opinions; not the embryo, but the ruins of a world. When he

turns his eye from this landscape of barrenness and horrour, so painful to the senses and the imagination, he will be led to contemplate the rigorous wisdom of Providence, which has so palpably ordained, that the guilt of this rebellion shall be punished by its folly.

It is no less true than singular, that our government is not supported by national prejudice. The people of every country, but our own, though poor and oppressed, bear a patriotick preference to their own laws and national character. They will not suffer any one to revile them. The Briton, who sells his vote, and is sold by his representative, glories in that freedom, which is his birthright: without the smallest knowledge of the principles and institutions, by which that freedom is secured, he relies upon the fact, and takes rank of a Frenchman, whom he stigmatizes as a slave. To defend that rank, his ardent valour is always devoted to his country. Every Frenchman is equally prompt to maintain the glory of his king. This prejudice is useful, and bears to just political knowledge the relation of instinct to reason: its decisions are quick; its influence uniform and certain. It is the cement of political union. The government of Turkey is doubtless applauded at Constantinople. Tyranny receives the homage of its dupes and its victims; but liberty among us cannot preserve the reverence of her sons. We have no national character, no just pride in the glorious distinction of freemen, which elevates a Massachusetts beggar above the despots of Asia. We have, it is true, our portion of common follies; and we are not exceeded by any people in the zeal to maintain them: but unfortunately they tend to vilify and to destroy the publick liberty. The people have turned against their teachers the doctrines, which were inculcated in order to effect the late revolution. With more privileges and more information than are possessed by the inhabitants of any other country, our citizens, either because they have not learned the value of those privileges by the loss of them, or by a comparison with the nations subject to despotism, or because they have not been accustomed to think that any change will be unfavourable to

them, appear to have no more attachment to the constitution than to the rules of the Robinhood society. The admirers of our government are beyond the Atlantick. It is extolled by the sages of Europe, as giving the sanction of law to the precepts of wisdom, and investing philanthropy with the power to legislate for mankind. But far from contemplating its excellence with partial fondness and implicit reverence, the people arraign the institution of the senate, the exactness and multiplicity of the laws, and the constitution itself. Devoted folly! Will they continue to destroy the pillars of their security till they are buried in the ruins!

CAMILLUS. N°. II.

IN our last speculation we expressed our surprise, that a government, which is free almost to excess, should want the love and veneration of that class of the people, whose rights and privileges are so peculiarly connected with its preservation. But it is to be considered, that they have once subverted and again formed a constitution. Their complete success in both attempts has extinguished all their ideas of the difficulty and hazard of this operation; and, accordingly, they seem to think it as easy and safe to change the government as the representatives. We have already considered some of the causes, which have produced this perversion of opinions. It is not strange, that people with little information or leisure, with violent prejudices and infinite credulity, should make indifferent politicians. But it remains a subject of amazement, that the men of speculation and refinement have wandered still more widely from the path of duty and good sense. It will be amusing to review the extravagances of these framers of hypotheses. They considered the contest with Britain, as involving the fate of liberty and science. To animate and recompense their sufferings and toils during the conflict, their ardent enthusiasm had anticipated a system of government too

pure for a state of imperfection. When they found, that, for the first time in the history of man, a nation was allowed by Providence to reduce to practice the schemes, which Plato and Harrington had only sketched upon paper, they expected a constitution which should be perfect and perpetual. Politicks has produced enthusiasts as well as religion; and in the theory of our constitution they could trace their fancied model of perfection. To the mind of the dreamer in speculation the government was a phantom; and to adorn it his fancy had stolen from the evening cloud the gaudiest of its hues: he had dipped his pencil in the rainbow to portray a picture of national felicity for admiration to gaze at. Then was the time to tell of virtue being raised from the dungeon, where priests and tyrants had confined her; and that science had been courted from the skies to meet her: then was the time to talk of restoring the golden age, without being laughed at; and many seemed to believe that a political millennium was about to commence.

But here end our heroes. When they quitted the theory to attend to the administration of government, they descended to vulgar prose. They found, that their admired plan of freedom of election had produced a too faithful representation of the electors; and that something more, and something worse than the publick wisdom and integrity were represented. They often heard the unmeaning din of vulgar clamour excited to make that odious which was right, and that popular which was wrong.

They well knew, that the laws were made supreme, and that politicks should have no passions. Yet it was soon perceived, that the legislators themselves sometimes felt, and too often feared and obeyed, the sudden passions and ignorant prejudices of their constituents. They expected a government by laws, and not by men; and they were chagrined to see, that the feelings of the people were not only consulted in all instances, but that in many they were allowed to legislate. They had hoped, that the supreme power would prove, to all legal purposes, omnipotent; and they were thrown into abso-

lute despair, when they found, that not only individuals, but conventions, and other bodies of men, unknown to the constitution, presumed to revise, and in effect to repeal, the acts of the legislature. Besides, the first years of the millennium had fallen far short of the expected felicity. But when a mad people flew to arms; when they found, that, in spite of the indocile and impenetrable stupidity of the insurgents, there was so much meaning in their wickedness; and that the reasonings of great numbers, who espoused the cause of government, were almost as hostile as the violence of the other party, they gave way to their spleen and disappointment, and declared their conviction, that a republican government was impracticable and absurd. They argued, as they said, from facts as well as from principles, that such a government was cursed with inherent inefficiency; and that property was more precarious than under a despot: a despot, they said, is a man, and would fear the retaliation of his tyranny; but an enthusiastick majority, steeled against compassion, and blind to reason, are equally sheltered from shame and punishment. The theory of the constitution has not escaped the havock of their fastidious criticism: and they have seen, with complacency, the stupid fury of Shays and his banditti employed to introduce a more stable government, whose powers, they predicted, would soon be lodged in the hands of abler men. They raved about monarchy, as if we were ripe for it; and as if we were willing to take from the plough-tail or dram-shop some vociferous committee man, and to array him in royal purple with all the splendour of a king of the Gypsies. So far as we may argue from the sympathy, which fools and knaves have for their fellows, and from the fact of Luke Day's influence in the rebellion, the presumption is, that our king, whenever Providence in its wrath shall send us one, will be a blockhead or a rascal.

The sons of science, who have adopted this reprehensible mode of reasoning, are, notwithstanding, the most sincere lovers of their country: they are not the men to subvert

empires. I will repeat for their consideration some observations, which, though trite, are not unreasonable.

The idea of a royal or aristocratical government for America, is very absurd. It is repugnant to the genius, and totally incompatible with the circumstances of our country. Our interests and our choice have made us republicans. We are too poor to maintain, and too proud to acknowledge, a king. The spirit of finance and the ostentation of power would create burdens; these would produce the Shayses and the Wheelers. The army must be augmented; discontent and oppression would augment of consequence. But this is mere idle speculation; for every honest man is surely bound to give his support to the existing government, until its power becomes intolerable. A change, though for the better, is always to be deplored by the generation in which it is effected. Much is lost, and more is hazarded. Our republick has not yet been allowed a fair trial. The rebellion has called forth its powers, and pointed out, most clearly, the means of giving it stability: let us, therefore, cherish and defend our constitution; and when time and wealth shall have corrupted it, our posterity may perform the melancholy task of laying in human blood and misery, as we have done, the foundations of another government. We, who are now upon the stage, bear upon our memories too deep an impression of the miseries of the last revolution to think of attempting another.

It is an Herculean labour to detail our political absurdities. Since the days of Cromwell there has not been an instance of such general infatuation. But while almost every tavern and conversation circle were infested with the harangues of the emissaries of treason, who without fear or measure reviled the government, and without shame perverted the truth, the opinions of the people at large were inevitably tainted with the impurity of the source from which they were derived.

Nor was the agency of rebel emissaries the only cause of popular errour. Where so much uneasiness prevailed against government, they could not be pursuaded, that all was right. The sufferers, many supposed, were the best able to decide

upon the reality of their grievances; and so many honest men would not combine to deceive them. The general court, in their last session, had given some colour to these presumptions, and no small consequence to the party, by the minute attention which they paid to their complaints, before they adopted measures to suppress the rebellion, and by the laws of an unprecedented nature, enacted for their relief. Great numbers took their fears for their counsellors, and thought it rashness to contend against the invincible host of insurgents. Another state tax was more dreaded by many, than the subversion of government. Some said, very gravely, Shays himself is for government; while others, as absurdly, in the zeal of their philanthropy against shedding blood, seemed wholly to forget, that the right of self defence belongs to rulers as plainly as to private men. In matters of etiquette and punctilio, the apostles of mischief seemed agreed, that it was more proper for the rulers of a great commonwealth, than for the leaders of a ragged banditti, to make concessions. Disappointed men have hoped to gratify their ambition or their revenge: the abolition of public and private debts has been a favourite object with some: others (such has been the extreme of frenzy) have contended for an equal distribution of property: while the giddy multitude have enjoyed the bustle of parties, and have found amusement in destruction.

With what impressions will the impartial world peruse the record of these facts? They will be ready to affirm, with the lunatick, that all the world had gone mad, except a few, who, for their sobriety, were confined in Bedlam.

CAMILLUS. N°. III.

WE cannot look back, without terrour, upon the dangers we have escaped. Our country has stood upon the verge of ruin. Divided against itself; the ties of common union dissolved; all parties claiming authority, and refusing obedience;

every hope of safety, except one, has been extinguished; and that has rested solely upon the prudence and firmness of our rulers. Fortunately, they have been uninfected with the frenzy of the times. They have done their duty, and have shewn themselves the faithful guardians of liberty, as well as of power. But much remains to do. Sedition, though intimidated, is not disarmed. It is a period of adversity. We are in debt to foreigners. Large sums are due internally. The taxes are in arrears, and are accumulating. Manufactures are destitute of materials, capital, and skill. Agriculture is despondent; commerce bankrupt. These are themes for factious clamour, more than sufficient to rekindle the rebellion. The combustibles are collected; the mine is prepared; the smallest spark may again produce an explosion.

This is a crisis in our affairs, which requires all the wisdom and energy of government: for every man of sense must be convinced, that our disturbances have arisen more from the want of power, than the abuse of it; from the relaxation, and almost annihilation of our federal government; from the feeble, unsystematick, temporising, inconstant character of our own state; from the derangement of our finances, the oppressive absurdity of our mode of taxation; and from the astonishing enthusiasm and perversion of principles among the people. It is not extraordinary that commotions have been excited. It is strange, under the circumstances which we have been discussing, that they did not appear sooner and terminate more fatally. For let it be remarked, that a feeble government produces more factions than an oppressive one: the want of power first makes individuals legislators, and then rebels. Where parents want authority, children are wanting in duty. It is not possible to advance further in the same path. Here the ways divide; the one will conduct us first to anarchy, and next to foreign or domestick tyranny; the other, by the wise and vigorous exertion of lawful authority, will lead to permanent power, and general prosperity. I am no advocate for despotism; but I believe the probability to be much less of its being introduced by the corruption of our rulers, than by the

delusion of the people. Experience has demonstrated that new maxims of administration are indispensable. It is not, however, by sixpenny retrenchments of salaries; nor by levying war against any profession of men; nor by giving substance and existence to the frothy essences and fantastick forms of speculation; nor is it by paper money, or an abolition of debts; nor by implicit submission to the insolence of beggarly conventions; nor by the temporary expedients of little minds, that authority can be rendered stable, and the people prosperous. A well digested, liberal, permanent system of policy is required; and, when adopted, must be supported, in spite of faction, against every thing but amendment. The confederation must be amended.

While the bands of union are so loose, we are no more entitled to the character of a nation than the hordes of vagabond traitors. Reason has ever condemned our paltry prejudices upon this important subject: now that experience has come in aid of reason, let us renounce them. For what is there now to prevent our subjugation by foreign power, but their contempt of the acquisition? It is time to render the federal head supreme in the United States. It is also time to render the general court supreme in Massachusetts. Conventions have too long, and indeed too unequally, divided power. Until this is effected, we cannot depend upon the success of any plans of reformation. When this is done, we ought to attempt the revival of publick and private credit. With what decency can we pretend, that republicks are supported by virtue, if we presume upon the foulest of all motives, our own advantage, to release the obligation of contracts?

Some measures to provide for the common safety and defence are necessary. It ought to be considered how far, and in what manner, this may be accomplished, by perfecting the discipline of the militia, or by calling them into actual service by rotation. Taxation is a subject of the greatest nicety and difficulty. When men of the first information have devised a plan, experience only can give it the stamp of excellence. The established mode is despicable in the extreme. It is arbitrary,

uncertain, and unequal; the smallest possible sum is taken out of the pockets of the people, and it is kept the longest possible time out of the hands of the commonwealth.

These important subjects deserve a distinct investigation. Perhaps, at some future period, the writer may be seduced by his zeal for the stability of the government, or by his vanity, to attempt it.

But, in the mean time, he would warn his countrymen, that our commonwealth stands upon its probation. If we make a wise use of the advantages, which, with innumerable mischiefs, the rebellion has afforded, our government may last. This is the tide in our affairs, which, if taken at the flood, will lead to glory. If we neglect it, ruin will be inevitable. It is in vain to expect security in future merely from the general conviction, that government is necessary, and that treason is a crime. It is vain to depend upon that virtue, which is said to sustain a commonwealth. This is the high flown nonsense of philosophy, which experience daily refutes. It is still more absurd, to expect to prevent commotions by conforming the laws to popular humours, so that faction shall have nothing to complain of, and folly nothing to ask for.

There is in nature, and there must be in the administration of government, a fixed rule and standard of political conduct, and that is, the greatest permanent happiness of the greatest number of the people. If we substitute for these maxims the wild projects, which fascinate the multitude in daily succession, we may amuse ourselves with extolling the nice proportions and splendid architecture of our republican fabrick. But it will be no better than a magnificent temple of ice, which the first south wind of sedition will demolish.

Anarchy and government are both before us, and in our choice. If we fall, we fall by our folly, not our fate. And we shall evince to the astonished world, of how small influence to produce national happiness are the fairest gifts of heaven, a healthful climate, a fruitful soil, and inestimable laws, when they are conferred upon a frivolous, perverse, and ungrateful generation.

SPEECH

IN THE CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS, ON BIENNIAL ELECTIONS.

DELIVERED JANUARY, 1788.

I DO not regret, Mr. President, that we are not unanimous upon this question. I do not consider the diversity of sentiment which prevails, as an impediment in our way to the discovery of truth. In order that we may think alike upon this subject at last, we shall be compelled to discuss it by ascending to the principles, upon which the doctrine of representation is grounded.

WITHOUT premeditation, in a situation so novel, and awed by the respect which I feel for this venerable assembly, I distrust extremely my own feelings, as well as my competency to prosecute this inquiry*. With the hope of an indulgent hearing, I will attempt to proceed. I am sensible, sir, that the doctrine of frequent elections has been sanctified by antiquity; and it is still more endeared to us by our recent experience, and uniform habits of thinking. Gentlemen have expressed their zealous partiality for it. They consider this as a leading question in the debate, and that the merits of many other parts of the constitution are involved in the decision. I confess, sir, and I declare, that my zeal for frequent elections is not inferiour to their own. I consider it as one of the first securities for popular liberty, in which its very essence may be supposed to reside. But how shall we make the best use of this pledge and instrument of our safety? A right principle, carried to an extreme, becomes useless. It is apparent that

* This was Mr. Ames's first speech in a state assembly.

a delegation for a very short term, as for a single day, would defeat the design of representation. The election in that case would not seem to the people to be of any importance, and the person elected would think as lightly of his appointment. The other extreme is equally to be avoided. An election for a very long term of years, or for life, would remove the member too far from the controul of the people, would be dangerous to liberty, and in fact repugnant to the purposes of the delegation. The truth, as usual, is placed somewhere between the extremes, and I believe is included in this proposition: the term of election must be so long, that the representative may understand the interests of the people, and yet so limited, that his fidelity may be secured by a dependence upon their approbation.

Before I proceed to the application of this rule, I cannot forbear to premise some remarks upon two opinions which have been suggested.

Much has been said about the people's divesting themselves of power, when they delegate it to representatives; and that all representation is to their disadvantage, because it is but an image, a copy, fainter and more imperfect than the original, the people, in whom the light of power is primary and unborrowed, which is only reflected by their delegates. I cannot agree to either of these opinions. The representation of the people is something more than the people. I know, sir, but one purpose, which the people can effect without delegation, and that is, to destroy a government. That they cannot erect a government, is evinced by our being thus assembled on their behalf. The people must govern by a majority, with whom all power resides. But how is the sense of this majority to be obtained? It has been said, that a pure democracy is the best government for a small people, who may assemble in person. It is of small consequence to discuss it, as it would be inapplicable to the great country we inhabit. It may be of some use in this argument, however, to consider, that it would be very burdensome, subject to faction and violence: decisions

would often be made by surprise, in the precipitancy of passion, by men who either understand nothing, or care nothing about the subject; or by interested men, or those who vote for their own indemnity. It would be a government not by laws, but by men. Such were the paltry democracies of Greece and Asia Minor, so much extolled, and so often proposed as a model for our imitation. I desire to be thankful, that our people are not under any temptation to adopt the advice. I think it will not be denied, that the people are gainers by the election of representatives. They may destroy, but they cannot exercise, the powers of government in person; but by their servants, *they* govern: they do not renounce their power; they do not sacrifice their rights; they become the true sovereigns of the country, when they delegate that power, which they cannot use themselves, to their trustees.

I KNOW, sir, that the people talk about the liberty of nature, and assert, that we divest ourselves of a portion of it, when we enter into society. This is declamation against matter of fact. We cannot live without society; and as to liberty, how can I be said to enjoy that which another may take from me, when he pleases. The liberty of one depends not so much on the removal of all restraint from him, as on the due restraint upon the liberty of others. Without such restraint, there can be no liberty. Liberty is so far from being endangered or destroyed by this, that it is extended and secured. For I said, that we do not enjoy that which another may take from us. But civil liberty cannot be taken from us, when any one may please to invade it; for we have the strength of the society of our side.

I HOPE, sir, that these reflections will have some tendency to remove the ill impressions, which are made by proposing to divest the people of their power.

THAT they may never be divested of it, I repeat, that I am in favour of frequent elections. They who commend annual elections are desired to consider, that the question is, whether biennial elections are a defect in the constitution: for it does

not follow, because annual elections are safe, that biennial are dangerous; for both may be good. Nor is there any foundation for the fears of those who say, that, if we, who have been accustomed to choose for one year only, now extend it to two, the next stride will be to five, or seven years, and the next for term of life: for this article, with all its supposed defects, is in favour of liberty. Being inserted in the constitution, it is not subject to be repealed by law. We are sure, that it is the worst of the case.

It is a fence against ambitious encroachments, too high and too strong to be passed: in this respect, we have greatly the advantage of the people of England, and of all the world. The law which limits their parliaments is liable to be repealed.

I will not defend this article by saying, that it was a matter of compromise in the federal convention: it has my entire approbation, as it stands. I think that we ought to prefer, in this article, biennial elections to annual; and my reasons for this opinion are drawn from these sources.

From the extent of the country to be governed.

The objects of their legislation.

And the more perfect security of our liberty.

It seems obvious, that men, who are to collect in congress from this great territory, perhaps from the bay of Fundy, or from the banks of the Ohio, and the shore of Lake Superiour, ought to have a longer term in office, than the delegates of a single state, in their own legislature. It is not by riding post to and from congress, that a man can acquire a just knowledge of the true interests of the union. This term of election is inapplicable to the state of a country, as large as Germany, or as the Roman empire in the zenith of its power.

If we consider the objects of their delegation, little doubt will remain. It is admitted, that annual elections may be highly fit for the state legislature. Every citizen grows up with a knowledge of the local circumstances of the state: but the business of the federal government will be very different. The objects of their power are few and national. At least two

years in office will be necessary to enable a man to judge of the trade and interests of states, which he never saw. The time, I hope, will come, when this excellent country will furnish food, and freedom, (which is better than food, which is the food of the soul) for fifty millions of happy people. Will any man say, that the national business can be understood in one year?

Biennial elections appear to me, sir, an essential security to liberty. These are my reasons.

Faction and enthusiasm are the instruments, by which popular governments are destroyed. We need not talk of the power of an aristocracy. The people, when they lose their liberties, are cheated out of them. They nourish factions in their bosoms, which will subsist so long as abusing their honest credulity shall be the means of acquiring power. A democracy is a volcano, which conceals the fiery materials of its own destruction. These will produce an eruption, and carry desolation in their way. The people always mean right, and if time is allowed for reflection and information, they will do right. I would not have the first wish, the momentary impulse of the publick mind, become law. For it is not always the sense of the people, with whom, I admit, that all power resides. On great questions, we first hear the loud clamours of passion, artifice, and faction. I consider biennial elections as a security, that the sober, second thought of the people shall be law. There is a calm review of publick transactions, which is made by the citizens, who have families and children, the pledges of their fidelity. To provide for popular liberty, we must take care that measures shall not be adopted without due deliberation. The member chosen for two years will feel some independence in his seat: the factions of the day will expire before the end of his term.

The people will be proportionally attentive to the merits of a candidate. Two years will afford opportunity to the member to deserve well of them, and they will require evidence that he has done it.

But, sir, the representatives are the grand inquisition of the union. They are by impeachment to bring great offenders to justice. One year will not suffice to detect guilt, and to pursue it to conviction: therefore it will escape, and the balance of the two branches will be destroyed, and the people oppressed with impunity. The senators will represent the sovereignty of the states. The representatives are to represent the people. The offices ought to bear some proportion in point of importance. This will be impossible, if they are chosen for one year only.

Will the people then blind the eyes of their own watchmen? Will they bind the hands which are to hold the sword for their defence? Will they impair their own power, by an unreasonable jealousy of themselves?

For these reasons I am clearly of opinion, that the article is entitled to our approbation as it stands: and as it has been demanded, why annual elections were not preferred to biennial, permit me to retort the question, and to inquire in my turn, what reason can be given, why, if annual elections are good, biennial elections are not better?

SPEECH ON MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS.

ON the 3d of January, 1794, Mr. Madison, a member from Virginia, proposed to the house of representatives of the United States a series of resolutions, to impose higher duties, and lay greater restrictions, on the manufactures, products, and ships, and on particular branches of trade, of a certain nation, or of nations therein described. In explanation of his motives and views, he spoke of the security and extension of our commerce, as a principal object for which the federal government was formed. He urged the tendency of his resolutions to secure to us an equitable share of the carrying trade; that they would enable other nations to enter into a competition with England for supplying us with manufactures; and in this way he insisted that our country could make *her enemies* feel the extent of her power, by depriving those who manufactured for us of their bread. He adverted to the measures enforced by a certain nation, contrary to our maritime rights; and out of the proceeds of the extra impositions proposed, he recommended a reimbursement to our citizens of their losses arising from those measures. He maintained, that, if the nation cannot protect the rights of its citizens, it ought to repay the damage; and that we are bound to obtain reparation for the injustice of foreign nations to our citizens, or to compensate them ourselves.

On the other hand, Mr. Ames thought, that, "whatever specious shew of advantage might be given to the policy proposed in the resolutions, it would prove an aggravation and not a remedy of any supposed or real evils in our commercial system." He considered the zeal for unlimited freedom of commerce as affected and insincere. He thought it ridiculous in this country to pretend, at this time, to change the general policy of nations; and to begin the abolition of restrictions by enacting non-importation laws. Shutting up the best markets for exports, and confining ourselves to the worst, for our imports, was peculiarly inconsistent and absurd in those who profess to aim at the benefit of trade. To him it appeared, that under the pretence of making trade better, it was to be annihilated: that it might serve France, but would certainly injure us. He saw too plainly that our trade was to wage war for our politicks, and to be used as the instrument of gratifying political resentments.

The way had been prepared for these resolutions by a report from Mr. Jefferson, as secretary of state, on the same subject, which had been long laboured to give it the aspect which it bore. Mr. Ames saw, or thought he saw, in these measures, the meditated overthrow of the commercial prosperity of the United States, and especially of that part of them whose interests were particularly confided to his care. With these impressions, he made the following speech on the 27th of the same month, 1794.

THE question lies within this compass, is there any measure proper to be adopted by congress, which will have the effect to put our trade and navigation on a better footing? If there is, it is our undoubted right to adopt it; if by *right* is understood the *power* of self-government, which every independent nation possesses, and our own as completely as any other, it is our duty also, for we are the depositaries and the guardians of the interests of our constituents, which, on every considera-

tion, ought to be dear to us. I make no doubt they are so, and that there is a disposition sufficiently ardent existing in this body to co-operate in any measures for the advancement of the common good. Indeed, so far as I can judge from any knowledge I have of human nature, or of the prevailing spirit of publick transactions, that sort of patriotism, which makes us wish the general prosperity, when our private interest does not happen to stand in the way, is no uncommon sentiment. In truth, it is very like self-love, and not much less prevalent. There is little occasion to excite and inflame it. It is, like self-love, more apt to want intelligence than zeal. The danger is always, that it will rush blindly into embarassments, which a prudent spirit of inquiry might have prevented, but from which it will scarcely find means to extricate us. While therefore the right, the duty, and the inclination to advance the trade and navigation of the United States, are acknowledged and felt by us all, the choice of the proper means to that end is a matter requiring the most circumspect inquiry, and the most dispassionate judgment.

After a debate has continued a long time, the subject very frequently becomes tiresome before it is exhausted. Arguments, however solid, urged by different speakers, can scarcely fail to render the discussion both complex and diffusive. Without pretending to give to my arguments any other merit, I shall aim at simplicity.

We hear it declared, that the design of the resolutions is to place our trade and navigation on a better footing. By better footing, we are to understand a more profitable one. Profit is a plain word, that cannot be misunderstood.

We have, to speak in round numbers, twenty million dollars of exports annually. To have the trade of exports on a good footing, means nothing more than to sell them dear; and consequently the trade of import on a good footing, is to buy cheap. To put them both on a better footing, is to sell dearer and to buy cheaper than we do at present. If the effect of the resolutions will be to cause our exports to be sold cheaper,

and our imports to be bought dearer, our trade will suffer an injury.

It is hard to compute how great the injury would prove; for the first loss of value in the buying dear, and selling cheap, is only the symptom and beginning of the evil, but by no means the measure of it; it will withdraw a great part of the nourishment, that now supplies the wonderful growth of our industry and opulence. The difference may not amount to a great proportion of the price of the articles, but it may reach the greater part of the profit of the producer; it may have effects in this way which will be of the worst kind, by discouraging the products of our land and industry. It is to this test I propose to bring the resolutions on the table; and if it shall clearly appear, that they tend to cause our exports to be sold cheaper, and our imports to be bought dearer, they cannot escape condemnation. Whatever specious shew of advantage may be given them, they deserve to be called aggravations of any real or supposed evils in our commercial system, and not remedies.

I have framed this statement of the question so as to comprehend the whole subject of debate, and, at the same time, I confess it was my design to exclude from consideration a number of topicks, which appear to me totally irrelative to it.

The best answer to many assertions we have heard is, to admit them without proof. We are exhorted to assert our natural rights; to put trade on a respectable footing; to dictate terms of trade to other nations; to engage in a contest of self-denial, and, by that, and by shifting our commerce from one country to another, to make our enemies feel the extent of our power. This language, as it respects the proper subject of discussion, means nothing, or what is worse. If our trade is already on a profitable footing, it is on a respectable one. Unless war be our object, it is useless to inquire, what are the dispositions of any government, with whose subjects our merchants deal to the best advantage. While they will smoke our tobacco, and eat our provisions, it is very immaterial, both to the consumer and the producer, what are the politicks

of the two countries, excepting so far as their quarrels may disturb the benefits of their mutual intercourse.

So far therefore as commerce is concerned, the inquiry is, have we a good market.

The good or bad state of our *actual* market is the question. The actual market is every where more or less a restricted one, and the natural order of things is displaced by the artificial. Most nations, for reasons of which they alone are the rightful judges, have regulated and restricted their intercourse, according to their views of safety and profit. We claim for ourselves the same right, as the acts in our statute book, and the resolutions on the table evince, without holding ourselves accountable to any other nation whatever. The right, which we properly claim, and which we properly exercise, when we do it prudently and usefully for our nation, is as well established, and has been longer in use in the countries of which we complain, than in our own. If their right is as good as that of congress, to regulate and restrict, why do we talk of a strenuous exertion of our force, and by dictating terms to nations, who are fancied to be physically dependent on America, to change the policy of nations? It may be very true, that their policy is very wise and good for themselves, but not as favourable for us as we could make it, if we could legislate for both sides of the Atlantick.

The extravagant despotism of this language accords very ill with our power to give it effect, or with the affectation of zeal for an unlimited freedom of commerce. Such a state of absolute freedom of commerce never did exist, and it is very much to be doubted whether it ever will. Were I invested with the trust to legislate for mankind, it is very probable the first act of my authority would be to throw all the restrictive and prohibitory laws of trade into the fire; the resolutions on the table would not be spared. But if I were to do so, it is probable I should have a quarrel on my hands with every civilized nation. The Dutch would claim the monopoly of the spice trade, for which their ancestors passed their whole lives in warfare. The Spaniards and Portuguese would be no less obstinate. If we calculate what colony monopolies have cost

in wealth, in suffering, and in crimes, we shall say they were dearly purchased. The English would plead for their navigation act, not as a source of gain, but as an essential means of securing their independence. So many interests would be disturbed, and so many lost, by a violent change from the existing to an unknown order of things; and the mutual relations of nations, in respect to their power and wealth, would suffer such a shock, that the idea must be allowed to be perfectly Utopian and wild. But for this country to form the project of changing the policy of nations, and to begin the abolition of restrictions by restrictions of its own, is equally ridiculous and inconsistent.

Let every nation, that is really disposed to extend the liberty of commerce, beware of rash and hasty schemes of prohibition. In the affairs of trade, as in most others, we make too many laws. We follow experience too little, and the visions of theorists a great deal too much. Instead of listening to discourses on what the market ought to be, and what the schemes, which always promise much on paper, pretend to make it, let us see what is the actual market for our exports and imports. This will bring vague assertions and sanguine opinions to the test of experience. That rage for theory and system, which would entangle even practical truth in the web of the brain, is the poison of public discussion. One fact is better than two systems.

The terms, on which our exports are received in the British market, have been accurately examined by a gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Wm. Smith). Before his statement of facts was made to the committee, it was urged, and with no little warmth, that the system of England indicated her inveteracy towards this country, while that of France, springing from disinterested affection, constituted a claim for gratitude and self-denying measures of retribution.

Since that statement, however, that romantick style, which is so ill adapted to the subject, has been changed. We hear it insinuated, that the comparison of the footing of our exports, in the markets of France and England, is of no importance; that it is chiefly our object, to see how we may assist

and extend our commerce. This evasion of the force of the statement, or rather this indirect admission of its authority, establishes it. It will not be pretended, that it has been shaken during the debate.

It has been made to appear, beyond contradiction, that the British market for our exports, taken in the aggregate, is a good one; that it is better than the French, and better than any we have, and for many of our products the only one.

The whole amount of our exports to the British dominions, in the year ending the 30th September, 1790, was nine millions two hundred and forty six thousand six hundred and six dollars.

But it will be more simple and satisfactory to confine the inquiry to the articles following:

Bread stuff, tobacco, rice, wood, the produce of the fisheries, fish-oil, pot and pearl ash, salted meats, indigo, live animals, flax-seed, naval stores, and iron.

The amount of the before mentioned articles, exported in that same year to the British dominions, was eight millions four hundred and fifty seven thousand one hundred and seventy three dollars.

We have heard so much of restriction, of inimical and jealous probibitions to cramp our trade, it is natural to scrutinize the British system, with the expectation of finding little besides the effects of her selfish and angry policy.

Yet of the great sum of nearly eight millions and an half, the amount of the products before mentioned sold in her markets, two articles only are dutied by way of restriction. Bread stuff is dutied so high in the market of Great Britain, as, in times of plenty, to exclude it, and this is done from the desire to favour her own farmers. The mover of the resolutions justified the exclusion of our bread stuff from the French West-Indies by their permanent regulations, because, he said, they were bound to prefer their own products to those even of the United States. It would seem that the same apology would do for England, in her home market. But what will do for the vindication of one nation becomes invective against another.

The criminal nation however receives our bread stuff in the West-Indies free, and excludes other foreign, so as to give our producers the monopoly of the supply. This is no merit in the judgment of the mover of the resolutions, because it is a fragment of her old colony system. Notwithstanding the nature of the duties on bread stuff in Great Britain, it has been clearly shewn that she is a better customer for that article, in Europe, than her neighbour France. The latter, in ordinary times, is a poor customer for bread stuff, for the same reason that our own country is, because she produces it herself, and therefore France permits it to be imported, and the United States do the like. Great Britain often wants the article, and then she receives it; no country can be expected to buy what it does not want. The bread stuff sold in the European dominions of Britain, in the year 1790, amounted to one million eighty seven thousand eight hundred and forty dollars.

WHALE-OIL pays the heavy duty of eighteen pounds three shillings sterling per ton; yet spermaceti oil found a market there to the value of eighty one thousand and forty eight dollars.

THUS it appears, that of eight millions and an half, sold to Great Britain and her dominions, only the value of one million one hundred and sixty eight thousand dollars was under duty of a restrictive nature. The bread stuff is hardly to be considered as within the description; yet, to give the argument its full force, what is it; about one eighth part is restricted. To proceed with the residue:

Indigo to the amount of	$ 473,830
Live animals to the West-Indies	62,415
Flax-seed to Great Britain	219,924
Total	$ 756,169

THESE articles are received, duty free, which is a good foot to the trade. Yet we find, good as it is, the bulk of our exports is received on even better terms:

Flour to the British West-Indies	$ 858,006
Grain	273,505
Free....while other foreign flour and grain are prohibited.	
Tobacco to Great Britain	2,754,493
Ditto to the West-Indies	22,816
One shilling and three pence sterling, duty; three shillings and six pence on other foreign tobacco.	
In the West-Indies other foreign tobacco is prohibited.	
Rice to Great Britain	773,852
Seven shillings and four pence per cwt. duty; eight shillings and ten pence on other foreign rice.	
To West-Indies	180,077
Other foreign rice prohibited.	
Wood to Great Britain	240,174
Free....higher duties on other foreign.	
To West-Indies	382,481
Free....other foreign prohibited.	
Pot and pearl ashes	747,078
Free....two shillings and three pence on other foreign, equal to ten dollars per ton.	
Naval stores to Great Britain	190,670
Higher duties on other foreign.	
To West-Indies	6,162
Free....other foreign prohibited.	
Iron to Great Britain	81,612
Free....duties on other foreign.	
	$6,510,926

THUS it appears, that nearly seven-eighths of the exports to the British dominions are received on terms of positive favour. Foreigners, our rivals in the sale of these articles, are either absolutely shut out of their market by prohibitions, or discouraged in their competition with us by higher duties. There is some restriction, it is admitted, but there is, to balance it, a large amount received duty free; and a half goes to the

account of privilege and favour. This is better than she treats any other foreign nation. It is better, indeed, than she treats her own subjects, because they are by this means deprived of a free and open market. It is better than our footing with any nation, with whom we have treaties. It has been demonstratively shewn, that it is better than the footing, on which France receives either the like articles, or the aggregate of our products. The best proof in the world is, that they are not sent to France. The merchants will find out the best market sooner than we shall.

'THE footing of our exports, under the British system, is better than that of their exports to the United States, under our system. Nay, it is better than the freedom of commerce, which is one of the visions for which our solid prosperity is to be hazarded; for, suppose we could batter down her system of prohibitions and restrictions, it would be gaining a loss; one-eighth is restricted, and more than six-eighths has restrictions in its favour. It is as plain as figures can make it, that, if a state of freedom for our exports is at par, the present system raises them in point of privilege, above par. To suppose that we can terify them by these resolutions, to abolish their restrictions and at the same time to maintain in our favour their duties, to exclude other foreigners from their market, is too absurd to be refuted.

WE have heard, that the market of France is the great centre of our interests; we are to look to her, and not to England, for advantages, being, as the style of theory is, our best customer and best friend, shewing to our trade particular favour and privilege; while England manifests in her system such narrow and selfish views. It is strange to remark such a pointed refutation of assertions and opinions by facts. The amount sent to France herself is very trivial. Either our merchants are ignorant of the best markets, or those which they prefer are the best; and if the English markets, in spite of the alleged ill usage, are still preferred to the French, it is a proof of the superior advantages of the former over the latter. The arguments I have adverted to oblige those who urge them

to make a greater difference in favour of the English than the true state of facts will warrant. Indeed, if they persist in their arguments, they are bound to deny their own conclusions. They are bound to admit this position: if France receives little of such of our products as Great Britain takes on terms of privilege and favour, because of that favour, it allows the value of that favoured footing. If France takes little of our articles, because she does not want them, it shews the absurdity of looking to her as the best customer.

It may be said, and truly, that Great Britain regards only her own interest in these arrangements; so much the better. If it is her interest to afford to our commerce more encouragement than France gives; if she does this, when she is inveterate against us, as it is alleged, and when we are indulging an avowed hatred towards her, and partiality towards France, it shews that we have very solid ground to rely on. Her interest is, according to this statement, stronger than our passions, stronger than her own, and is the more to be depended on, as it cannot be put to any more trying experiment in future. The good will and friendship of nations are hollow foundations to build our systems upon. Mutual interest is a bottom of rock: the fervour of transient sentiments is not better than straw or stubble. Some gentlemen have lamented this distrust of any relation between nations, except an interested one; but the substitution of any other principle could produce little else than the hypocrisy of sentiment, and an instability of affairs. It would be relying on what is not stable, instead of what is; it would introduce into politicks the jargon of romance. It is in this sense, and this only, that the word favour is used: a state of things, so arranged as to produce our profit and advantage, though intended by Great-Britain merely for her own. The disposition of a nation is immaterial; the fact, that we profit by their system, cannot be so to this discussion.

The next point is, to consider, whether our imports are on a good footing, or, in other words, whether we are in a situation to buy what we have occasion for at a cheap rate. In this

view, the systems of the commercial nations are not to be complained of, as all are desirous of selling the products of their labour. Great Britain is not censured in this respect. The objection is rather of the opposite kind, that we buy too cheap, and therefore consume too much; and that we take not only as much as we can pay for, but to the extent of our credit also. There is less freedom of importation, however, from the West-Indies. In this respect, France is more restrictive than England; for the former allows the exportation to us of only rum and molasses, while England admits that of sugar, coffee, and other principal West-India products. Yet, even here, when the preference seems to be decidedly due to the British system, occasion is taken to extol that of the French. We are told that they sell us the chief part of the molasses, which is consumed, or manufactured into rum; and that a great and truly important branch, the distillery, is kept up by their liberality in furnishing the raw material. There is at every step matter to confirm the remark, that nations have framed their regulations to suit their own interests, not ours. France is a great brandy manufacturer; she will not admit rum, therefore, even from her own islands, because it would supplant the consumption of brandy. The molasses was, for that reason, some years ago of no value in her islands, and was not even saved in casks. But the demand from our country soon raised its value. The policy of England has been equally selfish. The molasses is distilled in her islands, because she has no manufacture of brandy to suffer by its sale.

A QUESTION remains respecting the state of our *navigation*. If we pay no regard to the regulations of foreign nations, and ask, whether this valuable branch of our industry and capital is in a distressed and sickly state, we shall find it is in a strong and flourishing condition. If the quantity of shipping was declining, if it was unemployed, even at low freight, I should say, it must be sustained and encouraged. No such thing is asserted. Seamen's wages are high, freights are high, and American bottoms in full employment. But the complaint is, our vessels are not permitted to go to the British West-Indies.

It is even affirmed, that no civilized country treats us so ill in that respect. Spain and Portugal prohibit the traffick to their possessions, not only in our vessels, but in their own, which, according to the style of the resolutions, is worse treatment than we meet with from the British. It is also asserted, and on as bad ground, that our vessels are excluded from most of the British markets.

This is not true in any sense. We are admitted into the greater number of her ports, in our own vessels; and by far the greater value of our exports is sold in British ports, into which our vessels are received, not only on a good footing, compared with other foreigners, but on terms of positive favour, on better terms than British vessels are admitted into our own ports. We are not subject to the alien duties; and the light money, &c. of 1*s*. 9*d*. sterling per ton is less than our foreign tonnage duty, not to mention the ten per cent. on the duties on goods in foreign bottoms.

But in the port of London our vessels are received free. It is for the unprejudiced mind to compare these facts with the assertions we have heard so confidently and so feelingly made by the mover of the resolutions, that we are excluded from most of their ports, and that no civilized nation treats our vessels so ill as the British.

The tonnage of the vessels, employed between Great Britain and her dependencies and the United States, is called two hundred and twenty thousand; and the whole of this is represented as our just right. The same gentleman speaks of our natural right to the carriage of our own articles, and that we may and ought to insist upon our equitable share. Yet, soon after, he uses the language of monopoly, and represents the whole carriage of imports and exports as the proper object of our efforts, and all that others carry as a clear loss to us. If an equitable share of the carriage means half, we have it already, and more, and our proportion is rapidly increasing. If any thing is meant by the natural right of carriage, one would imagine that it belongs to him, whoever he may be, who, having bought our produce, and made himself the owner, thinks proper to take

it with him to his own country. It is neither our policy nor our design to check the sale of our produce. We invite every description of purchasers, because we expect to sell dearest, when the number and competition of the buyers is the greatest. For this reason the total exclusion of foreigners and their vessels from the purchase and carriage of our exports is an advantage, in respect to navigation, which has disadvantage to balance it, in respect to the price of produce. It is with this reserve we ought to receive the remark, that the carriage of our exports should be our object, rather than that of our imports. By going with our vessels into foreign ports we buy our imports in the best market. By giving a steady and moderate encouragement to our own shipping, without pretending violently to interrupt the course of business, experience will soon establish that order of things, which is most beneficial to the exporter, the importer, and the ship owner. The best interest of agriculture is the true interest of trade.

In a trade, mutually beneficial, it is strangely absurd to consider the gain of others as our loss. Admitting it however for argument sake, yet it should be noticed, that the loss of two hundred and twenty thousand tons of shipping is computed according to the apparent tonnage. Our vessels not being allowed to go to the British West-Indies, their vessels, making frequent voyages, appear in the entries over and over again. In the trade to the European dominions of Great Britain, the distance being greater, our vessels are not so often entered. Both these circumstances give a false shew to the amount of British tonnage, compared with the American. It is however very pleasing to the mind, to see that our tonnage exceeds the British in the European trade. For various reasons, some of which will be mentioned hereafter, the tonnage in the West-India trade is not the proper subject of calculation. In the European comparison, we have more tonnage in the British than in the French commerce; it is indeed more than four to one.

The great quantity of British tonnage employed in our trade is also, in a great measure, owing to the large capitals

of their merchants, employed in the buying and exporting our productions. If we would banish the ships, we must strike at the root, and banish the capital. And this, before we have capital of our own grown up to replace it, would be an operation of no little violence and injury, to our southern brethren especially.

INDEPENDENTLY of this circumstance, Great Britain is an active and intelligent rival in the navigation line. Her ships are dearer, and the provisioning her seamen is perhaps rather dearer than ours: on the other hand, the rate of interest is lower in England, and so are seamen's wages. It would be improper, therefore, to consider the amount of British tonnage in our trade, as a proof of a bad state of things, arising either from the restrictions of that government, or the negligence or timidity of this. We are to charge it to causes, which are more connected with the natural competition of capital and industry, causes, which in fact retarded the growth of our shipping more, when we were colonies, and our ships were free, than since the adoption of the present government.

IT has been said with emphasis, that the constitution grew out of the complaints of the nation respecting commerce, especially that with the British dominions. What was then lamented by our patriots? Feebleness of the publick counsels; the shadow of union, and scarcely the shadow of publick credit; every where despondence, the pressure of evils, not only great, but portentous of civil distractions. These were the grievances; and what more was then desired than their remedies? Is it possible to survey this prosperous country and to assert that they have been delayed? Trade flourishes on our wharves, although it droops in speeches. Manufactures have risen under the shade of protecting duties from almost nothing to such a state, that we are even told we can depend on the domestick supply, if the foreign should cease. The fisheries, which we found in decline, are in the most vigorous growth: the whale fishery, which our allies would have transferred to Dunkirk, now extends over the whole ocean. To that hardy race of men the sea is but a park for hunting its monsters; such is their activity, the deepest abysses scarcely afford to their prey a

hiding place. Look around, and see how the frontier circle widens, how the interiour improves, and let it be repeated, that the hopes of the people, when they formed this constitution, have been frustrated.

But if it should happen, that our prejudices prove stronger than our senses; if it should be believed, that our farmers and merchants see their products and ships and wharves going to decay together, and they are ignorant or silent on their own ruin; still the publick documents would not disclose so alarming a state of our affairs. Our imports are obtained so plentifully and cheaply, that one of the avowed objects of the resolutions is, to make them scarcer and dearer. Our exports, so far from languishing, have increased two millions of dollars in a year. Our navigation is found to be augmented beyond the most sanguine expectation. We hear of the vast advantage the English derived from the navigation act; and we are asked in a tone of accusation, shall we sit still and do nothing? Who is bold enough to say, congress has done nothing for the encouragement of American navigation? To counteract the navigation act, we have laid on British a higher tonnage than our own vessels pay in their ports; and what is much more effectual, we have imposed ten per cent. on the duties, when the dutied articles are borne in foreign bottoms. We have also made the coasting trade a monopoly to our own vessels. Let those, who have asserted that this is nothing, compare facts with the regulations which produced them.

Tonnage.	Tons.	Excess of American tonnage.
American, 1789	297,468	
Foreign	265,116	
		32,352
American, 1790	347,663	
Foreign	258,916	
		88,747
American, 1791	363,810	
Foreign	240,799	
		123,011
American, 1792	415,330	
Foreign	244,263	
		171,067

Is not this increase of American shipping rapid enough? Many persons say it is too rapid, and attracts too much capital for the circumstances of the country. I cannot readily persuade myself to think so valuable a branch of employment thrives too fast. But a steady and sure encouragement is more to be relied on than violent methods of forcing its growth. It is not clear, that the quantity of our navigation, including our coasting and fishing vessels, is less in proportion to those of that nation: in that computation we shall probably find, that we are already more a navigating people than the English.

As this is a growing country, we have the most stable ground of dependence on the corresponding growth of our navigation: and that the increasing demand for shipping will rather fall to the share of Americans than foreigners, is not to be denied. We did expect this from the nature of our own laws; we have been confirmed in it by experience; and we know that an American bottom is actually preferred to a foreign one. In cases where one partner is an American, and another a foreigner, the ship is made an American bottom. A fact of this kind overthrows a whole theory of reasoning on the necessity of further restrictions. It shows, that the work of restriction is already done.

If we take the aggregate view of our commercial interests, we shall find much more occasion for satisfaction, and even exultation, than complaint, and none for despondence. It would be too bold to say, that our condition is so eligible there is nothing to be wished. Neither the order of nature, nor the allotments of Providence, afford perfect content; and it would be absurd to expect in our politicks what is denied in the laws of our being. The nations, with whom we have intercourse, have, without exception, more or less restricted their commerce. They have framed their regulations to suit their real or fancied interests. The code of France is as full of restrictions as that of England. We have regulations of our own; and they are unlike those of any other country. Inasmuch as the interest and circumstances of nations vary so essentially, the project of an exact reciprocity on our part is a vision.

What we desire is, to have, not an exact reciprocity, but an intercourse of mutual benefit and convenience.

It has scarcely been so much as insinuated, that the change contemplated will be a profitable one; that it will enable us to sell dearer and to buy cheaper: on the contrary, we are invited to submit to the hazards and losses of a conflict with our customers; to engage in a contest of self-denial. For what—to obtain better markets? No such thing; but to shut up forever, if possible, the best market we have for our exports, and to confine ourselves to the dearest and scarcest markets for our imports. And this is to be done for the benefit of trade, or, as it is sometimes more correctly said, for the benefit of France. This language is not a little inconsistent and strange from those, who recommend a non-importation agreement, and who think we should even renounce the sea and devote ourselves to agriculture. Thus, to make our trade more free, it is to be embarrassed, and violently shifted from one country to another, not according to the interest of the merchants, but the visionary theories and capricious rashness of the legislators. To make trade better, it is to be made nothing.

So far as commerce and navigation are regarded, the pretences for this contest are confined to two. We are not allowed to carry manufactured articles to Great Britain, nor any products, except of our own growth; and we are not permitted to go, with our own vessels, to the West-Indies. The former, which is a provision of the navigation act, is of little importance to our interests, as our trade is chiefly a direct one, our shipping not being equal to the carrying for other nations; and our manufactured articles are not furnished in quantities for exportation, and, if they were, Great Britain would not be a customer. So far, therefore, the restriction is rather nominal than real.

The exclusion of our vessels from the West-Indies is of more importance. When we propose to make an effort to force a privilege from Great Britain, which she is loath to yield to us, it is necessary to compare the value of the object with the effort, and, above all, to calculate very warily the

probability of success. A trivial thing deserves not a great exertion; much less ought we to stake a very great good in possession for a slight chance of a less good. The carriage of one half the exports and imports to and from the British West-Indies, is the object to be contended for. Our whole exports to Great Britain are to be hazarded. We sell on terms of privilege and positive favour, as it has been abundantly shewn, near seven millions to the dominions of Great Britain. We are to risk the privilege in this great amount—for what? For the freight only of one half the British West-India trade with the United States. It belongs to commercial men to calculate the entire value of the freight alluded to. But it cannot bear much proportion to the amount of seven millions. Besides, if we are denied the privilege of carrying our articles in our vessels to the islands, we are on a footing of privilege in the sale of them. We have one privilege, if not two. It is readily admitted, that it is a desirable thing, to have our vessels allowed to go to the English islands; but the value of the object has its limits, and we go unquestionably beyond them, when we throw our whole exports into confusion, and run the risk of losing our best markets, for the sake of forcing a permission to carry our own products to one of those markets: in which, too, it should be noticed, we sell much less than we do to Great Britain herself. If to this we add, that the success of the contest is grounded on the sanguine and passionate hypothesis of our being able to starve the islanders, which, on trial, may prove false, and which our being involved in the war would overthrow at once, we may conclude, without going further into the discussion, that prudence forbids our engaging in the hazards of a commercial war; that great things should not be staked against such as are of much less value; that what we possess should not be risked for what we desire, without great odds in our favour; still less, if the chance is infinitely against us.

If these considerations should fail of their effect, it will be necessary to go into an examination of the tendency of the

system of discrimination to redress and avenge all our wrongs, and to realize all our hopes.

It has been avowed, that we are to look to France, not to England, for advantages in trade; we are to shew our spirit, and to manifest towards those who are called enemies the spirit of enmity, and towards those we call friends something more than passive good will. We are to take active measures to force trade out of its accustomed channels, and to shift it by such means from England to France. The care of the concerns of the French manufacturers may be left perhaps as well in the hands of the convention, as to be usurped into our own. However our zeal might engage us to interpose, our duty to our own immediate constituents demands all our attention. To volunteer it, in order to excite competition in one foreign nation to supplant another, is a very strange business; and to do it, as it has been irresistibly proved it will happen, at the charge and cost of our own citizens, is a thing equally beyond all justification and all example. What is it but to tax our own people for a time, perhaps for a long time, in order that the French may at last sell as cheap as the English: cheaper they cannot, nor is it so much as pretended. The tax will be a loss to us, and the fancied tendency of it not a gain to this country in the event, but to France. We shall pay more for a time, and in the end pay no less; for no object but that one nation may receive our money, instead of the other. If this is generous towards France, it is not just to America. It is sacrificing what we owe to our constituents to what we pretend to feel towards strangers. We have indeed heard a very ardent profession of gratitude to that nation, and infinite reliance seems to be placed on her readiness to sacrifice her interest to ours. The story of this generous strife should be left to ornament fiction. This is not the form nor the occasion to discharge our obligations of any sort to any foreign nation: it concerns not our feelings but our interests; yet the debate has often soared high above the smoke of business into the epick region. The market for tobacco, tar, turpentine,

and pitch has become matter of sentiment, and given occasion alternately to rouse our courage and our gratitude.

If, instead of hexameters, we prefer discussing our relation to foreign nations in the common language, we shall not find, that we are bound by treaty to establish a preference in favour of the French. The treaty is founded on a professed reciprocity, favour for favour. Why is the principle of treaty or no treaty made so essential, when the favour we are going to give is an act of supererogation? It is not expected by one of the nations in treaty: for Holland has declared in her treaty with us, that such preferences are the fruitful source of animosity, embarrassment and war. The French have set no such example. They discriminate, in their late navigation act, not as we are exhorted to do, between nations in treaty and not in treaty, but between nations at war and not at war with them; so that, when peace takes place, England will stand by that act on the same ground with ourselves. If we expect by giving favour to get favour in return, it is improper to make a law. The business belongs to the executive, in whose hands the constitution has placed the power of dealing with foreign nations. It is singular to negociate legislatively; to make by a law half a bargain, expecting a French law would make the other. The footing of treaty or no treaty is different from the ground taken by the mover himself in supporting his system. He has said favour for favour was principle: nations not in treaty grant favours, those in treaty restrict our trade. Yet the principle of discriminating in favour of nations in treaty, is not only inconsistent with the declared doctrine of the mover and with facts, but it is inconsistent with itself. Nations not in treaty are so very unequally operated upon by the resolutions, it is absurd to refer them to one principle. Spain and Portugal have no treaties with us, and are not disposed to have: Spain would not accede to the treaty of commerce between us and France, though she was invited: Portugal would not sign a treaty after it had been discussed and signed on our part. They have few ships or manufactures, and do not feed their colonies from us: of course there is little for the discrimina-

tion to operate upon. The operation on nations in treaty is equally a satire on the principle of discrimination. In Sweden, with whom we have a treaty, duties rise higher if borne in our bottoms, than in her own France does the like, in respect to tobacco, two and a half livres the quintal, which in effect prohibits our vessels to freight tobacco. The mover has, somewhat unluckily, proposed to except from this system nations having no navigation acts; in which case France would become the subject of unfriendly discrimination, as the house have been informed since the debate began, that she has passed such acts.

I MIGHT remark on the disposition of England to settle a commercial treaty, and the known desire of the marquis of Lansdown (then prime minister), in 1783, to form such a one on the most liberal principles. The history of that business, and the causes which prevented its conclusion, ought to be made known to the publick. The powers given to our ministers were revoked, and yet we hear, that no such disposition on the part of Great Britain has existed. The declaration of Mr. Pitt in parliament, in June, 1792, as well as the correspondence with Mr. Hammond, shew a desire to enter upon a negociation. The statement of the report of the secretary of state, on the privileges and restrictions of our commerce, that Great Britain has shewn no inclination to meddle with the subject, seems to be incorrect.

THE expected operation of the resolutions on different nations, is obvious, and I need not examine their supposed tendency to dispose Great Britain to settle an equitable treaty with this country; but I ask, whether those, who hold such language towards that nation as I have heard, can be supposed to desire a treaty and friendly connexion. It seems to be thought a merit to express hatred: it is common and natural to desire to annoy and to crush those whom we hate, but it is somewhat singular to pretend, that the design of our anger is to embrace them.

THE tendency of angry measures to friendly dispositions and arrangements is not obvious. We affect to believe, that we

shall quarrel ourselves into their good will: we shall beat a new path to peace and friendship with Great Britain, one that is grown up with thorns, and lined with men-traps and spring-guns. It should be called the war path.

To do justice to the subject, its promised advantages should be examined. Exciting the competition of the French is to prove an advantage to this country, by opening a new market with that nation. This is scarcely intelligible. If it means any thing, it is an admission, that their market is not a good one, or that they have not taken measures to favour our traffick with them. In either case our system is absurd. The balance of trade is against us, and in favour of England. But the resolutions can only aggravate that evil, for, by compelling us to buy dearer and sell cheaper, the balance will be turned still more against our country. Neither is the supply from France less the aliment of luxury, than that from England. There excess of credit is an evil, which we pretend to cure by checking the natural growth of our own capital, which is the undoubted tendency of restraining trade: the progress of the remedy is thus delayed. If we will trade, there must be capital. It is best to have it of our own; if we have it not, we must depend on credit. Wealth springs from the profits of employment, and the best writers on the subject establish it, that employment is in proportion to the capital, that is to excite and reward it. To strike off credit, which is the substitute for capital, if it were possible to do it, would so far stop employment. Fortunately it is not possible; the activity of individual industry eludes the misjudging power of governments. The resolutions would, in effect, increase the demand for credit, as our products selling for less in a new market, and our imports being bought dearer, there would be less money and more need of it. Necessity would produce credit. Where the laws are strict, it will soon find its proper level; the uses of credit will remain, and the evil will disappear.

But the whole theory of balances of trade, of helping it by restraint, and protecting it by systems of prohibition and restriction against foreign nations, as well as the remedy for credit, are

among the exploded dogmas, which are equally refuted by the maxims of science and the authority of time. Many such topicks have been advanced, which were known to exist as prejudices, but were not expected as arguments. It seems to be believed, that the liberty of commerce is of some value. Although there are restrictions on one side, there will be some liberty left: counter restrictions, by diminishing that liberty, are in their nature aggravations and not remedies. We complain of the British restrictions as of a millstone: our own system will be another; so that our trade may hope to be situated between the upper and the nether millstone.

On the whole, the resolutions contain two great principles: to controul trade by law, instead of leaving it to the better management of the merchants; and the principle of a sumptuary law. To play the tyrant in the counting-house, and in directing the private expenses of our citizens, are employments equally unworthy of discussion.

Besides the advantages of the system, we have been called to another view of it, which seems to have less connection with the merits of the discussion. The acts of states, and the votes of publick bodies, before the constitution was adopted, and the votes of the house since, have been stated as grounds for our assent to this measure at this time. To help our own trade, to repel any real or supposed attack upon it, cannot fail to prepossess the mind; accordingly the first feelings of every man yield to this proposition. But the sober judgment on the tendency and reasonableness of the intermeddling of government often does, and probably ought still oftener to change our impressions. On a second view of the question, the man, who voted formerly for restrictions, may say, much has been done under the new constitution, and the good effects are yet making progress. The necessity of measures of counter restriction will appear to him much less urgent, and their efficacy in the present turbulent state of Europe infinitely less to be relied on. Far from being inconsistent in his conduct, consistency will forbid his pressing the experiment of his principle under circumstances, which baffle the hopes of its success. But if so

much stress is laid on former opinions, in favour of this measure, how happens it that there is so little on that, which now appears against it? Not one merchant has spoken in favour of it in this body; not one navigating or commercial state has patronised it.

It is necessary to consider the dependence of the British West-India islands on our supplies. I admit, that they cannot draw them so well, and so cheap, from any other quarter; but this is not the point. Are they physically dependent? Can we starve them; and may we reasonably expect, thus, to dictate to Great Britain a free admission of our vessels into her islands? A few details will prove the negative. Beef and pork sent from the now United States to the British West-Indies, 1773, fourteen thousand nine hundred and ninety three barrels. In the war time, 1780, ditto from England, seventeen thousand seven hundred and ninety five: at the end of the war, 1783, sixteen thousand five hundred and twenty six. Ireland exported, on an average of seven years prior to 1777, two hundred and fifty thousand barrels. Salted fish the English take in abundance, and prohibit its importation from us. Butter and cheese from England and Ireland are but lately banished even from our markets. Exports from the now United States, 1773, horses two thousand seven hundred and sixty eight, cattle one thousand two hundred and three, sheep and hogs five thousand three hundred and twenty. Twenty two years prior to 1791, were exported from England to all ports, twenty nine thousand one hundred and thirty one horses. Ireland, on an average of seven years to 1777, exported four thousand and forty live stock, exclusive of hogs. The coast of Barbary, the Cape de Verds, &c. supply sheep and cattle. The islands, since the war, have increased their domestick supplies to a great degree.

The now United States exported about one hundred and thirty thousand barrels of flour in 1773 to the West-Indies. Ireland by grazing less could supply wheat; England herself usually exports it: she also imports from Archangel. Sicily and the Barbary states furnish wheat in abundance. We are deceived, when we fancy we can starve foreign countries.

France is reckoned to consume grain at the rate of seven bushels to each soul. Twenty six millions of souls, the quantity one hundred and eighty two millions of bushels. We export, to speak in round numbers, five or six millions of bushels to all the different countries, which we supply; a trifle this to their wants. Frugality is a greater resource. Instead of seven bushels, perhaps two could be saved by stinting the consumption of the food of cattle, or by the use of other food. Two bushels saved to each soul is fifty two millions of bushels, a quantity which the whole trading world, perhaps, could not furnish. Rice is said to be prohibited by Spain and Portugal to favour their own. Brasil could supply their rice instead of ours.

Lumber; I must warn you of the danger of despising Canada and Nova Scotia too much as rivals in the West-India supply, especially the former. The dependence the English had placed on them some years ago failed, partly because we entered into competition with them on very superiour terms, and partly because they were then in an infant state. They are now supposed to have considerably more than doubled their numbers since the peace; and if, instead of having us for competitors for the supply as before, we should shut ourselves out by refusing our supplies, or being refused entry for them, those two colonies would rise from the ground: at least we should do more to bring it about than the English ministry have been able to do. In 1772, six hundred and seventy nine vessels, the actual tonnage of which was one hundred and twenty eight thousand, were employed in the West-India trade from Great Britain. They were supposed, on good ground, to be but half freighted to the islands: they might carry lumber, and the freight supposed to be deficient would be, at forty shillings sterling the ton, one hundred and twenty eight thousand pounds sterling. This sum would diminish the extra charge of carrying lumber to the islands. But is lumber to be had? Yes, in Germany, and from the Baltick. It is even cheaper in Europe than our own. Besides

which, the hard woods used in mills are abundant in the islands.

We are told they can sell their rum only to the United States. This concerns not their subsistence, but their profit. Examine it however. In 1773, the now United States took near three million gallons of rum. The remaining British colonies, Newfoundland and the African coast, have a considerable demand for this article. The demand of Ireland is very much on the increase. It was in 1763, five hundred and thirty thousand gallons; 1770, one million five hundred and fifty eight thousand gallons; 1778, one million seven hundred and twenty nine thousand gallons.

Thus we see, a total stoppage of the West-India trade would not starve the islanders. It would affect us deeply; we should lose the sale of our products, and, of course, not gain the carriage in our own vessels: the object of the contest would be no nearer our reach than before. Instead, however, of a total stoppage of the intercourse, it might happen, that, each nation prohibiting the vessels of the other, some third nation would carry on the traffick in its own bottoms. While this measure would disarm our system, it would make it recoil upon ourselves. It would, in effect, operate chiefly to obstruct the sale of our products. If they should remain unsold, it would be so much dead loss; or if the effect should be to raise the price on the consumers, it would either lessen the consumption, or raise up rivals in the supply. The contest, as it respects the West-India trade, is in every respect against us. To embarrass the supply from the United States, supposing the worst as it regards the planters, can do no more than enhance the price of sugar, coffee, and other products. The French islands are now in ruins, and the English planters have an increased price and double demand in consequence. While Great Britain confined the colony trade to herself, she gave to the colonists in return a monopoly in her consumption of West-India articles. The extra expense, arising from the severest operation of our system, is already provided against

two fold: like other charges on the products of labour and capital, the burden will fall on the consumer. The luxurious and opulent consumer in Europe will not regard, and perhaps will not know, the increase of price nor the cause of it. The new settler, who clears his land and sells the lumber, will feel any convulsion in the market more sensibly, without being able to sustain it at all. It is a contest of wealth against want of self-denial, between luxury and daily subsistence, that we provoke with so much confidence of success. A man of experience in the West-India trade will see this contrast more strongly than it is possible to represent it.

One of the excellences, for which the measure is recommended, is, that it will affect our imports. What is offered as an argument is really an objection. Who will supply our wants? Our own manufactures are growing, and it is a subject of great satisfaction that they are. But it would be wrong to over-rate their capacity to clothe us. The same number of inhabitants require more and more, because wealth increases. Add to this the rapid growth of our numbers, and perhaps it will be correct to estimate the progress of manufacturers as only keeping pace with that of our increasing consumption and population. It follows, that we shall continue to demand in future to the amount of our present importation. It is not intended by the resolutions, that we shall import from England. Holland and the north of Europe do not furnish a sufficient variety, or sufficient quantity for our consumption. It is in vain to look to Spain, Portugal, and the Italian States. We are expected to depend principally upon France: it is impossible to examine the ground of this dependence without adverting to the present situation of that country. It is a subject, upon which I practise no disguise; but I do not think it proper to introduce the politicks of France into this discussion. If others can find in the scenes that pass there, or in the principles and agents that direct them, proper subjects for amiable names, and sources of joy and hope in the prospect, I have nothing to say to it: it is an amusement, which it is not

my intention either to disturb or to partake of. I turn from these horrours to examine the condition of France in respect to manufacturing, capital, and industry. In this point of view, whatever political improvements may be hoped for, it cannot escape observation, that it presents only a wide field of waste and desolation. Capital, which used to be food for manufactures, is become their fuel. What once nourished industry now lights the fires of civil war, and quickens the progress of destruction. France is like a ship with a fine cargo burning to the water's edge; she may be built upon anew, and freighted with another cargo, and it will be time enough, when that shall be, to depend on a part of it for our supply: at present, and for many years, she will not be so much a furnisher as a consumer. It is therefore obvious, that we shall import our supplies either directly or indirectly from Great Britain. Any obstruction to the importation will raise the price which we, who consume, must bear.

That part of the argument, which rests on the supposed distress of the British manufacturers, in consequence of the loss of our market, is in every view unfounded. They would not lose the market in fact, and if they did, we prodigiously exaggerate the importance of our consumption to the British workmen. Important it doubtless is, but a little attention will expose the extreme folly of the opinion, that they would be brought to our feet by a trial of our self-denying spirit. England now supplants France in the important Levant trade, in the supply of manufactured goods to the East, and, in a great measure, to the West-Indies, to Spain, Portugal, and their dependencies. Her trade with Russia has, of late, vastly increased; and she is treating for a trade with China: so that the new demands of English manufactures, consequent upon the depression of France as a rival, has amounted to much more than the whole American importation, which is not three millions.

The ill effect of a system of restriction and prohibition in the West-Indies has been noticed already. The privileges

allowed to our exports to England may be withdrawn, and prohibitory or high duties imposed.

The system before us is a mischief, that goes to the root of our prosperity. The merchants will suffer by the schemes and projects of a new theory. Great numbers were ruined by the convulsions of 1775. They are an order of citizens deserving better of government, than to be involved in new confusions. It is wrong to make our trade wage war for our politicks. It is now scarcely said, that it is a thing to be sought for, but a weapon to fight with. To gain our approbation to the system, we are told it is to be gradually established. In that case, it will be unavailing. It should be begun with in all its strength, if we think of starving the islands. Drive them suddenly and by surprise to extremity, if you would dictate terms; but they will prepare against a long-expected failure of our supplies.

Our nation will be tired of suffering loss and embarrassment for the French. The struggle, so painful to ourselves, so ineffectual against England, will be renounced, and we shall sit down with shame and loss, with disappointed passions and aggravated complaints. War, which would then suit our feelings, would not suit our weakness. We might perhaps find some European power willing to make war on England, and we might be permitted by a strict alliance to partake the misery and the dependence of being a subaltern in the quarrel. The happiness of this situation seems to be in view, when the system before us is avowed to be the instrument of avenging our political resentments. Those, who affect to dread foreign influence, will do well to avoid a partnership in European jealousies and rivalships. Courting the friendship of the one, and provoking the hatred of the other, is dangerous to our real independence; for it would compel America to throw herself into the arms of the one for protection against the other. Then foreign influence, pernicious as it is, would be sought for; and though it should be shunned, it could not be resisted. The connections of trade form ties between indivi-

duals, and produce little controul over government. They are the ties of peace, and are neither corrupt nor corrupting.

We have happily escaped from a state of the most imminent danger to our peace: a false step would lose all the security for its continuance, which we owe at this moment to the conduct of the president. What is to save us from war? Not our own power which inspires no terrour; not the gentle and forbearing spirit of the powers of Europe at this crisis; not the weakness of England; not her affection for this country, if we believe the assurances of gentlemen on the other side. What is it then? It is the interest of Great Britain to have America for a customer, rather than an enemy: and it is precisely that interest, which gentlemen are so eager to take away, and to transfer to France. And what is stranger still, they say, they rely on that operation as a means of producing peace with the Indians and Algerines. The wounds, inflicted on Great Britain by our enmity, are expected to excite her to supplicate our friendship, and to appease us by soothing the animosity of our enemies. What is to produce effects so mystical, so opposite to nature, so much exceeding the efficacy of their pretended causes? This wonder-working paper on the table is the weapon of terrour and destruction: like the writing on Belshazzer's wall, it is to strike parliaments and nations with dismay: it is to be stronger than fleets against pirates, or than armies against Indians. After the examination it has undergone, credulity itself will laugh at these pretensions.

We pretend to expect, not by the force of our restrictions, but by the mere shew of our spirit, to level all the fences, that have guarded for ages the monopoly of the colony trade. The repeal of the navigation act of England, which is cherished as the palladium of her safety, which time has rendered venerable, and prosperity endeared to her people, is to be extorted, from her fears of a weaker nation. It is not to be yielded freely, but violently torn from her; and yet the idea of a struggle to prevent indignity and loss, is considered as a chimera too ridiculous for sober refutation. She will not dare,

say they, to resent it; and gentlemen have pledged themselves for the success of the attempt: what is treated as a phantom is vouched by fact. Her navigation act is known to have caused an immediate contest with the Dutch, and four desperate sea fights ensued, in consequence, the very year of its passage.

How far it is an act of aggression, for a neutral nation to assist the supplies of one neighbour, and to annoy and distress another, at the crisis of a contest between the two, which strains their strength to the utmost, is a question, which we might not agree in deciding; but the tendency of such unseasonable partiality to exasperate the spirit of hostility against the intruder cannot be doubted. The language of the French government would not sooth this spirit. It proposes, on the sole condition of a political connection, to extend to us a part of their West-India commerce. The coincidence of our measures with their invitation, however singular, needs no comment. Of all men those are least consistent, who believe in the efficacy of the regulations, and yet affect to ridicule their hostile tendency. In the commercial conflict, say they, we shall surely prevail and effectually humble Great Britain.

In open war we are the weaker, and shall be brought into danger, if not to ruin. It depends, therefore, according to their own reasoning, on Great Britain herself, whether she will persist in a struggle, which will disgrace and weaken her, or turn it into a war, which will throw the shame and ruin upon her antagonist. The topicks, which furnish arguments to shew the danger to our peace from the resolutions, are too fruitful to be exhausted. But without pursuing them further, the experience of mankind has shewn, that commercial rivalships, which spring from mutual efforts for monopoly, have kindled more wars, and wasted the earth more, than the spirit of conquest.

I hope we shall shew by our vote, that we deem it better policy to feed nations than to starve them, and that we shall never be so unwise as to put our good customers into a situa-

tion to be forced to make every exertion to do without us. By cherishing the arts of peace, we shall acquire, and we are actually acquiring the strength and resources for a war. Instead of seeking treaties, we ought to shun them; for the later they shall be formed, the better will be the terms: we shall have more to give, and more to withhold. We have not yet taken our proper rank, nor acquired that consideration, which will not be refused us, if we persist in prudent and pacifick counsels, if we give time for our strength to mature itself. Though America is rising with a giant's strength, its bones are yet but cartilages. By delaying the beginning of a conflict, we insure the victory.

By voting out the resolutions, we shall shew to our own citizens, and foreign nations, that our prudence has prevailed over our prejudices, that we prefer our interests to our resentments. Let us assert a genuine independence of spirit: we shall be false to our duty and feelings as Americans, if we basely descend to a servile dependence on France or Great Britain.

SPEECH

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, IN SUPPORT OF THE FOLLOWING MOTION:

RESOLVED, That it is expedient to pass the laws necessary to carry into effect the treaty lately concluded between the United States and the king of Great Britain.

DELIVERED APRIL 28, 1796.

I ENTERTAIN the hope, perhaps a rash one, that my strength will hold me out to speak a few minutes.

IN my judgment, a right decision will depend more on the temper and manner, with which we may prevail upon ourselves to contemplate the subject, than upon the developement of any profound political principles, or any remarkable skill in the application of them. If we could succeed to neutralize our inclinations, we should find less difficulty than we have to apprehend in surmounting all our objections.

THE suggestion, a few days ago, that the house manifested symptoms of heat and irritation, was made and retorted as if the charge ought to create surprise, and would convey reproach. Let us be more just to ourselves and to the occasion. Let us not affect to deny the existence and the intrusion of some portion of prejudice and feeling into the debate, when, from the very structure of our nature, we ought to anticipate the circumstance as a probability, and when we are admonished by the evidence of our senses that it is a fact. How can we make professions for ourselves, and offer exhortations to the house, that no influence should be felt but that of duty, and no guide respected but that of the understanding, while the peal to rally every passion of man is continually ringing in our ears. Our understandings have been addressed, it is true, and with ability and effect; but, I demand, has any corner of the heart been left unexplored? It has been ransacked to find

auxiliary arguments; and, when that attempt failed, to awaken the sensibility, that would require none. Every prejudice and feeling has been summoned to listen to some peculiar style of address; and yet we seem to believe, and to consider a doubt as an affront, that we are strangers to any influence but that of unbiassed reason.

It would be strange, that a subject, which has roused in turn all the passions of the country, should be discussed without the interference of any of our own. We are men, and therefore not exempt from those passions: as citizens and representatives, we feel the interest that must excite them. The hazard of great interests cannot fail to agitate strong passions: we are not disinterested; it is impossible we should be dispassionate. The warmth of such feelings may becloud the judgment, and, for a time, pervert the understanding. But the publick sensibility, and our own, has sharpened the spirit of inquiry, and given an animation to the debate. The publick attention has been quickened to mark the progress of the discussion, and its judgment, often hasty and erroneous on first impressions, has become solid and enlightened at last. Our result will, I hope, on that account, be the safer and more mature, as well as more accordant with that of the nation. The only constant agents in political affairs are the passions of men. Shall we complain of our nature; shall we say that man ought to have been made otherwise. It is right already, because HE, from whom we derive our nature, ordained it so; and because, thus made and thus acting, the cause of truth and the publick good is the more surely promoted.

But an attempt has been made to produce an influence of a nature more stubborn, and more unfriendly to truth. It is very unfairly pretended, that the constitutional right of this house is at stake, and to be asserted and preserved only by a vote in the negative. We hear it said, that this is a struggle for liberty, a manly resistance against the design to nullify this assembly, and to make it a cypher in the

government: that the president and senate, the numerous meetings in the cities, and the influence of the general alarm of the country, are the agents and instruments of a scheme of coercion and terrour, to force the treaty down our throats, though we loath it, and in spite of the clearest convictions of duty and conscience.

It is necessary to pause here, and inquire, whether suggestions of this kind be not unfair in their very texture and fabrick, and pernicious in all their influences. They oppose an obstacle in the path of inquiry, not simply discouraging, but absolutely insurmountable. They will not yield to argument; for, as they were not reasoned up, they cannot be reasoned down. They are higher than a Chinese wall in truth's way, and built of materials that are indestructible. While this remains, it is vain to say to this mountain, be thou cast into the sea. For I ask of the men of knowledge of the world, whether they would not hold him for a blockhead, that should hope to prevail in an argument, whose scope and object it is to mortify the self-love of the expected proselyte? I ask further, when such attempts have been made, have they not failed of success? The indignant heart repels a conviction, that is believed to debase it.

The self-love of an individual is not warmer in its sense, nor more constant in its action, than what is called in French l'esprit du corps, or the self-love of an assembly; that jealous affection which a body of men is always found to bear towards its own prerogatives and power. I will not condemn this passion. Why should we urge an unmeaning censure, or yield to groundless fears that truth and duty will be abandoned, because men in a publick assembly are still men, and feel that esprit du corps which is one of the laws of their nature? Still less should we despond or complain, if we reflect, that this very spirit is a guardian instinct that watches over the life of this assembly. It cherishes the principle of self-preservation, and without its existence, and its existence with all the strength we see it possess, the privileges of the

representatives of the people, and, mediately, the liberty of the people would not be guarded, as they are, with a vigilance that never sleeps, and an unrelaxing constancy and courage.

If the consequences most unfairly attributed to the vote in the affirmative were not chimerical, and worse, for they are deceptive, I should think it a reproach to be found even moderate in my zeal to assert the constitutional powers of this assembly; and whenever they shall be in real danger, the present occasion affords proof, that there will be no want of advocates and champions.

Indeed so prompt are these feelings, and, when once roused, so difficult to pacify, that, if we could prove the alarm was groundless, the prejudice against the appropriations may remain on the mind, and it may even pass for an act of prudence and duty to negative a measure, which was lately believed by ourselves, and may hereafter be misconceived by others, to encroach upon the powers of the house. Principles that bear a remote affinity with usurpation on those powers will be rejected, not merely as errours, but as wrongs. Our sensibility will shrink from a post, where it is possible it may be wounded, and be inflamed by the slightest suspicion of an assault.

While these prepossessions remain, all argument is useless: it may be heard with the ceremony of attention, and lavish its own resources, and the patience it wearies to no manner of purpose. The ears may be open, but the mind will remain locked up, and every pass to the understanding guarded. Unless therefore this jealous and repulsive fear for the rights of the house can be allayed, I will not ask a hearing.

I cannot press this topick too far; I cannot address myself with too much emphasis to the magnanimity and candour of those who sit here, to suspect their own feelings, and, while they do, to examine the grounds of their alarm. I repeat it, we must conquer our persuasion, that this body

has an interest in one side of the question more than the other, before we attempt to surmount our objections. On most subjects, and solemn ones too, perhaps in the most solemn of all, we form our creed more from inclination than evidence.

Let me expostulate with gentlemen to admit, if it be only by way of supposition, and for a moment, that it is barely possible they have yielded too suddenly to their alarms for the powers of this house; that the addresses, which have been made with such variety of forms, and with so great dexterity in some of them, to all that is prejudice and passion in the heart, are either the effects or the instruments of artifice and deception, and then let them see the subject once more in its singleness and simplicity.

It will be impossible, on taking a fair review of the subject, to justify the passionate appeals that have been made to us, to struggle for our liberties and rights, and the solemn exhortations to reject the proposition, said to be concealed in that on your table, to surrender them for ever. In spite of this mock solemnity, I demand, if the house will not concur in the measure to execute the treaty, what other course shall we take? How many ways of proceeding lie open before us?

In the nature of things, there are but three: we are either to make the treaty, to observe it, or break it. It would be absurd to say, we will do neither. If I may repeat a phrase already so much abused, we are under coercion to do one of them; and we have no power, by the exercise of our discretion, to prevent the consequences of a choice.

By refusing to act, we choose: the treaty will be broken and fall to the ground. Where is the fitness then of replying to those who urge upon the house the topicks of duty and policy, that they attempt to force the treaty down, and to compel this assembly to renounce its discretion, and to degrade itself to the rank of a blind and passive instrument in the hands of the treaty-making power. In case we reject

the appropriation, we do not secure any greater liberty of action, we gain no safer shelter than before from the consequences of the decision. Indeed they are not to be evaded. It is neither just nor manly to complain, that the treaty-making power has produced this coercion to act: it is not the art or the despotism of that power, it is the nature of things, that compels. Shall we, dreading to become the blind instruments of power, yield ourselves the blinder dupes of mere sounds of imposture? Yet that word, that empty word, coercion, has given scope to an eloquence, that one would imagine could not be tired, and did not choose to be quieted.

Let us examine still more in detail the alternatives that are before us, and we shall scarcely fail to see in still stronger lights the futility of our apprehensions for the power and liberty of the house.

If, as some have suggested, the thing, called a treaty, is incomplete, if it has no binding force or obligation, the first question is, will this house complete the instrument, and, by concurring, impart to it that force which it wants.

The doctrine has been avowed, that the treaty, though formally ratified by the executive power of both nations, though published as a law for our own by the president's proclamation, is still a mere proposition submitted to this assembly, no way distinguishable in point of authority or obligation from a motion for leave to bring in a bill, or any other original act of ordinary legislation. This doctrine, so novel in our country, yet so dear to many precisely for the reason, that in the contention for power victory is always dear, is obviously repugnant to the very terms as well as the fair interpretation of our own resolution. (Mr. Blount's.) We declare, that the treaty-making power is exclusively vested in the president and senate, and not in this house. Need I say, that we fly in the face of that resolution, when we pretend, that the acts of that power are not valid, until we have concurred in them. It would be nonsense, or worse,

to use the language of the most glaring contradiction, and to claim a share in a power, which we at the same time disclaim, as exclusively vested in other departments. What can be more strange than to say, that the compacts of the president and senate with foreign nations are treaties, without our agency, and yet that those compacts want all power and obligation, until they are sanctioned by our concurrence. It is not my design in this place, if at all, to go into the discussion of this part of the subject. I will, at least for the present, take it for granted, that this monstrous opinion stands in little need of remark, and, if it does, lies almost out of the reach of refutation.

But, say those who hide the absurdity under the cover of ambiguous phrases, have we no discretion? and if we have, are we not to make use of it in judging of the expediency or inexpediency of the treaty? Our resolution claims that privilege, and we cannot surrender it without equal inconsistency and breach of duty.

If there be any inconsistency in this case, it lies not in making the appropriations for the treaty, but in the resolution itself. Let us examine it more nearly. A treaty is a bargain between nations, binding in good faith: and what makes a bargain? The assent of the contracting parties. We allow, that the treaty power is not in this house; this house has no share in contracting, and is not a party: of consequence the president and senate alone may make a treaty that is binding in good faith. We claim, however, say the gentlemen, a right to judge of the expediency of treaties; that is the constitutional province of our discretion. Be it so. What follows? Treaties, when adjudged by us to be inexpedient, fall to the ground, and the publick faith is not hurt. This, incredible and extravagant as it may seem, is asserted. The amount of it, in plainer language, is this, the president and senate are to make national bargains, and this house has nothing to do in making them. But bad bargains do not bind this house, and of inevitable consequence,

do not bind the nation. When a national bargain, called a treaty, is made, its binding force does not depend on the making, but upon our opinion that it is good. As our opinion on the matter can be known and declared only by ourselves, when sitting in our legislative capacity, the treaty, though ratified, and, as we choose to term it, made, is hung up in suspense, till our sense is ascertained. We condemn the bargain, and it falls, though, as we say, our f ith does not. We approve a bargain as expedient, and it stands firm, and binds the nation. Yet, even in this latter case, its force is plainly not derived from the ratification by the treaty-making power, but from our approbation. Who will trace these inferences, and pretend, that we have no share, according to the argument, in the treaty-making power? These opinions, nevertheless, have been advocated with infinite zeal and perseverance. Is it possible that any man can be hardy enough to avow them, and their ridiculous consequences?

Let me hasten to suppose the treaty is considered as already made, and then the alternative is fairly present to the mind, whether he will observe the treaty, or break it. This, in fact, is the naked question.

If we choose to observe it with good faith, our course is obvious. Whatever is stipulated to be done by the nation, must be complied with. Our agency, if it should be requisite, cannot be properly refused. And I do not see why it is not as obligatory a rule of conduct for the legislature as for the courts of law

I cannot lose this opportunity to remark, that the coercion, so much dreaded and declaimed against, appears at length to be no more than the authority of principles, the despotism of duty. Gentlemen complain we are forced to act in this way; we are forced to swallow the treaty. It is very true, unless we claim the liberty of abuse, the right to act as we ought not. There is but one right way open for us: the laws of morality and good faith have fenced up

every other. What sort of liberty is that, which we presume to exercise against the authority of those laws? It is for tyrants to complain, that principles are restraints, and that they have no liberty, so long as their despotism has limits. These principles will be unfolded by examining the remaining question:

Shall we break the treaty?

The treaty is bad, fatally bad, is the cry. It sacrifices the interest, the honour, the independence of the United States, and the faith of our engagements to France. If we listen to the clamour of party intemperance, the evils are of a number not to be counted, and of a nature not to be borne, even in idea. The language of passion and exaggeration may silence that of sober reason in other places, it has not done it here. The question here is, whether the treaty be really so very fatal, as to oblige the nation to break its faith. I admit that such a treaty ought not to be executed. I admit that self-preservation is the first law of society, as well as of individuals. It would perhaps be deemed an abuse of terms to call that a treaty, which violates such a principle. I wave also, for the present, any inquiry, what departments shall represent the nation, and annul the stipulations of a treaty. I content myself with pursuing the inquiry, whether the nature of the compact be such as to justify our refusal to carry it into effect. A treaty is the promise of a nation. Now, promises do not always bind him that makes them.

But I lay down two rules, which ought to guide us in this case. The treaty must appear to be bad not merely in the petty details, but in its character, principle, and mass: and in the next place, this ought to be ascertained by the decided and general concurrence of the enlightened publick. I confess there seems to me something very like ridicule thrown over the debate by the discussion of the articles in detail.

The undecided point is, shall we break our faith? And while our country, and enlightened Europe, await the issue

with more than curiosity, we are employed to gather, piecemeal, and article by article, from the instrument, a justification for the deed by trivial calculations of commercial profit and loss. This is little worthy of the subject, of this body, or of the nation. If the treaty is bad, it will appear to be so in its mass. Evil to a fatal extreme, if that be its tendency, requires no proof: it brings it. Extremes speak for themselves, and make their own law. What if the direct voyage of American ships to Jamaica with horses or lumber might net one or two per cent. more than the present trade to Surinam, would the proof of the fact avail any thing in so grave a question as the violation of the publick engagements?

It is in vain to allege, that our faith plighted to France is violated by this new treaty. Our prior treaties are expressly saved from the operation of the British treaty. And what do those mean, who say, that our honour was forfeited by treating at all, and especially by such a treaty? Justice, the laws, and practice of nations, a just regard for peace as a duty to mankind, and the known wish of our citizens, as well as that self-respect which required it of the nation to act with dignity and moderation, all these forbad an appeal to arms before we had tried the effect of negociation. The honour of the United States was saved, not forfeited by treating. The treaty itself, by its stipulations for the posts, for indemnity, and for a due observation of our neutral rights, has justly raised the character of the nation. Never did the name of America appear in Europe with more lustre, than upon the event of ratifying this instrument. The fact is of a nature to overcome all contradiction.

But the independence of the country—we are colonists again. This is the cry of the very men who tell us, that France will resent our exercise of the rights of an independent nation to adjust our wrongs with an aggressor, without giving her the opportunity to say, those wrongs shall subsist and shall not be adjusted. This is an admirable specimen of independence. The treaty with Great Britain, it cannot be denied, is unfavourable to this strange sort of independence.

Few men of any reputation for sense among those who say the treaty is bad, will put that reputation so much at hazard as to pretend, that it is so extremely bad as to warrant and require a violation of the publick faith. The proper ground of the controversy, therefore, is really unoccupied by the opposers of the treaty; as the very hinge of the debate is on the point, not of its being good or otherwise, but whether it is intolerably and fatally pernicious. If loose and ignorant declaimers have any where asserted the latter idea, it is too extravagant, and too solidly refuted, to be repeated here. Instead of any attempt to expose it still further, I will say, and I appeal with confidence to the candour of many opposers to the treaty to acknowledge, that, if it had been permitted to go into operation silently, like our other treaties, so little alteration of any sort would be made by it in the great mass of our commercial and agricultural concerns, that it would not be generally discovered by its effects to be in force, during the term for which it was contracted. I place considerable reliance on the weight men of candour will give to this remark, because I believe it to be true, and little short of undeniable. When the panick dread of the treaty shall cease, as it certainly must, it will be seen through another medium. Those who shall make search into the articles for the cause of their alarms, will be so far from finding stipulations that will operate fatally, they will discover few of them that will have any lasting operation at all. Those which relate to the disputes between the two countries will spend their force upon the subjects in dispute, and extinguish them. The commercial articles are more of a nature to confirm the existing state of things, than to change it. The treaty alarm was purely an address to the imagination and prejudices of the citizens, and not on that account the less formidable. Objections that proceed upon errour in fact or calculation, may be traced and exposed; but such as are drawn from the imagination, or addressed to it, elude definition, and return to domineer over the mind, after having been banished from it by truth.

I WILL not so far abuse the momentary strength that is lent to me by the zeal of the occasion, as to enlarge upon the commercial operation of the treaty. I proceed to the second proposition, which I have stated as indispensably requisite to a refusal of the performance of a treaty: will the state of publick opinion justify the deed?

No government, not even a despotism, will break its faith, without some pretext; and it must be plausible, it must be such as will carry the publick opinion along with it. Reasons of policy, if not of morality, dissuade even Turkey and Algiers from breaches of treaty in mere wantonness of perfidy, in open contempt of the reproaches of their subjects. Surely a popular government will not proceed more arbitrarily, as it is more free; nor with less shame or scruple, in proportion as it has better morals. It will not proceed against the faith of treaties at all, unless the strong and decided sense of the nation shall pronounce, not simply that the treaty is not advantageous, but that it ought to be broken and annulled.

SUCH a plain manifestation of the sense of the citizens is indispensably requisite; first, because, if the popular apprehensions be not an infallible criterion of the disadvantages of the instrument, their acquiescence in the operation of it is an irrefragable proof, that the extreme case does not exist, which alone could justify our setting it aside.

IN the next place, this approving opinion of the citizens is requisite, as the best preventive of the ill consequences of a measure always so delicate, and often so hazardous. Individuals would, in that case at least, attempt to repel the opprobrium that would be thrown upon congress by those who will charge it with perfidy. They would give weight to the testimony of facts, and the authority of principles, on which the government would rest its vindication: and if war should ensue upon the violation, our citizens would not be divided from their government, nor the ardour of their courage be chilled by the consciousness of injustice, and the sense of humiliation, that sense which makes those despicable who know they are despised.

I ADD a third reason, and with me it has a force that no words of mine can augment, that a government wantonly refusing to fulfil its engagement is the corrupter of its citizens. Will the laws continue to prevail in the hearts of the people, when the respect that gives them efficacy is withdrawn from the legislators? How shall we punish vice, while we practise it? We have not force, and vain will be our reliance, when we have forfeited the resources of opinion. To weaken government, and to corrupt morals, are effects of a breach of faith not to be prevented; and from effects they become causes, produced with augmented activity, more disorder and more corruption: order will be disturbed, and the life of the publick liberty shortened.

AND who, I would inquire, is hardy enough to pretend, that the publick voice demands the violation of the treaty? The evidence of the sense of the great mass of the nation is often equivocal; but when was it ever manifested with more energy and precision than at the present moment? The voice of the people is raised against the measure of refusing the appropriations. If gentlemen should urge, nevertheless, that all this sound of alarm is a counterfeit expression of the sense of the publick, I will proceed to other proofs. Is the treaty ruinous to our commerce? What has blinded the eyes of the merchants and traders? Surely they are not enemies to trade, nor ignorant of their own interests. Their sense is not so liable to be mistaken as that of a nation, and they are almost unanimous. The articles stipulating the redress of our injuries by captures on the sea, are said to be delusive. By whom is this said? The very men whose fortunes are staked upon the competency of that redress, say no such thing. They wait with anxious fear, lest you should annul that compact, on which all their hopes are rested.

THUS we offer proof, little short of absolute demonstration, that the voice of our country is raised not to sanction, but to deprecate, the non-performance of our engagements. It is not the nation, it is one, and but one, branch of the govern-

ment that proposes to reject them. With this aspect of things, to reject is an act of desperation.

I SHALL be asked, why a treaty so good in some articles, and so harmless in others, has met with such unrelenting opposition? and how the clamours against it from New-Hampshire to Georgia can be accounted for? The apprehensions so extensively diffused, on its first publication, will be vouched as proof, that the treaty is bad, and that the people hold it in abhorrence.

I AM not embarrassed to find the answer to this insinuation. Certainly a foresight of its pernicious operation could not have created all the fears that were felt or affected: the alarm spread faster than the publication of the treaty: there were more criticks than readers. Besides, as the subject was examined, those fears have subsided. The movements of passion are quicker than those of the understanding: we are to search for the causes of first impressions, not in the articles of this obnoxious and misrepresented instrument, but in the state of the publick feeling.

THE fervour of the revolution war had not entirely cooled, nor its controversies ceased, before the sensibility of our citizens was quickened with a tenfold vivacity by a new and extraordinary subject of irritation. One of the two great nations of Europe underwent a change, which has attracted all our wonder, and interested all our sympathy. Whatever they did, the zeal of many went with them, and often went to excess. These impressions met with much to inflame, and nothing to restrain them. In our newspapers, in our feasts, and some of our elections, enthusiasm was admitted a merit, a test of patriotism; and that made it contagious. In the opinion of party, we could not love or hate enough. I dare say, in spite of all the obloquy it may provoke, we were extravagant in both. It is my right to avow, that passions so impetuous, enthusiasm so wild, could not subsist without disturbing the sober exercise of reason, without putting at risk the peace and precious interests of our country. They were hazarded. I will not exhaust the little breath I have left, to

say how much, nor by whom, or by what means they were rescued from the sacrifice. Shall I be called upon to offer my proofs? They are here, they are every where. No one has forgotten the proceedings of 1794. No one has forgotten the captures of our vessels, and the imminent danger of war. The nation thirsted not merely for reparation but vengeance. Suffering such wrongs and agitated by such resentments, was it in the power of any words of compact, or could any parchment with its seals prevail at once to tranquillize the people? It was impossible. Treaties in England are seldom popular, and least of all, when the stipulations of amity succeed to the bitterness of hatred. Even the best treaty, though nothing be refused, will choak resentment, but not satisfy it. Every treaty is as sure to disappoint extravagant expectations, as to disarm extravagant passions. Of the latter, hatred is one that takes no bribes: they who are animated by the spirit of revenge, will not be quieted by the possibility of profit.

WHY do they complain, that the West-Indies are not laid open? Why do they lament, that any restriction is stipulated on the commerce of the East-Indies? Why do they pretend, that if they reject this, and insist upon more, more will be accomplished? Let us be explicit—more would not satisfy. If all was granted, would not a treaty of amity with Britain still be obnoxious? Have we not this instant heard it urged against our envoy, that he was not ardent enough in his hatred of Great Britain? A treaty of amity is condemned because it was not made by a foe, and in the spirit of one. The same gentleman, at the same instant, repeats a very prevailing objection, that no treaty should be made with the enemy of France. No treaty, exclaim others, should be made with a monarch or a despot: there will be no naval security while those sea robbers domineer on the ocean: their den must be destroyed: that nation must be extirpated.

I LIKE this, sir, because it is sincerity. With feelings such as these, we do not pant for treaties: such passions seek nothing, and will be content with nothing, but the destruction of their object. If a treaty left king George his island, it

would not answer, not if he stipulated to pay rent for it. It has been said, the world ought to rejoice, if Britain was sunk in the sea; if, where there are now men, and wealth, and laws, and liberty, there was no more than a sand bank for the sea monsters to fatten on, a space for the storms of the ocean to mingle in conflict.

I OBJECT nothing to the good sense or humanity of all this. I yield the point, that this is a proof that the age of reason is in progress. Let it be philanthropy, let it be patriotism, if you will; but it is no indication, that any treaty would be approved. The difficulty is not to overcome the objections to the terms; it is to restrain the repugnance to any stipulations of amity with the party.

HAVING alluded to the rival of Great Britain, I am not unwilling to explain myself: I affect no concealment, and I have practised none. While those two great nations agitate all Europe with their quarrels, they will both equally endeavour to create an influence in America: each will exert all its arts to range our strength on its own side. How is this to be effected? Our government is a democratical republick: it will not be disposed to pursue a system of politicks, in subservience to either France or England, in opposition to the general wishes of the citizens: and, if congress should adopt such measures, they would not be pursued long, nor with much success. From the nature of our government, popularity is the instrument of foreign influence. Without it, all is labour and disappointment: with that mighty auxiliary, foreign intrigue finds agents, not only volunteers, but competitors for employment, and any thing like reluctance is understood to be a crime. Has Britain this means of influence? Certainly not. If her gold could buy adherents, their becoming such would deprive them of all political power and importance. They would not wield popularity as a weapon, but would fall under it. Britain has no influence, and, for the reasons just given, can have none. She has enough; and God forbid she ever should have more. France, possessed of popular enthusiasm, of party attachments, has had, and still has, too much influence

on our politicks: any foreign influence is too much and ought to be destroyed. I detest the man, and disdain the spirits, that can bend to a mean subserviency to the view of any nation. It is enough to be Americans: that character comprehends our duties, and ought to engross our attachments.

But I would not be misunderstood. I would not break the alliance with France: I would not have the connection between the two countries even a cold one. It should be cordial and sincere; but I would banish that influence, which, by acting on the passions of the citizens, may acquire a power over the government.

It is no bad proof of the merit of the treaty, that, under all these unfavourable circumstances, it should be so well approved. In spite of first impressions, in spite of misrepresentation and party clamour, inquiry has multiplied its advocates; and at last the publick sentiment appears to me clearly preponderating to its side.

On the most careful review of the several branches of the treaty, those which respect political arrangements, the spoliations on our trade, and the regulation of commerce, there is little to be apprehended; the evil, aggravated as it is by party, is little in degree, and short in duration—two years from the end of the European war. I ask, and I would ask the question significantly, what are the inducements to reject the treaty? What great object is to be gained, and fairly gained by it? If, however, as to the merits of the treaty, candour should suspend its approbation, what is there to hold patriotism a moment in balance as to the violation of it? Nothing. I repeat confidently, nothing. There is nothing before us in that event, but confusion and dishonour.

But before I attempt to develope those consequences, I must put myself at ease by some explanation. Nothing is worse received among men, than the confutation of their opinions; and, of these, none are more dear or more vulnerable than their political opinions. To say, that a proposition leads to shame and ruin, is almost equivalent to a charge, that the supporters of it intend to produce them. I throw myself

upon the magnanimity and candour of those who hear me. I cannot do justice to my subject without exposing, as forcibly as I can, all the evils in prospect. I readily admit, that in every science, and most of all in politicks, errour springs from other sources than the want of sense or integrity. I despise indiscriminate professions of candour and respect. There are individuals opposed to me, of whom I am not bound to say any thing; but of many, perhaps of a majority of the opposers of the appropriations, it gives me pleasure to declare, they possess my confidence and regard. There are among them individuals, for whom I entertain a cordial affection.

The consequences of refusing to make provision for the treaty are not all to be foreseen. By rejecting, vast interests are committed to the sport of the winds: chance becomes the arbiter of events, and it is forbidden to human foresight to count their number, or measure their extent. Before we resolve to leap into this abyss, so dark and so profound, it becomes us to pause, and reflect upon such of the dangers as are obvious and inevitable. If this assembly should be wrought into a temper to defy these consequences, it is vain, it is deceptive to pretend, that we can escape them. It is worse than weakness to say, that, as to publick faith, our vote has already settled the question. Another tribunal than our own is already erected: the publick opinion, not merely of our own country, but of the enlightened world, will pronounce a judgment that we cannot resist, that we dare not even affect to despise.

Well may I urge it to men, who know the worth of character, that it is no trivial calamity to have it contested. Refusing to do what the treaty stipulates shall be done, opens the controversy. Even if we should stand justified at last, a character that is vindicated is something worse than it stood before, unquestioned and unquestionable. Like the plaintiff in an action of slander, we recover a reputation disfigured by invective, and even tarnished by too much handling. In the combat for the honour of the nation, it may receive some wounds, which, though they should heal, will leave scars. I need not say, for surely the feelings of every bosom have anticipated, that we

cannot guard this sense of national honour, this ever living fire, which alone keeps patriotism warm in the heart, with a sensibility too vigilant and jealous. If, by executing the treaty, there is no possibility of dishonour, and if, by rejecting, there is some foundation for doubt and for reproach, it is not for me to measure; it is for your own feelings to estimate, the vast distance that divides the one side of the alternative from the other.

If therefore we should enter on the examination of the question of duty and obligation with some feelings of prepossession, I do not hesitate to say, they are such as we ought to have: it is an after inquiry to determine, whether they are such as ought finally to be resisted.

The resolution (Mr. Blount's) is less explicit than the constitution. Its patrons should have made it more so, if possible, if they had any doubts, or meant the publick should entertain none. Is it the sense of that vote, as some have insinuated, that we claim a right, for any cause or no cause at all, but our own sovereign will and pleasure, to refuse to execute, and thereby to annul the stipulations of a treaty? that we have nothing to regard but the expediency or inexpediency of the measure, being absolutely free from all obligation by compact to give it our sanction? A doctrine so monstrous, so shameless, is refuted by being avowed. There are no words you could express it in, that would not convey both confutation and reproach. It would outrage the ignorance of the tenth century to believe; it would baffle the casuistry of a papal council to vindicate. I venture to say it is impossible. No less impossible that we should desire to assert the scandalous privilege of being free, after we have pledged our honour.

It is doing injustice to the resolution of the house, (which I dislike on many accounts) to strain the interpretation of it to this extravagance. The treaty-making power is declared by it to be vested exclusively in the president and senate. Will any man in his senses affirm, that it can be a treaty before it it has any binding force or obligation? If it has no binding force upon us, it has none upon Great Britain. Let candour answer, is Great Britain free from any obligation to deliver

the posts in June, and are we willing to signify to her, that we think so? Is it with that nation a question of mere expediency or inexpediency to do it; and that too, even after we have done all that depends upon us to give the treaty effect? No sober man believes this. No one who would not join in condemning the faithless proceeding of that nation, if such a doctrine should be avowed, and carried into practice: and why complain, if Great Britain is not bound? There can be no breach of faith, where none is plighted. I shall be told, that she is bound. Surely it follows, that, if she is bound to performance, our nation is under a similar obligation: if both parties be not obliged, neither is obliged; it is no compact, no treaty. This is a dictate of law and common sense, and every jury in the country has sanctioned it on oath. It cannot be a treaty and yet no treaty, a bargain and yet no promise. If it is a promise, I am not to read a lecture to shew, why an honest man will keep his promise.

The reason of the thing, and the words of the resolution of the house, imply, that the United States engage their good faith in a treaty. We disclaim, say the majority, the treaty-making power, we of course disclaim (they ought to say) every doctrine, that would put a negative upon the doings of that power. It is the prerogative of folly alone to maintain both sides of the proposition.

Will any man affirm, the American nation is engaged by good faith to the British nation; but that engagement is nothing to this house? Such a man is not to be reasoned with. Such a doctrine is a coat of mail, that would turn the edge of all the weapons of argument, if they were sharper than a sword. Will it be imagined the king of Great Britain and the president are mutually bound by the treaty; but the two nations are free?

It is one thing for this house to stand in a position, that presents an opportunity to break the faith of America, and another to establish a principle that will justify the deed.

We feel less repugnance to believe, that any other body is bound by obligation than our own. There is not a man here,

who does not say that Great Britain is bound by treaty. Bring it nearer home. Is the senate bound? Just as much as the house and no more. Suppose the senate, as part of the treaty power, by ratifying a treaty on Monday, pledges the publick faith to do a certain act. Then, in their ordinary capacity as a branch of the legislature, the senate is called upon on Tuesday to perform that act, for example, an appropriation of money, is the senate (so lately under obligation) now free to agree or disagree to the act? If the twenty ratifying senators should rise up and avow this principle, saying, we struggle for liberty, we will not be cyphers, mere puppets, and give their votes accordingly, would not shame blister their tongues, would not infamy tingle in their ears, would not their country, which they had insulted and dishonoured, though it should be silent and forgiving, be a revolutionary tribunal, a rack, on which their own reflections would stretch them?

This, sir, is a cause, that would be dishonoured and betrayed, if I contented myself with appealing only to the understanding. It is too cold, and its processes are too slow for the occasion. I desire to thank God, that, since he has given me an intellect so fallible, he has impressed upon me an instinct that is sure. On a question of shame and honour, reasoning is sometimes useless, and worse. I feel the decision in my pulse: if it throws no light upon the brain, it kindles a fire at the heart.

It is not easy to deny, it is impossible to doubt, that a treaty imposes an obligation on the American nation. It would be childish to consider the president and senate obliged, and the nation and house free. What is the obligation? perfect or imperfect? If perfect, the debate is brought to a conclusion. If imperfect, how large a part of our faith is pawned? Is half our honour put at risk, and is that half too cheap to be redeemed? How long has this hair-splitting subdivision of good faith been discovered, and why has it escaped the researches of the writers on the law of nations? Shall we add a new chapter to that law; or insert this doctrine as a supplement to, or more properly a repeal of the ten commandments?

The principles and the example of the British parliament have been alleged to coincide with the doctrine of those, who deny the obligation of the treaty. I have not had the health to make very laborious researches into this subject; I will, however, sketch my view of it. Several instances have been noticed; but the treaty of Utrecht is the only one that seems to be at all applicable. It has been answered, that the conduct of parliament in that celebrated example affords no sanction to our refusal to carry the treaty into effect. The obligation of the treaty of Utrecht has been understood to depend on the concurrence of parliament, as a condition to its becoming of force. If that opinion should, however, appear incorrect, still the precedent proves, not that the treaty of Utrecht wanted obligation, but that parliament disregarded it: a proof, not of the construction of the treaty-making power, but of the violation of a national engagement. Admitting still further, that the parliament claimed and exercised its power, not as a breach of faith, but as a matter of constitutional right, I reply that the analogy between parliament and congress totally fails. The nature of the British government may require and justify a course of proceeding in respect to treaties, that is unwarrantable here.

The British government is a mixed one. The king at the head of the army, of the hierarchy, with an ample civil list, hereditary, unresponsible, and possessing the prerogative of peace and war, may be properly observed with some jealousy, in respect to the exercise of the treaty-making power. It seems, and perhaps from a spirit of caution on this account, to be their doctrine, that treaties bind the nation, but are not to be regarded by the courts of law, until laws have been passed conformably to them. Our constitution has expressly regulated the matter differently. The concurrence of parliament is necessary to treaties becoming laws in England, gentlemen say; and here the senate, representing the states, must concur in treaties. The constitution, and the reason of the case make the concurrence of the senate as effectual as the sanction of parliament; and why not? The senate is an elective body, and the approbation of a majority of the states affords the nation

as ample security against the abuse of the treaty-making power, as the British nation can enjoy in the controul of parliament.

WHATEVER doubt there may be as to the parliamentary doctrine of the obligation of treaties in Great Britain, (and perhaps there is some) there is none in their books, or their modern practice. Blackstone represents treaties as of the highest obligation, when ratified by the king: and for almost a century, there has been no instance of opposition by parliament to this doctrine. Their treaties have been uniformly carried into effect, although many have been ratified of a nature most obnoxious to party, and have produced a louder clamour than we have lately witnessed. The example of England, therefore, fairly examined, does not warrant, it dissuades us from a negative vote. . . .

GENTLEMEN have said, with spirit, whatever the true doctrine of our constitution may be, Great Britain has no right to complain or to dictate an interpretation: the sense of the American nation, as to the treaty power, is to be received by all foreign nations. This is very true as a maxim; but the fact is against those who vouch it: the sense of the American nation is NOT as the vote of the house has declared it. Our claim to some agency in giving force and obligation to treaties, is beyond all kind of controversy NOVEL. The sense of the nation is probably against it: the sense of the government certainly is. The president denies it on constitutional grounds, and therefore cannot ever accede to our interpretation. The senate ratified the treaty, and cannot without dishonour adopt it, as I have attempted to shew. Where then do they find the proof, that this is the American sense of the treaty-making power, which is to silence the murmurs of Great Britain? Is it because a majority of two or three, or, at the most, four or five of this house will reject the treaty? Is it thus the sense of our nation is to be recognised? Our government may thus be stopped in its movements: a struggle for power may thus commence, and the event of the conflict may decide, who is the victor, and the quiet possessor of the treaty power. But, at present, it is beyond all credibility, that our vote by a bare majority, should

be believed to do any thing better than to embitter our divisions, and to tear up the settled foundations of our departments.

If the obligation of a treaty be complete, I am aware that cases sometimes exist, which will justify a nation in refusing a compliance. *Are our liberties*, gentlemen demand, *to be bartered away by a treaty, and is there no remedy?* There is. Extremes are not to be supposed; but, when they happen, they make the law for themselves. No such extreme can be pretended in this instance; and, if it existed, the authority it would confer to throw off the obligation would rest where the obligation itself resides, in the nation. This house is not the nation; it is not the whole delegated authority of the nation. Being only a part of that authority, its right to act for the whole society obviously depends on the concurrence of the other two branches. If they refuse to concur, a treaty once made remains of full force, although a breach on the part of the foreign nation would confer upon our own a right to forbear the execution. I repeat it, even in that case, the act of this house cannot be admitted as the act of the nation; and if the president and senate should not concur, the treaty would be obligatory.

I put a case that will not fail to produce conviction. Our treaty with France engages, that free bottoms shall make free goods; and how has it been kept? As such engagements will ever be in time of war. France has set it aside, and pleads imperious necessity. We have no navy to enforce the observance of such articles, and paper barriers are weak against the violence of those, who are on the scramble for enemy's goods on the high seas. The breach of any article of the treaty by one nation gives an undoubted right to the other to renounce the whole treaty. But has one branch of the government that right, or must it reside with the whole authority of the nation? What if the senate should resolve, that the French treaty is broken, and therefore null and of no effect? The answer is obvious; you would deny their sole authority. That branch of the legislature has equal power, in this regard, with the house of representatives: one branch alone cannot express the will of the nation.

A RIGHT to annul a treaty, because a foreign nation has broken its articles, is only like the case of a sufficient cause to repeal a law. In both cases, the branches of our government must concur in the orderly way, or the law and the treaty will remain.

THE very cases supposed by my adversaries in this argument, conclude against themselves. They will persist in confounding ideas, that should be kept distinct; they will suppose, that the house of representatives has *no* power unless it has *all* power: the house is nothing, if it be not the whole government, the nation.

ON every hypothesis, therefore, the conclusion is not to be resisted: we are either to execute this treaty, or break our faith.

To expatiate on the value of publick faith may pass with some men for declamation: to such men I have nothing to say. To others I will urge, can any circumstance mark upon a people more turpitude and debasement? Can any thing tend more to make men think themselves mean, or degrade to a lower point their estimation of virtue and their standard of action? It would not merely demoralize mankind; it tends to break all the ligaments of society, to dissolve that mysterious charm which attracts individuals to the nation, and to inspire in its stead a repulsive sense of shame and disgust.

WHAT is patriotism? Is it a narrow affection for the spot where a man was born? Are the very clods where we tread entitled to this ardent preference, because they are greener? No, sir, this is not the character of the virtue, and it soars higher for its object. It is an extended self-love, mingling with all the enjoyments of life, and twisting itself with the minutest filaments of the heart. It is thus we obey the laws of society, because they are the laws of virtue. In their authority we see, not the array of force and terrour, but the venerable image of our country's honour. Every good citizen makes that honour his own, and cherishes it not only as precious, but as sacred. He is willing to risk his life in its defence; and is conscious that he gains protection, while he gives it. For what rights of a citizen will be deemed inviolable, when a state

renounces the principles that constitute their security ? Or, if his life should not be invaded, what would its enjoyments be in a country odious in the eyes of strangers, and dishonoured in his own ? Could he look with affection and veneration to such a country as his parent ? The sense of having one would die within him ; he would blush for his patriotism, if he retained any, and justly, for it would be a vice : he would be a banished man in his native land.

I SEE no exception to the respect that is paid among nations to the law of good faith. If there are cases in this enlightened period when it is violated, there are none when it is decried. It is the philosophy of politicks, the religion of governments. It is observed by barbarians : a whiff of tobacco smoke, or a string of beads, gives not merely binding force, but sanctity to treaties. Even in Algiers, a truce may be bought for money ; but, when ratified, even Algiers is too wise or too just to disown and annul its obligation. Thus we see, neither the ignorance of savages, nor the principles of an association for piracy and rapine, permit a nation to despise its engagements. If, sir, there could be a resurrection from the foot of the gallows, if the victims of justice could live again, collect together and form a society, they would, however loath, soon find themselves obliged to make justice, that justice under which they fell, the fundamental law of their state. They would perceive it was their interest to make others respect, and they would therefore soon pay some respect themselves to the obligations of good faith.

IT is painful, I hope it is superfluous, to make even the supposition, that America should furnish the occasion of this opprobrium. No, let me not even imagine, that a republican government, sprung, as our own is, from a people enlightened and uncorrupted, a government whose origin is right, and whose daily discipline is duty, can, upon solemn debate, make its option to be faithless ; can dare to act what despots dare not avow, what our own example evinces the states of Barbary are unsuspected of. No, let me rather make the supposition, that Great Britain refuses to execute the treaty, after we have done

every thing to carry it into effect. Is there any language of reproach pungent enough to express your commentary on the fact? What would you say, or, rather, what would you not say? Would you not tell them, wherever an Englishman might travel, shame would stick to him: he would disown his country. You would exclaim, England, proud of your wealth, and arrogant in the possession of power, blush for these distinctions, which become the vehicles of your dishonour. Such a nation might truly say to corruption, thou art my father, and to the worm, thou art my mother and my sister. We should say of such a race of men, their name is a heavier burden than their debt.

I CAN scarcely persuade myself to believe, that the consideration I have suggested requires the aid of any auxiliary; but, unfortunately, auxiliary arguments are at hand. Five millions of dollars, and probably more, on the score of spoliations committed on our commerce, depend upon the treaty: the treaty offers the only prospect of indemnity. Such redress is promised as the merchants place some confidence in. Will you interpose and frustrate that hope, leaving to many families nothing but beggary and despair? It is a smooth proceeding to take a vote in this body: it takes less than half an hour to call the yeas and nays, and reject the treaty. But what is the effect of it? What but this: the very men, formerly so loud for redress, such fierce champions, that even to ask for justice was too mean and too slow, now turn their capricious fury upon the sufferers, and say, by their vote, to them and their families, no longer eat bread: petitioners go home and starve: we cannot satisfy your wrongs, and our resentments.

WILL you pay the sufferers out of the treasury? No. The answer was given two years ago, and appears on our journals. Will you give them letters of marque and reprisal, to pay themselves by force? No. That is war. Besides it would be an opportunity for those who have already lost much, to lose more. Will you go to war to avenge their injury? If you do, the war will leave you no money to indemnify them. If it should be unsuccessful, you will aggravate existing evils: if

successful, your enemy will have no treasure left to give our merchants: the first losses will be confounded with much greater, and be forgotten. At the end of a war there must be a negociation, which is the very point we have already gained: and why relinquish it? And who will be confident, that the terms of the negociation, after a desolating war, would be more acceptable to another house of representatives than the treaty before us? Members and opinions may be so changed, that the treaty would then be rejected for being what the present majority say it should be. Whether we shall go on making treaties and refusing to execute them, I know not: of this I am certain, it will be very difficult to exercise the treaty-making power on the new principle, with much reputation or advantage to the country.

The refusal of the posts (inevitable if we reject the treaty) is a measure too decisive in its nature to be neutral in its consequences. From great causes we are to look for great effects. A plain and obvious one will be, the price of the Western lands will fall: settlers will not choose to fix their habitation on a field of battle. Those who talk so much of the interest of the United States should calculate, how deeply it will be affected by rejecting the treaty; how vast a tract of wild land will almost cease to be property. This loss, let it be observed, will fall upon a fund expressly devoted to sink the national debt. What then are we called upon to do? However the form of the vote and the protestations of many may disguise the proceeding, our resolution is in substance, and it deserves to wear the title of a resolution, to prevent the sale of the Western lands and the discharge of the publick debt.

Will the tendency to Indian hostilities be contested by any one? Experience gives the answer. The frontiers were scourged with war, until the negociation with Great Britain was far advanced; and then the state of hostility ceased. Perhaps the publick agents of both nations are innocent of fomenting the Indian war, and perhaps they are not. We ought not, however, to expect that neighbouring nations, highly irritated against each other, will neglect the friendship of the savages.

The traders will gain an influence, and will abuse it; and who is ignorant that their passions are easily raised and hardly restrained from violence? Their situation will oblige them to choose between this country and Great Britain, in case the treaty should be rejected: they will not be our friends, and at the same time the friends of our enemies.

But am I reduced to the necessity of proving this point? Certainly the very men who charged the Indian war on the detention of the posts, will call for no other proof than the recital of their own speeches. It is remembered, with what emphasis, with what acrimony, they expatiated on the burden of taxes, and the drain of blood and treasure into the Western country, in consequence of Britain's holding the posts. Until the posts are restored, they exclaimed, the treasury and the frontiers must bleed.

If any, against all these proofs, should maintain, that the peace with the Indians will be stable without the posts, to them I will urge another reply. From arguments calculated to produce conviction, I will appeal directly to the hearts of those who hear me, and ask whether it is not already planted there? I resort especially to the convictions of the Western gentlemen, whether, supposing no posts and no treaty, the settlers will remain in security? Can they take it upon them to say, that an Indian peace, under these circumstances, will prove firm? No, sir, it will not be peace, but a sword; it will be no better than a lure to draw victims within the reach of the tomahawk.

On this theme, my emotions are unutterable. If I could find words for them, if my powers bore any proportion to my zeal, I would swell my voice to such a note of remonstrance, it should reach every log-house beyond the mountains. I would say to the inhabitants, wake from your false security: your cruel dangers, your more cruel apprehensions are soon to be renewed: the wounds, yet unhealed, are to be torn open again: in the day time, your path through the woods will be ambushed; the darkness of midnight will glitter with the blaze of your dwellings. You are a father—the blood of your sons shall

fatten your corn-field: you are a mother—the war hoop shall wake the sleep of the cradle.

On this subject you need not suspect any deception on your feelings: it is a spectacle of horrour, which cannot be overdrawn. If you have nature in your hearts, they will speak a language, compared with which all I have said or can say will be poor and frigid.

Will it be whispered, that the treaty has made me a new champion for the protection of the frontiers. It is known, that my voice as well as vote have been uniformly given in conformity with the ideas I have expressed. Protection is the right of the frontiers; it is our duty to give it.

Who will accuse me of wandering out of the subject? Who will say, that I exaggerate the tendencies of our measures? Will any one answer by a sneer, that all this is idle preaching. Will any one deny, that we are bound, and I would hope to good purpose, by the most solemn sanctions of duty for the vote we give? Are despots alone to be reproached for unfeeling indifference to the tears and blood of their subjects? Are republicans unresponsible? Have the principles, on which you ground the reproach upon cabinets and kings, no practical influence, no binding force? Are they merely themes of idle declamation, introduced to decorate the morality of a newspaper essay, or to furnish pretty topicks of harangue from the windows of that state-house? I trust it is neither too presumptuous nor too late to ask: Can you put the dearest interest of society at risk, without guilt, and without remorse?

It is vain to offer as an excuse, that publick men are not to be reproached for the evils that may happen to ensue from their measures. This is very true, where they are unforeseen or inevitable. Those I have depicted are not unforeseen: they are so far from inevitable, we are going to bring them into being by our vote: we choose the consequences, and become as justly answerable for them, as for the measure that we know will produce them.

By rejecting the posts, we light the savage fires, we bind the victims. This day we undertake to render account to the

widows and orphans whom our decision will make, to the wretches that will be roasted at the stake, to our country, and I do not deem it too serious to say, to conscience and to God. We are answerable; and if duty be any thing more than a word of imposture, if conscience be not a bugbear, we are preparing to make ourselves as wretched as our country.

THERE is no mistake in this case, there can be none: experience has already been the prophet of events, and the cries of our future victims have already reached us. The Western inhabitants are not a silent and uncomplaining sacrifice. The voice of humanity issues from the shade of the wilderness: it exclaims, that, while one hand is held up to reject this treaty, the other grasps a tomahawk. It summons our imagination to the scenes that will open. It is no great effort of the imagination to conceive that events so near are already begun. I can fancy that I listen to the yells of savage vengeance and the shrieks of torture: already they seem to sigh in the Western wind; already they mingle with every echo from the mountains.

IT is not the part of prudence to be inattentive to the tendencies of measures: where there is any ground to fear that these will be pernicious, wisdom and duty forbid that we should under-rate them. If we reject the treaty, will our peace be as safe as if we execute it with good faith? I do honour to the intrepid spirit of those who say it will. It was formerly understood to constitute the excellence of a man's faith, to believe without evidence and against it.

BUT, as opinions on this article are changed, and we are called to act for our country, it becomes us to explore the dangers that will attend its peace, and avoid them if we can. Few of us here, and fewer still in proportion of our constituents, will doubt, that, by rejecting, all those dangers will be aggravated.

THE idea of war is treated as a bugbear. This levity is at least unseasonable, and most of all unbecoming some who resort to it. Who has forgotten the philippicks of 1794? The cry then was, reparation; no envoy; no treaty; no tedious

delays. Now it seems the passion subsides, or at least the hurry to satisfy it. Great Britain, say they, will not wage war upon us.

In 1794, it was urged by those who now say, no war, that, if we built frigates, or resisted the piracies of Algiers, we could not expect peace. Now they give excellent comfort truly. Great Britain has seized our vessels and cargoes to the amount of millions; she holds the posts; she interrupts our trade, say they, as a neutral nation; and these gentlemen, formerly so fierce for redress, assure us, in terms of the sweetest consolation, Great Britain will bear all this patiently. But let me ask the late champions of our rights, will our nation bear it? Let others exult because the aggressor will let our wrongs sleep for ever. Will it add, it is my duty to ask, to the patience and quiet of our citizens to see their rights abandoned? Will not the disappointment of their hopes, so long patronised by the government, now in the crisis of their being realized, convert all their passions into fury and despair?

Are the posts to remain for ever in the possession of Great Britain? Let those who reject them, when the treaty offers them to our hands, say, if they choose, they are of no importance. If they are, will they take them by force? The argument I am urging would then come to a point. To use force is war; to talk of treaty again is too absurd: the posts and redress must come from voluntary good will, treaty, or war. The conclusion is plain: if the state of peace shall continue, so will the British possession of the posts.

Look again at this state of things: on the sea coast, vast losses uncompensated; on the frontier, Indian war, and actual encroachment on our territory; every where discontent; resentments tenfold more fierce because they will be impotent and humbled; national discord and abasement. The disputes of the old treaty of 1783, being left to rankle, will revive the almost extinguished animosities of that period. Wars in all countries, and most of all in such as are free, arise from the impetuosity of the public feelings. The despotism of Turkey is often obliged by clamour to unsheath the sword. War

might perhaps be delayed, but could not be prevented: the causes of it would remain, would be aggravated, would be multiplied, and soon become intolerable. More captures, more impressments would swell the list of our wrongs, and the current of our rage. I make no calculation of the arts of those whose employment it has been, on former occasions, to fan the fire; I say nothing of the foreign money and emissaries that might foment the spirit of hostility, because the state of things will naturally run to violence: with less than their former exertion, they would be successful.

Will our government be able to temper and restrain the turbulence of such a crisis? The government, alas! will be in no capacity to govern. A divided people, and divided counsels! Shall we cherish the spirit of peace, or shew the energies of war? Shall we make our adversary afraid of our strength, or dispose him, by the measures of resentment and broken faith, to respect our rights? Do gentlemen rely on the state of peace, because both nations will be worse disposed to keep it? because injuries, and insults still harder to endure, will be mutually offered?

Such a state of things will exist, if we should long avoid war, as will be worse than war: peace without security, accumulation of injury without redress, or the hope of it, resentment against the aggressor, contempt for ourselves, intestine discord, and anarchy. Worse than this need not be apprehended, for if worse could happen, anarchy would bring it. Is this the peace gentlemen undertake, with such fearless confidence, to maintain? Is this the station of American dignity, which the high-spirited champions of our national independence and honour could endure; nay, which they are anxious and almost violent to seize for the country? What is there in the treaty that could humble us so low? Are they the men to swallow their resentments, who so lately were choking with them? If in the case contemplated by them, it should be peace, I do not hesitate to declare, it ought not to be peace.

Is there any thing in the prospect of the interiour state of the country, to encourage us to aggravate the dangers of a

war? Would not the shock of that evil produce another, and shake down the feeble and then unbraced structure of our government? Is this a chimera? Is it going off the ground of matter of fact to say, the rejection of the appropriation proceeds upon the doctrine of a civil war of the departments. Two branches have ratified a treaty; and we are going to set it aside. How is this disorder in the machine to be rectified? While it exists, its movements must stop; and when we talk of a remedy, is that any other than the formidable one of a revolutionary interposition of the people? And is this, in the judgment even of my opposers, to execute, to preserve the constitution, and the publick order? Is this the state of hazard, if not of convulsion, which they can have the courage to contemplate and to brave; or beyond which their penetration can reach and see the issue? They seem to believe, and they act as if they believed, that our union, our peace, our liberty, are invulnerable and immortal; as if our happy state was not to be disturbed by our dissentions, and that we are not capable of falling from it by our unworthiness. Some of them have no doubt better nerves and better discernment than mine. They can see the bright aspects and happy consequences of all this array of horrours. They can see intestine discords, our government disorganized, our wrongs aggravated, multiplied and unredressed, peace with dishonour, or war without justice, union or resources, in "the calm lights of mild philosophy."

But whatever they may anticipate as the next measure of prudence and safety, they have explained nothing to the house. After rejecting the treaty, what is to be the next step? They must have foreseen what ought to be done; they have doubtless resolved what to propose. Why then are they silent? Dare they not now avow their plan of conduct, or do they wait until our progress towards confusion shall guide them in forming it?

Let me cheer the mind, weary no doubt and ready to despond on this prospect, by presenting another which it is yet in our power to realize. Is it possible for a real American to look at the prosperity of this country, without some desire

for its continuance, without some respect for the measures which, many will say, produced, and all will confess have preserved it? Will he not feel some dread, that a change of system will reverse the scene? The well grounded fears of our citizens, in 1794, were removed by the treaty, but are not forgotten. Then they deemed war nearly inevitable, and would not this adjustment have been considered at that day as a happy escape from the calamity? The great interest and the general desire of our people was to enjoy the advantages of neutrality. This instrument, however misrepresented, affords America that inestimable security. The causes of our disputes are either cut up by the roots, or referred to a new negociation, after the end of the European war. This was gaining every thing, because it confirmed our neutrality, by which our citizens are gaining every thing. This alone would justify the engagements of the government. For, when the fiery vapours of the war lowered in the skirts of our horizon, all our wishes were concentred in this one, that we might escape the desolation of the storm. This treaty, like a rainbow on the edge of the cloud, marked to our eyes the space where it was raging, and afforded at the same time the sure prognostick of fair weather. If we reject it, the vivid colours will grow pale, it will be a baleful meteor portending tempest and war.

Let us not hesitate then to agree to the appropriation to carry it into faithful execution. Thus we shall save the faith of our nation, secure its peace, and diffuse the spirit of confidence and enterprise that will augment its prosperity. The progress of wealth and improvement is wonderful, and some will think, too rapid. The field for exertion is fruitful and vast, and if peace and good government should be preserved, the acquisitions of our citizens are not so pleasing as the proofs of their industry, as the instruments of their future success. The rewards of exertion go to augment its power. Profit is every hour becoming capital. The vast crop of our neutrality is all seed wheat, and is sown again, to swell, almost beyond calculation, the future harvest of prosperity. In this

progress what seems to be fiction is found to fall short of experience.

I ROSE to speak under impressions that I would have resisted if I could. Those who see me will believe, that the reduced state of my health has unfitted me, almost equally, for much exertion of body or mind. Unprepared for debate by careful reflection in my retirement, or by long attention here, I thought the resolution I had taken, to sit silent, was imposed by necessity, and would cost me no effort to maintain. With a mind thus vacant of ideas, and sinking, as I really am, under a sense of weakness, I imagined the very desire of speaking was extinguished by the persuasion that I had nothing to say. Yet when I come to the moment of deciding the vote, I start back with dread from the edge of the pit into which we are plunging. In my view, even the minutes I have spent in expostulation have their value, because they protract the crisis, and the short period in which alone we may resolve to escape it.

I HAVE thus been led by my feelings to speak more at length than I had intended. Yet I have perhaps as little personal interest in the event as any one here. There is, I believe, no member, who will not think his chance to be a witness of the consequences greater than mine. If, however, the vote should pass to reject, and a spirit should rise, as it will, with the publick disorders to make "confusion worse confounded," even I, slender and almost broken as my hold upon life is, may outlive the government and constitution of my country.

LAOCOON, N°. I.

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In the two following essays the party aiming to subvert the federal cause and administration, are termed jacobins. "All who from credulity, envy, anger, and pride, from ambition or cupidity, are impatient under the restraints, or impatient for the trappings of power," are arranged in one general class, and denominated from that portion of it, which the authour considered most dangerous. In the other parts of his writings, he admits a difference in the character of those who compose a faction in a republican government. A democrat believes in the success of impossible experiments, and that it is easy to govern without a government. A jacobin, void of this credulity himself, seizes upon it in others, and uses it as a powerful instrument of his ambition. But they all reason, act, and feel, in a manner unfavourable to a truly republican system, of which the permanent publick good is the proper object and result. Hence he insisted, that there are essentially but two divisions of the active citizens, the federal or republican, and the democratick or jacobin party. At the time Laocoon was written, the leaders of the democratick party were making desperate efforts to bring federal or true republican principles, measures, and men, into hatred; their spirit of falsehood and bitter malignity, excited the abhorrence of the writer, while the apathy and presumption of the friends of government shocked and dismayed him. Writing under such impressions and feelings; indignant at the hypocritical and audacious pretensions of false patriotism, and agitated and overwhelmed by the foresight of the ruin that would follow the downfal of the federal system, he does not mark the grades of demerit in those against whom he inveighs. He speaks of the party generally under the name of those guides and masters, by whom it is combined, animated, directed, and employed.

SOME labour has been recently bestowed on the proposition, that the sect of jacobins is not to be converted, and in enforcing the obvious duty on all honest men to unite with energy to resist them. This alarm, it will be objected, is for ever sounding; and it is replied, for ever sounding to the deaf. Honest men, it is allowed, reasonably expect to enjoy tranquillity under the protection of government; instead of which, it is not denied, that they are incessantly summoned to their posts, to afford to government the protection they had hoped it would be in a condition to bestow. The cry of danger disturbs their beloved and promised ease, disappoints their fond hopes, disgraces their splendid theories, and saddens that futurity which fancy had adorned like the millenium. To the inhabitants of a besieged town fatigue renders repose more welcome and more necessary; the roar of cannon does not awake them. Familiar dangers lose half their terrour, and we yield,

with a weakness which we will not detect and cannot resist, to the delusions of every rumour without evidence, and every hope that rises up to console us against it. The federalist rises like the sluggard from his bed at the cry of fire, hoping that a little more water will quench it, and that he may then return to sleep undisturbed. It is not easy, perhaps it is not possible, to make the citizens political soldiers, to persuade them to sleep on their arms, ready at the beat of drum, to repel the assaults of the jacobins, on law and liberty. It will even sink their estimate of the value of civil liberty, to know that it gives joy, gives safety, honour, gives every thing but sleep. They will be apt, in obedience to the suggestions of spleen and weariness, to say, that the single thing it denies is worth more than the million it bestows, and joyfully to embrace a political condition, which would somewhat abate the pretension of each individual to be a sovereign, and require a less painful effort to maintain it.

It is, indeed, exceedingly obvious, that many, if not most persons have chosen the state of the highest liberty, without having counted how much it must cost to preserve it. The calumnies vented against president Adams's book, are signal proofs of the crude and indocile state of popular opinion amongst us. He has ingeniously described evils and faithfully and wisely pointed out their remedies: yet he is accused of being no friend to republicks, because he well understands their nature, and seriously dreads their dangers. The very factions who create and aggravate those dangers, and who neither understand nor desire those remedies, honour their own ignorance with the name of principle, and claim for their licentiousness the exclusive title of republicanism. If it fails, it is they who will make it fail. The impediments to its success, which arise from the structure of the human heart, create *surprise*, though they were obviously inevitable, and something like *despair*, though we know that they may be surmounted.

> Faction will freedom, like it's shade, pursue;
> Yet, like the shadow, proves the substance true.

We have to sustain an everlasting conflict with faction, a foe, destined to be the companion of liberty, and, at last, its assassin. However we may flatter ourselves with the idea, that our blows will prove fatal to this foe, yet, though smitten to the ground, it will rise again like Anteus, untired, invulnerable, and immortal. Nothing can more strikingly illustrate the folly of the jacobins, in their pretensions to a superiour vigilance for the *people*, than the natural and indeed experienced tendency of their turbulence to strengthen the powers of government. The danger these men create, must be repelled by arming our rulers with force enough, and appointing them to watch in our stead. Thus good citizens find, that they must submit to laws of the more rigour, because the desperate licentiousness and wickedness of the bad, could not be otherwise restrained. If the laws they complain of really abridge liberty, as they pretend, which, however, is positively denied, it is their own wickedness that has supplied to government the pretext, and varnished it over with the appearance of necessity. Quiet, satisfied people, need the least law ; but as the jacobins are of a very different character, it is clear that all the fruit of their perverseness must be to abridge the liberty of the people ; and this too if they fail of success. But if they should prevail, the *people* would be crushed, as in France, under tyranny more vindictive, unfeeling, and rapacious, than that of Tiberius, Nero, or Caligula, or any single despot that ever existed. The rage of one man will be tired by repetition of outrage, or it may be eluded by art or by flight. It seldom smites the obscure, who are, many, but, like a gust, uproots chiefly the great trees that overtop the forest. A mobocracy, however, is always usurped by the worst men in the most corrupt times ; in a period of violence by the most violent. It is a Briareus with a thousand hands, each bearing a dagger ; a Cerberus gaping with ten thousand throats, all parched and thirsting for fresh blood. It is a genuine tyranny, but of all the least durable, yet the most destructive while it lasts. The power of a despot, like the ardour of a summer's sun, dries up the grass, but the roots remain fresh in the soil ; a mob-government, like a West-

India hurricane, instantly strews the fruitful earth with promiscuous ruins, and turns the sky yellow with pestilence. Men inhale a vapour like the Sirocco, and die in the open air for want of respiration. It is a winged curse that envelops the obscure as well as the distinguished, and is wafted into the lurking places of the fugitives. It is not doing justice to licentiousness, to compare it to a wind which ravages the surface of the earth; it is an earthquake that loosens its foundations, burying in an hour the accumulated wealth and wisdom of ages. Those, who, after the calamity, would reconstruct the edifice of the publick liberty, will be scarely able to find the model of the artificers, or even the ruins. Mountains have split and filled the fertile vallies, covering them with rocks and gravel; rivers have changed their beds; populous towns have sunk, leaving only frightful chasms, out of which are creeping the remnant of living wretches, the monuments and the victims of despair. This is no exaggerated description. Behold France, that open hell, still ringing with agonies and blasphemies, still smoking with sufferings and crimes, in which we see their state of torment, and perhaps our future state. There we see the wretchedness and degradation of a people, who once had the offer of liberty, but have trifled it away; and there we have seen crimes so monstrous, that, even after we know they have been perpetrated, they still seem incredible.

If, however, the real people will wake, when their own government is in danger; if like a body of minute-men they will rally in its defence, we may long preserve our excellent system unimpaired in the degree of its liberty; we may preserve every thing but our tranquillity.

It is however difficult, if not impossible, to excite and maintain as much zeal and ardour in defence of government, as will animate the jacobins for its subversion; for to them action is ease, to us it is effort: to be at rest costs them more constraint, than us to stir. The machinery of our zeal is wrought by a feeble and intermitting momentum, and is impeded by its own friction; their rage beats like the pulse of life, and to stop it would be mortal. Like the whirlwind it clears away

obstacles, and gathers speed in its progress. Any great exertion not only tires, but disgusts the federalists: their spirit, after flaming brightly, soon sleeps in its embers; but the jacobins, like salamanders, can breathe only in fire. Like toads, they suck no aliment from the earth but its poisons. When they rest in their lurking places, as they did after the publication of the *despatches*, it is, like serpents in winter, the better to concoct their venom; and when they are in action, it is to shed it. Without digressing to make an analysis of the jacobin character, whether it is envy that sickens at the fame of superiours, cupidity that seeks political power for the sake of plunder, or ambition that considers plunder as the instrument to get power; whether their characters are formed by the weak facility of their faith, or their faith determined by the sour, malignant, and suspicious cast of their temperament, yet all agree in this one point, all are moved by some fixed prejudice or strong passion, some powerful spring of action, so blended with self-interest, or self-love, and so exalted into fanaticism, that the ordinary powers of the man, and the extraordinary powers conferred on the enthusiast, are equally devoted to their cause of anarchy. Hatred of the government becomes a mania, a *dementia quoad hoc*, and their dread of all power but their own, resembles the hydrophobia, baffling our attempts to describe its nature or its remedies. These are the fanaticks whom the federalists must oppose; and what in common times is to excite their zeal and secure the constancy of their opposition? A sense of duty, which a few men of abstraction will deduce from just principles, and the foresight of a few more, who will be terrified by the tendencies of democracy to anarchy? But sober duty and a timorous forecast are feeble antagonists against jacobinism; it is flat tranquillity against passion; dry leaves against the whirlwind; the weight of gun powder against its kindled force. Such federalists may serve as weathercocks to show how the wind blows, but are no shelter against its violence. The quiet citizens may be compared to the still water in the lake; the acobins to that part of it which falls over a cataract at its outlet: the former having a thousand

times the greatest mass, but no energy, and scarcely motion enough to keep it sweet; the latter dashed into foam, and scooping deeper channels in the rocks of adamant. To weight we must impart motion; correct good sense must acquire the energy of zeal. A score of absurd cant opinions must be scouted, all which tend to make us like the jacobin designs a little more, and to dread and abhor their agents a little less. Take a specimen of the proselyting logick: the jacobins, they tell us, are many of them *honest men, but misled.* Whether they will long remain honest, yet the associates of knaves and their fellow workers of iniquity, may be doubted. If the invectives against those, who insist on being called honest, among the jacobins, are "too harsh and acrimonious" to-day, they will by to-morrow, or the next day, be sufficiently assimilated to the company they keep, and the designs they pursue, to merit them: they get a character for life only one day too soon. Besides, it is not the character of an odd man or two, or at most of half a dozen in a state, that happens to have a head too thick to admit, or too hot to yield to the principles of the party, that is to denominate the exact dark hue of the vice, or the precise measure of infamy that belongs of right to the party. Look at France, see jacobinism at home, where, neither ashamed of its character, nor afraid of its punishment, it indulges the unrestrained propensities of its nature, and then decide, reader, if you can, that the victims of law are a worse set of men than its conquerors.

It must be remembered too, that publick opinion is the great auxiliary of good government. Where can its weight fall so properly as on the conspirators who disturb its tranquillity and plot its subversion? The man, who, from passion or folly, or bad company, happens to believe, that liberty will rise, when government sinks, may be less criminal, but little less contemptible for his sincerity. If a mad man should poison a spring, because he fancies, that all, who drink and die, will go to heaven and be happy, is he to be soothed and

indulged? Will you let him have his way? Are you not to tell those who are thirsty, and about to drink the poisonous water, that it is death? Will it be against "candour and decency" to tell them, that the man is mad? The gentle criticks on the style of federal writers would have that scorn withheld, which is almost the only thing that actually restrains the jacobins from mischief; that scorn, which makes those who might be misled ashamed to join them. The factious have the cunning to say, that the bitterness of their spirit is owing to the harsh and acrimonious treatment they receive; as if reproach had made them jacobins; whereas it is jacobinism that extorts reproach. Our government has not armies, nor a hierarchy, nor an extensive patronage. Instead of these auxiliaries of other governments, let it have the sword of public opinion drawn in its defence, and not only drawn but whetted by satire to an edge to hew its adversaries down. Let jacobin vice be seen as a monster, and let not a mock candour pity, till we embrace it. Other governments may stand, though not very steadily, if publick opinion be only neuter: but our system has so little intrinsick energy, that this soul of the republick's soul must not only approve, but co-operate. The vain, the timid, and trimming must be made by examples to see that scorn smites, and blasts, and withers like lightning the knaves that mislead them. Then let the misled *many* come off and leave the party if they will; if not, let them club it with them for the infamy.

A FRAME of government less free and popular might perhaps have been left to take some care of itself; but the people choose to have it as it is, and, therefore, they must not complain of the burden, but come forward and support it: it has not strength to stand alone without such help from the wise and honest citizens. The time to do this, is at the elections. There, if any where, the sovereignty of the citizen is to be exercised; and there the privilege is open to the most excessive and most fatal abuse.

HERE at last the jacobins have taken their post, and here they have intrenched themselves to assail our sober and orderly liberty. Here we see of late, indeed within a single year, an almost total change in the tacticks, and management of parties. The jacobins have at last made their own discipline perfect: they are trained, officered, regimented and formed to subordination, in a manner that our militia have never yet equalled. Emissaries are sent to every class of men, and even to every individual man, that can be gained. Every threshing floor, every husking, every party at work on a house-frame or raising a building, the very funerals are infected with bawlers or whisperers against government. In one of our towns, it is a fact, that the vote would have been unanimous for our worthy chief magistrate; but a turbulent man who kept two great dogs, but could not keep his estate, had influence enough to gain five or six votes for the anti-candidate: the only complaint he had to urge against the governour was, that he had signed the act for the dog tax.

THE extreme industry of this faction shews the extent of their designs; even the town governments are not below their scheme of influence. It is plain, that they intend to get the state government into their hands. They will make the attempt, and if they get only one-fifth jacobin members, they will try again next year, never despairing of their final success: should they succeed, they would use the power of Massachusetts against the laws and government of the United States. No longer hoping much aid from the fleets and armies of France, which they but lately declared they wished to see on our shores and coast, they rely on themselves. In every state they are exerting themselves rather more like an armed force beating up for recruits, than a sect of political disputants; and it is as certain as any future event can be, that they will take arms against the laws as soon as they dare; probably within a year, if they get the countenance of the New-England state governments. They are already in arms in Pennsylvania, and Virginia holds forth all possible

encouragement to their rising, by resolutions and remonstrances calculated to excite civil war, and to infuse into the bosoms of the factious all the fury with which such wars are carried on.

If they would rise and try the issue in the field, they would be beaten. Let them then come out; but while they depend on lies and industry in spreading them, they will beat us.

They are overmatched by the federalists in argument. Every publick question, that has been keenly investigated, and sifted by the political writers and debaters on both sides, has been clearly decided against them. In the resources of money and that sort of credit, which grows out of confidence in the virtue and morals of political men, the jacobins are weak indeed. The federalists, throughout New-England at least, probably pay nineteen shillings in the pound of the taxes; and as to *credit*, the chiefs of the party would consider an inquiry into their title to any as a cruel irony. For talents as statesmen the New-England jacobin leaders are despicable; their ignorance of commerce, of finance, and of the "diplomatick skill" of France, is not only obvious, but they are concerned to urge the last as an excuse, for if they are not ignorant they are wicked: it is possible they are both. As to talents in the field, on which side do they appear? The reader may be left to look up jacobin generals and heroes.

With all these undoubted titles to contempt, are the jacobins to be despised? Individually, it may be so; though great numbers are rather to be pitied; but, collectively, they are formidable, and a party is never more to be feared than when it is despised. Then they are let alone to undermine the pillars of the publick order; then it happens, as at the present moment, that they bestir themselves to get jacobins elected into the general court; and the friends of government, despising their foe, sleep in a dangerous security.

The jacobins know, that they are as yet weak in force, though powerful in lies and low cunning. They will not

appear in arms at present, for that would make their weakness the antagonist of our strength. But lies and cunning are always formidable at elections: thus they oppose their strength to our weakness; we cannot and will not resort to lies. But we can overmatch them when we take the alarm in season, and rouse the federal zeal: that zeal has more than once saved the country. Now is the time and the occasion again to display it, for the faction turns its evil eyes to the elections of the house of representatives of the state; and if they obtain even a large minority, they will spread the infection with more ardour than even a majority, as minorities are ever the most industrious and most firmly united. So large a mass of poison in the general court, lying in fermentation for a year, would vitiate and corrupt our political health; and by another year a jacobin majority would appear there to overturn, and overturn, and overturn, till property shall take wings, and true liberty and good government find their graves. By getting a majority of jacobins into the New-England state legislatures, they would make civil war, disunion, and perhaps a foreign yoke, the lot of the present generation. Friends of virtue, if you will not attend the election, and lend to liberty the help of your votes, within two years you will have to defend her cause with your swords.

LAOCOON, N°. II.

TO some the warmth of the preceding number of Laocoon will appear excessive, and to others altogether superfluous: *excessive*, because, they urge, the feelings of the jacobins ought to be treated with more tenderness, and their designs with more candour; and *superfluous*, because the political sky is bright and unclouded, promising the long continuance of fair weather. The adoption of either of these opinions

would have an influence with the writer; the first would change his style, the latter impose silence. Faction is an adherence to interests foreign to the interests of the state: there is such a faction amongst us devoted to France. He believes that the jacobin *faction* is composed, like every other, of ambitious knaves who mislead, and of a weak and infatuated rabble who are misled. Among the latter are numbers who set out *honest*, and, while they continue so, they are deserving of some indulgence, and there is some hope of reclaiming a *very few* of them; but if they travel far on the party road, or associate long with the desperadoes in the van, who explore the thorny and crooked by-ways, they will not *remain honest*. They will be corrupted, and so deeply, that, in every approach towards civil war and revolution, the dupes, who sincerely believe the whole creed of their party, will be found ready to go the farthest. After they have thrown off all political duty, the remains of *other* moral principles, which *the philosophers* would call the *prejudices* of education, will be just sufficient to prevent remorse, or to stifle it. There is a sophistry in all the passions, and that of every strong one is almost always convincing. We see accordingly that men of some morals, when they run politically mad, far from flinching from the debasing company of knaves, whom party dubs *patriots*, make open profession of their monstrous principles, and hardily vindicate their most desperate designs. It is a fact, the talk of the jacobins, and even their printed threats are to demolish bank property and funded debt, and to wreak vengeance on the aristocrats, meaning the possessors of property. How many professors of the christian religion have seen with complacency, nay with joy and exultation, the downfal of priests, and creeds, and churches in France. The unspeakable cruelties and crimes exercised against catholics, they tell us, will introduce the true worship, and that they admire, and we are bound to approve, proceedings that *are* so wicked, because they *will be* so useful. The sophistry that can thus

silence conscience and varnish crimes, has no less succeeded in blinding the understandings of these *honest jacobins* (so called) to the absolute falsehood of their political notions. France has confessedly lost liberty, and the spirit and love of it, and has become infatuated with the passion for rapine and conquest; yet they still insist, that, though France has *not* liberty at present, she *will* have it. After the revolutionary storm, there will be a delightful calm, when reason only will be heard, and nothing but the equal rights of man desired or regarded: and as to the conquest of other nations, aristocracies or corruptions of democracy fell in Switzerland, and the universal domination of France will multiply republicks and demolish thrones. Is the writer to blame, if he feels contempt for opinions like these? If, notwithstanding their absurdity, and indeed for the very reason that they are absurd, he sees that they are contagious, and knows that they are dangerous; if he sees their propagators formidable by their zeal, and the more formidable for its blindness, digging their mines and laying their trains of gun-powder to blow up the temple of liberty, is it possible for him to feel contempt in silence, or can he express it without a mixture of detestation and abhorrence? The party who thus labour to destroy all that we have toiled and fought for, and *sworn* to preserve, is surely, collectively speaking, the proper object of our considerate indignation; nor can there be any *unfitness*, any want of *candour*, any departure from the line of *policy*, in exhibiting the picture of this party, *as it is*. The inevitable effect of this picture is to excite aversion, scorn, and terrour: the fault of rousing these unpleasant emotions, in all their strength, is not in the painter, it is in the *subject*. Let the soft seekers of popularity dream of soothing parties into moderation. When they see a faction devoted to our foreign enemy, putting their *all* in jeopardy, let them counsel us again, as they have often done before, to bestow upon the factious all our charity, and more than half our esteem, and upon the government that is struggling to preserve us, all our jealousy, and as much of our support as we can afford it with-

out making enemies. Let them compose new homilies for hypocrisy, to inculcate upon citizens brotherly love towards amiable, *patriotick* traitors, and upon government forbearance to make or execute laws against *inoffensive* conspiracies. But let such discourses issue only from the Chronicle. Let all but its readers and patrons abstain from censuring the asperity, with which the jacobins, as a party, are treated. The scorn that is poured upon them is the greatest obstacle they encounter in their more than Jesuit labours of making converts to jacobinism; and the dread and abhorrence, in which the party and their schemes are held, is the chief auxiliary of good government in preventing their success. It is the squeamishness, the trimming, half-way, selfish spirit of too many federalists that keeps the faction encouraged to prosecute its pestilent designs. The British nation is now united as one man, and the force of publick opinion is combined, the voice of the real nation is heard, and faction is of consequence in the mire of contempt. Till our spirit is in like manner roused, all things will seem to be possible to party, and therefore all evil things will be attempted. If we allow ourselves to hope any respite from the assaults of the French faction, it is by animating the zeal of the friends of virtue and government, and persuading them to come forth and to speak out, and thus we shall discourage and disarm the factious: their affected moderation must not rob the cause of half its support. It is indeed evident, that the spirit of the friends of order is at all times weak, excepting only when the danger is so near and obvious as to rouse an universal alarm and a common exertion. A correct view of the character of jacobinism, if once clearly taken and profoundly impressed upon the publick, would keep those well grounded apprehensions constantly awake, which in effect are the guardians of our political safety.

I WILL not therefore admit, that the task of delineating the true character of the *deluded* mass of the jacobins is unnecessary, or that by adhering to truth there will be a deviation from urbanity and candour. I will raise my feeble voice to expose

the frailty of those hopes, which too many repose on the *honesty* of the factious, and which incline them to behold the desperation of their measures without much fear, because they trust that the individuals of the party will flinch as soon as things approach towards extremities. This trust is a vain one. I am as ready as others to make excuses for the deluded of all parties. Of all the causes of seduction from virtue, perhaps, none is so powerful as the fellowship of party. But what then? Are we still to maintain that party men are *honest*, when they have been long exposed to an influence, which we know is almost irresistibly corrupting? We may, and we ought, on this account, the more deeply to deplore the ravages of the spirit of faction upon morals and the sentiments of humanity. We are not, however, to deny the fact, and insist upon reposing our confidence in the correct moral discernment of men, whom we know to be deluded, nor in the restraints of shame and principle upon those minds, which have already overcome the shame of their principles and their associates. We may be sure, that more than half the utmost corrupting work of political vice is already done, and that the reputed honest men of the faction have either renounced their old principles, or dismissed them as the guides of their conduct. It is a cruel mercy, that would spare the party, because some of the individuals mean well. The plain truth should be told; it may alarm a few, and save them from being traitors.

Some labour to exhibit a brief analysis will be proper, as it will tend to excite federalists to a sense of their actual danger, and disarm the host of trimmers and political hypocrites of a topick which they never fail to urge upon our politeness and good nature, whenever they would abate the scorn that is thrown upon one party, or quench the sparks of that zeal which is too rarely excited in the other.

Supposing the *honest* among the jacobins to possess the ordinary degrees of self-knowledge, on looking inward they will find there a consciousness of some moral principle, of some integrity of heart. This will make them less distrustful

of themselves, less apprehensive of the reproaches of others; and having adopted erroneous political maxims, they will pursue their dark mazes with a fearless step. The ill consequences, though natural, not being foreseen, will seem to proceed from accident, and only stimulate their perseverance, or to be owing to the malice of the concealed aristocrats, and inflame with a ten-fold heat the rancour of their hostility. What was errour becomes passion. The *honest* man thinks, that he is summoned to the combat: the casuistry of a jacobin conscience spreads a mist before *his* eyes, which he thinks renders him invisible; obstinacy cases him in mail; French humanity puts a dagger into one hand, and party zeal, calling itself patriotism, a fire brand into the other. Thus the *honest* jacobin, equally misled by what he knows, and by the nature of his own principles and their tendencies, goes forth to assist knaves in what he deems the cause of *virtue*. He has so many excuses in the good motives, which he is sure he does feel, and in the happy consequences, which he thinks he certainly does foresee, that he makes haste to spread ruin without compunction, and to perpetrate crimes without remorse. Every intelligent politician knows, that, in all party affairs, the unthinking dupes and honest fools are the rashest. The crimes they can excuse, and even persuade themselves to call virtues, they do not blush to commit. They are not afraid of shame, because they adopt the creed of their teachers, and glory in it. They dance on the edge of a precipice, and think it a firm plain all round their feet. They foresee but little, and dread little of what they foresee. Little deterred by unforeseen danger, and strongly allured by imaginary good, that will be the sure reward of their patriot labours, if successful, the duty to struggle for that success appears to be superiour to every other. The best institutions, the great safeguards of order, seem to them abuses: government is an obstacle, and must be removed; magistrates are enemies, and must be conquered. They at last make conscience of committing the most shocking atrocities, and learn to throw their eyes beyond the gulph

of revolution, confusion, and civil war, which yawns at their feet, to behold an Eden of primitive innocence, equality, and liberty in blossom on the other side. There these tigers of revolution, their leaders, are to lie down with the lamb-like multitude, sometimes suffering hunger, yet forbearing to eat them. The rights of man are to be established by being solemnly proclaimed, and printed, so that every citizen shall have a copy. Avarice, ambition, revenge, and rage will be disenchanted from all hearts, and die there; man will be regenerated; by slaying half a million only once, four millions will be born twice, and the glorious work of that perfectibility of the species, foretold by Condorcet and the Mazzei sect in America, will begin.

The knaves, however, who lead this infatuated *honest* multitude, indulge no such extravagant delusions. They have no faith in this splendid hereafter, this happy *future* state for jacobins in *this* world. They have as little taste for it. They propose other rewards for their patriotick virtue, than this heaven of metaphysicks has laid up for them. Turning to their own base hearts, they shrink from themselves, and are more likely to feel remorse, than their *honest* disciples; they are conscious, that they ought to be suspected, and they act with the caution that this consciousness inevitably inspires; their dupes act with a fervour, and rage, and thirst for innovation, which render the prospects of all possible confusion insufficient to satisfy them. The cold thinking villains who lead, "whose "black blood runs temperately bad," desire on the contrary no more confusion than just enough to answer their own ends: their ambition would naturally desire to preserve the powers of government to usurp them, and their rapacity would spare the wealth of the state to plunder it. A fresh set would indeed succeed, as in France, and rob the first despoilers, till the state, successively a prey, would be reduced to beggary and ruin. It is seldom that the leaders of revolutions have much profited by them; and this shews the shortsightedness even of *their* policy, and that, as it relates to their own personal

advantage, they are nearly as much deluded as their dupes. But the possession of the sovereign power, however precarious, is too great a temptation for their prudence to withstand. Accordingly we see, that for such a prize competitors are never wanting; and they struggle for the imperial purple with as much ardour and fierceness, as if it were not wet and dropping with the blood of its last usurper. Robespierre's fall incited more pretenders than it intimidated.

It will be objected, that this open avowal of contempt and detestation of the jacobins, and this unreserved exhortation to all friends of government to inculcate these sentiments, can only exasperate party animosities and augment their mutual virulence. I ask in reply, would my silence, or the most soothing style of address I could choose, prevent or compose these animosities? Is it in the nature of free governments to exist without parties? Such a thing has never yet been and probably never will be. Is it in the nature of party to exist without passion? or of passion to acquiesce, when it meets with opposers and obstacles? Is it owing, do the vapid declaimers really think in good faith, to the intemperance or indiscretion of federal writers, that jacobins are restless and malignant? or that, by changing epithets or lavishing lying praises on their *honesty*, they would change their nature and renounce their designs? No, it is absurd to expect faction cold in the pursuit of great objects, reasonable in selecting means for gratifying inordinate designs, retarded by moral doubts and perplexities, when led by *philosophers*, soft to persuade, when it is callous to pity, and fearless of consequences. Party moderation is children's talk. Who has ever seen faction *calmly* in a rage? Who will expect to see that carnivorous monster quietly submit to eat grass?

The criticks on this performance may be assured, therefore, that, if no good is done by it, it will not do the mischief they apprehend. Parties will hate each other a little less for mutual plain dealing and freedom of speech; for they never

hate with more inveteracy than when they condescend to sooth and to flatter.

THERE are some who will admit, that the spirit of party is virulent, and its principle and designs utterly profligate, who will nevertheless scruple to say, that the present state of affairs is such as to demand an alarming appeal to the patriotism of the citizens. France, our dangerous foe, they will tell us, is baffled and detected in her arts, and deprived by the victories of the English navy of her arms; that all fear of invasion may be dismissed; and even if a few thousand negroes should be landed from Guadaloupe, the citizens would rally round the standard of lawful government, and crush the invaders; that the rebellion in Pennsylvania is feeble in force, and cowardly in spirit; that the government never before had such power of arms, of credit, of treasure, and what is more than arms and treasure, of duty and affection in the hearts of all good citizens; that it appears the fairer, for having been falsely accused; that its friends have more zeal and confidence than ever, and the jacobins now feel their own weakness, and know, that they can depend little on themselves, and none at all on France. This is, therefore, they will insist, a time for exultation, not of alarm; a time tranquilly to enjoy the blessings of our free constitution, not to suffer anxiety, and to mount guard, as heretofore, for its defence. These are pleasing illusions, but they are illusions.

WHEN we look at Europe, and contemplate its political state, we seem to be treading on the crater of a half-extinguished volcano. Here, scarcely cool from their fusion, are the cinders of one republick, and there still smoke the brands of another. On this side see a little Italian state beginning to belch revolutionary fires; on that another lies like a little mount on the great French volcano, a jumbled mass of lava and ruins. Can we think there is a decree for the immortality of our republick, when every gazette from Europe is blackened with the epitaphs of nations once independent, now no more. Lately they had life and being; now they lie like little mangled birds to digest in the French tiger's maw. One

nation alone resists these new Romans, and prevents the establishment of a universal domination, and a despotism over the whole civilized world. Surely, if we contemplate only *external* danger, this is no time for security and presumptuous confidence. That single nation, though magnanimous, though powerful in wealth as well as spirit, may grow weary of standing in the gap, or, possibly, may imitate the wretched policy of the emperour, and, in compensation for a respite to the strong foes of France, may permit her to finish the conquest of her weak ones. The power of France, though checked at sea, is still gigantick, far exceeding that of the Roman empire in the days of Trajan; and, before the end of the year, she will probably incorporate all Italy, Spain, and Portugal, with her vast territory, which takes the Rhine for a boundary, and includes Holland. It is more than a thousand years, since the world has seen a power any thing near so overwhelming and terrifick as that of France. Dreadful as her force is, her arts are still more dreadful, and here our danger lies.

A FACTION, whose union is perfect, whose spirit is desperate, addressing something persuasive to every prejudice, putting something combustible to every passion, granting some indulgence to every vice, promising those who dread the law to set them above it, to the mean whispering suspicion, to the ambitious offering power, to the rapacious, plunder, to the violent, revenge, to the envious, the abasement of all that is venerable, to innovators, the transmutation of all that is established, grouping together all that is folly, vice, and passion in the state, and forming of these vile materials another state, *an imperium in imperio*—Behold this is our condition, these our terrours. And what are the resources for our safety?

THEY all exist in the energy and correctness of the publick opinion. A thousand proofs exist, but the fact is so notorious it is needless to vouch them, to show, that our government has been, and is supported only by the appeal to the virtue, zeal, and patriotism of the *body of the citizens*. Genet assumed upon himself the powers of a sovereign, and exercised them

too, till the government cried out for help to the people, and they came to help in season. The treaty contest stopped the wheels of government for a time; and the effective sovereignty was first actually assumed and exercised by the town meetings, and then *divided* between the executive and senate on one side, who adhered to the treaty, and the house who shewed a disposition to annul it. This was an instance of the government being near its death, by the benumbing stroke of a factious apoplexy, without a resort to arms, without taking the sense of the people. But again in that case, the real people took the alarm, and saved the country from the terrible convulsions, which never fail to ensue, when the political house is divided against itself. With less intelligence of the citizens, or a fortnight's less speed in rallying, all would then have been lost.

When the instances are so recent, that the pulse of alarm has scarcely yet ceased to flutter, will any man of common sense pretend to say, that our government stands unshaken upon a foundation of rock? that the sounds of alarm are counterfeit or imaginary? that faction is impotent and contemptible?

No nation can rely on the sufficiently clear and early political discernment of its citizens, to discover and repel the danger to its liberty and independence: they may discover their danger too late, as all the people of the fallen European states did: they may mistake too, and think, as the Swiss did, that it is safer to trust the foe than to resist him. Opinion is every where fickle, and our political situation is awkward and unprecedented; hard *now* to change, impossible to maintain a strange middle state, not easy to be understood or approved. It is peace without tranquillity; it is war without action: it is peace, yet it is dangerous; it is war, yet it deadens all the fervours of patriotism, all the energies of valour: it is peace so far only, as to lay our bosoms bare to the poisoned darts of our foe, and to the hostility of his ally, our intestine faction; it is war to every extent, that can expose us to alarm, to depredation, and to expense. Such a state cannot be maintained longer than just to afford to the nation some few months to decide which they will prefer, a foreign or a civil war.

THE malady of a foreign faction has grown inveterate by time and by palliatives; it has burrowed deep in the flesh, and mingled a corrosive lymph with the marrow of the bones. Every common observer may be sure it is approaching a violent crisis. The jacobins have been every where in movement, preparing every engine of power and influence, to transfer the country, its liberty, and property, at the next election of president and vice-president, into the hands of men equally destitute of private virtue and of publick spirit.

AT this day, so fatal to the independence of free states, the sound of alarm ought not to surprise, it should animate. Republican liberty is held by the tenure of continuing worthy to hold it: we have to choose between the burden of its duties and its destiny. It has ever been deemed the Hesperian fruit, but since the days of fable it was never yet guarded by dragons. Why then will any one reprove the writer for attempting to rouse the vigilance of the citizens? It is for them as a body, and individually, to form a lifeguard to protect it from assassination.

EULOGY ON WASHINGTON.

DELIVERED, AT THE REQUEST OF THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS, FEB. 8, 1800.

IT is natural that the gratitude of mankind should be drawn to their benefactors. A number of these have successively arisen, who were no less distinguished for the elevation of their virtues, than the lustre of their talents. Of those, however, who were born, and who acted, through life, as if they were born, not for themselves, but for their country and the whole human race, how few, alas! are recorded in the long annals of ages, and how wide the intervals of time and space that divide them. In all this dreary length of way, they appear like five or six light houses on as many thousand miles of coast: they gleam upon the surrounding darkness, with an inextinguishable splendour, like stars seen through a mist; but they are seen like stars, to cheer, to guide, and to save. WASHINGTON is now added to that small number. Already he attracts curiosity, like a newly discovered star, whose benignant light will travel on to the world's and time's farthest bounds. Already his name is hung up by history as conspicuously, as if it sparkled in one of the constellations of the sky.

BY commemorating his death, we are called this day to yield the homage that is due to virtue; to confess the common debt of mankind as well as our own; and to pronounce for posterity, now dumb, that elogium, which they will delight to echo ten ages hence, when we are dumb.

I CONSIDER myself not merely in the midst of the citizens of this town, or even of the state In idea, I gather round me the nation. In the vast and venerable congregation of the patriots of all countries and of all enlightened men, I would, if I could, raise my voice, and speak to mankind in a strain

worthy of my audience, and as elevated as my subject. But you have assigned me a task that is impossible.

O IF I could perform it, if I could illustrate his principles in my discourse as he displayed them in his life, if I could paint his virtues as he practised them, if I could convert the fervid enthusiasm of my heart into the talent to transmit his fame, as it ought to pass, to posterity, I should be the successful organ of your will, the minister of his virtues, and may I dare to say, the humble partaker of his immortal glory. These are ambitious, deceiving hopes, and I reject them; for it is, perhaps, almost as difficult, at once with judgment and feeling, to praise great actions, as to perform them. A lavish and undistinguishing elogium is not praise; and to discriminate such excellent qualities as were characteristick and peculiar to him, would be to raise a name, as he raised it, above envy, above parallel, perhaps, for that very reason, above emulation.

SUCH a portraying of character, however, must be addressed to the understanding, and, therefore, even if it were well executed, would seem to be rather an analysis of moral principles, than the recital of a hero's exploits.

WITH whatever fidelity I might execute this task, I know that some would prefer a picture drawn to the imagination. They would have our WASHINGTON represented of a giant's size, and in the character of a hero of romance. They who love to wonder better than to reason, would not be satisfied with the contemplation of a great example, unless, in the exhibition, it should be so distorted into prodigy, as to be both incredible and useless. Others, I hope but few, who think meanly of human nature, will deem it incredible, that even WASHINGTON should think with as much dignity and elevation as he acted; and they will grovel in vain in the search for mean and selfish motives, that could incite and sustain him to devote his life to his country.

Do not these suggestions sound in your ears like a profanation of virtue? and, while I pronounce them, do you not feel a thrill of indignation at your hearts? Forbear. Time never fails to bring every exalted reputation to a strict scrutiny: the

world, in passing the judgment that is never to be reversed, will deny all partiality even to the name of WASHINGTON. Let it be denied, for its justice will confer glory.

SUCH a life as WASHINGTON'S cannot derive honour from the circumstances of birth and education, though it throws back a lustre upon both. With an inquisitive mind, that always profited by the lights of others, and was unclouded by passions of its own, he acquired a maturity of judgment, rare in age, unparalleled in youth. Perhaps no young man had so early laid up a life's stock of materials for solid reflection, or settled so soon the principles and habits of his conduct. Gray experience listened to his counsels with respect, and, at a time when youth is almost privileged to be rash, Virginia committed the safety of her frontier, and, ultimately, the safety of America, not merely to his valour, for that would be scarcely praise, but to his prudence.

IT is not in Indian wars that heroes are celebrated; but it is there they are formed. No enemy can be more formidable, by the craft of his ambushes, the suddenness of his onset, or the ferocity of his vengeance. The soul of WASHINGTON was thus exercised to danger; and, on the first trial, as on every other, it appeared firm in adversity, cool in action, undaunted, self-possessed. His spirit, and still more his prudence, on the occasion of Braddock's defeat, diffused his name throughout America, and across the Atlantick. Even then his country viewed him with complacency, as her most hopeful son.

AT the peace of 1763, Great Britain, in consequence of her victories, stood in a position to prescribe her own terms. She chose, perhaps, better for us than for herself: for by expelling the French from Canada, we no longer feared hostile neighbours; and we soon found just cause to be afraid of our protectors. We discerned, even then, a truth, which the conduct of France has since so strongly confirmed, that there is nothing which the gratitude of weak states can give, that will satisfy strong allies for their aid, but authority: nations that want protectors, will have masters. Our settlements, no longer checked by enemies on the frontier, rapidly increased; and it

was discovered, that America was growing to a size that could defend itself.

In this, perhaps unforeseen, but at length obvious state of things, the British government conceived a jealousy of the colonies, of which, and of their intended measures of precaution, they made no secret.

Our nation, like its great leader, had only to take counsel from its courage. When Washington heard the voice of his country in distress, his obedience was prompt; and though his sacrifices were great, they cost him no effort. Neither the object, nor the limits of my plan, permit me to dilate on the military events of the revolutionary war. Our history is but a transcript of his claims on our gratitude: our hearts bear testimony, that they are claims not to be satisfied. When overmatched by numbers, a fugitive with a little band of faithful soldiers, the states as much exhausted as dismayed, he explored his own undaunted heart, and found there resources to retrieve our affairs. We have seen him display as much valour as gives fame to heroes, and as consummate prudence as ensures success to valour; fearless of dangers that were personal to him, hesitating and cautious, when they affected his country; preferring fame before safety or repose, and duty before fame.

Rome did not owe more to Fabius, than America to Washington. Our nation shares with him the singular glory of having conducted a civil war with mildness, and a revolution with order.

The event of that war seemed to crown the felicity and glory both of America and its chief. Until that contest, a great part of the civilized world had been surprisingly ignorant of the force and character, and almost of the existence, of the British colonies. They had not retained what they knew, nor felt curiosity to know the state of thirteen wretched settlements, which vast woods enclosed, and still vaster woods divided from each other. They did not view the colonists so much a people, as a race of fugitives, whom want, and solitude, and intermixture with the savages, had made barbarians.

At this time, while Great Britain wielded a force truly formidable to the most powerful states, suddenly, astonished Europe beheld a feeble people, till then unknown, stand forth, and defy this giant to the combat. It was so unequal, all expected it would be short. Our final success exalted their admiration to its highest point: they allowed to Washington all that is due to transcendent virtue, and to the Americans more than is due to human nature. They considered us a race of Washingtons, and admitted that nature in America was fruitful only in prodigies. Their books and their travellers, exaggerating and distorting all their representations, assisted to establish the opinion, that this is a new world, with a new order of men and things adapted to it; that here we practise industry, amidst the abundance that requires none; that we have morals so refined, that we do not need laws; and though we have them, yet we ought to consider their execution as an insult and a wrong; that we have virtue without weaknesses, sentiment without passions, and liberty without factions. These illusions, in spite of their absurdity, and, perhaps, because they are absurd enough to have dominion over the imagination only, have been received by many of the malecontents against the governments of Europe, and induced them to emigrate. Such illusions are too soothing to vanity to be entirely checked in their currency among Americans.

They have been pernicious, as they cherish false ideas of the rights of men and the duties of rulers. They have led the citizens to look for liberty, where it is not; and to consider the government, which is its castle, as its prison.

Washington retired to Mount Vernon, and the eyes of the world followed him. He left his countrymen to their simplicity and their passions, and their glory soon departed. Europe began to be undeceived, and it seemed, for a time, as if, by the acquisition of independence, our citizens were disappointed. The confederation was then the only compact made "to form "a perfect union of the states, to establish justice, to ensure the "tranquillity, and provide for the security, of the nation;" and, accordingly, union was a name that still commanded reverence,

though not obedience. The system called justice was, in some of the states, iniquity reduced to elementary principles; and the publick tranquillity was such a portentous calm, as rings in deep caverns before the explosion of an earthquake. Most of the states then were in fact, though not in form, unbalanced democracies. Reason, it is true, spoke audibly in their constitutions; passion and prejudice louder in their laws. It is to the honour of Massachusetts, that it is chargeable with little deviation from principles: its adherence to them was one of the causes of a dangerous rebellion. It was scarcely possible that such governments should not be agitated by parties, and that prevailing parties should not be vindictive and unjust. Accordingly, in some of the states, creditors were treated as outlaws; bankrupts were armed with legal authority to be persecutors; and, by the shock of all confidence and faith, society was shaken to its foundations. Liberty we had, but we dreaded its abuse almost as much as its loss; and the wise, who deplored the one, clearly foresaw the other.

The peace of America hung by a thread, and factions were already sharpening their weapons to cut it. The project of three separate empires in America was beginning to be broached, and the progress of licentiousness would have soon rendered her citizens unfit for liberty in either of them. An age of blood and misery would have punished our disunion: but these were not the considerations to deter ambition from its purpose, while there were so many circumstances in our political situation to favour it.

At this awful crisis, which all the wise so much dreaded at the time, yet which appears, on a retrospect, so much more dreadful than their fears; some man was wanting who possessed a commanding power over the popular passions, but over whom those passions had no power. That man was Washington.

His name, at the head of such a list of worthies as would reflect honour on any country, had its proper weight with all the enlightened, and with almost all the well disposed among the less informed citizens, and, blessed be God! the constitu-

tion was adopted. Yes, to the eternal honour of America among the nations of the earth, it was adopted, in spite of the obstacles, which, in any other country, and, perhaps, in any other age of *this*, would have been insurmountable; in spite of the doubts and fears, which well-meaning prejudice creates for itself, and which party so artfully inflames into stubbornness; in spite of the vice, which it has subjected to restraint, and which is therefore its immortal and implacable foe; in spite of the oligarchies in some of the states, from whom it snatched dominion; it was adopted, and our country enjoys one more invaluable chance for its union and happiness: invaluable! if the retrospect of the dangers we have escaped shall sufficiently inculcate the principles we have so tardily established. Perhaps multitudes are not to be taught by their fears only, without suffering much to deepen the impression; for experience brandishes in her school a whip of scorpions, and teaches nations her summary lessons of wisdom by the scars and wounds of their adversity.

THE amendments which have been projected in some of the states shew, that, in them at least, these lessons are not well remembered. In a confederacy of states, some powerful, others weak, the weakness of the federal union will, sooner or later, encourage, and will not restrain, the ambition and injustice of the members: the weak can no otherwise be strong or safe, but in the energy of the national government. It is this defect, which the blind jealousy of the weak states not unfrequently contributes to prolong, that has proved fatal to all the confederations that ever existed.

ALTHOUGH it was impossible that such merit as WASHINGTON'S should not produce envy, it was scarcely possible that, with such a transcendent reputation, he should have rivals. Accordingly, he was unanimously chosen president of the United States.

As a general and a patriot, the measure of his glory was already full: there was no fame left for him to excel but his own; and even that task, the mightiest of all his labours, his civil magistracy has accomplished.

No sooner did the new government begin its auspicious course, than order seemed to arise out of confusion. Commerce and industry awoke, and were cheerful at their labours; for credit and confidence awoke with them. Every where was the appearance of prosperity; and the only fear was, that its progress was too rapid to consist with the purity and simplicity of ancient manners. The cares and labours of the president were incessant: his exhortations, example, and authority, were employed to excite zeal and activity for the publick service: able officers were selected, only for their merits; and some of them remarkably distinguished themselves by their successful management of the publick business. Government was administered with such integrity, without mystery, and in so prosperous a course, that it seemed to be wholly employed in acts of beneficence. Though it has made many thousand malecontents, it has never, by its rigour or injustice, made one man wretched.

Such was the state of publick affairs: and did it not seem perfectly to ensure uninterrupted harmony to the citizens? Did they not, in respect to their government and its administration, possess their whole heart's desire? They had seen and suffered long the want of an efficient constitution; they had freely ratified it; they saw Washington, their tried friend, the father of his country, invested with its powers: they knew that he could not exceed or betray them, without forfeiting his own reputation. Consider, for a moment, what a reputation it was: such as no man ever before possessed by so clear a title, and in so high a degree. His fame seemed in its purity to exceed even its brightness: office took honour from his acceptance, but conferred none. Ambition stood awed and darkened by his shadow. For where, through the wide earth, was the man so vain as to dispute precedence with him; or what were the honours that could make the possessor Washington's superiour? Refined and complex as the ideas of virtue are, even the gross could discern in his life the infinite superiority of her rewards. Mankind perceived some change in their

ideas of greatness: the splendour of power, and even of the name of conqueror, had grown dim in their eyes. They did not know that WASHINGTON could augment his fame; but they knew and felt, that the world's wealth, and its empire too, would be a bribe far beneath his acceptance.

THIS is not exaggeration: never was confidence in a man and a chief magistrate more widely diffused, or more solidly established.

IF it had been in the nature of man, that we should enjoy liberty, without the agitations of party, the United States had a right, under these circumstances, to expect it: but it was impossible. Where there is no liberty, they may be exempt from party. It will seem strange, but it scarcely admits a doubt, that there are fewer malecontents in Turkey, than in any free state in the world. Where the people have no power, they enter into no contests, and are not anxious to know how they shall use it. The spirit of discontent becomes torpid for want of employment, and sighs itself to rest. The people sleep soundly in their chains, and do not even dream of their weight. They lose their turbulence with their energy, and become as tractable as any other animals: a state of degradation, in which they extort our scorn, and engage our pity, for the misery they do not feel. Yet that heart is a base one, and fit only for a slave's bosom, that would not bleed freely, rather than submit to such a condition; for liberty with all its parties and agitations is more desirable than slavery. Who would not prefer the republicks of ancient Greece, where liberty once subsisted in its excess, its delirium, terrible in its charms, and glistening to the last with the blaze of the very fire that consumed it?

I DO not know that I ought, but I am sure that I do, prefer those republicks to the dozing slavery of the modern Greece, where the degraded wretches have suffered scorn till they merit it, where they tread on classick ground, on the ashes of heroes and patriots, unconscious of their ancestry, ignorant of the nature, and almost of the name of liberty, and insensible

even to the passion for it. Who, on this contrast, can forbear to say, it is the modern Greece that lies buried, that sleeps forgotten in the caves of Turkish darkness? It is the ancient Greece that lives in remembrance, that is still bright with glory, still fresh in immortal youth. They are unworthy of liberty, who entertain a less exalted idea of its excellence. The misfortune is, that those who profess to be its most passionate admirers have, generally, the least comprehension of its hazards and impediments: they expect, that an enthusiastick admiration of its nature will reconcile the multitude to the irksomeness of its restraints. Delusive expectation! WASHINGTON was not thus deluded. We have his solemn warning against the often fatal propensities of liberty. He had reflected, that men are often false to their country and their honour, false to duty and even to their interest, but multitudes of men are never long false or deaf to their passions: these will find obstacles in the laws, associates in party. The fellowships thus formed are more intimate, and impose commands more imperious, than those of society.

THUS party forms a state within the state, and is animated by a rivalship, fear, and hatred, of its superiour. When this happens, the merits of the government will become fresh provocations and offences, for they are the merits of an enemy. No wonder then, that as soon as party found the virtue and glory of WASHINGTON were obstacles, the attempt was made, by calumny, to surmount them both. For this, the greatest of all his trials, we know that he was prepared. He knew, that the government must possess sufficient strength from within or without, or fall a victim to faction. This *interiour* strength was plainly inadequate to its defence, unless it could be reinforced from *without* by the zeal and patriotism of the citizens; and this latter resource was certainly as accessible to president WASHINGTON, as to any chief magistrate that ever lived. The life of the federal government, he considered, was in the breath of the people's nostrils: whenever they should happen to be so infatuated or inflamed as to abandon its

defence, its end must be as speedy, and might be as tragical, as a constitution for France.

While the president was thus administering the government in so wise and just a manner, as to engage the great majority of the enlightened and virtuous citizens to co-operate with him for its support, and while he indulged the hope that time and habit were confirming their attachment, the French revolution had reached that point in its progress, when its terrible principles began to agitate all civilized nations. I will not, on this occasion, detain you to express, though my thoughts teem with it, my deep abhorrence of that revolution; its despotism, by the mob or the military, from the first, and its hypocrisy of morals to the last. Scenes have passed there which exceed description, and which, for other reasons, I will not attempt to describe; for it would not be possible, even at this distance of time, and with the sea between us and France, to go through with the recital of them, without perceiving horrour gather, like a frost, about the heart, and almost stop its pulse. That revolution has been constant in nothing but its vicissitudes, and its promises; always delusive, but always renewed, to establish philosophy by crimes, and liberty by the sword. The people of France, if they are not like the modern Greeks, find their cap of liberty is a soldier's helmet: and with all their imitation of dictators and consuls, their exactest similitude to these Roman ornaments, is in their chains. The nations of Europe perceive another resemblance, in their all-conquering ambition.

But it is only the influence of that event on America, and on the measures of the president, that belongs to my subject. It would be ingratefully wrong to his character, to be silent in respect to a part of it, which has the most signally illustrated his virtues.

The genuine character of that revolution is not even yet so well understood, as the dictates of self-preservation require it should be. The chief duty and care of all governments is to protect the rights of property, and the tranquillity of society.

The leaders of the French revolution, from the beginning, excited the poor against the rich. This has made the rich poor, but it will never make the poor rich. On the contrary, they were used only as blind instruments to make those leaders masters, first of the adverse party, and then of the state. Thus the powers of the state were turned round into a direction exactly contrary to the proper one, not to preserve tranquillity and restrain violence, but to excite violence by the lure of power, and plunder, and vengeance. Thus all France has been, and still is, as much the prize of the ruling party, as a captured ship, and if any right or possession has escaped confiscation, there is none that has not been liable to it.

Thus it clearly appears, that, in its origin, its character, and its means, the government of that country is revolutionary; that is, not only different from, but directly contrary to, every regular and well-ordered society. It is a danger, similar in its kind, and at least equal in degree, to that, with which ancient Rome menaced her enemies. The allies of Rome were slaves; and it cost some hundred years efforts of her policy and arms, to make her enemies her allies. Nations, at this day, can trust no better to treaties; they cannot even trust to arms, unless they are used with a spirit and perseverance becoming the magnitude of their danger. For the French revolution has been, from the first, hostile to all right and justice, to all peace and order in society; and, therefore, its very existence has been a state of warfare against the civilized world, and most of all against free and orderly republicks, for such are never without factions, ready to be the allies of France, and to aid her in the work of destruction. Accordingly, scarcely any but republicks have they subverted. Such governments, by shewing in practice what republican liberty *is*, detect French imposture, and shew what their pretexts are *not*.

To subvert them, therefore, they had, besides the facility that faction affords, the double excitement of removing a reproach, and converting their greatest obstacles into their most efficient auxiliaries.

Who then, on careful reflection, will be surprised, that the French and their partizans instantly conceived the desire, and made the most powerful attempts, to revolutionize the American government? But it will hereafter seem strange that their excesses should be excused, as the effects of a struggle for liberty; and that so many of our citizens should be flattered, while they were insulted with the idea, that our example was copied, and our principles pursued. Nothing was ever more false, or more fascinating. Our liberty depends on our education, our laws, and habits, to which even prejudices yield; on the dispersion of our people on farms, and on the almost equal diffusion of property; it is founded on morals and religion, whose authority reigns in the heart; and on the influence all these produce on publick opinion, before *that* opinion governs rulers. *Here* liberty is restraint; *there* it is violence: *here* it is mild and cheering, like the morning sun of our summer, brightening the hills, and making the vallies green; *there* it is like the sun, when his rays dart pestilence on the sands of Africa. American liberty calms and restrains the licentious passions, like an angel that says to the winds and troubled seas, be still; but how has French licentiousness appeared to the wretched citizens of Switzerland and Venice? Do not their haunted imaginations, even when they wake, represent her as a monster, with eyes that flash wild fire, hands that hurl thunderbolts, a voice that shakes the foundation of the hills? She stands, and her ambition measures the earth; she speaks, and an epidemick fury seizes the nations.

Experience is lost upon us, if we deny, that it had seized a large part of the American nation. It is as sober, and intelligent, as free, and as worthy to be free, as any in the world; yet, like all other people, we have passions and prejudices, and they had received a violent impulse, which, for a time, misled us.

Jacobinism had become here, as in France, rather a sect than a party, inspiring a fanaticism that was equally intolerant and contagious. The delusion was general enough to be thought

the voice of the people, therefore, claiming authority without proof, and jealous enough to exact acquiescence without a murmur of contradiction. Some progress was made in training multitudes to be vindictive and ferocious. To them nothing seemed amiable, but the revolutionary justice of Paris; nothing terrible, but the government and justice of America. The very name of *patriots* was claimed and applied, in proportion as the citizens had alienated their hearts from America, and transferred their affections to their foreign corrupter. Party discerned its intimate connection of interest with France, and consummated its profligacy by yielding to foreign influence.

The views of these allies required, that this country should engage in war with Great Britain. Nothing less would give to France all the means of annoying this dreaded rival: nothing less would ensure the subjection of America, as a satellite to the ambition of France: nothing else could make a revolution here perfectly inevitable.

For this end, the minds of the citizens were artfully inflamed, and the moment was watched, and impatiently waited for, when their long heated passions should be in fusion, to pour them forth, like the lava of a volcano, to blacken and consume the peace and government of our country.

The systematick operations of a faction under foreign influence had begun to appear, and were successively pursued, in a manner too deeply alarming to be soon forgotten. Who of us does not remember this worst of evils in this worst of ways? Shame would forget, if it could, that, in one of the states, amendments were proposed to break down the federal senate, which, as in the state governments, is a great bulwark of the publick order. To break down another, an extravagant judiciary power was claimed for states. In another state a rebellion was fomented by the agent of France: and who, without fresh indignation, can remember, that the powers of government were openly usurped, troops levied, and ships fitted out to fight for her? Nor can any true friend to our government consider without dread, that, soon afterwards, the treaty-mak-

ing power was boldly challenged for a branch of the government, from which the constitution has wisely withholden it.

I AM oppressed, and know not how to proceed with my subject. WASHINGTON, blessed be GOD! who endued him with wisdom and clothed him with power; WASHINGTON issued his proclamation of neutrality, and, at an early period, arrested the intrigues of France and the passions of his countrymen, on the very edge of the precipice of war and revolution.

THIS act of firmness, at the hazard of his reputation and peace, entitles him to the name of the first of patriots. Time was gained for the citizens to recover their virtue and good sense, and they soon recovered them. The crisis was passed, and America was saved.

YOU and I, most respected fellow citizens, should be sooner tired than satisfied in recounting the particulars of this illustrious man's life.

How great he appeared while he administered the government, how much greater when he retired from it, how he accepted the chief military command under his wise and upright successor, how his life was unspotted like his fame, and how his death was worthy of his life, are so many distinct subjects of instruction, and each of them singly more than enough for an elogium. I leave the task, however, to history and to posterity; they will be faithful to it.

IT is not impossible, that some will affect to consider the honours paid to this great patriot by the nation, as excessive, idolatrous, and degrading to freemen, who are all equal. I answer, that refusing to virtue its legitimate honours would not prevent their being lavished, in future, on any worthless and ambitious favourite. If this day's example should have its natural effect, it will be salutary. Let such honours be so conferred only when, in future, they shall be so merited: then the publick sentiment will not be misled, nor the principles of a just equality corrupted. The best evidence of reputation is a man's whole life. We have now, alas! all WASHINGTON'S before us. There has scarcely appeared a really great man,

whose character has been more admired in his life time, or less correctly understood by his admirers. When it is comprehended, it is no easy task to delineate its excellences in such a manner, as to give to the portrait both interest and resemblance; for it requires thought and study to understand the true ground of the superiority of his character over many others, whom he resembled in the principles of action, and even in the manner of acting. But perhaps he excels all the great men that ever lived, in the steadiness of his adherence to his maxims of life, and in the uniformity of all his conduct to the same maxims. These maxims, though wise, were yet not so remarkable for their wisdom, as for their authority over his life: for if there were any errours in his judgment, (and he discovered as few as any man) we know of no blemishes in his virtue. He was the patriot without reproach: he loved his country well enough to hold his success in serving it an ample recompense. Thus far self-love and love of country coincided: but when his country needed sacrifices, that no other man could, or perhaps would be willing to make, he did not even hesitate. This was virtue in its most exalted character. More than once he put his fame at hazard, when he had reason to think it would be sacrificed, at least in this age. Two instances cannot be denied: when the army was disbanded; and again, when he stood, like Leonidas at the pass of Thermopylæ, to defend our independence against France.

It is indeed almost as difficult to draw his character, as the portrait of virtue. The reasons are similar: our ideas of moral excellence are obscure, because they are complex, and we are obliged to resort to illustrations. Washington's example is the happiest, to shew what virtue is; and to delineate his character, we naturally expatiate on the beauty of virtue: much must be felt, and much imagined. His preeminence is not so much to be seen in the display of any one virtue, as in the possession of them all, and in the practice of the most difficult. Hereafter, therefore, his character must be studied before it will be striking; and then it will be admitted as a model, a precious one to a free republick!

It is no less difficult to speak of his talents. They were adapted to lead, without dazzling mankind; and to draw forth and employ the talents of others, without being misled by them. In this he was certainly superiour, that he neither mistook nor misapplied his own. His great modesty and reserve would have concealed them, if great occasions had not called them forth; and then, as he never spoke from the affectation to shine, nor acted from any sinister motives, it is from their effects only that we are to judge of their greatness and extent. In publick trusts, where men, acting conspicuously, are cautious, and in those private concerns, where few conceal or resist their weaknesses, Washington was uniformly great, pursuing right conduct from right maxims. His talents were such as assist a sound judgment, and ripen with it. His prudence was consummate, and seemed to take the direction of his powers and passions; for, as a soldier, he was more solicitous to avoid mistakes that might be fatal, than to perform exploits that are brilliant; and as a statesman, to adhere to just principles, however old, than to pursue novelties; and therefore, in both characters, his qualities were singularly adapted to the interest, and were tried in the greatest perils, of the country His habits of inquiry were so far remarkable, that he was never satisfied with investigating, nor desisted from it, so long as he had less than all the light that he could obtain upon a subject, and then he made his decision without bias.

This command over the partialities that so generally stop men short, or turn them aside in their pursuit of truth, is one of the chief causes of his unvaried course of right conduct in so many difficult scenes, where every human actor must be presumed to err. If he had strong passions, he had learned to subdue them, and to be moderate and mild. If he had weaknesses, he concealed them, which is rare, and excluded them from the government of his temper and conduct, which is still more rare. If he loved fame, he never made improper com-

pliances for what is called popularity. The fame he enjoyed is of the kind that will last for ever; yet it was rather the effect, than the motive, of his conduct. Some future Plutarch will search for a parallel to his character. Epaminondas is perhaps the brightest name of all antiquity. Our WASHINGTON resembled him in the purity and ardour of his patriotism; and, like him, he first exalted the glory of his country. There, it is to be hoped, the parallel ends: for Thebes fell with Epaminondas. But such comparisons cannot be pursued far, without departing from the similitude. For we shall find it as difficult to compare great men as great rivers: some we admire for the length and rapidity of their current, and the grandeur of their cataracts; others, for the majestick silence and fulness of their streams: we cannot bring them together to measure the difference of their waters. The unambitious life of WASHINGTON, declining fame, yet courted by it, seemed, like the Ohio, to choose its long way through solitudes, diffusing fertility; or like his own Potowmack, widening and deepening his channel, as he approaches the sea, and displaying most the usefulness and serenity of his greatness towards the end of his course. Such a citizen would do honour to any country. The constant veneration and affection of his country will shew, that it was worthy of such a citizen.

HOWEVER his military fame may excite the wonder of mankind, it is chiefly by his civil magistracy, that his example will instruct them. Great generals have arisen in all ages of the world, and perhaps most in those of despotism and darkness. In times of violence and convulsion, they rise, by the force of the whirlwind, high enough to ride in it, and direct the storm. Like meteors, they glare on the black clouds with a splendour, that, while it dazzles and terrifies, makes nothing visible but the darkness. The fame of heroes is indeed growing vulgar: they multiply in every long war; they stand in history, and thicken in their ranks, almost as undistinguished as their own soldiers.

But such a chief magistrate as Washington appears like the pole star in a clear sky, to direct the skilful statesman. His presidency will form an epoch, and be distinguished as the age of Washington. Already it assumes its high place in the political region. Like the milky way, it whitens along its allotted portion of the hemisphere. The latest generations of men will survey, through the telescope of history, the space where so many virtues blend their rays, and delight to separate them into groups and distinct virtues. As the best illustration of them, the living monument, to which the first of patriots would have chosen to consign his fame, it is my earnest prayer to heaven, that our country may subsist, even to that late day, in the plenitude of its liberty and happiness, and mingle its mild glory with Washington's.

SCHOOL BOOKS.

First published in the Palladium, January, 1801.

It has been the custom, of late years, to put a number of little books into the hands of children, containing fables and moral lessons. This is very well, because it is right first to raise curiosity, and then to guide it. Many books for children are, however, injudiciously compiled: the language is too much raised above the ideas of that tender age; the moral is drawn from the fable, they know not why; and when they gain wisdom from experience, they will see the restrictions and exceptions which are necessary to the rules of conduct laid down in their books, but which such books do not give. Some of the most admired works of this kind abound with a frothy sort of *sentiment*, as the readers of novels are pleased to call it, the chief merit of which consists in shedding tears, and giving away money. Is it right, or agreeable to good sense, to try to make the tender age more tender? Pity and generosity, though amiable impulses, are blind ones, and, as we grow older, are to be managed by rules, and restrained by wisdom.

It is not clear, that the heart, at thirty, is any the softer for weeping, at ten, over one of Berquin's fables, the point of which turns on a beggar boy's being ragged, and a rich man's son being well clad. Some persons, indeed, appear to have shed all their tears of sympathy before they reach the period of mature age. Most young hearts are tender, and tender enough; the object of education is rather to direct these emotions, however amiable, than to augment them.

Why then, if these books for children must be retained, as they will be, should not the bible regain the place it once held as a school book? Its morals are pure, its examples captivating and noble. The reverence for the sacred book,

that is thus early impressed, lasts long; and, probably, if not impressed in infancy, never takes firm hold of the mind. One consideration more is important. In no book is there so good English, so pure and so elegant; and by teaching all the *same* book, they will speak alike, and the bible will justly remain the standard of language as well as of faith. A barbarous provincial jargon will be banished, and taste, corrupted by pompous Johnsonian affectation, will be restored.

FALKLAND. N°. I.

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TO NEW-ENGLAND MEN.

THE change of the American administration is an event to create surprise and alarm.

How will it be considered, and what will be its effects? In Europe, it will certainly discredit republican principles. Those who did not reason deeply, but took their opinions of America as they found them most prevalent, will exclaim, Paine, and Barlow, and half the book-makers, and more than half the expatriated American travellers, have told us, that republican principles were pure in the new world, as they flowed from the fountain head, the people, and the rights of man, and that plenty, contentment, and equality reigned, as in the golden age.

WHATEVER interest our national vanity may take in these representations, however land-jobbers may try to prolong their credit by painting Kentucky and Tennessee as a new Arcadia, the evidence of facts will prevail. It will be known, that the government had enemies, and that our political millenium has bred thousands of malecontents. They will see, that the men who said the constitution ought not to have had being, are entrusted with its life and authority.

THEY are to be bound by duty and by oaths to recommend to confidence what they have blasted with suspicion; to enforce what they have resisted; and to spare the prey they have so long hunted, and at last taken. As the party in power has called the government a bastard of monarchy, a government already rotten, though not ripe, foreigners will conclude, from the event of the election, that this is the publick sentiment of the nation, and that the Americans are sick of their republican experiment.

Is it not to all the European world the evidence of facts, that we are at length fully convinced that the antifederalists, who were against trying it, were very much in the right? Republican principles will hold, therefore, in Europe, nearly the same rank with the principles of swindling. Nothing, they will insist, can be so bewitching as their promise; nothing so bitter or so sure as their disappointment. Perhaps, as Europe is not fit for republican forms of government, it is best that they should not any longer admire what they ought not to adopt, and what, if adopted, they could not maintain.

Foreigners, who examine events with an eye of scrutiny, will not hesitate to foretell, that the change is no little cabinet scene, where one minister comes into power and another goes out, but a great moral *revolution*, proceeding from the vices and the passions of men, shifting officers to-day, that measures, and principles, and systems, may be shifted to-morrow. They will say, we know something of Mr. Monroe, his astonishing complaisance to the tyrants of Paris, and the no less astonishing rudeness and insult thrown by Barras on this minister's government. By such a sample we may judge, they will cry, of the spirit and character of the new American rulers; for he is in credit, and his party associates are coming into power. The Washington and Adams policy has built up much. What have they built, that the artificers of ruin have not already denounced, and meditated to destroy? Will Mazzei's correspondent cherish what he hates, or, in the day of democratick wrath, spare what he dreads?

The banks and publick paper, the "sceleris vestigia nos-"tri," will be expected speedily to fall. Commerce will be represented, as in the days of opposition, when the first frigates were voted against the Algerines, as too expensive to be protected by a naval force. Down then with the navy. Down goes commerce, the fruitful mother of British debts, the grandmother and nurse of British influence. Why should we maintain soldiers? Colonel Fries is *now* attached to the administration, and, therefore, we may depend on him, and

on men like him, and on some generals and brigadiers of the militia, to defend the excise and land-tax laws from being *repealed* by the sovereigns of a whiskey congress, convened at a sedition pole. Down then with the army—that is already down; down with the diminutive image of an army on the frontiers, a miniature that preserves deformity and loses the grace and resemblance. Let the sons of Logan come and help us to establish the happy state of nature and primitive virtue. What need of revenue more than impost will yield? Retrench expenses; get rid of the vermin that fatten upon it, and very little revenue will answer. The blood-suckers will grow thin, perhaps die, but *the people* will thrive: they will be freed from exaction and guarded against corruption. So long as their lands, and houses, and distilleries pay *tribute*, they are not free; so long as this tribute goes to pamper an insolent upstart race of funding system *lords*, they are not equal.

Wise Europeans will ask, what can protect the rights of the few, when the rage of the many is thus directed against them? We have seen the French clergy stripped in a night. One vote of congress would put the funded debt into the family tomb with paper money. What will be the security of right that is unpopular? and what shall prolong the life of the creatures of popularity? You cannot keep the insects, that buzz in the August sunshine, over winter.

To European observers the prospect of America will appear to sadden, and its horizon to lower.

There is scarcely any evil, that has not been foretold in our own gazettes, and that good men do not unfeignedly apprehend from the change.

If the violent jacobins should have it in their power to do what they wish, there is not a shadow of doubt, that they would make smooth work of all the most cherished systems of the administrations of Washington and Adams. When they heard of the success of their ticket, it is certain they

thought all this would be in their power, and they began to make feasts and to exclaim :

Aggredere O magnos, aderit jam tempus, honores,

which, in English, is, now is the glorious time for jacobins to get offices.

If they should administer the government according to the principles they have avowed in the gazettes of the party, and the examples in France which they have so much admired, and if they should abolish and new model all that they have so much professed to detest in the laws of congress, there is indeed no curse of a thorough-going revolution, with which we are not threatened.

FALKLAND N°. II.

TO NEW-ENGLAND MEN.

BEFORE evils have happened, it is the part of wisdom to exhibit their worst aspects. When they are known to be inevitable, or have actually occurred, it is no less the office of wisdom to display their palliations or their remedies. It would be cowardly, in despair, to aggravate their weight, or to sink under its pressure. No : bad as our prospects are, they are not hopeless. There is a sure resource for hope *in ourselves:* the steady good sense of New-England will be a shield of defence. *Tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito.* The publick spirit and opinion of this division of the union constitute a force, which the enemies of our constitutions and fundamental interests will labour to corrupt, but will not dare to withstand.

For New-England is not inhabited by a conquered people. Their opinions will have some influence on the *policy*, if their commerce, navigation, and credit should have no hold on the *hearts* of their rulers. Even conquerors, unless they were willing to have their fighting work to do over again, would

choose to mask under the most specious disguises the violation of rights and the contempt of opinions.

There is evidence enough, that the party expected to rule is not friendly to the commerce of any of the states, and especially to the fisheries and navigation of the Eastern states. We do not want, they argue, an expensive navy for the sake of these; nor these for the sake of a navy. Navies breed wars, and wars augment navies, and both augment expenses, and this brings forth funding systems, banks, and corrupt influence.

These few words contain the system of our new politicians, which it is probable they will be, in future, as in time past, complaisant enough to one another to call philosophy. Such illuminism, such visions of bedlam have visited some famous heads that do not repose within its cells, and condensed their thin essences into schemes of political reform, projects of cheap governments, that are to be rich without revenue, strong without force, venerable with popular prejudice directed by faction against them. Learned fools are of all the greatest, as well as the most indocile. Accordingly, in despite of the experience of all the world and of our own, in despite of common sense and the dictates of obvious duty, such men, high in reputation, and expected to be high in office, have insisted that we do not want a single soldier, nor a single armed ship: that credit is an abuse, an evil to be cured only by having none, a cancer that eats, and will kill unless cut or burnt out with causticks: that if we have any superfluity, foreigners will come for it, if they need it, and if they do not, it would be a folly and a loss for us to carry it to them. They tell us with emphasis, and seem to expect our vanity will gain them credit for saying, that America ought to renounce the sea and to draw herself closely into her shell: let the mad world trade, negociate, and fight, while we Americans live happily, like the Chinese, enjoying abundance, independence, and liberty.

This is said by persons clad in English broadcloth and Irish linen, who import their conveniences from England, and their politicks from France. It is solemnly pronounced as the only wise policy for a country, where the children multiply faster

than the sheep, and it is, inconsistently enough too, pronounced by those who would have all farmers, no manufacturers.

Notions of this stamp of sublimated extravagance have been often in the heads of book-makers and projectors. Some Frenchman suggested a scheme of like wisdom, to bind kings and princes, *not republicks*, to keep the peace, and be of good behaviour; and there are some declaimers, who would have the Indians on the frontiers enter into recognizance, and thus get rid of the expense and danger of *a standing army of four regiments*. But they would have a militia, half a million strong, made expert soldiers by training them, unpaid, till they become equal to veterans. A militia system is right; these reformers, however, never touch truth but to distort it, nor any sound principle but to drive it to extremes: they would, therefore, make a militia system burdensome, unwieldy, and corrupt, a standing army for faction, distinguished by a strange badge, and arrayed *against* the government.

It is indeed probable, that these wild theories have never yet much disturbed the world by addling the brains of any man who had its business to do. Such political sophists, till lately, have been calmly despised, but never trusted with power. Into the hands of such children it has never before been thought prudent to put knives.

If, to punish the manifold sins of this nation, God's displeasure dooms it to be delivered over to projectors and philosophists, the first of the sort who ever had the chance to play the statesman, will they have the temerity to undertake, and will they accomplish their plans?

In free states, so long as they preserve their laws and their tranquillity, the publick opinion is the efficient ruler. *In times of convulsion, it is probably less regarded in such states than under a despotism, because it can be counterfeited better.* Suppose Mr. Jefferson should come into office: with all his refinements, he is reputed a man of genius. His experience and caution, we hope, will forbid his pushing schemes against the clear sense of the people, or even of a very large part of them. If the reformers should cry, perish commerce, fisheries, and naviga-

tion, live and prosper agriculture, yet the conception of this precious project would be found easier than its execution. Reformers make nothing of old establishments, of interests that have taken root for ages, and of prejudices, habits, and relations, rather less ancient and rather more stubborn than they.

New-England now contains a million and a half of inhabitants, of all colonies that ever were founded the largest, the most assimilated, and, to use the modern jargon, *nationalized*, the most respectable and prosperous, the most truly interesting to America and to humanity, more unlike and more superiour to other people, (the English excepted) than the old Roman race to their neighbours and competitors. This people, whose spirit is as lofty as their destiny, is settled on an extensive coast, and, by situation and character, has a greater proportion of its inhabitants engaged in navigation and maritime affairs than France or England, perhaps than even Holland. In spirit and enterprise no nation exceeds them. It is in vain to say, things ought not to have been so, it would have been better to have had half as many farmers. It is absurd to say any such thing.

The question for a new administration is not, what ought to have been preferred three ages ago, but what *must now be destroyed*. These great interests are too precious to be sacrificed, they are too powerful even to be neglected. They will demand, and well they may, the effectual, zealous, assiduous protection and fostering care of government; and no president will ever repel the claim with defiance or contempt. Protection will be promised, and, perhaps, with the design to afford it.

It is right for the publick to suppose, that Mr. Jefferson's administration must be tried before it can be known. It is fair and candid to make every presumption in favour of his *intentions*, that may not be discredited by his conduct. It is, however, an effort of candour, but we must make it, to allow, that, like most men of genius, he has been carried away by systems, and the everlasting zeal to generalize, instead of proceeding, like common men of practical sense, on the low, but sure

foundation of matter of fact. It is the forte, and it is also the foible of genius, to be under the dominion of the imagination; and such men often judge of a law as they would of a picture, by the rules of taste. They can decide in such a case only as the mob do, by *acclamation*. What ought to be the result of experience, that a blockhead could both feel and express, is comprehended in the province of sentiment; and, for the curse and confusion of a state, the plodding business of politicks becomes one of the fine arts. The statesman is bewildered with his own peculiar fanaticism: he sees the stars near, but loses sight of the earth: he sails in his balloon into clouds and thick vapours, above his business and his duties, and if he sometimes catches a glimpse of the wide world, it seems flattened to a plain, and shrunk in all its proportions; therefore he strains his opticks to look beyond its circumference, and contemplates invisibility, till he thinks nothing else is real. New worlds of metaphysicks issue from his teeming brain, and whirl in orbits more elliptick than the comets. Man rises from the mire, into which aristocracy has trodden him, shakes off the sleep of ignorance and the fetters of the law, a gorgeous new being, invested with perfectibility, a saint in purity, a giant in intellect, and goes to inhabit these worlds. Condorcet and Roland, and men like them, will be there, and Paine, and Duane, and Marat, and Burroughs. There virtue will celebrate her triumphs; there patriotism will be inebriated with the ecstacy of her fellowships.

I KNOW as little of the political illuminists as of the sect of the Swedenborgians; but to me it has ever appeared, that the former are a new sect of fanaticks. They manifest a strange heat in the heart, but no light in the brain, unless it be a feeble light, whose rays are gathered in the lens of philosophy, to kindle every thing in the state, that is combustible, into a blaze. A statesman of this sect will poise himself in his chair, like an alchymist in his laboratory, pale with study, his fingers sooty with experiments, eager to make fuel of every thing that is precious, and sanguinely expecting that he shall extract

every thing precious from the cinders and dross that must be thrown away.

YET if we ascribe to Mr. Jefferson these vagaries, so dear if they happen to be his own, so confidently trusted because they have not been tried, it is natural enough to expect, that, nevertheless, he will desist from his *experiments* as soon as the results become too complicated and too uncertain for the satisfaction of a philosopher. He may think it prudent to wait till the world is more enlightened, before he prosecutes his schemes to hasten the progress of its absolute perfectibility. He will stoop to the prejudice that will not rise with him. The family of labour, brown with West-India suns, or glistening and rancid with whale oil, will tell him, that they had rather tread a ship's deck than the wilderness, and prefer the conflict with the storms of Spitzbergen, and the chace of the spermaceti, where there is danger and glory, and associates to share the one and to bestow the other, to scalping Indians, or skinning otters, in roaming over an immeasurable waste, where the silence is broken only by the howlings of the famished wolves, and where the sight, even of these animals is less dreaded and less dangerous than that of their fellows. They will tell him, they cannot change their element, nor will they submit, when politicians, with hearts colder than that element at the pole, prove, on calculation, it is best that they should perish in it.

FALKLAND. N°. III.

TO NEW-ENGLAND MEN.

THE project of transmuting the classes of American citizens, and converting sailors into back-woods-men, is not too monstrous for speculatists to conceive and to desire; but it is too vast for such men, and especially in four years, to accomplish. They are not of the race of the Titans. They cannot pluck up

the iron-bound shores, with all their towns, and plant them on the Miami; and as long as the sea washes these shores, our citizens will be navigators, and will claim protection in a tone that will not be soothed by the answer, that a navy is expensive, or that the wilderness stretches out its welcome arms to receive them. They will reply, so does death its more welcome arms.

The maritime interest of New-England is very essential to the existence of every other. If it really is not, it is pretty extensively believed to be, the root of our prosperity. Laying, or threatening to lay the axe to that root, would excite such an opposition as would deter the most vigorous despotism from its purpose.

In prosperous times, when men feel the greatest ardour in their pursuits of gain, they manifest the most callous apathy to politicks. Those who possess nothing, and have nothing to do but to manage the intrigues of elections, will prevail against five times their number of men of business. Each description is actuated by strong passions, moving in different, but not opposite directions. When, however, some of the great interests of society are invaded, those passions change their direction and are quickened in it. They are then capable of defending themselves with all the vivacity of the spirit of gain and of enterprise, with all the energies of vengeance and despair. These, it must be confessed, are revolutionary resources, for the defence of property and right, which cannot and ought not to be called forth on ordinary occasions. The classes in question will be long in danger, before they will be in fear, and if their adversary forbears to push the attack in so rude a manner as to make that fear overpower all other emotions, he may proceed, unsuspected and unopposed. They will be as much engrossed with their business, as the political projectors with their plans of reforming, till they destroy it. It is probable, therefore, that the maritime interest of the Eastern states is scarcely yet beginning to suffer apprehension, or to think of measures of precaution. It will seem incredible to the concerned, that interests so precious should appear

of small value even to illuminists and reformers. They will not believe that the jacobin Catalines could be vile or daring enough to assail them. They will say, supposing the new president to be fond of power, it cannot be the interest of his ambition to prosecute the attack, as it would expose his four years administration to the most dreadful agitations, and animate against himself, personally, enemies by classes and hosts, whom he could not expect ever to pacify, nor always to overpower. They will, therefore, feel a sanguine confidence, that banks and debts, publick and private, manufactures, navigation, and the fisheries will be sure of tranquillity, and almost sure of patronage. It would extend these pages too far to examine in detail the grounds of this confidence. It will be sufficient, briefly to observe, that it may be true, and perhaps it is, as the democrats pledged themselves for the event, that the new president will be averse from violent counsels, that he is so from principle, character, and policy, and that the new men will pursue the old measures. Yet it ought to be remembered that the head of the party cannot wholly reject, nor, perhaps, very materially alter, the system prescribed to him by his political supporters. If he does, he will be a federalist. If he will support principles, they will not oppose him: they will not, like the jacobins, oppose for opposition sake. But to gain their confidence, he must give them the evidence of facts: he must act right. For confidence grows, if at all, without artificial culture; it will not bear the forcing of a hot-house. Like a shrub on the high peak of a mountain, where it seldom rains, it absorbs the dew, and though it grows not much in a year, and is never lofty, its roots striking deeper than its top branches, yet it grows for an age, and braves the tempests; while the weeds of popularity have tall, weak stems, from the rankness of their growth, and perish on the dunghills that they sprout from.

If he should cling with fond zeal to the schemes of his old friends, the president will be strongly impelled by the party current, and if he yields to it, he will soon cease to be their leader and become their instrument. Indeed there are but

two divisions of party in the United States, and he is a very weak or very presumptuously vain man, who can think of organizing a third party, that shall rule them both. Those who possess property, who enjoy rights, and who reverence the laws as the guardians of both, naturally think it important, and what is better, feel the necessity of sustaining the controling and restraining power of the state: in other words, their interests and wishes are on the side of *justice*, because justice will secure to every man his own. This is federalism. On the other hand, those who do not know what right is, or if they do, despise it; who have no interest in justice, because they have little for it to secure, and that little, perhaps, its impartial severity would transfer to creditors; who see in the mild aspect of our government a despot's frown, and a dagger in its hand, while it scatters blessings; who consider government as an impediment to liberty, and the stronger the government, the stronger the impediment; that it is patriotism, virtue, heroism to surmount it; that liberty is to be desired for its abstract excellence, rather than its practical benefits, and, therefore, that it is better to run the hazard of the greatest possible degree of a perishable liberty, rather than to accept it with those guards and defences, which to insane theorists seem to make it less, but which, on the just analogies of experience, promise to make it immortal; those, in a word, who look on government with fear and aversion, on the relaxation or subversion of it, with complacency and hope; all who from credulity, envy, anger, and pride, from ambition or cupidity, are impatient *under* the restraints, or eager for the trappings of power.

All such reason, when they can, and act, and feel in a manner unfavourable to the support of the constitution and laws. Their opinions and creeds are various, and many of them are plausible, and seem to be moderate. It is probable they would all, except the leaders, at present incline to stop short of the extremes, to which the first steps are not perceived to tend, but which, when they are taken, are inevitable. They are impelled by a common instinct, as blind as it is steady and

powerful in its action. They are, by nature, instinct, habit, and interest, opposers of the government. They consist of four classes, antifederalists, democrats, anarchists, and jacobins, exceedingly unlike in character and in views, yet, while they are all out of power, harmoniously concurring to promote the common cause: once in power, it is probable they would disagree. There can, of course, exist but two political divisions in the country; to help, or to hinder the administration of its government. This description is so comprehensive as to embrace all the active citizens, and leaves, for the formation of a third party, neither materials, artificers, nor object.

Some very vain and some weak men, and some very great hypocrites, pretend to be of no party: while they arrogate to themselves a discernment superiour to both parties, they affect to be neutral and undecided between them. They claim the title of the truest patriots, and to love their country with the ardour of passion, yet they inconsistently condemn the violence of both parties, and expect to have both believe that the fire of their zeal subsists pure and unexpended in the frost of moderation. Such men are often flattered as federalists, more often used as democrats, but always held in a contempt that is never more hearty than when it is discreetly suppressed.

Whoever is president will have too much sense to denounce both parties, and to think of poising his weight exactly between two supports, but resting upon neither. We know already, that this policy, if it may be called such, will not be adopted by either of the two successful candidates. He will shape his system according to the federal or democratick plan; he will adhere either to the restraining doctrines, or to those which counteract restraint: he must either serve God or Mammon. The Washington and Adams administration proceeded on the basis, that the government was organized, and clothed with power to rule according to the constitution; the democratick theorists insist, that the people, meaning themselves, have a good right to rule the government.

By exciting the people to govern or to oppose government, these leaders well know, that those who are thus irregularly

permitted to act in their behalf, will engross all their power. Against this natural propensity to faction, a regular and vigorous government is the proper and only adequate security. Of course, for that very reason, such a government will be hateful to faction, and will be, if possible, usurped and destroyed by it. For such usurpation the nature of liberty excites the desire, and affords the pretext and the means.

Accordingly, we have seen a faction, bitter against the constitution in its passage, against the government in its administering the laws, and the magistrates and officers intrusted with the execution of them. They have struggled for the mastery, and after a persevering effort for twelve years, they have succeeded in the late great election. Will this party acquiesce, if the mere change of *men* should be the only fruit of their victory? No, the nature of faction itself, our observation of jacobinism in France, our knowledge of jacobin characters at home, forbid the idea. They will be greater malecontents than ever, if new men should pursue old measures. Few can be so absurd as to expect office; multitudes do expect a political millenium. Taxes are to be abolished: the occasions for taxes are to be for ever removed: armies are to be no more raised: navies will be reduced, reduced as soon as it can be made tolerably safe and popular, to nothing: interest on the publick debt is to be reduced gradually, but at the pleasure of those who think the principal a fraud and a curse, an avenging devil and a tempter. Hopes, like these, are to be disappointed or gratified. The president will know, that it is impossible to do *all* that is expected, but he will readily undertake to do something, that every thing may not be required of him. He will recommend economy, and profess the profoundest reverence for the *sense* of the people, which the united Irishmen will of course apply to themselves. He will keep in office such federalists as are willing to stay, and lend a prismatick light of contrasted colours to his administration. He will appoint a Livingston and a Gallatin to office.

He will lavish his smiles on federalists, and his confidence on two or three select democrats, and will be very glad, per-

haps, to get on his four years political journey in this seemingly equivocal manner as a president,

> Placed on the isthmus of a middle state,
> A being darkly wise and rudely great.

But if this would do for him, it would not answer for his party: they will expect much and attempt every thing.

FALKLAND N°. IV.

TO NEW-ENGLAND MEN.

TO abolish the funding system is neither necessary nor decorous. But there are as many ways to slay this enemy, as to destroy human life; by violence, by poison, by neglect. By violence the interest may be reduced; by taxing the holders of publick debt as much may be drawn back in taxes, as is paid in name of interest: this is poison. Or the laws for enforcing the revenue and carrying into effect the engagements of the government may be delayed, and finally not passed. The Gallatin doctrine in regard to treaty appropriations furnishes theory enough for all the paper money iniquity, that ever was practised or imagined. The children of the publick faith may come to a democratick government, and say, in the name of justice and plighted honour, give us bread; and such a government may say, as the state government of Rhode-Island have heretofore said of their war debts, *take your bread*, offering a stone.

The new president will have a part of no common difficulty to act. He will desire to conciliate the federalists, and without respecting their systems, might be willing to let them alone. The democrats really wish to see an impossible experiment fairly tried, and to govern without government. It is to be expected, that they will applaud their chief, who is believed to be their true disciple, if he should take a fancy to try it.

THEY consider government as a strange sort of self-moving mill, or a ship, that, while it is acted upon by one element, goes the better for the resistance of another. It is an even chance, therefore, that they may deem the *opposition* of the federalists as harmless and even as salutary as their own. In pursuance of their plan, they will let the government alone to go by its own inscrutable momentum. They will, as heretofore, deem it proper to be lookers on, not co-operators, unless when it shall want either force or treasure, or even countenance and approbation; and then they will summon each other to their old post of opposition. Treasure corrupts, and force oppresses, and, therefore, government shall have neither. The immediate evil to be apprehended to our government, is the denial of its daily bread; that sort of consumption which preys on the balsamick parts of the blood, and leaves a residuum of vitriol. The body politick, though bloated with a shew of health while it perishes, and alive with double-concocted poisons, will shed a corroding and mortal venom on all it touches. The laws will be jacobin; for as soon as the democrats have wasted their first energies, and their system falls into decrepitude, (and a year of democratick government is old age) they will crowd themselves into power. They are a race distinct from the democrats, and as much worse in their designs, as the independents, in Oliver Cromwell's time, than the presbyterians.

THEN expect amendments, that will make the constitution a confederation. Then expect commercial regulations, which will profess to cramp British commerce, and will cramp our own. First revenue, wealth, and credit will take flight; then peace.

THE danger, therefore, to all the interests and institutions of New-England, is not so much to be ascribed to the character or designs of the new president, whoever he may be, or to be feared in the first year of the new administration, as from the progress of time, and the natural developments of faction. There is universally a presumption in democracy that promises

every thing; and at the same time an imbecility that can accomplish nothing, nor even preserve itself.

THERE is in jacobinism all the vigour, audacity, and intelligence requisite to take advantage of this state of things. The democrats will be their journeymen to do the work, while *they* claim the wages; the pioneers, who will clear the way for the procession of the jacobin triumph. The jacobins and democrats are, in fact, less agreed in their objects and principles, though these latter do not know it, than the federalists and the democrats.

IT would be improper as well as tedious to pursue, in a newspaper essay, all the illustrations and details, that these observations may seem to require. They are not, however, so much addressed to men who are no federalists, but who might be convinced to become such, nor to men who already wish well to the good old cause of order, law, and liberty, yet who are weak enough to think it will be safe in jacobin hands, as to the old federalists, the true and intelligent, who rightly conclude, that, if our excellent government, in this the day of its humiliation and imminent peril, is to be saved, it must be by the correctness of the publick opinion and the energy of the publick spirit that is to impress it.

THIS is no day for despondency, or servility, or trimming. It is as little to the purpose, to trust implicitly to the moderation of a jacobin administration, or to those smooth professions, with which it will attempt in the beginning to make the federalists supine or treacherous in the cause, to make them cold in its defence, or go over to the enemy.

THAT cause, though endangered, is not desperate. The jacobins have pretended, that the people approve their designs; but their partial success has been owing to the concealment of those designs. They have played the part of hypocrisy with an audacity of impudence that is unparalleled: they have affected to be federalists, republicans, friends, admirers, and champions of the constitution: they have recommended jacobin members of congress, as better watchmen for it than its known friends: they have assured us, that Mr. Jefferson will

not subvert or neglect to preserve those institutions and interests, which he is known, and, it is believed, well-known to condemn and abhor as much as his adherents. These protestations have had effect, and jacobins have been preferred, not because they were such, but because it was believed, that they were what they pretended to be. The wolves in sheep's clothing have not yet been stripped: they are in the sheep-fold.

Let them not, however, imagine, that the people, especially of the Eastern states, are ready to co-operate in the work of jacobinism. If, after having with some success deceived the people, they should become such dupes as to act on the credit of their own tales, let them beware. They will find it is easier to deceive a high-spirited people, than to enslave them, and safer to insult them by the imputation of political principles that they abhor, than to plunder and beggar them by carrying such principles into effect.

THE OBSERVER.

First published in the Palladium, February, 1801.

THE French revolution is a sort of experimental political philosophy, in which many foolish opinions are tried and found wanting. The jacobins are, however, like quacks, who recommend their patent medicines. Experience has no effect on them to cure their delusion. They say, their elixir of immortality has not yet been fairly tried, and that some aristocratick patients stopped breathing only to effect the disgrace of their nostrums. They would give a whole nation a quietus at once, if they could only persuade them to swallow some liquor of long life, some restorative pill, or some powder, that is to sweeten the blood. Accordingly, the jacobin papers even yet manifest, how little they learn from the direful experience of France; for *even yet* they dare to call the success of French arms, the cause of liberty and republicanism. Whether we have any fools left, who still flounder in this confusion of mind, is more than I know; but many jacobins, it is certain, still claim credit for their sincerity to that amazing extent of infatuation.

FRANCE is the only state in Europe completely military: they are now what the Turks lately were, all soldiers, or all liable to be made soldiers. Their spirits have been wrought up by eight years of war, by revolution, and by the excesses of what our mobocrats call liberty, into a ferment, equal to that of the ancient crusaders. No state could be safe, while France had the power to disturb them; and every state that thought itself safe in inaction has fallen: the only powers that yet stand, are those that resisted with courage. France has not changed; the danger to other nations is not less, and the only path to safety is thorny and perilous: it is to be trodden in arms. Mithridates, Antiochus, Perseus, the Etolian and Achæan leagues were successively lost, either by seeking an alliance with ancient Rome, or by neglecting the

obvious policy of confederating with other states in like peril: Perseus allied with Antiochus, or Mithridates with Sertorius, might have saved the world from servitude. France now claims empire, and will not bear rivalship. Austria and England can have no peace: they will fail, unless their arms should so far cripple their foe, as to disable him from prosecuting his scheme of universal dominion. France is as revolutionary as ever: Buonaparte keeps down jacobinism at home, but it deeply concerns him to stir it up in every other state, where French influence is wanted. Jacobinism is, therefore, more than ever to be dreaded by England and Austria, because its operations in France are more artfully disguised by the government. It is more than ever to be dreaded in America, because the moment approaches, when its success can be turned to immediate account. What event could ever happen more auspicious to her views, than to have an administration that would bend the laws and commercial systems of *this* country to the policy of *that?* Mr. Madison's famous commercial resolutions were grounded on the idea of making America useful as a colony to France; not how we should make our trade the most useful to ourselves. The New-England merchants had sense enough to understand this delusive, this disgraceful policy, and spurned at it. They will do it again, if it should be repeated. We are still wanted by France, and *to have us*, she must spread jacobinism. It might, and would help her to rule our citizens, though, if suffered to prevail in France, it might hinder Buonaparte from quietly ruling Frenchmen at home.

SKETCHES OF THE STATE OF EUROPE.

N°. I.

First published in the Palladium, March, 1801.

THE policy and conduct of the French, since the commencement of their revolution, exhibit very little of novelty, except in the degrees of political intrigue, and revolutionary cruelty and injustice. Wrought up almost to a state of phrenzy by an unexampled combination of circumstances and events, they have applied principles and adopted practices with a skill and ardour, which have hitherto rendered them the terrour and scourge of Europe. As this revolution has, at different periods, involved the interests, and called forth the exertions of almost all the European powers, it will be necessary to look at their designs and relative positions at its commencement.

A SENSE of common danger, and those laws, which, in peace and war, have always regulated the great republick of the European states, impelled them to check, by force of arms, the progress of that revolutionary system, which was wasting France and threatening the rest of Europe. Accordingly, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Holland, and England, at an early period, united to repress the spirit of jacobinism, and, by timely and vigorous exertions, hoped to obtain security to themselves, and restore tranquillity to France. But, in spite of all opposition, her armies penetrated into Holland, Germany, and Italy. In the management of this war France has imitated the policy of the Romans, in detaching members of confederacies against them, from their alliance. Sensible that the united exertions of Europe would disable them from propagating their principles and extending their territory, they felt the necessity of separating the allied powers to accomplish their ambitious projects. Of course, jealousies were excited among them, separate interests were brought into view, the blind pursuit of which tended to ruin the common cause by

diverting the collected energies of the coalition. The king of Prussia, jealous of the house of Austria, and reluctant to contribute to its aggrandizement, soon entered into negotiations for a separate peace, and, by scrupulously watching the internal state of his dominions, and maintaining a military force ready to act as occasion might require, has ever since been able to support his authority at home, and hold a neutral position in the midst of contending nations. Holland, spiritless and panick-struck at the successes and power of France, yielded, with a feeble struggle, her resources and liberties into the hands of French robbers and tyrants, who have, at length, broken her ancient spirit, and still continue to drill and whip her to the performance of the most humiliating services for the great nation. Spain, paralyzed with fear, and willing to make any sacrifices to preserve life, broke from the confederacy in defiance of the most solemn treaties, and, like Holland, submitted herself to the unqualified disposal of France.

But here it may be asked, why have the French permitted the church and the throne to rest quietly upon their ancient foundations? The destruction of kings and priests, is the first article in the revolutionary code: why then have they not planted the tree of liberty in Madrid, and proclaimed the downfal of civil and ecclesiastical tyranny? Upon the ruin of these, they have founded their claim to superiour light and wisdom. In every other country, where, by arts and arms, they have obtained a permanent footing, existing establishments have been subverted, and constitutions made after the newest fashion imposed upon the people, for which nothing has been demanded but submission, gratitude, and the "simple tithe of all they had." Some powerful reasons, therefore, must have dictated a line of policy so opposite to their professions and feelings, and so different from that, which, in other countries, they have invariably pursued. It is not probable, that the French were, at any time, doubtful of success in an enterprise against Spain and Portugal. An army of thirty thousand men was drawn out, and a general appointed to lead them through Spain to the heart of Portugal; but motives of policy checked the enter-

prise, and led France to employ her armies, where their successes would not be followed by equal or superiour advantage to her enemies. It was foreseen, that if Spain should be revolutionized, the commerce of her colonies in the West-Indies and upon the continent would greatly increase the power of England, and more than balance the accession of strength which would be gained from the plunder of Portugal. Had the project for breaking up the ancient establishments of Spain, and weakening the allies by the destruction of Portugal, been carried into effect, the Spanish and Portuguese colonies would have thrown off their dependence upon the mother countries, and assumed the station of independent states, or put themselves under the protection of England or the United States. In either case, England would have felt, that her *sinews of war were made stronger*, and her ability of continuing it increased. Such, then, have been the motives, which, while they have deterred the French from adding Spain and Portugal to the list of new republicks, have manifested the hollowness of their professions, and their deep-laid schemes of unlimited domination.

While the French were hot in the pursuit of conquest, a grand alliance, in which the Russian emperour was to put forth his energies, was formed for the purpose of driving the French from Italy in a single campaign, and of carrying the war into France. It is probable, that the emperour Paul engaged with as disinterested views, as those of any member of the confederacy, and with a determination to restore the ancient government of France. Suwarrow, a perfect master in all the schemes and artifices of war, who alone knew to lead Russian troops to victory, was entrusted with the chief command. In a few months he broke the force of the French in Italy, and proceeded to the conquest of Switzerland. But here an untoward combination of circumstances defeated his designs, and compelled him to retreat. The Austrians failed in the execution of that part of the plan assigned to them; the army in Switzerland under the command of Hotze had been routed, and Hotze himself killed, by the unexpected descent of the army of Lecourbe and Massena from the Alps ; and the troops of

Suwarrow, exhausted and without supplies, were obliged to save themselves by flight. Suwarrow was extremely exasperated at the conduct of the Austrians, and, although the Russians co-operated with the English in an unsuccessful expedition to Holland, the retreat of Suwarrow from Switzerland seems to have been the first step towards the secession of Paul from the coalition. Here was given a fair opportunity for court intrigue to interpose, and represent the partiality of the English for the Austrians, the mercenary views of the house of Austria, manifested in a disposition to make no sacrifice of private interests for the sake of the common cause. Paul, naturally capricious, being led to suspect that the allies meant to weaken his power by employing his troops as mercenaries against France, withdrew from the alliance with indignation. At this time, it is probable that his attention was diverted with the idea of extending his dominions in Turkey.

NOTWITHSTANDING Austria has been often charged with selfish and mercenary views in the conduct of the war, it may be doubted, whether, previous to the secession of Paul, she acted inconsistent with the best interests of the coalition. Her taking possession of the reconquered places in Italy might have been with the view of throwing into them such forces, as would have formed a barrier to the future progress of the French: in themselves, they were feeble and needed protection, and the interests of the alliance probably demanded, that they should be secured from the grasp of their enemies.

SKETCHES OF THE STATE OF EUROPE.

N°. II.

THE change of the politicks of Russia, is one of the chief facts to attract attention. Whether this change originated from mere whim and fickleness of temper of the emperour, or from deep views of future advantage to Russia, we know very little, and the little that we do know affords no very satisfactory ground even for conjecture. Politically speaking,

Russia, as a member of the European state, is still an undiscovered country: it is an empire so vast, so new, so motley, and so barbarous, it is such a Babel, whose tongues are yet so confounded, a gigantick infant, that changes so often by its growth, and so much oftener by its caprice, time is doing so much, and accident so much more, to give it a determinate impression and character, that no one has cause to be ashamed of his ignorance of its politicks. It is, perhaps, after all a question, whether Paul is not as rash as his father, Peter the third, in his conduct, and whether a revolution, like that which dethroned his father in 1762, will not soon happen.

Be that as it may, it is impossible to look at the present position of the great European powers without being struck with *this* contrast: in 1793, all were joined with Great Britain in opposition to France, now all are leagued in opposition to Great Britain. Perhaps it will be seen again, that a single power is an overmatch for a confederacy.

The *pretexts* of Russia, to justify this new system, are frivolous; for the British dominion of the seas is no grievance to Russia. Sweden, and Denmark are mere satellites, and act only as they are acted upon. Russia has no commerce to be cramped by searches. Its industry is little, its trading capital less, and its mercantile navigation nothing. Besides, the very British men of war, that thus rule the seas, are furnished with Russian hemp, and cordage, and iron. The pretext, therefore, amounts to nothing more, than that the English are their best customers for naval stores. Lazy and poor nations must depend on such as are industrious and rich; but it is absurd to say that Russia is or can be the *rival* of England. A man barefoot is no rival of the shoemaker; a naked man in a cold climate must depend on the woollen-draper. Russia sells a superfluity, that it cannot use nor work up, and that nobody would pay for, if England did not. Commercially speaking, therefore, it seems obvious and certain, that the interests of Russia are not pursued or regarded by the authors of the war.

But great nations make light of the affair of gain or loss in trade, when political considerations intervene; for if England

did not rule the ocean, Russia could not: it would be France, the little finger of whose despotism would be found thicker than the British loins. Russia must have other motives.

Turkey has been long a defenceless prey to any of the powerful states, and would long ago have been devoured, if their mutual jealousy had not delayed her fate. There has been no period, since the Turks took Constantinople, in 1453, when it was so easy for Russia to conquer the European provinces of this paralytick empire. The rulers of France, at all other times interested to save Turkey, have now no objects but such as are personal and temporary. Buonaparte would be glad to say to Paul, let me alone, do you conquer on your side, I wish to meet with none of your interruption in conquering on mine. France is at war with Turkey, and eager to establish her colony in Egypt, Austria is beaten, and England has her hands full; it would not be strange, therefore, if Paul should be found to look for the recompense of his war with England in the conquest of the Greek provinces, or in a treaty with the Porte that would assure to him their final subjection. This is but conjecture, perhaps not plausible. The second son of the emperour Paul is named Constantine, and was taught Greek to gain the affections of his intended subjects: this fact has long been well-known. Europe is a gaming table, where the bets are often shifted, and sometimes the players as well as the luck. There is scarcely any thing that we are not to expect to see staked by the gamesters; especially as they make no scruple, as in the case of Venice, to play for what is none of their own.

It is natural to ask, whether England can face a world in arms. That armed world is very far from her happy island and while she triumphs on the seas, they must keep their distance. Famine might enrage her labouring people and convulse her within; but the government is active in its measures to prevent that evil. The contest is, therefore, left to the trial of her resources. These are wonderful, and the exclusive empire and commerce of the seas will not ultimately lessen them. It is a splendid lesson to America of the energies that

industry, and such a government as will protect its earnings, can command. Our free republican government, we trust, is such a government; and we hope our new rulers will not hate commerce, as a New-England gold mine, nor check it, lest the *monied* interest, as the democrats call the proceeds of trade and fisheries, should surpass and outweigh the landed interest, as they call the tobacco planters, *God's chosen people, if ever he had a chosen people.*

Great events are to be looked for, and, whatever they may be, it is wise policy and obvious duty for our government to disentangle our politicks from France, who wants to use our strength, and to cherish as much as possible the commercial spirit that will make America rich by industry, and thus to gain strength, while Europe grows poor by war. Happy shall we be, if, while we gain riches, we do not lose our spirit, and if peace abroad shall not embitter dissentions at home.

In this momentous contest between Great Britain and the numerous foes who have joined with France against her, it is probable, that the profits of our commerce will be enlarged, and the danger of our being forced into the war much lessened. If Britain, however, should be very unsuccessful, we might then expect France would a *second* time require us, as Genet did before, to vindicate our neutral rights by arms: in other words, to fight her enemy in her cause. It seems to be, therefore, as clear as the noonday sun, that our interest, our peace, and our commercial liberty require, that France should not, by humbling and weakening England, be able to take the high ground to *command* America to join her. We know, that France would do it in a day, if she had, which, thank God! she has not, the means to enforce her commands.

It is a singular proof of the utter want of all patriotism in the violent spirit of jacobinism, that the Aurora and Chronicle are incessantly exhibiting the triumphs of France as the security of America, and the overthrow of the British dominion of the sea as our triumph and final emancipation. This is senseless and absurd beyond measure. France has no enemy that can face her at land. The British naval power is a coun-

terpoise. Each of these nations is thus a check on the other, and both court friends among the powers who could help or hinder their operations. Some little respect is thus procured for neutrality; whereas, if England were beaten at sea as completely as Austria is at land, France would domineer both on sea and land; the civilized world would be subject instantly to a despotism, as arrogant, as rapacious, as unfeeling as that of Rome: her arms would be vigorously employed to spread her power from the Ganges to the Ohio.

The Aurora and Chronicle are desired to notice these sentiments, and they are invited to represent them as the proofs of partiality for Britain, and of the force of British influence: there are many hundreds of their readers weak enough to accept such proofs as demonstrations. It would be easy to retort on the jacobins, that their aversion to admit such ideas is a clear indication, that they love France well enough to help her to be the universal despot, and that they love America so little they would rejoice to see her the satellite of that despot. It is obvious, that the security of feeble states must depend on the power of the great states being balanced and divided; and those Americans, who can deliberately wish to see Britain conquered at sea, must be traitors or fools.

In the course of this great contest, facts and principles are established of the most momentous concern to all independent nations. The first leading observation is, that wretched is the condition of subjects, when the state itself is small and feeble. Holland had no patriotism, because its strength was little, and division and discord made that little less. It has been a prey, and its wealth has been squeezed out by taxes openly laid to fill the French treasury. A tax of ten per cent. on income, excepting the poorer classes, who were to be used as sans culottes, was imposed in the first year of their slavery, six per cent. of which was for France. The rich were declared lawful prize; and France, the captor, divided the spoil, like the lion in the fable. Switzerland, and

the Italian republicks and states, exhibit the wretchedness of the people, where the publick force is feeble.

Another observation is, that, where the executive authority is weak, patriotism is extinct. Holland was uneasy, because the stadtholder was the first magistrate. But, had the execution of the laws been duly intrusted to him, he would have resisted foreign influence with better success than he did: the Dutch would not have lost their patriotism, before they lost their country. Switzerland was more than half conquered, before it was invaded. England, on the contrary, has made it dangerous to be a traitor; and neither France nor England allows faction to grow formidable before it is crushed.

Again, we must remark, how much less resistance is made by states that are confederated, or broken up into separate sovereignties, as Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, than by such as, like France and England, are one and indivisible. Every Frenchman, in this country, has been a stickler for state sovereignty; and, in France, every Frenchman has cried, no federalism, the republick one and indivisible. Accordingly, France has taken care to make her neighbours weak and dependent, by clipping and slicing their territory into petty republicks: she will not suffer any body to *be great* but herself. Germany formerly kept the legions of Rome at bay, and now it is overrun in one campaign; yet Germany is scarcely less populous or warlike than France. Italy has done nothing; but her petty sovereigns have waited the event of battles, to see who should be their masters. Switzerland has done nothing worthy of her liberty and ancient glory.

Is it not, therefore, to be hoped, that, if great changes must be violently made in Europe, they will be chiefly such as will consolidate the monstrous confederations of many heads without a common body or one soul, and that the smaller powers will be formed into great states, so as to

increase the future security for the liberty, and independence, and happiness of their subjects.

We take occasion to declare, however, that we are not desirous to see the American separate state powers attacked. As they are, let them remain, till experience suggests changes, and the people are freely willing to make them. We do not pretend, however, that a discerning patriot ought not to apprehend the ambitious abuse, that faction is trying to make of the powers of the great states, Pennsylvania and Virginia, and of the disturbance, foreign influence, and consequent weakness of the national force. This point is of late much better understood in New-England.

PHOCION. N°. I.

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BRITISH INFLUENCE.

BRITISH influence is a phrase commonly enough used by the jacobins without any meaning, or without any that is precise. They hate the federalists, and they have some unknown and incommunicable reasons for it, which are at once conveyed, without being defined, by charging them with acting under British influence.

CORRECT inquirers will, however, ask for definitions. *Influence*, then let it be said, *is political power, and is exerted to modify or control, or prevent the publick measures of the American nation.* It may be the private opinion of a few scholars, that the English government is excellent in its principles, and favourable to that sort of healthful, long-lived liberty, that grows hardy by braving labours, and perils, and storms, and that it will probably survive, and be in its youth, twenty ages after the ephemeral despotisms of France are lost in oblivion. These individual opinions, if they are erroneous, or extravagant, or obnoxious to popular prejudices, are not of a sort to influence the publick measures of this country. They never have done it; they have never been popular opinions, and of course have never had political influence. Nor is it material, that some persons still respect England as the land of our father's sepulchres.

THEY may think, that the early principles and institutions, in which the first settlers of New-England were educated in England, and which they brought over and planted here, entitle that nation to our respectful remembrance. If even the English character should impress some respect, as being sincere, generous, and benevolent, if their magnanimous spirit in war, their strict and impartial administration of justice, their enter-

prise in commerce, their ingenuity in the arts, and the renown of their poets, statesmen, and philosophers, should, in the eyes of some admirers, throw a lustre over the British name, yet, let it be remembered, those admirers are not numerous. They dare not avow, that such are their sentiments. No, though we sprung from English parents, the only language that can be used, without the risk of persecution, is that of rage, abhorrence, and contempt. At the hazard of disgracing our own pedigree, we are summoned, six times a week, in the jacobin gazettes, to treat the British subjects as the slaves of a tyrant, whose spirit is as wretched as their lot. The publick opinion is certainly not that of attachment to England; and it is the *prevailing* popular sentiment only that can influence the measures of our government.

If Britain then has *influence*, or, in other words, political power, it must be exerted in some other way, and by some other instruments than such as we have mentioned.

The base will say, and the base will believe, that Britain has gold enough to buy friends and to carry a vote in congress as often as her interests require the expense. A charge of this nature seldom needs proof, or is much shaken by confutation. The base will believe it without proof. They will consider congress as a market, where virtue is for sale, and, if they look into their own hearts, they will find nothing there to discredit the evidence of such a traffick, or to enhance the terms of the bargain. Integrity and honour are sounding words, and they, who would pay a price according to the sound, are welcome to the substance. They consider all virtue as a thing not wanted for their own use, but as a false jewel, to be disposed of to the best customers. Of all men I have ever known, the jacobins have the worst opinion of human nature. An honest discharge of duty in any station, is a thing incredible, because with them it is incomprehensible. Accordingly, they begin with accusations and calumnies of the foulest sort, and call upon us to shew that they are not true; as if the burden of proof did not rest on the accusers, but the accused.

After having charged Washington, Adams, Hamilton, Pickering, Wolcott, and others, with being British partizans, they assume the charge as a sentence judicially pronounced and established, and affect to consider all solicitude to repel it as an indication of a consciousness of guilt: the galled jade winces, they will say. But even this burden of proof, however unfairly imposed, may be fearlessly assumed by the friends of the federal administration of our government.

It is proper to remark to the men who are observers of human nature, that of all kinds of influence the first for ignorant and vulgar minds to suspect, is downright bribery and corruption; it is, nevertheless, the last for even the profligate and shameless to yield to. It is so coarse an instrument, that it seldom answers the purpose. There are instances, and one is said to have happened during our revolution, where a man, who wanted integrity, made an outcry, when he had it in his power to brag that it had been tempted. More than half the indictments for rapes, are founded on the charges of women of no virtue. There is so much shame in yielding to the offer of a bribe, and so much glory in refusing it, that the latter is often the better and more tempting bribe, which determines the conduct.

Sir Robert Walpole, the celebrated English minister, is said to have been a master in the art of corruption; but when publick opinion was decided strongly for or against a measure, as in the cases of the excise, the Jew bill, if I mistake not, and the cruelties of the Spanish guarda-costas, his gold and his art failed to secure a majority in parliament. In the late attempt to *unite* Great Britain and Ireland, the project, in spite of ministerial influence, was at first rejected by the Irish commons. The publick reasons were strong, the publick good plainly called for the *union*; yet passion and prejudice opposed the measure. Ireland, by the union, seemed to be lost and swallowed up; and this secret dread, this inward horrour, of sinking into nothing, outweighed all the forcible national arguments in favour of the measure. It may be added, that the members felt a like decline of their own weight and influence.

It may, therefore, be said, with sir Robert Walpole, that it is hard to bribe members even to do their duty, and to vote according to their consciences: much less can they be bribed to vote against them, or rather against the known voice of the nation.

All experience shews, that to get a bad measure adopted, when it is popular, is easy; to get a good one is ever hard, against the current of even the most absurd and groundless popular clamour. The side, therefore, to look for corrupt influence is ever the popular side, because that is the unsuspected, and yet the dark side: members, in that case, can be praised for acting *against* duty. As many are willing to yield their principles, who cannot part with their reputation, the occasions are frequent, when members prefer acting so as to please the people instead of serving them.

The current of popularity has ever been anti-British, it has ever been dangerously French. From hence it follows, that bribes could not have been employed without great difficulty, nor with much effect on the British side, nor without a great deal of effect on the French side: there was a general willingness to be deceived in regard to France. Mr. Monroe's unexampled assurances, that Americans would submit to captures, and rejoice in their losses, if it would serve the republick, and Mr. Gerry's unaccountable, and yet unexplained lingering in Paris, are proofs how deep-rooted and general the prejudice is in favour of the French.

It will be asked, also, if *bribes* were given by England, *who* was bribed? Washington ratified the treaty; was he bribed? Was the senate and a majority of the house of representatives? If that is true, or only suspected, the democrats, who suspect it, ought to go to France to enjoy "the pure morals of the republick," instead of living in a country so corrupt, and, as Fauchet said, so early decrepid.

It is confessed, these are observations which tarnish a newspaper: they dishonour America, and yet the files of the democratick gazettes repeat their audacious slanders of British influence, in a style to extort a careful and circumstantial

examination of the charge. What will foreigners think, what will honest and yet uncorrupted Americans believe of their new government, such as free elections have made it, such as Washington administered and left it, that, after twelve prosperous years, it is scarcely tolerated; nay, it is *not* tolerated, for it is taken from the hands of its old friends to put it into *other* hands; it is arraigned at the bar like a culprit, and called to plead to a charge of bribery and corruption. If those who *will* rail *could* reason, the scandalous necessity of this vindication would not be wholly useless: it would come out of the fire of accusation the brighter for the trial. But there is as much levity as malice in the jacobins: they forget the lie and the confutation, and when the Chronicle repeats the lie, it is ever fresh and unconfuted.

PHOCION. N°. II.

British Influence.

BRITISH influence, it has been shewn, could scarcely operate at all in the way of *bribes*. Even if members would sell themselves to a British emissary, let it be considered, how few occasions could be sought or found to earn the wages of iniquity. Unless their conduct was popular, they would lose their seats, and it would be necessary every two years to buy a fresh set. It is, therefore, clear, that British gold could not buy influence against the course of popular prejudices; and if popularity were once gained, there would be no need of bribing votes. Pretty good sort of men, we know, will work for popularity; very bad men could not work to any effect for wages against it. Let it be remembered, that a famous democratick member on the floor of congress once said, when the French minister applied for anticipation of an instalment of the French debt, before it was due, and there was no money in the United States' treasury to pay more than the current expenses and the interest of the publick debt: *There would be no merit in paying only when it was due, and*

when it was convenient to pay: he rejoiced, he said, that America could strain her means, and hazard something to shew her gratitude. Bribery did not buy this sentiment, base as it was; nor, had it been unpopular, could money have bought it, for then its intrinsick baseness would have blasted the speaker.

It is the people, who are to be bribed, influenced, and corrupted. It is their folly, their prejudice, their best feelings, and their worst, that are to be tampered with. A lie in the Chronicle goes farther than a guinea, and ten can be coined and pushed into currency, before even *** could be enlisted. This is the lever to pry the world out of its orbit. This is the power of necromancy, that can conjure spirits from the deep, and they will come and dwell in Marlborough and in Cambridge. The passions of the people are the engines of influence; and he who can move them seems to have the faculty of working miracles. A stupid Chronicle, whose history is false, whose argument is sophistry, seemingly too flimsy to gull the mob, whose sneers always want wit, and whose malice seems to be too blind to choose or to exercise its weapons, even this wretched Chronicle, which one would think has not vivacity enough to interest fools, nor talent enough to satisfy its knaves, has influence, and it is French influence. Somniferous as it is, yet, like the wand of Mercury, it has the power to compel the spirits of a multitude.

But from speculative reasoning, let us turn our attention to *facts*. Is there one measure of the government, in which British influence has manifested itself: it would be silly to suppose, that votes were bought to be lost. In what act has a partiality for Great Britain appeared? Surely our impost act affords no such proof: American manufactures are deservedly preferred. This would be a tender point for British partizans to push. And be it remembered, the opposers of such preference of our own manufactures were, first to last, the Southern jacobins. Had British gold been used for British purposes, the federalists could have gratified their opposers by yielding this point; but they did not, and would not yield it. A point no less dear to Great Britain is her *carrying trade*. That was

carried by federal votes to prefer American bottoms, and the preference was carried so far, that some sound friends to our navigating interest were afraid of making a counteraction by the British government. Does this look like British influence? If Britain had any thing at heart, it was this; yet the very clamorers about British influence were the opposers of these measures. What did they do? They wished to prefer French fabricks and French bottoms to British; and this would have placed the burden of encouraging French manufactures and shipping, as a tax on the consumers and shippers in America. Does not this look like foreign influence with a vengeance? When Britain captured our vessels, in 1794, the federalists were the only men, who said, negotiate first, prepare revenue, ships, and troops, and if we cannot get justice, then fight. This was Hamilton's plan, and all the federal members acted upon it. The opposers of this plan were the accusing jacobins. They said, no ships, nor troops, nor taxes: let New-England fit out privateers; we will confiscate: that is our sort of resolution and patriotism. Does not this fact, so authentick and solemn, as well as recent, speak to the memory of the people, that if foreign influence prevails, it is not among federalists that it prevails. There is not a naked tribe in Guinea, whose spirit is baser, or has yielded with more servile cowardice to foreign influence, than the conduct of the democrats has manifested towards France; yet these are the accusers. Shame, if it had not lost its power on these men, would strike them dumb with confusion. Is there any point, that any administration, even Washington's, could have yielded to Britain, so debasing as the surrender of the ships captured from France? There is no condition of disgrace below it: without being vanquished, we agree to pass under the yoke.

On a review of the long series of publick measures, there is none that bears the aspect of British influence. There has been no attempt even to prefer any foreign nation to America, except in favour of France. That shameless attempt, always baffled, is still renewed; and Buonaparte and his admirers still hope, that we shall be French enough to enter the lists against

Great Britain, to assert the absurd novelties called the modern law of nations.

Facts do not lie. They speak plainly, that there has been no political power to control or prevent the measures of our government, possessed or exercised by Britain. Yet this evidence will not silence or abash the impudence of the democratick slanderers of our government: credulity will still be a dupe, nor will detection spoil the game of imposture.

PHOCION. N°. III.

British Influence.

IT is not their only reason, but it is one of very great efficacy with the politicians of the Virginia school, for exciting and diffusing an aversion to the commercial system, that our commerce is carried on by the help of British capital, and that, as the trade increases, the mass of debt due to British merchants goes on augmenting. Hence they assure us, that our trade with England is a fruitful source both of corruption and dependence. Nay, these apostles from the race-ground and the cock-pit tremble for our republican morals, so much exposed to the contagion of our intercourse with the manners and fashions, the books and institutions of a corrupted monarchy. The word *monarchy* is of course a substitute for argument, and its overmatch: many hundreds will condemn the task, as equally bold and mischievous, of the writer, who shall presume to think, that we may deal with the subjects of a king, and make estates, without making a set of king, lords, and bishops for ourselves.

There is a previous question: are we more likely to become, from observation, monarchy-men, than the citizens of London are to adopt the maxims of our democracies? Perhaps it will appear, that *our* danger is not so great as *theirs*. Democracy, by indulging the fervours of the popular spirit, is more disposed to imbibe a zeal for proselytism. The everlasting bustle of our elections, the endless disputations and harangues of

demagogues, keep our spirits half the time smoking and ready to kindle, and the other half in a blaze. Zeal is ever contagious, and, accordingly, the only political propagandists now in the world are the democrats. The monarchists have less to do in the concerns of their government, and talk and wrangle less about it. The spirit of subordination they have; that of proselytism they have not. When life, liberty, and property are protected, they are contented, although their system should appear to speculatists inferiour in its theory to the best of all possible governments. Some men among us, and some of our scribbling countrymen abroad, have been modest and wise enough to imagine, that all the kings and ministers in Europe were watching our republican administration with eyes of fear and jealousy. The jacobin newspapers have assured us, that all kings sleep unquietly, and are visited with horrid dreams, because we are republicans. In 1794, "the Solomons in "council" then advised us to cling to sister France, as the only power, able, and, being a republick, *willing* to save us from a royal coalition. The fact is, foreign statesmen have not regarded America as much as they ought: we can see more evident marks of their neglect than their dread of us.

But the other part of this common-place threadbare proof of the preponderance of British influence remains to be considered. We employ British capitals, and, therefore, as the borrower is servant to the lender, they say, we are but passive instruments in the hands of our creditors. There is no country, where capital is employed to so manifest and lasting advantage as in the United States, because there is none, where the objects of employment so much exceed the amount of capital to be employed. When we give five or six per cent. for British capital, and employ it at eight, ten, or in some branches of trade, at twenty, or when it is occupied in clearing a wilderness almost boundless, and filling it with houses and settlers, the augmentation of our wealth is obvious. The *real* estate of the nation, that which must belong to posterity, is also prodigiously increased: every year some hundred thousand acres of new cleared land are added to the pasturage and wheat fields:

Yet these advantages, great as they are, would be too dearly purchased, if Great Britain derived a political influence over our government from the operations of her wealthy capitalists. It is not easy to see how she obtains a control over our publick measures, from her subjects permitting our merchants, and speculators, and land-jobbers to acquire a control over their wealth. Of all men the jacobins ought to abstain from saying, that this is the influence of Britain over our government. They avow principles in regard to publick faith and the rights of British creditors, that manifestly place British property, intrusted to the safe-keeping of our laws, at the mercy of a confiscating majority of congress, if, to the scandal of America, such a majority should be there. British capital, deposited in Algiers, would be considered as a pledge held by the Dey, liable to forfeiture in case the British government should give him occasion of offence. With ideas so honourable to America, principles so truly Algerine, that they would be nets to catch unwary Englishmen, it is truly astonishing, that the jacobins should mistake so grossly as to call this a source of British influence. One of their objections to the treaty was, that it stipulates security to this booty, and restrains congress from privateering ashore and before a declaration of war.

The British creditor, who claims his debt against a citizen, is dependent on the justice of our laws. All the *influence* that he or his government can desire in the case, is just payment; if more is demanded, surely our juries will be protectors of the rights of the debtor. Any honest American will blush, if it is suggested, that British influence will be necessary to prevent the denial of justice.

This brings us to consider the supposed influence arising from the claims of British creditors. This is a question to be tested by experience. If political power has followed British debts, then the greatest display and most flagrant abuse of that power is to be expected in the states, where there is the largest arrear of debt. Yet in Virginia, which

owes fifty times as much as Connecticut, the British influence has never been great enough to obtain payment, while Connecticut allows an Englishman to exact it without reluctance or impediment. So far is Virginia from having been enslaved by the British creditors, that her state laws have been framed and administered so as to exclude lands, and I believe, in effect, if not expressly, negroes from the operation of process. A man might be a debtor there thousands of pounds more than his estate would discharge, and live a life of ease and luxury, defying British creditors and cursing British influence, go to congress a patriot fiercer than a dragon for liberty and equal rights.

WHO does not know, that many of the states were in the hands of debtors, who made laws to keep off creditors? Who is ignorant, that the constitution contains an article to restrain such laws, and that this article soured into fermentation the leaven of anti-federalism at first, and of jacobinism since? The great planters could not endure it, that equal justice should strip them of the pre-eminence that they derived from their lands, and that the laws, made for their own convenience, had so long secured to them. So far have British debts been from creating British influence, that they have given rise to the most rancorous hatred. Happy will it be, if the Northern people are not, in the end, made victims of that hatred; if a system of irritation should not be cunningly devised, and blindly adopted, that New-England may be stripped of its earnings by captures, and that Virginia debts may be wiped off by an unnecessary British war.

PHOCION. N°. IV.

British Influence.

THE first settlers of the British Northern colonies were Englishmen. Most new settlements are first peopled by the outcasts and scum of the mother country; but New-England

can boast, that its ancestors were Englishmen, which, I confess, I consider as matter of boasting, and that they were the best of Englishmen: they were serious, devout christians, of pure, exemplary morals, zealous lovers of liberty, well educated and men of substantial property. There was never a new colony formed of better materials; never was one more carefully founded on plan and system, and no plan or system has discovered more foresight, or been crowned with more splendid success. Our forefathers immediately displayed a zeal and watchfulness, that the new society should be of the best sort, rather than of the largest size. Instead of building a Babel of wild Irish, Germans, and outlaws of all nations, such as would be suitable for a *** to govern, and such as would have preferred his government, they excluded not only foreigners but immoral persons from political power and even from inhabitancy. This has been called meanness and narrowness of spirit. New-England, however, owes its schools, colleges, towns, and parishes, its close population, its learned clergy, much of its light and knowledge, its arts and commerce, and spirit of enterprise to this early wisdom of our ancestors. Even its growth and prosperity, though later, will not ultimately prove less, than if it had been settled on what many call a *liberal* plan.

In consequence of our extraction and the institutions of our ever to be remembered ancestors, New-England has a distinct and well-defined national character; the only part of the United States that has yet any pretensions to it. There are many truly enlightened citizens in the other states, who have tried to introduce into them the schools, town divisions, and other institutions of New-England. But if they could do it, these institutions would be novelties, whose authority would be for an age or two feeble and limited, in comparison of old habits and institutions. Besides, most of the Southern men of sense have prejudices in respect to the establishment of a learned clergy, and obliging every small district to sup-

port a minister. Without this precious security for the support of good morals and true religion, the attempt will be vain to adopt the laws and institutions of our ancestors.

Nay, popular prejudices against these institutions are fixed, and have been cherished in most of the Southern states. They, perhaps sincerely, consider these as burdensome and tyrannical restraints, and, without very well knowing what they are, unite in disclaiming them as English, and remnants of bigotry. Hence the laws and customs of England are so much represented in Virginia as inconsistent with republicanism, that they have voted to instruct their members in congress to procure their formal abolition. Hence it is, that they are stated to be the badges and the instruments of British influence. They say, an Englishman from the midland counties, suddenly transplanted into New-England, would scarcely know he was not in his own country: he would hear the same language, he would observe the same manners. This close affinity and resemblance, they say, is the occasion of a partiality for England that is dangerous to our republicanism.

Trite observations of this kind make impression on the two-fold account, that they are plausible, and that they are so loose and indefinite that they are not precisely understood. It seems to be very possible, that we should reverence the English common law, and the customs and institutions we derive from our English ancestors, without loving or trusting lord North, or William Pitt, or any other minister of the British government. This distinction was made very exactly in the year 1775, when hostilities began The New-England states are closely allied in affection, as well as by resemblance of character and manners; yet it has never been the case, that Massachusetts was able to exercise an inconvenient influence over the affairs of Connecticut. It is, perhaps, to be lamented, that the good sense and good order of Connecticut, in its elections, have not had influence enough to procure the adoption of their laws by their neighbours.

Thus it seems that fact stands, as it often does, in opposition to plausible theory.

We adopt the rules of justice from Great Britain, and as long as we are allowed to enjoy good order, we shall desire to provide for the administration of justice, and we shall continue to think it a precious advantage, that we can adopt so many important rules and principles to regulate its distribution, after England has tried them, and proved that they will answer. Surely this is a different thing from political influence. As well might it be said, that by copying their books, or even imitating their new invented labour-saving machines, we augment their influence.

Next to the power of religion, a strict administration of justice is the best security of morals. Foreign influence will not greatly prevail, as long as morals remain uncorrupted. The British common law is, therefore, one of the bulwarks against that corruption of manners, which will invite foreign influence, in spite of all the frothy harangues that will ascribe it to the wrong causes. A people thoroughly licentious and corrupt (and democracy will make them such) will be betrayed, and foreign states will reward demagogues for managing their passions to mislead them. It is by practising on their hopes and fears, that such men gain an influence over the people, and after they have gained, they have it for sale.

But, for the very reason that we nearly resemble the English, it will be peculiarly difficult to acquire that popular influence. Let this be examined.

Nothing is so odious or offensive as comparisons. When we find that we are compared with others, we are uneasy and displeased with the result of the comparison, unless we find that the preference is assigned to ourselves. We consider those as our enemies, who thus degrade us, and we revenge ourselves by noting the defects of their judgment and the malignity of their dispositions, who have thus deeply wounded our self-love. Comparisons that are thus frequently made, render this angry spirit rancorous and habitual. But comparisons of this kind are not made, unless with persons who

pretty nearly resemble us. It is believed to be hard for two beauties to be friends. Our pride is never hurt by our being compared with those who are very unlike us, and even if the superiority is assigned to the other party, the decision is rendered inoffensive by the manifest dissimilarity of the subjects of the comparison. In like manner, we know that Americans resemble Frenchmen so little, that there is no ground for invidious comparison; but Englishmen we are like, and the painful question to national pride is, which nation is superiour. Partial as we are and ought to be to the American nation, we cannot despise the English nation, we will not prefer them, all that is left is to hate them. I ask with emphasis, is not this done? Is not the pride of Great Britain the theme of popular irritation? Is not their power held up as a bug-bear? Is not this fear an instrument to work upon the passions of our citizens? and which of our demagogues could hold his authority without using it? We are too much like the English to love them, because we love ourselves better, and we hate all comparisons that mortify our self-love.

THE fact is, the hatred of England is excessive, and, as popular passions are the agents of our political good or evil, exposes our government to the extreme hazard of confusion and French fraternity, and our peace to the shock of a British war.

PHOCION. N°. V.

British Influence.

FOREIGN influence has been traced with some attention to the impediments and auxiliaries of its operation, *within* our country. It remains to look *without* it, and to consider the political situation of France and England, and to determine, *which* of the two will be disposed and invited to employ her influence in the control of our affairs.

THE counsels of both will be guided by their views of political good and evil. It is not believed, that France, insolent with victory, and crimson with revolutionary crimes, will regard

either shame or principle. It is not believed, that England will wholly disregard the maxims and rules of civilized states. But without really admitting, that France is on a footing in point of morals or deference to the laws of nations, even with Algiers, it shall, for argument sake, be conceded to those who love her better than America, that France and England will exactly alike pursue what their interest dictates. Be it so.

England then is commercial. Her commerce thrives by the immense superiority of her skill, industry, and capital. She has capital enough to employ and to *trust*. Her interest, as a trading nation, is to have good customers: her interest is, that those who owe should pay. But the essence, and almost the quintessence, of a good government is, to protect property and its rights. When these are protected, there is scarcely any booty left for oppression to seize; the objects and the motives to usurpation and tyranny are removed. By securing property, life and liberty can scarcely fail of being secured: where property is safe by rules and principles, there is liberty. It is precisely such a government that Great Britain wishes to find and to sustain, wherever her commerce and credit extend. She is, of course, so far as her commercial interest extends, the friend of all governments that are friends to justice and protectors of honest creditors. Where justice ceases, there her credit stops. Stable governments, and especially such as have a portion of liberty to give them enterprise and to make them large consumers, are her best customers. If Turkey in Europe had as much law and liberty as the United States, it would demand, perhaps, as much manufactures as Britain could supply. Britain is obviously and demonstrably interested, not in the overthrow, but in the support of the regular governments in existence, no matter whether monarchies or republicks. Governments that will compel debtors to be just, are all, in their form and administration, that British influence, in this point of view, could be employed to make them. Accordingly, we do not find, that the trade of England with Holland was ever disturbed, because the latter was a *republick*, and for half a century destitute even of a stadtholder; we do not find,

that Englishmen were set at work to preach democracy in Cadiz, though surely English liberty is as unlike Spanish despotism as our republicanism. No, she was well content to clothe the colonists of Spain, and to receive their gold, silver, and diamonds, without stirring up a faction in Lisbon or Madrid to call first town meetings and then parliaments. Experience has fully shewn, that commerce, with democratick and aristocratick republicks, with monarchies and simple despotisms, has been alike cherished and prosecuted for ages, without a suspicion, and certainly without an attempt on the part of Great Britain to revolutionize their governments. It is not difficult to shew, that stable liberty is the best condition of nations for the advancement of her commercial interest; yet no attempt is recollected even to introduce this blessing insidiously among her customers. The subjects of despots consume little and pay less: the diffusion of true and stable liberty would augment her commerce and manufactures.

It must be urged also, that the genuine liberty of Englishmen is unfavourable to the fanatical spirit of conquest. Every able-bodied man at the plough or in the workshops of Birmingham and Sheffield, is worth scarcely less than one hundred guineas. A free nation will be prosperous, and a prosperous nation cannot employ a man as a soldier without diverting his industry from husbandry or the arts. It costs too much for free thriving nations to be soldiers: the military spirit is no more to be indulged, than a taste for luxuries by the poor, because the objects of gratification are, in both cases, equally out of reach. Rich states can poorly afford to wear armour: the sword is the dearest of all tools. The ragged peasantry of France, half employed, less than half paid, were ever ready to listen to the enchanting eloquence of a recruiting sergeant. War has ever been in France the trade first in credit and least of all in rivalship with any other.

Britain, with a moderate population, has, therefore, never been in a condition to indulge the spirit of conquest. Territorial aggrandizement has, indeed, been her object in Bengal and the peninsula of India; but it was there in subservience

to her commerce; and, let it be remarked, that the unwarlike Gentoos offered little resistance to her arms: she employed but a handful of Europeans to subject empires to the India company. This seeming exception from the observation before made is, nevertheless, a strong illustration of its truth: she contended for territory for the sake of her commerce, and great as the prize was, the means she could employ were feeble.

It may be said, therefore, on the ground of experience, that the territorial ambition of Great Britain is limited and checked by her situation, character, and means; her insular situation, her commercial character, and her pecuniary means. Being an island, she cannot annex provinces to her empire; being commercial, she aims rather at profit than power; and being prosperous and industrious, her citizens are too *dear* to be hired as soldiers. Britain cannot raise great land armies, and, therefore, she cannot be so mad as to effect conquests that would require them. Admitting that the United States would submit a little sourly to her government, it would take forty or fifty thousand men in camps and garrisons, to keep any shew of authority over America; and on the first symptoms of resistance they must be doubled. Great Britain, as she is, is not rich enough to afford to accept of the sixteen states as provinces. If a spirit, as restless and turbulent as Pennsylvania has shewn, should accompany and succeed our submission, we should certainly drain her treasury, and finally baffle her arms.

Great Britain pursues a policy of more moderation, justice, and wisdom. Her naval superiority is employed to extend her commerce: if she carries her sword in one hand, it is to offer her commodities with the other. Her ships of war cannot conquer extensive territories, nor preserve them in subjection. Thus the means she possesses, and those she wants, almost equally exclude her from territorial power. Perhaps the increase of her soldiers would necessarily exhaust the funds for the support of her ships, and, therefore, we are certain that

she will not ordinarily attempt impossibilities; she will not try to gain the possession of territory that she could not keep.

The application of these remarks is easy. We conceive that Britain has no motive, nor has she means to disturb the government of the United States, by attempting to excite the popular passions to control its measures. She cannot have influence, because those passions will for ever run counter to her wishes: those wishes, conformable to her interests, will be to support the government, that the goverment may support justice. The very nature of her power ensures an irreconcilable hostility with popular feeling in the United States. She is commercial, and so are we. Excluded from some of her ports in our own ships, rivals and competitors in all marts, inferiour in all seas, and made especially in time of war sensible by her arrogance and injustice, painfully sensible of our inferiority, we shall hate her power, and suspect her influence, when she has none, when she cannot have any, and when the hatred gives influence to her rival, France.

PHOCION. N°. VI.

French Influence.

FRENCH influence has found, and will long find, both motives and means to disturb and control the measures of any honest and truly national government in America.

Since Rome, no state has ever manifested such exorbitant ambition as France. Whether this arises from the nature of her power, which has ever been military, or the extent of it, which, for two centuries, has proved an overmatch for any European state; whether two centuries spent in efforts for aggrandizement have formed martial habits, or whether the national character be the cause rather than the effect of those struggles, the fact is certain, that France is of all modern states the most military, intriguing, and ambitious. Since the revolution, all traces of every other passion have disappeared, and the sword is the only utensil to occupy industry or to carve

out its recompense. With that, Frenchmen reap where they have not sowed: by waving that, they command the diamonds of Brasil, and strip the churches of Italy. Good fortune, scarcely less than Roman, has kindled a passion for conquest, and blown up a pride, which the hostile force of the civilized world would not intimidate, the empire of the world would not satisfy. The avarice of a commercial nation calculates its means and reckons up the value of them; a conquering nation disdains both gold and arithmetick, and computes the presumption and audacity of its attempts, as surprises on its plodding neighbours, and as the resources to ensure its triumphs. Behold France, conducting her intrigues and arraying her force between the arctick circle and the tropicks; see her, in Russia, the friend of despotism, preparing to subvert the empire of the Turks; in Ireland, the auxiliary of a bloody democracy; in Spain and Italy, a papist; in Egypt, a mussulman; in India, a bramin; and at home, an atheist; countenancing despotism, monarchy, democracy, religion of every sort, and none at all, as suits the necessity of the moment. It may be said, that it is nothing to the people of France, whether their armies win or lose a battle: glory is not bread.

It is incredible to many, that a nation should perform labours and make efforts of the most perilous and astonishing kind, merely for glory. Those, however, who reason against the military passion as a chimera, arraign the authority of history. What was it to the Romans, that Mithridates, or Tigranes, or Antiochus, or Perseus, or Arsaces, did not respect the majority of the Roman people? Surely that did not affect the markets or amusements of Rome. Yet never was there an objection in the forum, never was there any repugnance to the enrolment of the legions for chastising the rebellious insolence of any king, who had never heard of the Roman name, or who did not tremble when he heard it. Accordingly, the soldier citizens cheerfully engaged to march across deserts and mountains to the extremities of the then known world, to assert the glory of the Roman name, and to fix the statue of the God Terminus as far East as the shore of the Euphrates. The sons of business, who do not feel this spirit, will be slow to be-

large a portion of it, as the soldiers of Paulus Emilius, Lucullus, or Crassus.

France is, probably, the most populous of European states, if we except the wandering tribes subject to Russia. It is the only state in which the sword is the only trade. *Commerce has not a single ship; arts and manufactures exist in ruins and memory only; credit is a spectre that haunts its burying place; justice has fallen on its own sword; and liberty, after being sold to Ishmaelites, is stripped of its bloody garments to disguise its robbers. A people, vain enough to be satisfied with the name of liberty, are called free, and the fervours of its spirit are roused to bind other nations in chains.*

From all these circumstances thus singularly combined, the whole physical force of France is its political force. There is not a vein nor a purse, that its gigantick despotism cannot open at pleasure.

It is impossible that means so vast should be possessed, without the desire to employ them. The obstacle to their successful employment is England: in all her ambitious attempts, she stands in her way. She stands like a necromancer, herself invulnerable, and by her spells the giant France is smitten with a palsy. With a spirit less generous than her courage, and sometimes with an attention to objects unworthy of her situation, England stands the bulwark of the civilized world, the only obstacle to the universal despotism of France.

Every thing, therefore, concurs to give activity to French influence. Her ambition, that seeks territorial aggrandizement in all parts of the earth, and the impediments that the naval power of Great Britain every where throws in her way, create the necessity, the motive, and the means of influence. Being inferiour at sea, she tries to gain friends or to subdue *allies* on the shore of every sea. Accordingly, in Italy she obliges the Genoese, the Tuscans, and the Romans to exclude the ships and manufactures of England from their ports. She will exact the like terms from the emperour and from Portugal. She will never cease to stir up the jealousy and ambition of the emperour Paul, till he has forced the Turks to banish the English from the Mediterranean. Egypt is seized to secure a station on the land, that may finally expel the English from India.

Popular passions are courted in America, that they may obstruct first, and then subvert and revolutionize the government. Credit, publick and private, is an anti-Gallican interest: by subverting credit and abolishing debts, British hostility is ensured, British commerce excluded. Besides, French islands in every war are destitute of the protection of a naval force: they are forced to depend on the resources of their own soil, and on the supplies that the United States will furnish. The neutrality, and still more the friendship and co-operation of the United States, will be sufficient to preserve their colonies, and, eventually, to turn the scale of power, in the contest for empire, in favour of France. Having no trade of her own, she is our customer, not our rival: her publick ships, fugitives on the ocean, are seldom its tyrants. She is interested, and has the opportunity, to foment the passions, which arise in America from the use and, too frequently, from the abuse of the British dominion of the sea.

Is it then difficult to explain by this theory all the conduct of France and her emissaries, and the co-operation of her partisans in America? She has exerted her diplomatick skill to seize Louisiana, Florida, and Canada, and employed her Genets to enlist men in our back country to occupy them. She was, in 1783, averse to our aggrandizement, lest it should make us strong enough to stand alone, and to do without her aid. She has opposed every step towards the stability of our government, and for the establishment of its resources and credit. Her emissaries, in 1783, opposed the grant to the army, wishing to foment factions and divisions; in 1787, the federal constitution; in 1789, the funding system. She has been leagued with every faction, as Fauchet's intercepted letter shews. There is no doubt that the jacobin gazettes are in her pay. The despatches from Mr. Gerry, Marshall, and Pinckney, shew that she relies on her power over the constituted powers of the United States. She has interfered in our elections; and she needs us as instruments of her hatred of England too much to lose a moment, or any practicable means, or to forbear any expense, that will secure the preponderance of her influence in our counsels.

THE NEW ROMANS.

N°. I.

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TO raise curiosity, wonder, and terrour, is the ordinary effect of great political events. All these, but especially wonder, have been produced by the progress of the French revolution. To wonder is not the way to grow wise: to extract wisdom from experience, we must ponder and examine; we must search for the *plan* which regulates political conduct, and its ultimate *design*. To know *what* is done, without knowing *why* it is done, and with what *spirit* it was undertaken, is knowing nothing: it is no better than laborious ignorance and studious errour. Such has been the crude mass of newspaper information, the blind and undistinguishing admiration of French victories. It would be difficult to understand all that it is profitable to know, in regard to these surprising events, if history did not teach us, that like actors and like scenes have been exhibited in ancient days, and that we may, if we will, learn wisdom from the sad experience of the nations which have gone before us.

SINCE the Romans, no nation has appeared on the stage of human affairs, with a character completely military, except the French; and that character was mingled with the commercial, until the revolution.

WITH less than half a million of citizens in her whole territory, according to the census or enumeration preserved by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Rome, soon after the expulsion of her kings, was ready to commence the conquest of Italy, a country scarcely less populous than France. It was, however, divided into petty states, many of which were as numerous, as brave, and as warlike as the Romans; but there was an immense difference in their national character and maxims of state. The citizens of Rome were all soldiers; they had no pay; all that rewarded their toils in war was pillage. Poor

as they were, and bands of robbers are ever poor, the spoils of an enemy's camp, or the division of conquered lands, was ample reward for a fortnight's campaign. Their enemies were near at hand and ever ready for combat; of course, the term of service was short, but the calls for it were frequent. In Rome, therefore, there was but one trade, and that was war: all were soldiers. Accordingly, Rome could array sixty thousand of the firmest infantry in the world, while she had not five hundred thousand citizens; a province in Italy with a million did not offer to resist one demi-brigade of French soldiers. What a prodigious difference! Holland is now kept in subjection by twenty thousand French troops, and its miserable people are ground to powder to pay and clothe these ragged masters for the trouble they take to oppress them.

One eighth of the population of Rome were soldiers, the best in the world; the United States, with not less than five million five hundred thousand people, are pronounced by the democrats, to be beggared and ruined to such a degree, that the children in every farm house will go supperless to bed to maintain three thousand: nay, that this STANDING ARMY of three thousand was raised with the design, and possesses the force and means, as well as disposition, to enslave the people and to set up a monarchy in America. France is exceedingly populous, and cannot need, if she could bear, as great a draft from her numbers as Rome; no modern nation has, however, come so near being, like the Romans, all soldiers, as the French. It is exceedingly difficult to state the proportion of soldiers to other citizens. It has generally been thought, that Germany had soldiers in proportion of one to a hundred. The distresses of Austria and the zeal of the Hungarians may have doubled the proportion, during the most trying periods of the war with France. There is, however, reason to believe, that, in the energies of Robespiereism, France, with her sixteen armies, arrayed within and without her territory nearly *one twelfth* of her vast population. Without a merchant ship, her navy hauled up, arts stagnant, capital spent, skill occupied in making arms, Lyons blown up with gunpowder, the only place to find busi-

ness, to get bread, fame, and promotion, was in the army : no modern state has been so nearly all military. This was not the effect of her momentary distresses ; it was the *plan* of her government, and a consequence of the character of her people. Her government, ever changing hands, was ever the same in spirit. Like Rome, who extended her conquests, while she was convulsed with civil war, every change has breathed new fury into the military enthusiasm of France. One passion, like a tyrant, has banished all others : it is the only one, that has aliment, or finds scope for its exercise. We see how prevalent this passion is in every French bosom ; for the emigrants who came here and to England, bespattered with the blood and brains of their fathers, and wives, and kindred, strut, on the news of their victories, as if they were an inch taller on the success of their oppressors, and they weep and mourn, when their fleets or armies are beaten. In France, the age of chivalry is not gone : a spirit, more ardent than the crusades engendered, glows there, which burns not for liberty, but for conquest. The money-getting and money-loving Dutch and Americans can scarcely credit the influence of this passion. Doubts of this sort are plausible errours ; and they oppose metaphysicks, as to what *ought* to govern men, to the confounding and decisive authority of experience, which determines what *does* govern men.

It might, if it were necessary, be shewn, that the chivalry of the military spirit ever was predominant in that country : all that was respected was military. The lower classes were emulous of this spirit, and they allowed that gentility consisted in bearing arms : the common soldiers fought duels, affected to be men of honour, and gloried in the distinction of wearing ragged uniform and eating bad provisions for the grand monarque. All this happened before the revolution. It might be added, that all trades, that merchandise, and a condition of labour were ever held base and degrading. It happened that the merchants, to whom honour was not ascribed, wanted honour and integrity. They were brought down, as might naturally be expected, to the rank in which they were held.

There was nothing that ought to rival the splendour of military distinction; there was nothing in the state that did rival it. All other passions were quenched; all the energies of the human character were concentred in the passion for arms. The revolution came and sublimated all the passions to fury and extravagance: it gave an immediate preponderance, nay, a sole dominion to the love of glory. The national guards were formed, and their epaulets and swords were worth more in their eyes than liberty.

THE bloody struggle that has buried arts, and institutions, and wealth, and thrones, and churches of God under heaps of cinders, has given that strength to this passion, which might be expected from partial indulgence and strict discipline.

VERY early the French perceived the affinity of their national character with that of the Romans; though it is, manifestly, with the Romans after they were corrupted and had lost their liberty. Their vanity instantly prompted them to emulate this model, and to illustrate this resemblance: they have been vain of their consuls and tribunes, and they have adopted the haughty demeanour, as well as the insidious art of the Roman senate. If modern nations are any better than barbarians, they ought to mark the spirit of these new Romans, and exert in self-defence a spirit of intelligence and patriotism, which was wanting to the ancient world, and which might have saved them from bondage. It is much to be desired, that your learned correspondent would pursue his *comparison of the French and Roman policy*. It is what popular prejudice needs, and, I perceive by the Aurora, it is what jacobinism dreads.

THE NEW ROMANS.

N°. II.

CONQUEST being the object of the Romans, and the spirit of the people being, in a high degree, martial, the next care was to train up men to be conquering soldiers. They believed, that they could, and that they ought to achieve more than other

soldiers; and, therefore, they cheerfully submitted to the augmentation of labour, and self-denial, and danger, that this preeminence of glory and courage were bound to sustain. Their patriotism was little less than self-love: they heard of nothing but what was due to their country; they lived, and acted, and were bound by oath, if necessary, to die, for it. The republick was a sort of divinity, which commanded their reverence and affection, and which alone conferred the rewards that were proper for heroes. This sentiment was strengthened by the rigour of the maxims, which then regulated war: to be conquered, or even to be a prisoner, was to be annihilated as a Roman, and for ever deprived of an inheritance of glory more precious than life. Religion added force to these popular sentiments, and a Roman false to them was more abhorred than an Arnold.

Such was the force of this complex and skilful machinery, that the Roman soldiers were heroes: they were all that men could be. Their country was a camp; and peace, a time not of rest but of preparation and exercise. They were taught to carry vast burdens, to march loaded like packhorses, to take fifteen days provisions, to transport weapons heavier than their enemies' entrenching tools, and much of the equipage of war, which is now conveyed by thousands of waggons. This habitual endurance of hardship made it familiar, hardened them to the rigour of climates and the most violent efforts: they were seldom sick. Their celerity in marching, their perfect discipline, their promptness to rally after a repulse, their unwearied perseverance in battle, were as extraordinary and as terrible to the foe as their heroick courage. They claimed to be, and their enemies admitted that they were, a superiour race of men. This lofty opinion realized itself: they did not rely on numbers, but thought it enough to send a popular general with two legions, *(not sixteen thousand men)* to overthrow the empires of Tigranes or Jugurtha: they expected, and experience justified their expectation, that the terrour of the Roman name would be more effectual than legions. Accordingly, the subjects and allies, and even the children, of the invaded kings,

seldom failed to desert his cause, who was the enemy of Rome, and, of course, devoted to ruin.

If this view of the military character of Rome has not led the mind of the reader to mark its resemblance with the French, it is not because the latter have omitted any means in their command to form themselves on the Roman model. As the French soldiers compose a large part of the able-bodied citizens, they are a better sort of men than are found in the ranks of their enemies. In England, for example, a prosperous commerce and vast manufactures leave only refuse and scum for their armies; the French soldiers are really Frenchmen, and animated with a large portion of that fiery, impetuous zeal for the glory of the nation, which is so remarkably characteristick. It is a subject, on which no Frenchman, however his country may have misused him, can be cold. All that taxes, that confiscation, or that foreign spoil could supply, has been promised as reward; and all that art or eloquence could do, has been used as incitement. In France, too, as in Rome, there is no claim of power and distinction, but what is derived from the sword: the consuls were generals, and all the offices were considered as in a degree military: no man can be great in France unless he is a great general. The abbe Sieyes has been made a consul, and, for wisdom in the cabinet, report assigns him the first place: when Caligula made his horse a consul, he did not make him as able and learned as Sieyes, but he invested him with the exact measure of power that Buonaparte allows to his colleague. The army, conscious of being the fountain of power, would as soon submit to the authority of a woman, as of any man eminent in any other art than the military, and ignorant of *that*. When, therefore, all glory, all distinction in the state, and the exclusive title to a share in the government of it, are confined to the military, no wonder that art has been carried to a degree of perfection far beyond the attainments of the rival states.

If those states were equally emulous of glory, if their subjects were all soldiers, and if all arts were held in contempt that were not subservient to arms, they would be on a footing

with the French. But, since the discovery of America, the systems of all the European governments have been commercial: they have patronised the arts that would procure riches, as preferable to those which confer power. The publick sentiment of every other nation has been rather that of avarice than of ambition. The military profession has been, in consequence, separated from every other, and, in some measure, degraded in estimation, as the only one that earns nothing, and that is corrupted by idleness. The rest of the society has become unwarlike, unfit for toil, insensible to glory. The citizen, attached to his ease, his property and family, considers it as both ruin and disgrace to become a soldier. Is it strange, then, that the entire mass of France should overpower its enemies? From the difference of character and situation, no other decision could have happened, than that which has happened.

France, subject to the most energetick despotism in the world, poured forth her myriads in arms. Formerly, a few strong fortresses, or a ridge of mountains, were called barriers; and to subdue a country these obstacles must be overcome: many campaigns were made by the famous Marlborough to break the line of the iron frontier of France, as the Netherlands have been called. The French have changed this system of war in a very extraordinary manner. By the immensity of the mass of their armies, by their great extent, occupying the whole frontier of an enemy's country, by the astonishingly numerous artillery, the rapid marches, the attacks made in concert in many places at once, from the lower Rhine to the Mincio and Adige, though at the distance of one hundred and fifty leagues, by the unwearied renewal of those attacks, if the first fails, and by the endless reinforcements of fresh troops, a state is now subdued, as soon as, formerly, Marlborough could take a town: the field of battle extends over several provinces: the map of a country is not extensive enough for the plan of a camp: all the heights and commanding positions are occupied in such a manner, that the two wings of the army are, perhaps, one hundred and fifty miles apart: if one of the enemy's posts can be passed by, or his forces are dislodged from

them, he must fall back to take the next best position in his rear, and thus a country falls in a day, and, perhaps, without a battle.

It is evident, that this new method of employing so vast armies, and this wasteful activity of manœuvring and fighting incessantly, by which a campaign has become unusually destructive of human life, will require Europe to be more military than ever; all must be soldiers, or all will be slaves: and this boasted and boastful revolution will tend to hasten and to fix for ages both barbarism and despotism.

THE NEW ROMANS.

N°. III.

ART cannot soon form the character of a nation, nor can violence soon change it. Of all the barbarous nations, the Franks were the most martial. Fourteen hundred years ago, they formed their petty tribes into a conquering nation. The greatness of the nation early inspired ambition, which several able and warlike princes inflamed into a national enthusiasm. While most other European states were feeble by their divisions, the French were powerful, and aspired to dominion and influence over other nations. More than a thousand years ago, their kings led armies into Italy, and parcelled out its governments, as Buonaparte has done. The splendour of the reign of Charlemagne fascinated the French, as much as their late victories, and established the pretensions of their vanity to be the *great* nation, the arbiters of Europe. The compactness as well as immensity of their force engaged them in every war that occurred. We know the power that habit has to form the characters of individual men and whole nations: by continual wars, the French lost nothing of the military spirit of their barbarous ancestors. The crusades and the age of chivalry exalted this spirit to its highest degree, and greatly distinguished the French among the crusaders. The Edwards, and still more Henry the seventh, of England, and afterwards the wise

Elizabeth, introduced commerce and the arts, and gave a new turn to the enterprise of the English nation. It may be conjectured with some appearance of probability, that the insular position of England very early determined the English character towards the arts of peace. As soon as the struggles between the king and the barons, and the rival houses of York and Lancaster, afforded any respite from arms, and any interiour order in the kingdom, two consequences resulted: a greater portion of the English inhabited the country, the country being as safe to inhabit as the cities; the yeomanry, or cultivators of land, increased in wealth and influence in the state, and constituted the mass and body of the nation: husbandry forms a class of men, and a determined character for the class, very unlike that of soldiers. A second consequence, and connected with the former, was, that the English were afterwards engaged less actively and, indeed, less dangerously in wars than their rivals: except the incursions of the Scotch, their wars were abroad, they were only occasional and of short duration. When the reign of Henry the seventh, and the discovery of America, awakened the ardour of discovery and commercial enterprise, this new propensity found little rivalship or impediment from the military passion, and, as it was fostered afterwards by Elizabeth and the Stuarts, the English soon became a shopkeeping nation, *une nation boutiquiere*, as the French contemptuously denominate them. Hence, the passion to acquire is characteristick of the English; the passion to rule is predominant with the French: the one seeks gain; the other glory.

The causes which have led to this national character, not only lie deep in the most remote antiquity, but events of a more recent date have contributed to decide and for ever to fix their preponderance.

The ravages of national wars frequently exposed the country people to spoil and violence; but the great lords and feudal chiefs claimed and exercised the right of private vengeance. Hence, animosities and endless civil wars desolated the continental states of Europe. The only places of security were

the fortified towns. Thus it happened, that the country was inhabited by a wretched, defenceless peasantry, without character or spirit, and subject to the *corvee* or ruinous slavery of performing certain labour for their lords, and to a whole system of feudal exactions and oppressions so heavy and so dispiriting, as to prevent their having any character of their own, or any influence on that of the nation. Indeed, emulation will be directed towards such qualities as are esteemed; and there was nothing in the condition of the labouring class to gratify pride or to inspire it. The soldiers only were respected or imitated: they gave the tone and the fashion to every thing in France. Cities were not much occupied in arts, and not at all in commerce. They were crowded with retainers to princes and nobles, who even wore their livery and fed at their tables: they followed them in war, and their multitude was the rule, by which the magnificence and power of the nobles was measured and displayed.

Thus the taste and manners of the French were not formed, like the English, in solitude and by the occupations of country life. Fashion governed the crowds in cities, and the nobles and their martial followers alone gave law to fashion: arms engrossed all thoughts, the business of war and the conversation of peace.

When Louis the eleventh humbled the great lords of France, and established a standing army, his sagacity discerned, that this leading propensity of the French character was to be used as the instrument to keep the nation in subjection. His successors cherished the military sense of honour, as the basis and guardian principle of the monarchy. The *noblesse* despised trade, and an artisan, however ingenious, was one of the *peuple*, or populace or mob.

From hence it followed, that arms alone were honoured: a rich man could not pretend to be a gentleman till he had served a campaign; and the French noblesse preserved undiminished, the gallantry, the impetuous valour that courted danger, which so much distinguished the age of the crusades and of chivalry: that gallant race was extinct, excepting in France.

THE revolution began, and was in a great measure effected, not by quenching this chivalrous spirit, but by awakening it in the rabble. They were sensible to honour and shame, and they claimed to be as brave, and, therefore, as much gentlemen as the noblesse. This emulation, the more lively for being newly inspired, animated the attack of the bastile, arrayed the national guards, and spread the power of enthusiasm, like the electrick fluid, over all France. The leaders of the revolution, as skilful to guide as to excite the popular ferment, availed themselves of these new energies to raise armies, and, after having subverted the monarchy, to find work for them in a war with Austria. The progress of this war, it was foreseen, would throw all the political and physical power of France into their hands, as the fervour of the revolution had already given them absolute power over opinion. Never, in the history of mankind, did the rulers of a nation possess an influence so combined and so unlimited. Robespiere held all France in his hand as a machine, he wielded it as a weapon, while the emperour and the king of Great Britain, whom the French call despots, could command only the surplus of the revenues, and some fragments of the force of their states.

BUT the manner, in which this gigantick despotism has proceeded, will best illustrate the popular sentiment, from which it sprung, and the end, which alone it deems worthy of its ambition and its efforts.

THE NEW ROMANS.

N°. IV.

IT has been attempted to shew, that military glory has ever been the first object of desire, the most fascinating claim to superiour consideration in France.

SAVAGES take their character from their situation as *individuals*, from their appetites and their wants, rather than from any sympathy of national sentiment: hunger makes them hun-

ters; fear, and, sometimes, revenge makes them warriours. But in polished societies, men derive their national cast from their intercourse with one another. Absolute want is felt by few, and those who feel it, are without influence on the society. Man ceases to be merely an individual; he models his desires and his sentiments according to his relation to the national body, of which he is a member. That class in society which is the most respected, is the most imitated. It has been shewn, that the class of artisans, or that of merchants, did *not* hold that envied place in France, but that the men of the sword *did*.

This being the national sentiment, it is obvious, that the government could not disobey, much less offend or shock, that sentiment, without losing, in a moment, all its hold on the popular affections. A dastardly policy, a dread of war with Austria or England, would have blasted the new leaders with disgrace. Taken, as they were, from the lowest classes of the nation, they would have been charged with having souls as mean as their condition, too mean to govern a republick, all whose citizens claimed an equal rank with their high-spirited nobles, and who required, that the great nation should adopt the lofty pretensions, and display the impetuous courage, of its military class. All the classes of society claimed an equality, and to be at the top, and thus the depression of ranks instantly produced an elevation of national spirit. Believing that they were all sovereign, and that France, by raising its spirit, had raised its power, they were anxious to make such a display of it, as should astonish and confound kings, whom they hated, and the English nation, whom they envied and feared. They considered their new liberty, as a new rank, and the highest rank, which, of course, in their eyes, was military; and that this sudden dignity was neither solidly established, nor sufficiently enjoyed, unless the *power* of France was displayed in a manner to excite both terrour and wonder, to make kings quake and their subjects admire. How dear a triumph for republicanism! How lofty a stage for equality!

Indeed it is not in the nature of things, that any strong popular impulse should be satisfied without action. The more sudden, surprising, and violent the action, the more likely is it to gratify and to prolong this impulse. All democracies are governments by popular passions. These cannot exist and be at rest; they cannot be indulged, and yet kept within the limits of moderation or principle. They sweep like whirlwinds, that are not stopped by desolation, but as they destroy, they level obstacles and are quickened in their progress. They pour like torrents from the mountains, and, if they reach the plains in their fulness, they are inundations unconfined by banks: the violence of each soon scoops for itself a narrow channel, and that is a dry one.

One auxiliary cause of the military passion of the French has not been mentioned in its proper place; it must not be omitted in the examination of characters. The English, their great rivals, ever thought themselves entitled to take rank as a *free* nation. The French could not vie with the English for *liberty*; but vanity, repelled from one course, sought and found relief in another: we are the most gallant people of Europe: these islanders, proud of their liberty, shall not be permitted to despise, they shall fear us. Pride, hot in the race of emulation, and smarting with the wound of its imputed degradation by slavery under an absolute monarch, grew prouder, when it wore its armour and surveyed its trophies. In that contemplation, every Frenchman stretched into a giant, and felt persuaded, that France alone was peopled by the race of Anak.

All this military fervour, with all its strength and all its blindness, was transferred by the revolution into the people, *la Bourgeoisie*, who claimed to be nobles, and who knew no other way to display it, than the usual and acknowledged one for men of rank, by military distinction.

Accordingly, in the first era of the revolution, the formation of the *national guards*, and the establishment of rank equal to veterans, awakened the sleeping pride of every heart, and mingled the love of liberty with self-love too intimately to

allow them afterwards to be dissociated. Pride received a new impulse to its current, but it ran in the old channel.

No sooner had the revolution attracted attention, than each Frenchman felt his individual title to pre-eminence, as well as that of the nation, to be subjected to a trial. He now claimed to be freer than the free, to be freer than an Englishman or American, as he had ever pretended to be the first among polished and brave men. Their common sentiment was, of course, that the friendship of those who resembled them in liberty was *a debt;* the submission of those who were inferiour to them in force and courage, was *a decree of fate.* The supposed hatred of kings, because *they* had made a republick, their contempt, because they had made a vile rabble rulers, alike stimulated their national vanity to assert claims that were thus disputed, and, if possible, to make them indisputable. They perceived, that France was a stage, and that the curiosity of mankind expected something magnificent in the scenes, something preternatural in the actors, something that would dazzle and astonish; that would make criticism distrustful of its rules, and awe contradiction into silence.

The revolution itself was one of those portentous, but rare events, which originate from the operation of moral causes, from the intestine agitation of the human mind; a fermentative power, that destroys the forms and the essences of the political body, and yet in its progress separates a larger portion of that pungent spirit, that was formerly the hidden aliment of its life, and is now its preservative from corruption. But, while all France was steaming with this pervading heat, and twitching with the spasms of enthusiastick passion, its popular leaders, assuming imposing names, and exercising a despotism that had neither known limits nor definition, suddenly found themselves invested with a power, that seemed miraculous. They could lead the nation out like an intoxicated giant; or like a war elephant to tread

down an enemy's ranks, and train him rather to be furious, than intimidated, by his wounds.

The spirit of the revolution, like that of the crusades, is a fierce and troubled spirit: and, like that, it may take two centuries to quiet it. The reformation of Luther, more necessary and more salutary, entailed three ages of war upon Europe. It is a prodigious power, which the monarchy could not resist; but which the chiefs of the military democracy have successively attempted to guide.

It may seem to most readers a paradox, that so much weight should be allowed to the popular sentiment, in a country so devoted to despotism as France. It should be remembered, that even a despotism has but a limited physical strength: it must depend on other props than mere force; it must make an auxiliary of publick opinion. The grand seignior governs Turkey by the aid of superstition, more than by his janissaries; and, even in France, where the people seem to be annihilated, and are nothing in the subordinate plans of the government, the great objects of policy must be chosen, and conducted, with no small condescension to their wishes. For instance, a peace, that should strip France of her conquests, that should tear the laurels from the army, that should expose the French nation to any loss of the reputation that victory has conferred, would shake the throne of the boldest usurper that has enslaved them. The claims of their vanity have been exorbitant from the first, and every new set of tyrants has promised still further to exalt that vanity. Indeed they have kept their word!

It is probable, that sensible Frenchmen have long ago discerned, that they did not possess liberty, and that they were not in the road to attain it; but they appeared to be in that road, and that illusion concealed their chains and soothed their sense of disappointment. They could bear it, that they were not freemen, it was what they were used and reconciled to; but they would not bear not to be conquerors. Their love of liberty was tractable; their vanity untractable. Accordingly, they gloried in the enthusiasm of their efforts to

expel the Prussians, who, by invading, had *profaned* the territory of the republick ; although no tyranny could be more odious or sanguinary than that for which they fought. They have borne taxes, paper money, famine, tyranny in all its worst forms, not merely with ordinary patience, but with alacrity, because the French nation struck Europe with admiration and terrour. While religion and morals took flight, industry starved, and innocence bled, national vanity has had its banquets : its frequent feasts have become its ordinary living, and now it would pine without a profusion of dainties.



THE NEW ROMANS.

N°. V.

AMIDST all the confusion of the changes in the government of France, the rulers have formed their policy on the basis of the vanity of the nation : every new set has promised aggrandizement and glory to France, and the infliction of a signal vengeance on its enemies.

This constancy in adhering to the same maxims of policy, while the men at the head of affairs were kings only for three months, may seem surprising. But Sparta preserved nearly the same character seven hundred years, though many violent revolutions occurred ; and Rome acted as long, and even more uniformly, on the strength of the national sentiment, that she could not exist at all, unless as a conqueror and mistress of the world ; yet Rome changed her consuls yearly. The diversity of the character of her magistrates was lost in the uniformity and force of her own.

In the very beginning of the French popular government, the national vanity was soothed by the incense of flattery from its own demagogues, and the natural jacobins of every civilized state. Addresses from clubs, and from individual incen-

diaries were multiplied, and graciously received at the bar of the convention. It seemed to be a Roman senate, sitting judicially to hear the grievances of all nations, and to parcel out the world into provinces. Anacharsis Cloots appeared, and harangued the assembly, as the orator of the human race. In November, 1792, the safety and independence of all states was formally attacked by the decree, that France would assist the rebels of all countries against their governments. The apologists for French extravagances, after some fruitless attempts to justify the principle of this outrage on all mankind, have next endeavoured to palliate: they say, less was intended than the words of the decree seem to import. When the conduct of France discredited even this palliation, it has been since insisted, that the decree was adopted in times of violence and confusion, and that it has been formally annulled. All periods have been violent, and marked with a more than Roman contempt of the rights, as well as the opinions of mankind. But Gregorei, in his laboured report to the assembly on the laws of nations, in which this monstrous decree is supposed to be annulled, expressly says, that the application of the principles he had exhibited, is the right only of the nations, whose governments are founded on the rights of man. The best proof, however, that France has not, in form, renounced the decree, is, that she has invariably adhered to it in fact.

It appears by the publications of Brissot and others, that the French rulers, like the Roman senate, believed it to be necessary rather to employ the fiery turbulent spirit of the nation in war abroad, than to let it employ itself in sedition at home. It is a general opinion among the democrats of all countries, that France was attacked by a royal coalition, jealous of her republicanism. The fact is, the French began the war in Flanders against the emperour, when his towns were without garrisons, the fortifications had been recently pulled down, and the troops ordinarily kept on foot, for their defence did not amount to half their complement.

With such a spirit as raged in France, and with such interests and means to turn the fury of the popular passions against the emperour and the king of England, peace was not to be maintained. When a whole street is on fire, can a man set at his ease and say, my house is of brick; let my next neighbour burn; the fire will burn out, and then the bustle and danger will be over. Such are the speeches made, and with great popular effect, to inflame the admirers of democracy with a zeal for injured, invaded France.

..... Jam proximus ardet
Ucalegon.

The conflagration of every thing combustible in France rendered it impossible for other powers to be at peace; and as France will not and cannot change her political character, Europe will not be permitted long to enjoy it. So vast a power is a continual incentive to ambition; and such a national military spirit naturally leads to power. There are many states in Europe still, that might tempt a conqueror; there is not one, except Great Britain, that has the spirit and means to resist him.

It has been already shewn, that the only prevailing popular sentiment was the military one. The excess of that passion has enabled the government to maintain tranquillity as profound, as if there was no war. The French saw tyranny in Paris, oppression in the provinces; all commerce, all credit, all manufacture was ruined; but as an offset for want, slavery, and ruin, there was victory, and all France shouted for joy.

The manner, in which this Roman power has been used, is truly Roman. The neighbouring states have been made, not merely the objects of conquest, but the instruments of ambition, to effect more conquests. Except Great Britain, Portugal, and Turkey, there is not one enemy left, whom France has not made her ally. The emperour and the king of Naples are to be dishonoured by a stipulation, that their

faithful protectors, the English, shall be excluded from their ports. Portugal is supposed, by this time, to be forced to adopt the like measure. To cut up Turkey, is said to be the object of a late treaty between Buonaparte and the emperour Paul of Russia. If this should be effected there will be new struggles and revolution ; the established order and balance of Europe will be subverted from their foundations ; and happy will it be, if, after thirty years war, it should be settled again as firmly, as it was by the peace of Westphalia, in 1648.

It was in like manner the policy of Rome, to make use of her feeble enemies to destroy such as were strong. The Ætolians in Greece were first engaged to assist in destroying Philip of Macedon. They, finding themselves duped and enslaved by the Romans, called in Antiochus, king of Syria, to assist them in their defence. The cities of Greece were gained, and dexterously played off to destroy the liberties of Greece. While Rome and Carthage were contending, the great powers, still unconquered, took no part in the contest. Thus Rome not only attacked them one after another, but was always sure to have the assistance of an old enemy, whom she had just conquered into an alliance, to overpower a new one. Hannibal, after his defeat, fled to Antiochus : it was then too late, for Carthage had received the law of the conqueror. Antiochus interfered in the affairs of Greece, after Philip of Macedon was humbled, and forced to be the ally of Rome against him. Mithridates, king of Pontus, had no ally, till his power was much enfeebled—then Tigranes joined him, in time to be defeated. Greece would have been strong, if it had been united ; but its numerous governments were jealous of one another, often at war, and ready to call in the Romans to enslave them all. It seems astonishing, that neither Macedon, nor Greece, nor Syria, nor Egypt made treaties of mutual defence, or took any sensible measure to employ all their joint forces in self-preservation. The world would have been saved from slavery.

THERE is scarcely a single article of Roman policy, in which we do not perceive the servile imitation of the French; and if Great Britain was a republick, as Carthage was, there would be a faction in its bosom, devoted to France, strong enough to ensure her slavery. The fall of Great Britain would quench every hope of the recovery of the independence of Europe: a new Roman servitude would spread over the civilized world. The United States would be exposed to new toils, conflicts, and dangers: faction would raise her snaky head with new audacity, confiding in the support that France would give to her efforts. We might be alarmed in time to see the approach of a foreign tyrant; but we should have to fight for our independence, or to resign it.

RUSSIA.

First published in the Palladium, July, 1801.

FEW things are worse understood, than the condition of the Northern powers in respect to England, especially Russia. English capital has made their pot-ash first, and then paid for it; it has bought their hemp-seed, paid for ploughing the land, and then purchased the hemp: advances were made by English merchants of the capital, many months before the product appeared at market. This has been so well understood, that American merchants have sent a purchasing capital, a year beforehand, into Russia to get hemp and cordage. The democrats will cry out, this is colonial dependence; and ring all the changes on their set of bells. It is true, countries half-settled and not half-civilized are, in fact, dependent on countries that are blessed with good government, and the laying-up of industry. Accordingly, the war of Russia against England is the effort of poverty against the very wealth that alone must employ it.

ERROURS in politicks so gross cannot be atoned for by moderate chastisement. It is impossible, that Russia should not suffer political evils of magnitude, in consequence of the infatuated counsels of her deceased madman. Ignorance is the proper soil for French principles to sprout in; of course, Russia, is in danger of being infected, and, after all, it cannot be the political interest of Russia to aggrandize France. The naval power of Great Britain is, ever has been, and must be favourable to Russia; the territorial greatness of France ever will be an impediment. France is interested to keep Turkey from falling: France never wishes to see any power great, but herself. Eternal barriers are placed between Russia and France; and no tricks of Buonaparte, no caprices of Paul, can level them. The attempt to disregard the fixed political laws of her being, will entail incalculable evils on Russia: it is possible to play the fool in politicks, as in private life, but never with impunity.

FOREIGN POLITICKS. N°. I.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

EUROPEAN events have long had such a monopoly of the attention of Americans, that we scarcely find leisure or disposition to backbite and persecute each other, as much as the rage of party spirit requires. Our pride is often offended, that our country makes a figure in the world so little conspicuous, that others overlook it; and we almost forget ourselves, while we suffer our sympathy and reflections to be exclusively engrossed by the events of the foreign war.

YET the champions of party ought to be consoled, for the diversion of any party of our patriotick energies from the domestick scene of controversy, by their own success in rendering foreign politicks subservient to their design. France, though nerve all over, does not feel the dread nor the shame of her defeats, nor the insolent joy of her victories, with more emotion than our jacobins. They can allege, in excuse for the deep concern they take in all the confusion and all the injustice of France, that they are not mere speculatists, nor subject to impulses that are blind and without object; but that their pure *love for the people* never ceases to animate them enough to *imitate* what they admire, and to introduce what they so long have studied, and so well understand.

THE men of sense and virtue have excuses too for their anxious solicitude about European affairs: there, they may say, faction culls her poisons; and in that bloody field, at length, we can perceive the antidote is sprouting. Already the Aurora tells us, it is nonsense to talk of liberty under Buonaparte. Nevertheless, if France should be superiour in the war, and should dictate the terms of peace, our inbred faction, her faithful ally, would be superiour here. The civilized world can enjoy neither safety nor repose, if the most restless and ambitious nation in it, obtains what it has struggled for, a more

than Roman sway, and a resistless power to render the interests of all other states as subservient to its own, as those of her Cisalpine allies. The forest that harbours one wild cat, should breed many squirrels. Ambition like that of France, requires, for its daily sustenance, tameness like that of Spain or Holland: if all her neighbours were like Britain, where could this royal tigress find prey?

So far, indeed, is the attention paid by Americans to the affairs of Europe from being a subject of reproach, that, on the contrary, no period of history will be deemed more worthy of study by our statesmen, as well as our youth, than that of the last twelve years.

In France, we behold the effects of trying by the test of experience the most plausible metaphysical principles, in appearance the most pure, yet the most surprisingly in contrast with the corruption of the national manners. Theories, fit for angels, have been adopted for the use of a multitude, who have been found, when left to what is called their self-government, unfit to be called men; as if the misrule of chaos or of pandemonium would yield to a little instruction in singing psalms and divine songs; as if the passions inherent in man, and a constituent part of his nature, were so many devils that even unbelievers could cast out, without a miracle, and without fasting and prayer. By stamping the rights of man on pocket handkerchiefs, it was supposed they were understood by those who understand nothing; and by voting them through the convention, it would cost a man his life and estate to say, that they were not established.

On grounds *so solid* Condorcet could proclaim to the enlightened, the fish women, and the mob of the suburbs of St. Antoine, all disciples of "the new school of philosophy;" Mr. Jefferson could assure Thomas Paine; and even the circumspect Madison could pronounce in congress, that France had improved on all known plans of government, and that her liberty was immortal.

Experience has shewn, and it ought to be of all teaching the most profitable, that any government by mere popular im-

pulses, any plan that *excites*, instead of restraining, the passions of the multitude, is a despotism: it is not, even in its beginning, much less in its progress, nor in its issue and effects, *liberty*. As well might we suppose, that the assassin's dagger conveys a restorative balsam to the heart, when it stabs it; or that the rottenness and dry bones of the grave will spring up again, in this life, endued with imperishable vigour and the perfection of angels. To cure expectations, at once so foolish and so sanguine, what can be more rational than to inspect sometimes the sepulchre of French liberty? The body is not deposited there, for indeed it never existed; but much instruction is to be gained by carefully considering the lying vanity of its epitaph.

The great contest between England and France, also, shews the stability and the resources of free governments, and the precariousness and wide-spreading ruin of the resort to revolutionary means. We shall not, therefore, hesitate to present, from time to time, the most correct and extensive views we can take of events in Europe.

We have made these observations, and we address them with the more deliberation to the good sense of the citizens, because it has been a part of the common place of democratick foppery to say, what have we to do with Europe? we are a world by ourselves. This they have said a thousand times, while they told us the cause of France was the cause of liberty, and inseparably our cause. Every body knows, that the mad zeal for France was wrought up with the intent to influence American politicks; and it did influence, and yet influences them. A trading nation, whose concerns extend over the commercial world, and whose interests are affected by their wars and revolutions, cannot expect to be a merely disinterested, though by good fortune it may be a neutral, spectator. Unless, therefore, we survey Europe, as well as America, we do not "take a view of the whole ground." And if we must survey it, and our interests are concerned in the course of foreign events, it is obviously important that we should understand what we ob-

serve, and separate, as much as possible, errour from the wisdom that is to be gleaned by experience.

We invite our able patrons and correspondents to assist us in our labours; and to exercise their candour, if, at any time, we should present an imperfect or mistaken view of European affairs: we shall not wilfully misrepresent.

FOREIGN POLITICKS. N° II.

Great Britain and France are the primary nations; it is evident, that all the rest play a subordinate and secondary part. The French adopt this opinion, and call France, Rome, and Great Britain, Carthage. If this similitude were exact, Britain would sink in the contest. But the British government is more stable than that of Carthage; and, therefore, faction is a little less virulent and a great deal less powerful. Besides, the British superiority on the seas is more clearly, as well as more durably established, and more effectively displayed, than that of Carthage. The naval art was rude and imperfect in ancient times; and those, who then understood it best, were little the better for that advantage. Duillius, the Roman consul, gained a naval victory with mere landsmen. The reason was, that the ships of war were rowed alongside their antagonists, and being grappled firmly together, the combat was maintained, as in fights on land, by a body of soldiers on each side. This being the ordinary event of a seafight, no wonder the Roman soldiers, whose valour was the steadiest and the best trained in the world, prevailed over the mercenaries of Carthage. Every thing is different between England and France. So superiour are the English seamen to the French, so little now depends on the number of men, and so much upon naval art, that the crowd of Frenchmen on board their vessels are rather an incumbrance, than an effective force. There is seldom a seafight, in which the French escape, although their crews are far more numerous than those of their conquerors. Great Britain, too, enjoys a *durable* superiority.

There must be commerce, before there will be seamen; there must be a stable government, before there will be a general spirit of enterprise and industry to create commerce. The hands of labour will be weak, while its earnings are exposed to rapine, as in France. It will be an age or two, before that nation will get rid of her military tyrants and her revolutionary spirit; and, till she does, her prosperity will be precarious, and her naval power will be displayed, like that of Turkey, by forcing awkward landmen on board ships. Despotism will waste men and wealth, and in vain, to imitate the spontaneous energies of industry and commerce, fostered by a free and stable government. It may be added, that a naval power is exerted with infinitely more effect now, than it was in ancient times: every nation almost is now vulnerable in its commerce and in its colonies; the ruin of these produces a decay of the revenues and resources for war.

If then France affects to be Rome, she will not find in Great Britain a Carthage. Nay, even in the military spirit of her people, Britain, with the exercise of one brisk campaign, would not be found inferiour to her boastful antagonist. The campaign in Egypt evinces, that Englishmen can be good soldiers, as well as seamen. Carthage, on the contrary, was too much torn by factions to maintain a good infantry of her own citizens: she hired strangers. But her cavalry, as that was not a despised service, like the infantry, but attended with honour, was excellent, and so superiour to that of Rome, that the Numidian horse, under Hannibal, won every battle in the open plains.

Carthage was rich, and England is richer; Carthage was called free, England is really so; and if the government of Great Britain were either a democracy or a despotism, it, in the first case, would have been shivered to pieces by faction, and in the latter, by France, within the first four years of the war. None but free governments are stable; and none that are purely democratick are free. We hope, that publick opinion will so effectually counteract the seduction and the threatened preponderance of a violent jacobin administration, that our

own government, so wisely and happily combined, and so well adapted to our circumstances and sentiments, will be found, after some trials and agitations, to be both stable and free.

In point of resources, it does not appear, that Britain experiences any want; nor that France has, except in the violence of force and tyranny, any sort of security for a supply. It was foretold years ago, that Great Britain was to be ruined and beggared, and must have peace if she took servitude with it. The *opposition* assured the nation of the event; yet time has confuted these predictions; wealth goes on augmenting; credit is the steadier for the shocks that have waved its branches, but could not stir its roots. The war is chiefly naval; and the seamen are now formed, and indeed have grown up in the war, in sufficient numbers. The expenses, great as they are, are not increasing, nor are they lavished in Germany, as they were in 1794 and 1795. A long war creates a sort of commerce for itself, and, as it were, makes a part of its own means. There cannot, therefore, exist a doubt, that Britain is *able* to continue the war. Her land never produced more; and its products never before were worth so much. Her industry never was greater; and the demands for its fabricks were never so little divided with competitors. Her tons of shipping and her trade are greater than at any former period. Her capital is doubled; and it is as sure to create employment, as employment is to accumulate capital. These are the fountains of wealth, and they flow with an unexhausted and progressively increasing stream. France is more nearly beggared by revolution, and Spain by the pride and laziness of her people, than Great Britain is by the war. It is a great evil to a nation to be obliged to exert all its energies to preserve itself from French fraternity; but it would be an evil a hundred times greater to fall under it.

The proper test of the justness of these observations is not, that they may appear to offend against some popular prejudices, or that the jacobin gazettes will interpret them into the most abominable meanings: no one expects, that the jacobins will content themselves with the truth on this subject. Inqui-

sitive persons, and fair-minded citizens, are desired to examine, before they decide; and even if they expose the errours of our judgment, they will advance our purpose, inasmuch as we wish, and it shall be our endeavour to extract from foreign events, the sound materials for political instruction. We leave it to the jacobin editors to cook for their readers a mawkish aliment for prejudice and faction.

Such readers believe, that, while Great Britain is on the verge of bankruptcy and ruin, while she is loathsome in her corruptions, and humbled by her fears and her defeats, France is renewing her youth and vigour, happy in her liberty, and strong by her victories. A European would scarcely believe there was in America enough of what, in other countries, is called *mob*, to give currency to such glaring falsehood.

France has used, from the first, *revolutionary* means, in other words, all that violence could procure. While England, with difficulty, taxed *income*, her rival could, by a decree, seize the *capital*; and after it had been sold to revolutionary buyers, the next men in power could decree, that these were royalists, and seize it a second time: every change brought the whole stock to the new mint. One would expect, that France was of all nations the richest in resources; since it could spend all, and then attack the new holders of property, and spend it as often as the necessities of *liberty* might require. By a formal decree, all property in France has been declared in *a state of requisition*. The whole people were also enrolled and *in requisition*; and death, or confiscation of the offender's property, ensued on disobedience. Never did Eastern despotism claim more tremendous power, or actually exercise so much. Yet violence is ever a temporary resource: it is a fire, whose splendour is brilliant ruin. France is now destitute of credit, of revenue, of all the *ordinary* means to extract resources from her people; and she has used and abused the *extraordinary*, till they are almost as unproductive, as they are odious. She looks for means abroad; she looks to Portugal, to Italy, to Spain, and to Holland. The field of plunder will not bear two crops, and it is already barren. Buonaparte, of course,

sees the varnish of his popularity wearing off, and the hopes of his slaves fading into disappointment. Already he fears the effects of that temper of the French, which is ever patient under tyranny, but ever eager to establish a new tyrant. He sees Egypt nearly wrested from his domination; his splendid promises of wealth and glory, in an expedition to subvert the British dominion in India, vanish into air; the powers of the North, whom he duped and betrayed, beaten into a better understanding of the law of nations, and embittered against their deceiver; Germany, though too discordant to oppose him in the field, yet too powerful to submit to his dictates. The secularization of the ecclesiastical states, is too much the concern of Russia and Prussia, to be carried along on the terms of the treaty of Luneville. He also needs peace to consolidate his power, and to give a breathing spell to his exhausted subjects, and also to induce his triumphant enemy to *disarm*. But, if the English populace have bread, and the English minister has sense and spirit, the affair of peace will be decided on other grounds, than Buonaparte's desire to obtain it. It will be asked, what has England to fear from war? What has she not to fear from peace? War brings no burdens, of which they have not had experience; no evils, but such as they have surmounted. Peace will be a new and untried state of being, requiring all the burdens of war taxes, and war forces, and giving no respite to Englishmen, while it affords one to France. The revolutionary fire is not quenched; and peace would leave it to blaze out again in three years, with a fiercer conflagration and a wider ruin than ever.

FOREIGN POLITICKS. N°. III.

FEW subjects are considered with so little care, and so much party feeling and prejudice, as the political situation of France. In respect to her neighbours, she is supposed to possess a power as durable as it is preponderant; and, with respect to her own citizens, she is deemed to be as happy as

victory, plenty, and liberty can make her. The grounds of these darling errours might be explored with advantage; but it would fill all the columns of a newspaper, and, indeed, the pages of an octavo volume, to exhibit the subject in detail. Men more competent, than we pretend to be, must write books; and persons more at leisure, than the majority of our readers, will read them. A brief and rapid summary of the most signal facts and principles, is all that we presume to undertake, and even for *that*, the materials are scanty, and the rage of party has confused and mutilated them. Every booby democrat from France comes home to brag of the power and splendour of the court of Buonaparte, and of the pure *republicanism and equality* of that nation, as if he had exactly the same measure of understanding, as of patriotism. It is well recollected, that, while Robespiere reigned, and the blood ran in Paris, Bourdeaux, Lyons, and Nantz, in streams, that would have turned corn-mills, every ship's captain arrived with such a tale for the jacobin newspapers, as would suit the fashion of our market: it seemed as if lies were bespoke and made for customers. All was then represented as peace and order, a stable government, and a contented, happy, prosperous people. The zeal for France invited deception, and sheltered it from scrutiny. The jacobins still prefer France to America, and try very hard to "*cover her with glory*," when she is defeated, and to represent the "*cowardly English*" as ruined, when they conquer. Accordingly, Egypt is still, in the Chronicle, a burying ground for the English, where they die of the plague, and by the sword of Menou, and by that of the mamelukes and Arabs, and thus the Chronicle thrice slays the slain; yet, probably, Egypt is now in the full possession of the English and Turks. In this case, one of the supposed difficulties in the way of peace is removed; for if Buonaparte holds Egypt, it can only be to make it a military post, from which, within two years from the signing of a peace, to send forth armies against the British possessions in India. A peace, on such terms, would be a truce altogether favourable to Buonaparte, unfavourable to England. If the spirit of the British nation

is up, the minister will not feel himself obliged to submit to any such insidious, and indeed hostile, arrangement. The loss of Egypt will remove this bone of contention.

YET, as France is too powerful to allow her neighbours any repose, the only question seems to be, not whether England shall lay aside her arms, for that is impossible, even in peace, but whether they shall be idle in her hands. While she is in danger, she must make all her efforts in self-defence; and surely every jacobin has enough of the Frenchman in his heart to allow, if he will speak out, that he would use the opportunity of peace to prepare the force, and the first moment of sedition or insurrection in England, or the decease of king George, or any other favourable event, to employ force, to overturn that cursed monarchy, and to strip that nation of its navy, commerce, and power. In this state of things, it seems justifiable for the British minister to ponder well, whether, if safety lies, as it certainly does, *in arms*, which is the best time to employ them, the present, or some future, and not distant time, that France shall seize, when England is in a state of division and dismay. The question is important, and concerns her political life or death.

IT has been already observed, that the British land and naval forces cannot be much reduced on a peace. Austria is recruiting her armies, and will soon have need of them, especially if she is believed to be unprepared for war. Peace will lessen the energies of war, but not its burdens. It will, at least in some degree, restore the commerce and navy of Britain's great rival, while her own trade and industry, now secure in a monopoly, will then have to struggle with competition. France is now nearly stript of all allies, except such as she has conquered. The independent powers are her foes in fact, or in sentiment and policy. Would it not then be strange, if Britain should purchase for herself a short truce, full of treachery and danger, that would refresh her enemy, and leave to her neither a respite nor the hope of advantage? The clamour for peace, so loud, while bread was scarce, ought now to subside in Eng-

land; and if they are not willing to be Dutchmen or Cisalpines, they ought to be willing to be soldiers and seamen.

War is indeed a great evil, but peace, with danger and dishonour, is a greater. It has been the fashion to make it a merit for any man to desire peace; as if the question of peace was to be considered in the abstract, and as if the war that rages was not a case, like every other, to be examined and pronounced upon according to its existing circumstances.

Supposing, then, the war should continue, because the ambition of France still thirsts for conquest and plunder, and because the English government seeks, what peace would deny her, security and repose, what are the chances of this mighty and long-protracted contest? England is all powerful at sea; France has hitherto proved victorious on land. Thus far the odds are in favour of England, because she can annoy France, she can insult her coasts, she can prevent her commerce from reviving, and thus she can distress her enemy in his supplies and his finances. France threatens England with invasion: is not the threat ridiculous? Two or three hundred English ships and frigates will almost touch one another in the channel, and effectually prevent a fleet of French flat-bottomed boats from landing an army by surprise. An English army of three hundred thousand men, fighting for life, liberty, and property, would destroy any hostile force that might be disembarked. The immense land force of France seems to be, therefore, nearly useless in the war with England. It serves, however, to consume her own resources, and to keep alive the jealousy and hatred of her neighbours. Rome subsisted her armies by plunder: a war found its own means of supply; and from the time of Perseus to the consulship of Hirtius and Pansa, the spoils of Macedon and other conquered states, supplied all expenses; so that, for more than one hundred years, no taxes were imposed on the Roman people. Let it be noted, however, that modern wars glean infinitely less from the field of plunder; while they cost, for artillery, sieges, and cavalry, infinitely more. To this add the Roman soldiers feared the Gods, and religiously kept their oath, to bring all the plunder

into the publick stock; the Roman senate faithfully and frugally administered this treasure. France plunders Europe; and her tyrants plunder France: it is easier for her to beggar Italy, than to satisfy her commissaries. Her trade is war, and in a maritime strife this cannot be a gainful trade. The confusion of twelve years is not to be retrieved by establishing martial law for eighteen months. The first consul may issue his general orders, that the revolution is over; all France may be hushed to silence, like a camp; yet it will not cease to suffer, while it trembles. With a fruitful territory, a vast addition of subjects by her conquests, and an energy of military government, that can take the last dollar, and a man's life, if he seems to give it loathly, it might appear, that her pecuniary means are not to be exhausted. Let it, however, be noted, that these very conquests require a large part of her force and treasure to preserve them. Perhaps they now require as much as they supply. Already plundered, they cannot soon yield any great amount of regular revenue, or even of plunder. The immense territory, nominally or effectively conquered by France, obliges her to keep on foot two hundred thousand men, nearly as many as her peace establishment under Louis the sixteenth. Three hundred thousand other troops absorb more than all the surplus of her means, after providing for other essential objects of government. How is she to defray this enormous charge, so much augmented by revolutionary confusion and fraud? The expedients she has resorted to, sufficiently prove the extremity of her distress on this account. She has had paper money; she has in effect blotted out her old debt; she has repeatedly stopped payment of her new debt, which she pretended to call the sacred price of her liberty; she has sold an hundred thousand square miles of confiscated estates, the property of men whom she forced to run away to save their lives; she has seized the Caisse d'Escompte and the other banks; she has violently extorted money from the jews and bankers of Paris; she has stript the churches of the Austrian Netherlands, and of Italy; taxed the Dutch six per cent. of all their property; and forced a loan from all her own

subjects. The conduct of this forced loan shews both her poverty and her tyranny: her poverty, because it yielded little of what was expected from it; and her tyranny, because no Eastern despot ever adopted more arbitrary means of compulsion. The sans-culottes, or rabble, and people of small property, who were violent revolutionists, paid nothing; while the rich were arbitrarily, and without any estimation or rule, assessed at pleasure. The tax was a decree of confiscation, with such exceptions in its collection, as to make it *robbery*. There never was a moment, when the government did not use all the rigours of tyranny to procure money; nor one, when the collection of it supplied any adequate resources: the people have ever suffered oppression, and the government want.

Let it be well considered, then, how desperate the contest must be for France, provided the English be able to maintain it for some years longer. The English are not a stupid people, nor have they a feeble government: they will discern the almost certainty of their success, and will persevere to ensure it. The civilized world, long endangered by France, will then be again in security.

HERCULES.

FIRST PUBLISHED IN THE PALLADIUM, OCTOBER, 1801.

TO PRINTERS.

IT seems as if newspaper wares were made to suit a market, as much as any other. The starers, and wonderers, and gapers, engross a very large share of the attention of all the sons of the type. Extraordinary events multiply upon us surprisingly. Gazettes, it is seriously to be feared, will not long allow room to any thing, that is not loathsome or shocking. A newspaper is pronounced to be very lean and destitute of matter, if it contains no account of murders, suicides, prodigies, or monstrous births.

SOME of these tales excite horrour, and others disgust; yet the fashion reigns, like a tyrant, to relish wonders, and almost to relish nothing else. Is this a reasonable taste? or is it monstrous and worthy of ridicule? Is the history of Newgate the only one worth reading? Are oddities only to be hunted? Pray tell us, men of ink, if our free presses are to diffuse *information*, and we, the poor ignorant people, can get it no other way than by newspapers, what knowledge we are to glean from the blundering lies, or the tiresome truths about thunder storms, that, strange to tell! kill oxen or burn barns; and cats, that bring two-headed kittens; and sows, that eat their own pigs? The crowing of a hen is supposed to forbode cuckoldom; and the ticking of a little bug in the wall threatens yellow fever. It seems really as if our newspapers were busy to spread superstition. Omens, and dreams, and prodigies, are recorded, as if they were worth minding. One would think our gazettes were intended for Roman readers, who were silly enough to make account of such things. We ridicule the papists for their credulity; yet, if all the trumpery of our papers is believed, we have little right to laugh at any set of people on earth; and if it is not believed, why is it printed?

SURELY, extraordinary events have not the best title to our studious attention. To study nature or man, we ought to know things that are in the ordinary course, not the unaccountable things that happen out of it.

THIS country is said to measure seven hundred millions of acres, and is inhabited by almost six millions of people. Who can doubt, then, that a great many crimes will be committed, and a great many strange things will happen every seven years? There will be thunder showers, that will split tough white oak trees; and hail storms, that will cost some farmers the full amount of *twenty shillings* to mend their glass windows; there will be taverns, and boxing matches, and elections, and gouging, and drinking, and love, and murder, and running in debt, and running away, and suicide. Now, if a man *supposes* eight, or ten, or twenty dozen of these amusing events will happen in a single year, is he not just as wise as another man, who reads fifty columns of amazing particulars, and, of course, *knows* that they have happened?

THIS state has almost one hundred thousand dwelling houses: it would be strange, if all of them should escape fire for twelve months. Yet is it very profitable for a man to become a deep student of all the accidents, by which they are consumed? He should take good care of his chimney corner, and put a fender before the back-log, before he goes to bed. Having done this, he may let his aunt or grandmother read by day, or meditate by night, the terrible newspaper articles of fires; how a maid dropped asleep reading a romance, and the bed-clothes took fire; how a boy, searching in a garret for a hoard of nuts, kindled some flax; and how a mouse, warming his tail, caught it on fire, and carried it into his hole in the floor.

SOME of the shocking articles in the papers raise simple, and very simple, wonder; some, terrour; and some, horrour and disgust. Now what instruction is there in these endless wonders? Who is the wiser or happier for reading the accounts of them? On the contrary, do they not shock tender minds, and addle shallow brains? They make a thousand old

maids, and eight or ten thousand booby boys, afraid to go to bed alone. Worse than this happens; for some eccentrick minds are turned to mischief by such accounts, as they receive, of troops of incendiaries burning our cities: the spirit of imitation is contagious; and boys are found unaccountably bent to do as men do. When the man flew from the steeple of the North church fifty years ago, every unlucky boy thought of nothing but flying from a signpost.

It was once a fashion to stab hereticks; and Ravaillac, who stabbed Henry the fourth of France, the assassin of the duke of Guise, and of the duke of Buckingham, with many others, only followed the fashion. Is it not in the power of newspapers to spread fashions; and by dinning burnings and murders in every body's ears, to detain all rash and mischievous tempers on such subjects, long enough to wear out the first impression of horrour, and to prepare them to act what they so familiarly contemplate? Yet there seems to be a sort of rivalship among printers, who shall have the most wonders, and the strangest and most horrible crimes. This taste will multiply prodigies. The superstitious Romans used to forbid reports of new prodigies, while they were performing sacrifices on such accounts.

Every horrid story in a newspaper produces a shock; but, after some time, this shock lessens. At length, such stories are so far from giving pain, that they rather raise curiosity, and we desire nothing so much, as the particulars of terrible tragedies. The wonder is as easy as to stare; and the most vacant mind is the most in need of such resources as cost no trouble of scrutiny or reflection: it is a sort of food for idle curiosity, that is ready chewed and digested.

On the whole, we may insist, that the increasing fashion for printing wonderful tales of crimes and accidents is worse than ridiculous, as it corrupts both the publick taste and morals. It multiplies fables, prodigious monsters, and crimes, and thus makes shocking things familiar; while it withdraws all popular attention from familiar truth, because it is not shocking.

Now, Messrs. Printers, I pray the whole honourable craft, to banish as many murders, and horrid accidents, and monstrous births and prodigies from their gazettes, as their readers will permit them; and, by degrees, to coax them back to contemplate life and manners; to consider common events with some common sense; and to study nature, where she can be known, rather than in those of her ways, where she really is, or is represented to be, inexplicable.

STRANGE events are facts, and as such should be mentioned, but with brevity and in a cursory manner. They afford no ground for popular reasoning or instruction; and, therefore, the horrid details that make each particular hair stiffen and stand upright in the reader's head, ought not to be given. In short, they must be mentioned; but sensible printers and sensible readers will think that way of mentioning them the best, that impresses them least on the publick attention, and that hurries them on the most swiftly to be forgotten.

NO REVOLUTIONIST.

First published in the Palladium, November, 1801.

MANY persons seem to despair of the commonwealth. They say, it is evident, a violent jacobin administration is begun. The address to the popular passions, they argue, is generally successful; and always very encouragingly rejected, even when it is not. While federalists rely on the *sense* of the people, the jacobins appeal to their nonsense with infinite advantage: they affect to be entirely on *the people's* side; and their mistake, if, by great good luck, it is supposed they err, is ascribed to a good motive, in a manner and spirit that invites fresh attempts to deceive. Thus the deceivers of the people *tire out* their adversaries; they try again and again; and an attempt that is never abandoned, at last will not fail. What then, it is asked, can be done? We have an enlightened people, who are not poor, and, therefore, are interested to keep jacobinism down, which ever seeks plunder as the end, and confusion as the means. Yet the best informed of this mighty people are lazy; or ambitious, and go over to the cause of confusion; or are artfully rendered unpopular, because they will not go over to it. The sense, and virtue, and property of the nation, therefore, will not govern it; but every day shews, that its vice, and poverty, and ambition will. We have been mistaken. In our affairs, we have only thought of what was to be hindered, and provided sufficiently for nothing that was to be done. We have thought that virtue, with so many bright rewards, had some solid power; and that, with ten thousand charms, she could always command a hundred thousand votes. Alas! these illusions are as thin as the gloss on other bubbles. Politicians have supposed, that man really is what he should be; that his reason will do all it can, and his passions and prejudice no

more than they ought; whereas his reason is a mere looker-on; it is moderation, when it should be zeal; is often corrupted to vindicate, where it should condemn; and is a coward or a trimmer, that will take hush-money. Popular reason does not always know how to act right, nor does it always act right, when it knows. The agents that move politicks, are the popular passions; and those are ever, from the very nature of things, under the command of the disturbers of society. While those who would defend order, and property, and right, the real friends of law and liberty, have a great deal to say to silence passion, but nothing to offer that will satisfy it; nothing that will convince a sans-culotte that his ignorance, or vice, and laziness, ordain that he should be poor, while a demagogue tells him it is the funding system that makes him poor, and *revolution* shall make him rich. Few can reason, all can feel; and such an argument is gained, as soon as it is proposed. While then the popular passions are sure to govern, and the reason of the society is sure to be awed into silence, or to be disregarded, if it is heard, what hope is there that our course will not be as headlong, as rapid, and as fatal, as that of every government by mere popular impulse has ever been? The turnpike road of history is white with the tombstones of such republicks.

Answer.—If our government must fall, as it *may* very deplorably, and soon, and as it certainly *must* with a violent jacobin administration, let the monstrous wickedness of working its downfal really be, and *appear*, if possible, to the whole people to be chargeable to the jacobins. Let the federalists cling to it, while it has life in it, and even longer than there is hope. Let them be auxiliary to its virtues; let them contend for its corpse, as for the body of Patroclus; and let them reverence its memory. Let them delay, if they cannot prevent, its fate; and let them endeavour so to animate, instruct, and combine the true friends of liberty, that a new *republican* system may be raised on the foundations of the present government. Despair not only hastens the evil, but renders any

remedy unavailing. Time, that sooths all other sufferings, will bring no relief to us, if we neglect or throw away the means in our hands. What are they? Truth and argument. They are feeble means, feeble indeed, against prejudice and passion; yet they are all we have, and we must try them. They will be jury masts, if we are shipwrecked.

THE managers of the *plan* of confusion, are not numerous: for that reason, they are the better united. They are a desperate gang, chiefly resident in the city of New-York, in Pennsylvania, and Virginia. No men on earth more despise democracy; or are more overbearing in their dispositions; or form vaster plans of personal aggrandizement. Yet, as they have need of the *democrats*, who are more numerous, are honester, and more in credit than the *jacobins*, they are obliged to make use of them. They flatter and deceive, and will surely betray them, as Cromwell and the independents did the presbyterians, in 1648, in England.

THEY will abolish credit, by taxing the funds; they will abolish justice, by transferring the judiciary to the states, that is, to Virginia. They will push on the democratick traders to do violent things, which will surely make them odious; and then they will expect, that the resentments of the honest federalists will assist the jacobins to supplant the democrats. The ruling party contains within itself the seeds of discord; yet, though the revolutionary spirit, once indulged, naturally leads to changes, they are sure to be changes for the worse: a more violent faction will dispossess one that is moderate.

THE question, therefore, seems to be, how far we shall probably travel in the revolutionary road; and whether there is any stopping place, any hope of taking breath, as we run towards the bottomless pit, into which the revolutionary fury is prone to descend. France had twenty three millions poor, and one million rich; America has twenty three persons at ease, to one in want. Our rabble is not numerous; and a reform in our elections ought to exclude those, who have nothing, or almost nothing, from the control of every thing.

Our assailants are, therefore, weaker, and our means of defence greater than the first patriots of France possessed; our good men, instead of running away, like the French emigrants, and giving up their estates to confiscation, must stay at home, and exert their talents and influence to save the country. Events may happen to baffle the schemes of jacobinism; and if New-England should not be sleepy or infatuated, of which there is, unhappily, great danger, our adversaries will never be able to push the work of mischief to its consummation.

EQUALITY. N°. I.

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THERE are some popular maxims, which are scarcely credited as true, and yet are cherished as precious, and defended as even sacred. Most of the *democratick* articles of faith are blended with truth, and *seem* to be true; and they so comfortably sooth the pride and envy of the heart, that it swells with resentment, when they are contested, and suffers some spasms of apprehension, even when they are examined. Mr. Thomas Paine's writings abound with this sort of specious falsehoods and perverted truths. Of all his doctrines none, perhaps, has created more agitation and alarm than that, which proclaims to all men, that they are free and equal. This creed is older than its supposed author, and was thread-bare in America, before Mr. Paine ever saw our shores; yet it had the effect, in other parts of the world, of novelty. It was *news*, that the French revolution scattered through the world. It made the spirit of restlessness and innovation universal. Those who could not be ruled by reason, resolved that they would not be restrained by power. Those who had been governed by law, hungered and thirsted to enjoy, or rather to exercise, the new prerogatives of a democratick majority, which, of right, could establish, and, for any cause or no cause at all, could change. They believed that by making their own and other men's passions *sovereign*, they should invest man with immediate perfectibility, and breathe into their regenerated liberty an ethereal spirit that would never die. Slaves grew weary of their chains, and freemen sick of their rights. The true liberty had no charms, but such as the philosophists affirmed had been already rifled. The lazaroni of Naples, fifty thousand houseless, naked wretches, heard of their rights and considered their wants as so many wrongs. The soldiers of Prussia were ready for town-meetings. Even in Constantinople, it seemed as if the new doctrine would overpower the

sedative action of opium, and stimulate the drowsy Turks to a Parisian frenzy. It is not strange, that slaves should sigh for liberty, as for some unknown good. But England and the United States of America, while in the full fruition of it, were almost tempted to renounce its possession for its promise. Societies were formed in both countries, which considered and represented their patriotism as the remnant of their prejudices; and the old defences of their liberty as the fortresses of an enemy, the means and the badges of their slavish subjection.

All men being free and equal, rulers become our servants, from whom we claim obligation, though we do not admit their right to exact any. This generation, being *equal* to the last, owes no obedience to its institutions; and, being *wiser*, owes them not even deference. It would be treachery to man, so long obstructed and delayed in his progress towards perfectibility, to forbear to exercise his *rights*. What if the existing governments should resist this new claim of the people, yet the people to be free, have only to will it! What if this age should bleed, the next, or the twentieth after this, will be disencumbered from the rubbish of the gothick building that we have subverted; and may lay the foundations of liberty as deep, and raise the pillars of its temple as high, as those who think correctly of its perpetuity and grandeur can desire.

With opinions so wild, and passions so fierce, the spirit of democracy has been sublimated to extravagance. There was nothing in the danger that affected other men's persons or rights that could intimidate, nothing in their sufferings that could melt them. They longed to see kings, and priests, and nobles expiring in tortures. This humane sentiment Barlow has expressed in verse. The massacres of Paris, the siege of Lyons, the drownings of Nantz, the murders in the name of justice, that made hosts of assassins weary of their work, were so many evils necessary to bring about good, or only so many acts of just retaliation of the oppressed upon their oppressors. The "*enlightened*" philosophists surveyed the agitations of the world, as if they did not live in it; as if they occupied, as

mere spectators, a safe position in some star, and beheld revolutions sometimes brightening the disk of this planet with their fires, and at others dimming it with their vapours. They could contemplate, unmoved, the whirlwind, lifting the hills from their base, and mixing their ruins with the clouds. They could see the foundations of society gaping in fissures, as when an earthquake struggles from the centre. A *true* philosopher is superiour to humanity: he could walk at ease over this earth, if it were unpeopled; he could tread, with all the pleasure of curiosity, on its cinders, the day after the final conflagration.

Equality, they insist, will indemnify mankind for all these apprehensions and sufferings. As some ages of war and anarchy may pass away, before the evils incident to the struggles of a revolution are exhausted, this generation might be allowed to have some cause to object to innovations, that are *certainly* to make them wretched, although, *possibly*, the grandchildren of their grandchildren may be the better for their sufferings. This slender hope, however, is all that the illuminists have proposed, as the indemnity for all the crimes and misery of France, and all the horrours of the new revolutions, that they wish to engender in Europe, from the Bosphorus to the Baltick. What is meant by this boastful equality? and what is its value?

EQUALITY. N°. II.

THE philosophers among the democrats will no doubt insist, that they do not mean to equalise property, they contend only for an equality of rights. If they restrict the word *equality* as carefully as they ought, it will not import, that all men have an equal right to all things, but, that to whatever they have a right, it is as much to be protected and provided for, as the right of any persons in society. In this sense, nobody will contest their claim. Yet, though the right of a poor man is

as much his right, as a rich man's, there is no great novelty or wisdom in the discovery of the principle, nor are the French entitled to any pre-eminence on this account. The *magna charta* of England, obtained, I think, in the year 1216, contains the great body of what is called, and our revolutionists of 1776 called it, *English liberty*. This they claimed as their birth-right, and with good reason; for it enacts, that justice shall not be sold, nor denied, nor delayed; and, as, soon afterwards, the trial by jury grew into general use, the subjects themselves are employed by the government to apply remedies, when *rights* are violated. For true equality and the rights of man, there never was a better or a wiser provision, as, in fact, it executes itself. This is the precious system of true equality, imported by our excellent and ever to be venerated forefathers, which they prized as their birth-right. Yet this glorious distinction of liberty, so ample, so stable, and so temperate, secured by the common law, has been reviled and exhibited to popular abhorrence, as the shameful badge of our yet colonial dependence on England.

As the common law secures equally all the rights of the citizens, and as the jacobin leaders loudly decry this system, it is obvious, that they extend their views still farther. Undoubtedly, they include in their plan of equality, that the citizens shall have assigned to them new rights, and different from what they now enjoy. You have earned your estate, or it descended to you from your father; of course, my right to your estate is not as good as yours. Am I then to have, in the new order of things, an equal right with you? Certainly not, every democrat of any understanding will reply. What then do you propose by your equality? You have earned an estate; I have not; yet I have a right, and as good a right as another man, to earn it. I may save my earnings, and deny myself the pleasures and comforts of life, till I have laid up a competent sum to provide for my infirmity and old age. All cannot be rich, but all have a right to make the attempt; and when some have fully succeeded,

and others partially, and others not at all, the several states, in which they then find themselves, become their condition in life; and whatever the rights of that condition may be, they are to be faithfully secured by the laws and government. This, however, is not the idea of the men of *the new order of things*, for, thus far, the plan belongs to a very old order of things.

They consider a republican government as the only one, in which this sort of equality can exist at all. A tyrant, or a king, which all democrats suppose to be words of like import, might leave the rights of his subjects unviolated. The grand seignior is arbitrary; the heavy hand of his despotism however falls only on the great men in office, the aristocrats, whom it must be a pleasure to the admirers of equality to see strangled by the bow-string; the great body of the subjects of the Turkish government lead a very undisturbed life, enjoying a stupid security from the oppressions of power. To enjoy rights, without having proper security for their enjoyment, ought not indeed to satisfy any political reasoners, and this is precisely the difficulty of the democratick sect. All the rights and equality they admire are destitute of any rational security, and are of a nature utterly subversive of all true liberty. For, on close examination, it turns out, that their notion of equality is, that all the citizens of a republick have *an equal right to political power*. This is called republicanism. This hastens the journey of a demagogue to power, and invests him with the title of *the man of the people*. This, the people are told, is their great cause, in opposition to the coalesced tyrants of Europe, and the intriguing federal aristocrats in America.

Let me *cut out the tongue* of that blasphemer, every democratick zealot will exclaim, who dares to deny the rightful and unlimited power of the people. It is indeed a very inveterate evil of our politicks, that popular opinion has been formed rather to democracy, than to sober republicanism. The American revolution was, in fact, after 1776, a resistance

to foreign government. We claimed the right to govern ourselves, and our patriots never contemplated the claim of the imported united Irish, that a mob should govern us. It is true, that the checks on the power of the people themselves were not deemed so necessary, as on the temporary rulers whom we elected: we looked for danger on the same side, where we had been used to look, and suspected every thing but ourselves. Our dread of rulers devoted them to imbecility; our presumptuous confidence in ourselves puffed all the weak, and credulous, and vain, with an opinion, that no power was safe but their own, and, therefore, that should be uncontrollable and have no limits. This is democracy, and not republicanism. The French revolution has been made the instrument of faction; it has multiplied popular errours, and rendered them indocile. Restraints on the power of the people, seem to all democrats, foolish, for how shall they restrain themselves? and mischievous, because as they think, the power of the people is their liberty. Restraints, that make it less, and, on every inviting occasion for mischief and the oppression of a minority, make it nothing, will appear to be the abandonment of its principles and cause.

EQUALITY. N°. III.

ALL democrats maintain, that the people have an inherent, unalienable right to *power:* there is nothing so fixed, that they may not change it; nothing so sacred, that their voice, which is the voice of God, would not unsanctify and consign to destruction: it is not only true, that no king, or parliament, or generation past can bind the people; but they cannot even bind themselves: the will of the majority is not only law, but right: having an unlimited right to act as they please, whatever they please to act is a rule. Thus, virtue itself,

thus, publick faith, thus, common honesty, are no more than arbitrary rules, which the people have, as yet, abstained from rescinding; and when a confiscating or paper money majority in congress should ordain otherwise, they would be no longer rules. Hence, the worshippers of this idol ascribe to it attributes inconsistent with all our ideas of the Supreme Being himself, to whom we deem it equally impious and absurd to impute injustice. Hence, they argue, that a publick debt is a burden to be thrown off, whenever the people grow weary of it; and hence, they, somewhat inconsistently, pretend, that the very people cannot make a constitution, authorizing any restraint upon malicious lying against the government. So that, according to them, neither religion, nor morals, nor policy, nor the people themselves can erect any barrier against the reasonable or the capricious exercise of their power. Yet, what these cannot do, the spirit of sedition can; this is more sacred than religion or justice, and dearer than the general good itself. For it is evident, that, if we will have the unrestricted liberty of lying against our magistrates, and laws, and government, we can have no other liberty; and the clamorous jacobins have decided, that *such* liberty, without any other, is better than every other kind of liberty without *it*.

Is it true, however, (if it be not rebellion to inquire) that this uncontrolled power of the people is their right, and that it is absolutely essential to their liberty? All our individual rights are to be exercised with due regard to the rights of others; they are tied fast by restrictions, and are to be exercised within certain reasonable limits. How is it, then, that the democrats find a right in the whole people so much more extensive, than what belongs to any one of their number? In other cases, the extremes of any principle are so many departures from principle. Why is it, then, that they make popular right to consist wholly in extremes, and that so absolutely, that, without such boundless pretensions, they say it could not subsist at all? Checks on the people themselves are not merely clogs, but chains. They are *usurpa-*

tions, which should be abolished, even if in practice they prove useful; for, they will tell you, precedent sanctions and introduces tyranny. Neither Commodus nor Caligula were ever so flattered with regard to the extent of their power, and the impiety of setting bounds to it, as any people who listen to demagogues.

The writings of Thomas Paine, and the democratick newspapers will evince, that this representation of their doctrine is not caricatured: it is not more extravagant than they represent it themselves. They often, indeed, affirm, that they are not admirers of a mere democracy: they know it will prove licentious: they are in favour of an energetick government.

It is both more satisfactory and more safe, to trust to the *conduct* of a party, than their *professions*. What says the conduct of the party? Either the power of the people in the United States is absolutely uncontrolled, or the executive authority, the senate, and the courts of law, are the branches constituted to check it. Now, is it not notorious, that one great complaint of the jacobins against the federalists is, that the latter are friendly to the executive department. They are, on the contrary, the friends of the people, and on all occasions bold and eager to enlarge their privileges and influence in the government. It is not amiss to notice, though it is somewhat of a digression, that, of late, the jacobins vindicate, in their own president, an extent of executive power and patronage, such as neither Washington, nor Adams, nor their friends, ever thought of claiming, or exercising. They say it is right, that the president should displace all federalists, and thus all officers become his creatures and dependents. Thus, a standing army of corruption is to be formed, to be drawn out in array on every election. When the British treaty was depending, these men contended, that no treaty was binding, after being ratified by the president and senate, until the immediate representatives of the people had approved it. This was Mr. Gallatin's disorganizing and unconstitutional doctrine. Yet every de-

mocrat extols Mr. Jefferson for delivering up the Berceau, and carrying the French treaty into full effect, before congress has even met to consider it. Even this house of representatives, that was thus to be supreme over the supreme treaty-making power, was nevertheless to be subject to a power superiour to itself. The people of any district could instruct their members, and such instructions bind him against the plain dictates of his honour and conscience: he must be a rebel to the people, if he will not be perjured.

Besides, the remonstrances of any description of citizens are so many expressions of the will of the *sovereign*, and being his *will*, ought to become law. Thus congress is to be, in all its branches, somewhat less than a mother jacobin club, which has ever been allowed to prescribe rules of conduct to its affiliated clubs. The senate is as little spared in this plan of apportionment of power by the democrats: they uniformly denominate this body the dark divan, the conclave, the aristocratick branch of the government. The famous Virginia amendments, proposed, when democracy was in its zenith, to render this branch null, and to make it less a barrier against licentiousness than its convenient instrument. Let every thinking man read those amendments with attention, and he will see, that to reform our government was not the object, but to subvert it.

In point of theory, notions somewhat more correct have prevailed in regard to the judiciary. Yet, even on this point, at this moment, the democratick gazettes assure us, that their majority will abolish the new judiciary by repealing the law. Thus, the judges are to hold their offices during good behaviour: they cannot be removed at pleasure; but, as they stand upon the law, that very foundation, the democrats tell us, can be torn up. So that one great barrier of the constitution, erected to answer the ends of justice and publick safety, when either government or the people themselves "feel power and forget right," may be subverted *indirectly*, though not directly: the democrats cannot get

over it ; but they say they will get *round it.* Instead of stopping the flood of democratick licentiousness, this dam is to be the first obstacle that is swept away.

Let the considerate friends of rational liberty decide then from *facts*, from the most authentick and solemn transactions of the democratick party, whether there be any check, limitation, or control, that they would impose on the people ; or any now existing, that they would not first weaken and then abolish. If the sober citizens really wish for a simple democracy, and that the power of the people shall be arbitrary and uncontrollable, then let them weigh the consequences well, before they consent to the tremendous changes that the federal government must undergo, before it will be fit for a democracy. Let them consider the sacrifices of liberty, as well as order, of blood, as well as treasure, that this sort of government never fails to exact ; and if, on due reflection, they choose these consequences, then let them elect, and let them follow in arms, the men who are so much infatuated to bring them about ; for " infuriated man will seek his long-" lost liberty through desolation and carnage." If, however, they prefer the constitution, as it was made, and as it has been honestly administered, they will cling to the old cause and the old friends of federal republicanism, which they have tried in trying times, and, of course, know how to value and to trust.

EQUALITY. N°. IV.

THERE is perhaps no country in the world, where visionary theory has done so much to darken political knowledge, as in France, nor where facts appear at length so conspicuously to enlighten it. The doctrines of equality, and the rights of man, and the uncontrolled power of the people, whose voice is, rather unintelligibly, said to be the voice of God, have been so prevalent, that most persons have allowed the French to be political discoverers; and that *they* were,

certainly, not God's, but some other being's, chosen people, selected to preserve the true faith in politicks from corruption and oblivion. These lofty claims French modesty urged in every country, as if they were Romans, and the others, barbarians. Our *patriotick* sophists very meekly admitted their claim.

Time is as little a friend to folly, as to hypocrisy. It obliges the intemperate sometimes to be sober, and makes knavery tired of its mask. The French revolutionary government is now in its teens, and we are compelled, with some steadiness of attention, to behold those features, which democratick fondness shut its eyes to imagine were divine in its cradle. Never was popular admiration more extravagant; never were its disappointments more signal or complete. The French revolution is one of those dire events, that cannot happen without danger, nor end without advantage to mankind. It is a rare inundation, whose ravages shew the utmost high-water mark: an earthquake, that has laid bare a mine: a comet, whose track through the sky, while it scatters pestilence, excites the curiosity of astronomers, and rewards it.

When the French revolution began, many of the best, and even some few of the wisest, rejoiced in some of the most pernicious, and most absurd of its measures. Down with the nobles, was the cry of the *Tiers Etat*, or third estate, and it was echoed here: let all the three orders vote in one chamber, in other words, let there be but one order, the democratick: *that* will rule and the others bleed. 'Down with the priesthood, was the next cry: abuses so great have been tolerated too long: we reform too late, and therefore we cannot reform too much. The many millions of church property were, of course, by a simple vote of a majority, *re*-annexed, as they called robbery, to the nation. The nobles were next dismounted in an evening's sitting, and in a fit of emulation in extravagance. All was done without reasoning and by acclamation. The *sovereign* mob of the suburbs of Paris,

called St. Antoine and Rue Marcel, were next employed. The bastile was taken; liberty celebrated her triumphs, she trod upon a plain, on the rubbish of her tyrants' palaces, whose ruins were not left as high as their foundations. Her path seemed to be smooth; all obstacles were removed; all men were free and equal; those who had rescued liberty by their blood were ready to shed it in her defence. Where are her friends? Behold them arrayed in armies, brandishing their pikes. Where are her enemies? See their heads dropping gore on those pikes. Is not the danger over? Is not the victory won? Are not the French free, and perfectly secure in their freedom?

Every sagacious democrat answered all these questions in the affirmative.

Nobody seemed any longer to have power, but the people. *They* had all power, and, of course, *unbounded* liberty. How little is it considered, that arbitrary power, no matter whether of prince or people, makes tyranny; and that in salutary restraint is liberty. A stupid, ferocious multitude, who are unfit to be free, may play the tyrant for a day, just long enough to put a sceptre of iron into their leader's hand. To use quaint language, in order to be the more intelligible, it may be said, that, when there is no end to the power of a multitude, there can be no beginning to their liberty.

Review the transactions in France since 1789, and it will appear, that there is no condition of a state, in which it is more impossible that liberty should subsist, or more nearly impossible that, after being lost, it should be retrieved, than after order has been overthrown, and popular licentiousness triumphs in its stead.

The old government of France was a bad one; but the new order of things was infinitely worse. Most persons suppose this is to be ascribed to the *excess* of liberty; they think there was too much of a good thing. Now the truth is, there was no liberty at all—absolutely none from the first, no reasonable hope, scarcely a lucky chance for it. Who had liberty? Clearly not the king, the nobles, nor the priests, nor the king's minis-

ters; all these were in jeopardy from the 14th July, 1789: not the rich; they were robbed and driven into banishment: not the great military officers who had gained glory in the American war; they were slain: not the farmers; their harvests and their sons were in requisition: not the merchants; they were so stripped, that their race was extinct; they were known only on the grave-stones of Nantz and Lyons; they were remembered in France, like the mammoth, by their bones. But, say the democrats, *the people*, the *many*, in other words, the rabble of the cities, were free: bread was issued to them by the publick. Yes, but it was the bread of soldiers, for which they were enrolled as national guards to uphold the tyranny of robbers and usurpers; and as soon as this very rabble reluctcd at their work, the more desperate cut-throats from Marseilles were called for, to shoot them in the streets.

It is often said, that the monarchy of France was forcibly upheld by the army. There is much incorrectness in the prevailing notions on this point. Without pausing to consider them, it may be sufficient to say, that the leaders of the revolution, apprehending that they should have an army against them, very early determined that they would have also an army on their side. By a simple vote, raising the pay of the king's soldiers, they detached the troops from his side to their own; and, still further to augment their military force, they enlisted the rabble of all the cities as national guards. Thus France was still governed by an army, but this army was itself governed by new chiefs. The people were more than ever subject to military power.

Now it would be a pleasant task for the democratick declaimers to shew, that *martial law* is *liberty;* and as there never was a half hour since July, 1789, when a man in France had any other rights, but such as that law saw fit to spare, they ought now to tell us, as they gave no reason at the time, *why* they roasted oxen on account of the triumphs of French liberty.

The nature of that precious liberty deserves some further consideration.

EQUALITY. N°. V.

THE French are very unjustly accused of having *lost* their liberty: they never had it. The old government was not a free one, and the violence that demolished it was not liberty. The leaders were, from the first, as much the sovereigns as the Bourbon kings. A mob would disperse in an hour without a leader, and that leader has immediately an authority, of all despots the most absolute, though the most precarious. To destroy the monarchy, the resort was to force, not to the people; and who, in those times of violence, had any liberty, but the possessors of that force? No liberty was then thought more valuable, than that of running away from mob tyranny.

ACCORDINGLY, the standing army, which had been only two hundred thousand strong, was suddenly increased to half a million. The ruin of trade and manufactories compelled scores of thousands to become soldiers for bread. All France was soon filled with terrour, pillage, and massacre. It is absurd, though for a time it was the fashion, to call that nation free, which was, at that very period of its supposed emancipation, subject to martial law, and bleeding under its lash. The rights of a Frenchman were never less, nor was there ever a time when he so little dared to resist or even to complain.

THE kings of France, it is true, had a great military force, but the new liberty-leaders had as much again. They used it, avowedly, to strike terrour into those they were pleased to call counter-revolutionists; in other words, to drive into exile nearly a million nobles, priests, rich people, and women: every description of persons, whom they hated, feared or wished to plunder, was placed on the proscribed list. All the kings of France, from the days of Pharamond and Clovis, down to the last of the Bourbon race, did not exercise despotick power on so great a scale, nor with such horrid cruelty. If the French were slaves under their kings, their masters did not try to aggravate the weight of their chains: the people were sometimes spared because they were a property; because

their kings had an interest in their lives, and some in their affections, but none in their sufferings. The *republican* French have not whispered their griefs, without hazard of a spy; they have not lingered in their servile tasks, without bleeding under the whips of their usurpers.

Yet this extremity of degradation and wretchedness, has been celebrated as a triumph. Americans have been made discontented with their liberty, because it was so much less an object of desire, a condition so inferiour in distinction to that of the French.

While the kings reigned, they permitted the laws to govern, at least, as much as their quiet and security would allow: and when they used military force to seize the members of the parliament of Paris, and to detain them prisoners for their opposition to their edicts, the ferment in the nation soon induced them to set them at liberty. Thus, it appears, that the rigours of despotism once had something existing to counteract and to soften them; but since the revolution, the popular passions have been invariably excited and employed to furnish arms to tyrants, and never to snatch them out of their hands; to overtake fugitive wretches, and to invent new torments.

This, bad as it is, is the natural course of things. Liberty is not to be enjoyed, indeed it cannot exist, without the habits of just subordination: it consists, not so much in removing all restraint from the orderly, as in imposing it on the violent. Now the first step in a revolution, is to make these restraints appear unjust and debasing, and to induce the multitude to throw them off; in other words, to give daggers to ruffians, and to lay bare honest men's hearts. By exalting their passions to rage and frenzy, and leading them on, before they cool, to take bastiles, and overturn altars, and thrones, a mad populace are well fitted for an army, but they are spoiled for a republick. Having enemies to contend with, and leaders to fight for, the contest is managed by force, and the victory brings joy only as it secures booty and vengeance. The conquering faction soon divides, and one part arrays its partizans in arms against the other; or, more frequently, by treachery

and surprise cuts off the chiefs of the adverse faction, and they reduce it to weakness and slavery. Then more booty, more blood, and new triumphs for liberty ! !

It is not because there are not malecontents, it is not because tyranny has not rendered scores of thousands desperate, that civil war has not, without ceasing, ravaged that country. But the despotism, that continually multiplies wretches, carefully disarms them : it so completely engrosses all power to itself, as to discourage all resistance. Indeed, the only power in the state is that of the sword ; and while the army obeys the general, the nation must obey the army. Hence it has been, that civil war has not raged. The people were nothing, and, of course, no party among them could prepare the force to resist the tyrants in Paris. Hence France has appeared to be tranquil in its slavery, and has been forced to celebrate feasts for the liberty it had *not*. They have often changed their tyrants, but never their tyranny, not even in the mode and instruments of its operation. An armed force has been the only mode from the first, which free governments may render harmless, because they may keep it subordinate to the civil power : this despotick states cannot do.

The mock "*republican*" leaders, as they affect to call themselves, but the *jacobin* chiefs in America, as they are known and called, are the close imitators of these French examples. They use the same popular cant, and address themselves to the same classes of violent and vicious rabble. Our Condorcets and Rolands are already in credit and in power. It would not be difficult to shew, that their notions of liberty are not much better than those of the French. If Americans adopt them, and attempt to administer our orderly and rightful government by the agency of the popular passions, we shall lose our liberty at first, and in the very act of making the attempt ; next we shall see our tyrants invade every possession that could tempt their cupidity, and violate every right that could obstruct their rage.

Nothing will better counteract such designs than to contemplate the effects of their success in the government of Buonaparte. Of that in the next number.

EQUALITY. N°. VI.

THE NATURE AND BASIS OF BUONAPARTE'S POWER.

EVERY democrat more or less firmly believes, that a revolution is the sure path to liberty; and, therefore, he believes government of little importance to the people, and very often the greatest impediment to their rights. Merely because the French had begun a revolution, and thrown every thing that was government, flat to the ground, they began to rejoice, because that nation had, *thus*, become the freest nation in the world. It is very probable many of the ignorant in France really thought so; it is lamentable, that many of the well informed in America fell into a like errour.

IT is essential, therefore, to review the history of that revolution, at least with so much attention, as to deduce a few plain conclusions. Popular discontents naturally lead to a forcible resistance of government. The very moment the physical power of the people is thus employed to resist, the people themselves become *nothing*. They can only destroy; they cannot rule. They cannot act without chiefs; nor have chiefs, and keep rights. They are blind instruments in the hands of ambitious men; and, of necessity, act merely as they are acted upon. Each individual is nothing; but the chief, having the power of a great many to aid him, can overpower, and will destroy, any mutinous citizen, who presumes to find fault with his general's conduct. Thus a revolution produces a mob. A mob is at first an irregular, then a regular army, but in every stage of its progress, the mere blind instrument of its leaders. The power of an army, of necessity, falls into the hands of one man, the general in chief, who is the sole despot and master of the state.

EVERY thing in France has gone on directly contrary to all the silly expectations of the democrats, though most exactly in conformity with the laws of man's nature, and the evidence of history. If this kind of contemplation could cure Americans of their strange, and, perhaps it will prove, *fatal*, propen-

sity to revolutionary principles, and induce them, in future, to prefer characters fitter to preserve order than to overthrow it, then we should grow wise by the direful experience of others. We might stop with our Rolands, without proceeding to our Dantons and Robespieres.

After many convulsions, we behold Buonaparte the undisputed master of France, of *new France*, whose vast extent, whose immense populousness, whose warlike spirit, and arrogance in victory, invest her with the means, as well as the claim, like old Rome, to parcel out kingdoms, and to sit in judgment upon nations. A nine years war has left those nations enfeebled. They are too much afraid of France to resist her singly; and, unhappily for the repose and security of mankind, too much afraid of each other to join in self-defence.

A position of things so tempting to ambition would awaken it in France, even if it ever slept there. But it never sleeps. Great Britain, though not weakened, is wearied and discouraged by the selfishness and discord of the continental powers, and will not resume her arms, unless compelled by absolute necessity.

Russia alone is not afraid of France; but Russia has views on Turkey, which she will not, by any hostile measures, rouse France to obstruct.

In reality, the European states are, by a singular concurrence of circumstances, more than ever exposed, at this moment, as a prey to the French; and even more exposed to their arts in peace, than to their arms in war. There is little doubt that the power of the French consul would prove irresistible; but the important doubt exists, is it stable?

Buonaparte reigns by military power. There is not, as formerly, a body of nobles, an order of priests, a jealous parliament of Paris, a system of wise municipal laws, that deserved respect, and of provincial customs and claims of separate sovereignty, that extorted it from their kings. The new monarchy is without any such checks. There is no exterior impediment to the power of an army: its obstacles are to be

sought for within itself. And simple as its machinery seems to be, military force requires the management of a skilful hand, and it is kept in order, by rightly touching many little wheels and springs.

It is indeed true, that discipline is the ruling principle of armies; but what is discipline more than the *fear* of the general? While they know they have every thing to suffer from disobedience, and nothing to hope, the troops will obey. If, however, a state of things should exist, that admitted of much to hope from mutiny, and little to dread, there is nothing in the principle of discipline to restrain the soldiers from revolt any more than citizens.

Suppose, for instance, the great lieutenant-generals, especially if they command separate armies, distant from the general, should conspire to place a new commander at their head; in that case, it is evident, the power of discipline would be turned against the general, and converted into an instrument of insurrection. Every body knows, that the troops would greatly incline to the side of their particular commander. As the thirst for rank is the very soul of an army, the great officers will be hindered from aspiring at the chief command only by the difficulty, and almost impossibility, of attaining it—for as to the *danger*, men of daring spirits, habituated to think life worth little, and honour worth every thing, will not make much account of the danger.

To guard against this mischief, inherent in the very life, and bone, and muscle of his power, Buonaparte must watch his great officers much, and trust them as little as possible. He must guard most vigilantly every avenue, by which a rival might enter his army to tamper with it: he must be jealous of every great military genius in his camp, and ready to meet every unforeseen event: he will prevent their being collected in great force in the distant provinces, and under popular lieutenant-generals: he will not let the honour of victories fall to the share of any commander but himself; and, for that reason, he will hurry to Marengo, that every body may be forced to ascribe the event to his superiour talents and fortune. While

he keeps the troops in dread of punishment, if they disobey, and the odium of such punishments he will throw on his lieutenant-generals, he will spare nothing, that taxes or that exactions without any formality can obtain, to bestow in largesses on his soldiers. Thus, he will be the dispenser of all bounties, and unite in his favour the sentiments of both fear and affection. Nobody will be able to do others so much evil, nor, before a nation's wealth is at his disposal, can any rival appear to be so willing to do them good, as he.

It is obvious, however, that this is a system both of jealousy and rigour. It is equally clear, that, to reward the soldiers, will be the chief thing; to spare the people a very subordinate consideration.

It will, indeed, for other reasons, be nearly impossible, under such a government, greatly to favour the people. The military class, holding the chief power, will claim the first place, in point of rank and honour. Soldiers would grow weary of their condition, if they were despised by the citizens, whom they are employed to keep in subjection. Besides, it would not be practicable, nor, perhaps, would it be good policy in the general, to allow the state of a citizen to be greatly preferable to that of a soldier.

It follows, also, that the inferiour kind of liberty, which many arbitrary governments venture to let their subjects enjoy, and which, prior to this revolution, all the European states seemed desirous to enlarge, will be denied to the French. For if they pretend to be free, they would soon corrupt the soldiery with their doctrines of equality. Hence, it is, that the liberty of the press has been tried in France, and really found to be inconsistent with *their* plan of government. We call it *their tyranny*, to abridge it; the fact is, self-preservation is the first law of every government; and the liberty to make Buonaparte odious, and to combine all his enemies into a regular body against him, would soon oblige him to draw the sword in self-defence. The liberty of the press, under a military government, is, indeed, only the liberty to kindle a civil war.

For the same reason, martial law must be universal: the government will defend itself; and it cannot defend itself, unless it every where watches its enemies, and hinders them from acting as soon as they begin to stir. Free governments may consider many libels and lies as idle words; many others as worthy only of moderate fines; but there is no safety in permitting your town-meeting orators to tamper with an army. The government *must* be jealous, and is scarcely permitted to be either magnanimous or merciful: its fears will make it always strict, and often cruel.

It is not possible, therefore, that the French should enjoy one half of the little liberty they had under their kings. Their revolution will lessen it throughout Europe. But it is certain, that the most rigorous governments are the hardest to maintain in tranquillity. Trivial risings of the people are not to be expected: the certainty, that any small insurgent force would be instantly crushed by the great force of the army, will prevent any risings, but such as are serious struggles for empire, and these are to be expected.

A great commander, with a hundred thousand men to second his designs, is crowned with success. The decision is made by the comparison of hostile forces, and the conqueror, having the greater force, claims the admiration of his countrymen and despotick authority over them. He obtains it. But in peace he has fewer to aid his designs, and more to obstruct them. Those whom he gratifies will not be grateful; those whom he denies will be vindictive. Extravagant hopes are formed, and even great success in a peaceful administration will not be splendid. Few will admire; many will repine and be disappointed.

The circumstance, that his claim to reign is merely personal, will ensure disturbances. Tranquillity will not be expected to last longer than his life, and that expectation will abridge it. His indisposition, his old age, his mistakes, and his disasters, will all engender those forebodings of change, that will hasten changes. His ambitious lieutenants will aspire to his place, and will cabal in the army to gain a party to be ready

to salute them emperours, as soon as he is dead, or has become odious.

Another consequence worth remark, is, that these changes have no tendency to establish liberty. A new struggle, like the old one, must be by violence, which can only give the sceptre to the most violent. The leaders will aim only at the *power to reign*, and it will not be their wish to lessen that power, which they hope to gain as a prize. The supreme power would not tempt them to such efforts, if it was to be made cheap and vile in their eyes, by bestowing it on the despised rabble of the cities and the common soldiery. These men are unfit for liberty; and, if they had it gained for them, would give it away to a demagogue, who would have, in six weeks, another army, and a new despotism, as hard to bear and to overturn as that which they had subverted. Nor could the leaders establish liberty if they tried: the supreme power being military, the contest can only determine what general shall hold it. A military government, in fact, though often changing its chief, is capable of very long duration. Rome, Turkey, and Algiers, are examples: France may prove another.

Thus the progress of mob equality is invariably to despotism, and to a military despotism, which, by often changing its head, embitters every one of the million of its curses, but which cannot change its nature. It renders liberty hopeless, and almost undesirable to its victims.

"HISTORY IS PHILOSOPHY TEACHING BY EXAMPLE."

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AMONG states and nations the law of the powerful is despotism. Yet there are, perhaps, of more than two hundred thousand heads of families in New-England, ten or twenty thousand, who sincerely believe, that the power of France is favourable to general liberty. The opinion is shallow, but a great many hundreds of the persons who entertain it are no fools. The error, gross as it is, lies in want of thought, and want of information.

A NATION, which has made almost every sacrifice for its ambition to rule other nations, will not, now it is victorious, be very modest in requiring from them like sacrifices. France affects to be the imitator of ancient Rome: never was there a more abominable original, or a more servile copy.

THERE was almost no evil that Rome did not inflict, scarcely any humiliation that she did not impose on her allies. The people of Latium were denominated her *confederates*, and entitled to what was called, as a kind of eminence in slavery, the *jus Latinum;* the other states claimed only the *jus Italicum.* These were degrees in slavery. For when the Latins insisted, as well they might, that they would not follow the Romans in their wars, their refusal was called treason; a war ensued, and the Latins yielded on the terms of having the excellent privilege of the *jus Latinum.* After Latium was thus humbled, Rome extended her sway over the twelve states of Etruria. Those nearest to her, and the most afraid of her power, were tempted by all the offers of citizenship that tyranny could hold forth; and they were offered with effect: they were neutral. Etruria did not combine to resist Rome, till Rome was not to be resisted. Samnium was next attacked. Seventy years of war, and more than twenty triumphs, were necessary to subdue the Samnites, who were as brave and as warlike as the Romans, but not half so well united. The Romans never failed

to use one set of slaves to conquer another. The Campanians were called allies, and, under that name, entitled to fight the Samnites; and, during a century of the most vigorous oppression, they were incessantly reproached with their *ingratitude* to the Romans, because they winced a little, when their chains galled to their marrow. The Samnites were reduced; and then Pyrrhus came. The people of Tarentum, who called him over, had little power, and his own state had none, for a distant expedition. He failed. The Carthaginians next disputed the dominion of Sicily with the Romans. They loved money better than glory; and the Romans sought money by winning glory. The men of the sword prevailed in combat against the shopkeepers.

Two extraordinary men raised up Carthage from the dust. Hamilcar, a great man, reduced Spain, where he was cut off in early life: Hannibal, his son, a greater man, perhaps the greatest of men, trained the armies and led them into Italy against the Romans. Much has been said, and more might be said, on this subject. Hannibal never met with his equal, and the reason why he did not finally conquer was, that the institutions of Carthage were inferiour to those of Rome. The policy of Carthage was to make money; that of Rome to make conquests. In consequence of this defect, Carthage lost both money and conquests; while Rome accumulated both. Carthage stood in fear of her allies; the allies of Rome were afraid of her. The conquests of Rome were old and well consolidated with her empire; those of Carthage recent and still turbulent. Accordingly, Spain, as soon as Hannibal left it, blazed out with wars, that made her the slave of Rome. Italy was more advanced in slavery, and felt an emulation among her states in their obedience to their mistress. She used her own allies as slaves, and the subjects of Carthage as allies.

Rome courted the great; Hannibal the populace. This was one cause of the ardour and perseverance of the allies in the service of Rome, who courted the oligarchy of every state to assist in oppressing it. Another impediment to Hannibal's success, was in the government of Carthage. It was popular,

and, therefore, a prey to faction. Hanno prevented the supplies being sent to Hannibal, that would have given him the superiority. The jacobins of Carthage destroyed her independence: they hated their rivals more than they loved their country.

The Romans dissembled their anger against Philip, king of Macedon, as long as they had the Carthaginians to deal with. When Carthage was subdued, they picked a quarrel with Philip. Even then they allied themselves with the Ætolians, the Virginians of ancient Greece, and used them as tools to subdue Philip. Philip was beaten at Cynocephale, and the Ætolians were greatly disappointed on the peace that ensued. For they expected that Rome would allow them to domineer as despots in Greece; but Rome very discreetly chose to domineer herself.

Indeed, ancient history has a great deal to say to America; but America will not hear it.

The Ætolians, disappointed in their ambition, then said a great many things that were true; but they said all from spite, and were not regarded. Flamininus, the conqueror of Philip, proclaimed, at the Isthmian games, liberty to the states of Greece; that is to say, *anarchy;* that all should be weak, and Rome stronger than all.

He, and the ten ambassadours, told the Roman senate, that, unless Lacedæmon were reduced, Nabis, the king of that state, would be lord of all Greece; and yet he told the assembled states of Greece, at Corinth, that it was wholly *their* affair and *nothing to the Romans.* The duplicity and profligacy of this transaction are exhibited even by Livy, who is a very Roman in his history.

By dividing, the Romans conquered. Weak confederacies are so many strong factions and crazy governments.

These old examples shew what France has already done in Europe, where she has destroyed every one of its republicks; and what she will do, if she and her allies, the jacobins, can, in America. They have begun their work—they have made progress.

BALANCE OF EUROPE.

First published in the Palladium, March, 1802.

TWO hundred and eighty years ago, Francis I. king of France, and Charles V. emperour of Germany, king of Spain, possessor of the dominions of the house of Austria in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries, began the contests of ambition, which have since regulated the *balance of Europe.*

Russia and Prussia were then nothing; England was not much, for we are to deduct from its present power Scotland, which was hostile, Ireland, little better civilized than the six nations, and the American colonies and India settlements, neither of which were then begun. England then had the weight of a feather, but of a feather that could turn the scale Henry VIII. had not always the good sense, to throw his weight into the right scale: he acted from passion, rather than from policy. France was greatly overmatched, and should have had his aid. Afterwards the troubles in France reduced that country to a state of insignificance, and Philip II. king of Spain, remained the preponderant power of Europe. After the middle of the seventeenth century, Louis XIV advanced to the front rank, as the leader of the European republick. Charles II. of England loved his pleasures too much, and trusted his parliament too little, to dispute that rank with him. Accordingly, Louis made great conquests, and annexed Alsace, Lorrain, and a part of the Low Countries to his vast monarchy.

At that time, there were only three powers in the north of Europe, Denmark, Sweden, and Poland. Sweden, especially, was highly military, and the size of her army made amends for the scantiness of her wealth and people. Russia was not born, and Prussia was not then gathered as a nation. England, Holland, and Austria formed a balance in the beginning of the eighteenth century for the immense power of France.

Spain was then nothing; for an Austrian and a Bourbon prince were competitors for its crown.

Something like a balance was, however, actually maintained: for at all times, the ambition to establish a universal monarchy existed; but, by great good fortune, sufficient obstacles to its accomplishment also existed. These were found in the combination of the weaker powers.

One reason for the success for this combination, may be ascribed to the inferiour military establishments of the several European states, at that period. A great power found it very difficult to maintain a great army; and a small state with a large army, and, especially, aided by a confederacy with other weak states, could effectually resist a great conqueror.

Hence, we may observe the great change in the face of Europe within a century. Armies are large, and more in proportion to the size of the several states. New combinations of politicks are formed, in consequence of the gradual and experienced insignificance of the weak states. New powers, as Russia and Prussia, have arisen; and the independence of all requires, that new principles should be adopted to support the balance, without which one nation will be the tyrant, and the rest slaves.

By the treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, Germany was condemned to endless anarchy. Its state sovereignties were scarcely to be counted or controlled.

Whatever is divided, is weakened; and, in politicks, whatever is weakened, is exposed as a prey. Accordingly, in every war, Germany furnished soldiers for France, and her own sons were employed to cut one another's throats.

Holland had some patriotism, one hundred years ago: faction has since extinguished it; and, instead of its being the enemy, it proved in 1794, the auxiliary of French domination.

In weak states, fear rules: temporary expedients are sought, and the rulers seldom fail in the end to act for their destroyers, because they are afraid to act against them. Hence it is, that the weak states of Europe have lately proved more

than passive to France: they have made a merit of devoting themselves to destruction.

In the present position of Europe, it is obvious, that France domineers. She has gained *positively*, by adding territory to her dominions equal in size, wealth, and people to a second-rate kingdom; she has gained *relatively*, by removing Austria to a distance, and by weakening that ancient rival to such a degree, as to secure her inaction for an age.

Prussia has gained prodigiously by the partition of Poland. It was natural to think, that Prussia had become powerful enough to disregard France; but it has unexpectedly happened, that Prussia has gained power without gaining entire independence. Austria is weaker; but France is stronger than ever. Besides, Russia is, more than ever, the preponderating power of the North. Of course it is, that Prussia still leans upon France, is more than ever afraid to provoke her displeasure, and, perhaps, more than ever really interested in her alliance, to secure herself against Russia.

France, then, finds no counterpoise in Prussia. Sweden and Denmark are no longer of any consequence. Their armies no longer bear any proportion to their extent of territory, and other powers have augmented their forces in proportion to their number of subjects. Denmark and Sweden have, of course, declined, both positively and relatively. Poland is annihilated as an independent power. Prussia, instead of balancing the power of France, is her ally, nearly as Latium was the ally of Rome.

Russia is a colossus, but, with one foot on the Frozen ocean, and the other on the Black sea, she cannot reach her antagonist in the south of Europe.

No foe is near enough, or powerful enough to save Europe from subjection, but Great Britain. Every independent power has, therefore, a manifest interest in the sufficiency of the British force to balance that of France.

It will be objected, that Britain has vastly grown in her naval strength; that if France domineers on the land, Great Britain is the despot of the ocean. Why, therefore, it will be

asked by the democrats, shall we view the aggrandizement of France with terrour, when her enemy is no less formidable, and much more in our way, sometimes as a competitor, often as a tyrant?

The answer is, that the modern balance of power in Europe is only of the *great* powers: the minor powers are no more. Switzerland, the Italian princes and states, Holland, even Spain, and the Baltick states, excepting Russia, are annihilated. Either there can be no balance, or it must be formed by the counterpoise of *great* states. When, therefore, France has grown to such a giant size, no dwarf can be her antagonist. The prodigious increase of the British navy is some counterpoise, but, we fear, a very insufficient one, for the tremendous means and still more formidable spirit of France.

It is allowed, that the British navy, considered in an abstract point, is too large and too superiour to that of all other nations, especially of our own. But naval power, it may be said, is rather less fitted for the purposes of national aggrandizement, than any other. It is very likely to provoke enemies, and not well adapted to subdue them. It is a glittering defensive armour. And, surely, all independent nations ought to rejoice, that Great Britain wears it. Great as its energy is, it is not too great to defend her from her adversary. If it be an evil, for that navy to be so great, it is clearly a less evil, than for the French power to be freed from its resistance. Remove that resistance, and France would rule the civilized world.

Turkey was formerly a great power, and a check on Austria and Russia. But as France finds Turkey too weak for that purpose; as she finds, that the fall of her old ally is not to be prevented, her policy will be to profit by her fall.

We have seen the eagerness of Buonaparte to possess himself of Egypt; and, had it not been for sir Sidney Smith, perhaps he would have conquered Syria, and marched to Constantinople. As long as France remains inferiour at sea, she will desire to use the Turkish dominions, as a station to con-

fine the Russians to the Black sea, and to collect the troops and resources to annoy the English empire in India. France, moreover, will desire to seize a part of Turkey, at least Candia, because, if she does not, Russia will. Turkey cannot be long hindered from falling, and cannot fall, without producing a scramble for her spoils.

It is hence, on the review of European affairs, obvious to remark, that all the states have become military in some proportion to their wealth and populousness. Hence, the weak states, that were of consequence one hundred years ago, have sunk into insignificance, since the great powers have armed and taken their natural superiority. Hence, also, it is apparent, *that nothing but military strength is any security for national independence;* as all the weak states have become abject, weak, and despised. It is, also, evident, that the great powers have grown in strength, and that France has outgrown them all. Great Britain has, indeed, increased in commerce and wealth; and France has declined in both; but France has despised all occupation but that of the sword: she has *destroyed her artisans* and *multiplied her soldiers*. This has ensured her poverty, and her conquests: it has filled her army, and emptied her workshops. England, on the contrary, has found her prosperity an impediment to her warlike operations. A man's labour is worth much in England, and it is expensive to use it in the field of war; it is of use to France only in that field.

It takes England, therefore, a long period to put on her armour; and it is worn with infinite expense. But, after it is adjusted to her limbs, she is capable of vast energy, because she gradually adopts a war system, and accommodates her industry to her situation. The war, at length, creates its own resources; and industry, that is ever found, when pressed by necessity, capable of working miracles, is sure to display them in furnishing the resources. Accordingly, we conclude, that the peace, by disarming England, exposes her to a danger and disadvantage infinitely beyond what she had to apprehend from the continuance of the war.

France experiences no such disadvantage. She will not let her troops be idle. If Toussaint should not find employment for them, she will send them to Louisiana: she will find work or make it.

But England has increased too in military strength and spirit. Our democrats are silly enough to think that nation subject to a standing army; the truth is, a militia, an effective militia of the real people, constitutes the force of Great Britain: it is the nation that holds the sword.

Add to this, the vast increase of the British power in India. On the whole, we may hope, that Great Britain will be able to maintain the post of glory and danger, in which she is placed. She cannot defend herself, without making other nations secure; nor is it possible, that her fall should happen, without infinite peril, perhaps utter ruin, to the independence of all other powers. France was, formerly, emulous of commercial greatness; but the spirit, that Colbert awakened, and that seemed to balance the spirit of chivalry of the nation, is apparently quenched. France is more military and less commercial, than ever she was before; England, on the contrary, is more than ever commercial. The basis of her naval superiority is widened. Hence we may infer, that Britain will continue to beat France at sea.

This review, also, serves to exhibit, in a proper light, the policy, if it be *policy*, of disarming the United States at a time of unprecedented danger. While all Europe is sliding from its old foundations; while France is pouring myriads of black, white, and ring-streaked banditti into St. Domingo, and is ready to vomit them on our shores, we are *boastfully* consigning our little army to nothing, and our navy to the worms.

It is in peace only that armies can be trained; it is in peace only that navies can be prepared, and a very long preparation is requisite. We have abolished revenue enough, *that no poor man felt, the collection of which sent no son of laborious poverty supperless to bed*, to build a fleet sufficient for our protection. Coaches, loaf sugar, and whiskey, are to go *free*, and our commerce to wear *shackles!* Nothing is easier than for the United

States to provide thirty ships of the line and sixty frigates. Such a force would protect our rights; and for want of it, France alone has plundered us of more than such a fleet would have cost to build, and equip, and maintain during the late war.

It is childish prattle, to inquire, what need have we of force? A nation that neglects its naval and military power, will not preserve its independence: weakness is subjugation. *Si vis pacem, para bellum*, is a maxim of good sense, but not of the democrats. To be without force or treasure, used to be deemed the course for a government to be without consideration; but, of late, it is deemed to be, though an evil, yet a less evil than another, that those, who are dismantling our government, like an old ship, that is to be broken up for the old iron, should be without popularity.

How long shall men, whose views are merely party or personal, whose foresight scarcely reaches a week forward, be *encouraged* by our suffrages to *work for our undoing!* A system so selfish and so mean, that begins and ends with the individual interests of those who act for us, is too gross to be misunderstood, and too mischievous long to be tolerated. It appears probable, that the PEOPLE will clearly discern how they *ought to vote*, two years before they will have the opportunity. Federal truth has begun its awful progress, and it will prevail: its sun has set to rise again.

POLITICAL REVIEW.

N°. I.

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THE war of arms is at an end; the war of the custom-house is commenced between France and England. More than ever their policy relates to the concerns of other powers; and the consequences of their competition will shew, that the same act, which has given peace to themselves, has scattered the seeds of discord among their neighbours. To lessen the commerce of England, will lessen her power. Buonaparte will, therefore, try all the means that his policy can employ, to make his rival defenceless, before he forces her to be hostile.

IT is not clear, that the people of England were willing any longer to prosecute the war; but it is now unquestionably clear, that it was their great ultimate interest to pursue it. Peace has brought with it no new resources; it has dried up those which spring up with a state of war: for war makes many of its own means. Peace divides the commerce, that war gave to her entire: her enemies, who lately did not own a ship, are now England's competitors. Their business was to destroy; now it is to produce and to fabricate. They want less; they supply more. They diminish her means; and they recruit their own. England looks at the peace with mingled shame and dread; shame, because she is already degraded in the eyes of strangers, if not in her own; with dread, for France has gained new power, and shews her old ambition.

IT is childish to say, that Mr. Pitt ought to have proceeded with the war, if he understood the position of things. He understood it; but it is alleged, and, perhaps, it is true, that the British nation preferred present ease, which they expected, and have failed of realizing, by peace, to the glory, the burdens and the distant ultimate security of war. We Americans choose to say, and we are vain-glorious enough to believe, that

the people are not counted for any thing any where, except in America. The truth is, the voice of the nation, when it conveys its wisdom or its deliberate mistakes, is more sure to penetrate audibly, and with effect, the recesses of St. James's, than those of Monticello. The British nation was weary of the war, and, therefore, it was ended. Peace will present an aspect of danger, which its courage will not be summoned to face. The only question is, whether, on viewing its formidable consequences, its policy will be able to surmount or elude them. A nice problem it is. America is infinitely interested in its favourable solution.

When we behold France with a power so vast, as to excite and enable her to undertake almost every thing, and a spirit still more romantick and vast, to prompt her to achieve impossibilities, we are led to think of a new Roman empire, under which the civilized world is first to bleed, and then to sweat in chains. We again see Rome, after the first Punick war; and, alas! we see Europe without a Hannibal, unless we look for him in England's Nelson or Smith. The little states are nothing; they are slaves, paid by titles to freedom for hewing wood and drawing water. The king of Prussia, though powerful, is no Philip; he is only an Attalus or Eumenes, under France. Spain has nothing of an independent monarchy, but the name. As to Holland, Switzerland, and the Cisalpine or Italian republicks, they are republicks during pleasure; they are sovereign, as Deiotarus, or Ariarathes, or Prusias were, to tame them for subjection. They are new recruits for the French republick, committed first to the drill-serjeant, before they are turned into the ranks. They will be cudgelled, if they prove refractory. They will be made to obey, like slaves, and yet to say and to swear, on occasion, that they are sovereign and independent, as may best suit the ambitious policy of France. Old Rome was too cautious and too much in earnest in her plan, to make a conquered people her subjects at once. She gave them a king, or made a pretty, little, snug *independent* republick for them, till every man was dead and gone, who was born and educated in independence: her bitter drugs

were all given in honey. So it is with France. Europe has no longer any minor powers ; they are swallowed up by France. Her establishment in Louisiana, which, though certain, is delayed only to choose the moment, when it will be most fatal to us, will convince even America, that distance is no protection : the plagues of Egypt will be in our bosoms, and in our porridge-pots. Our pity or our folly has made us weep or wonder at the events of Europe. We have had our spasms, when we saw distress and disease abroad ; we are doomed by fate to scratch with a mortal leprosy of our own : Gehazi, by accepting bribes, is smitten with Naaman's pestilence. Our government has little force, and, since the deplorable fourth of March, 1801, less than ever, to defend Kentucky and Tennessee from the arms of France : soon or late they will fall victims to their arts. In spirit and policy we are Dutchmen : we are to lose our honour and our safety ; and the *economical* statesmen, whom the wrath of heaven has placed at our head, will inquire what are they worth in shillings. Every penny of their folly will cost a pound.

But, say Job's comforters, France is a republick, and, of course, a *sister republick* will not only find friendship, but security, in the *aggrandizement* of France. Miserable comforters are all these ! Before this boasted revolution, Europe had many free republicks. Alas ! they are no more. France, proclaiming war against palaces, has waged it against commonwealths. Switzerland, Holland, Geneva, Venice, Lucca, Genoa are gone, and the wretched Batavian, Helvètian, and Italian republicks, are but the faint images, the spectres, that haunt the sepulchres, where they rot. So far has France been from paying exclusive regard to republicks, that she has considered them, not as associates, but as victims. Venice she sold to the emperour. Holland she taxed openly for her own wants, till she drove her rich men into banishment. She " ransomed Dutch liberty," with a vengeance, " from the hands of the *opulent :*"—so far she took counsel from the Worcester Farmer ; or he from her admired example. From Switzerland she drained her youth to be food for gun-powder. This is not all. But the king of

Etruria is tricked out in purple robes, like a playhouse monarch, to tread the stage in mock dignity. The proud Spaniard finds for France gold and dollars, and for *that* proof of "civism" he is treated as headservant in Buonaparte's kitchen. So that to favour kings, and to depress, plunder, and destroy republicks, has been the sure and experienced consequence of French domination.

Let the ignorant hirelings of France prattle about the cause of liberty. Let them repeat the second million of times the silly lie, that we triumph with France. Her triumphs are terrible. A voice seems to issue from the tombs of the fallen republicks for our warning. Our citizens are warned, though our government is not; and they would be armed, if France or fate did not ordain, that we should be disarmed and defenceless.

POLITICAL REVIEW. N°. II.

ONE of the consequences of the progress of ancient Rome to empire was, to lower the spirit of all other nations, while she raised her own. Already Buonaparte talks in the tone of a master; and his rivals and enemies, like slaves. The emperour of Germany has *congratulated* him in form, because he has elected himself president of the Italian republick. The grand Turk has renewed his old treaties with the man, whose expedition to Egypt, in a time of profound peace, shewed his absolute contempt of their obligation. Russia smothers her anger on account of Malta and Corfu. All Europe is striving to make its hypocrisy conceal its terrour.

After every former war, the question in every state was, how to arrange its concerns so as best to profit by the mutual dread, in which every power stood of its neighbour. Since the treaty of Amiens, the little powers are extinct, and the only concern is, how to find defence against France: there is but one leviathan, and half a score of small fish.

But, as France emulates old Rome, it is material to note the points of difference and resemblance.

Rome achieved her conquests, while she was republican; France is now *imperial*, precisely in the state, in which Rome became pacifick and began to feel decline.

France is as corrupt, and has had as much to corrupt her, as Rome had, after the horrours of her civil wars. Yet it is probable Buonaparte is less of a politician and more of a warriour, than Augustus, the second Roman Cesar. The Roman, too, had no foe near him. Parthia lay beyond the Euphrates; and a desart of parching sand, without fountains of water, divided the two great empires of Rome and Parthia from each other. Wars, when they were waged, were, therefore, produced by vain-glory, and very little interested the passions of the people of either of these states. In order to make the comparison fairly, we must suppose that Cornelius Sylla, instead of abdicating the dictatorship, remained at the head of the Roman armies, the Buonaparte of Rome. Even then, we shall scarcely find a formidable enemy left. Gaul and Britain were barbarous; Carthage, Greece, Macedonia, and the Syrian monarchy under Antiochus, were reduced to subjection. Whereas the modern Sylla finds in England, Austria, and Russia, a Hannibal, a Philip, and a Mithridates.

France, then, as military as Rome was under the Cesars, finds, in these obstacles, infinitely greater incentives to her ambition than they did. She has enemies near, and in force. Of necessary consequence, her system will not be pacifick: to make the power of her enemies less, will be the same thing as to make her own greater. The power of England, depending on her navy, will necessarily engage her active hostility. She will try the utmost efforts of her policy and "diplomatick skill," to detach the United States from being customers of Great Britain; and will, if possible, unite them to herself, as auxiliaries to her scheme of aggrandizement. We have some thousands of jacobins wicked enough, and some tens of thousands of democrats weak enough, to second her plan. They are ready to make the United States the tool of France, and, in that *illustrious* character, to revive the famous resolutions of Mr. Madison, and the report of Mr. Jefferson on the

privileges and restrictions of our commerce with foreign nations, so as to render congress the instrument of their war upon Sheffield, Manchester, and Birmingham, in England. Mr. Madison, who knew a great deal less than nothing at all of his subject, fancied that we could starve these manufacturers; and because we *could*, he humanely and wisely insisted, that we *ought* to starve them; and, therefore, that we ought to frame regulations, by which our consumers and the English manufacturers would both suffer, and the French would gain. All this, so worthy of a Frenchman, was to be done to restore to trade its *liberty:* it was to suffer *force*, in order to be *free*. It was to be compelled to do, as it ought to be disposed, but was not disposed to do. Not one merchant supported this scheme; but it will be revived.

France will soon have Louisiana. A formal treaty has already given it to her, and all our papers have published its contents. She only waits for a more convenient season: she waits to conquer the islands. She waits to let the true Americans recover from their fears, and have her partisans profit by their superiority in our counsels. She will depend on our fears, to do all the mischief she meditates against Great Britain, as a peace-offering, to obtain the delay of that which she meditates against us; but she will not delay it long, even though we should commence a war of acts of congress against British ships and manufactures.

Louisiana will produce as much cotton, as Great Britain imports; Georgia already yields two thirds of that amount. France will be in a hurry to send her legions to settle these fertile lands, vast enough in extent for an empire. She will be able to block up the Mississippi. She will be able to make terms for our degradation. She will menace our frontiers, while her faction in our bosom will enfeeble the centre. In a military and financial view, we shall become weaker than ever, at the very moment when we shall more than ever have need of force.

Our wealth, supposed by the democratick babblers to be the incentive to war, is the security for our tameness. To

get, and to keep, and to enjoy, is the spirit of our nation ; but to keep with honour and security, is no part of common arithmetick. The world, France excepted, is now peopled with Dutchmen. England is made tame by her banking and funded wealth : she is bound in golden chains. France intends to take them off, and to put on chains of iron. Compared with England, France is now what her own Parisian rabble was in 1790, prone to any change, because there is much wealth to be gained, none to be hazarded. Our half-witted democrats insist, that great wealth produces war. So far is this from being true, that the pursuit and the possession of wealth make a nation not less servile than sordid, willing to take kicks for pay, and to prefer gain to honour and security. France has the spirit of a camp ; the peace of Amiens shews, that England has that of a counting-house.

POLITICAL REVIEW. N°. III.

CORRECT views of European politicks lead to sound results of the publick judgment on our own. We have been long, too long, amused with the democratick prattle about the love of peace, and the love of our fellow-men, and the millennium, that would begin as soon as all kings were *murdered*, and all the citizen kings were fairly crammed together, forty deep, into a Philadelphia state-house-yard, or a Paris field of Mars, or a London Copenhagen-house, to exercise, as a triumphant mob, their imprescriptible and more than royal rights and functions. On the contrary, instead of perpetual peace among nations, we see a state of things, which renders all hope of any long peace ridiculously chimerical. Two mighty champions stand observing each other ; and, though they have suspended the combat, they have not laid aside their arms : they are furbishing them up, expecting to renew it. England is in dread for her existence ; France is full of impatience to effect the consummation of her ambition. Peace will afford neither to the one nor the other an hour of relaxation or repose.

It will turn no swords into plough-shares; but it is an awful interval of danger and terrour, which requires, that England, at least, should beat her plough-shares into swords. Including her militia, her land forces will exceed in the peace establishment, as it is called, the number she had on foot at the end of the American war. A peace, that requires more soldiers than such a war, is not the beginning of the expected millennium.

How ardent France is to extend her domination, no man of the least sense and observation can need to be told. She has not lost a minute to recover St. Domingo, nor to prepare a great army to take possession of Louisiana, as soon as it will best answer her purpose. Since the preliminaries of peace were signed on the first of October, 1801, Buonaparte has appointed himself president of the Italian republick, in other, but not plainer, words, king of Italy. She has a treaty with Portugal, which brings her near enough to the mouth of the great river Amazon, to secure at a future day, her command of the vast territory, bigger than all France, lying on that river. She has prohibited all importation of English manufactures; and has obliged her viceroy, the king of Spain, and her subjects in Holland, to do the like.

With these decisive marks of rooted hostility, with these undisguised preparations of the means to renew the contest, whenever it can be done with the best prospect of subverting the government and independence of Great Britain, with all the parade of equipping new navies in France, and her Spanish and Dutch provinces, and with her legion of honour, the consuls, pretorian guards, and with the draft of twice sixty thousand men, to fill up the ranks of her armies, who will doubt, that she is intent on the schemes of her ambition, and will go to war on the first favourable occasion for their accomplishment?

Whether Great Britain is competent to defend herself against a force so vast, and a spirit of hostility so rancorous and ardent, is a question of infinite importance to the whole civilized world, and, perhaps, of as much to the United States, as to any nation in it.

The examination of this subject deserves the best pens. We invite men of ability to favour us with such authentick statements of the commerce, revenue, and forces of the British empire and of France, as will assist us to make conjectures. The world is threatened with subjection to French military despotism. Unless Great Britain can defend herself, we are to look for such another age of iron, as passed in the twelfth century, when soldiers were ruffians, and all that were not soldiers were slaves.

In this scene it is some consolation to perceive, that Britain, at length, discerns her danger. The popularity of the peace is greatly impaired; and the aggrandizement of France, since the preliminaries, has awakened the pride and the fears of the nation.

British wealth, commerce, and naval force have greatly increased since the peace of 1783. Her manufactures exported at that period were about *nine million and a half of pounds sterling;* at the peace of 1801, *twenty four millions.* Her whole exports, in 1783, *fourteen millions;* in 1801, *thirty five millions.* In 1783, her merchant shipping *less than six hundred thousand tons;* in 1801, *fifteen hundred thousand.* In 1783, her armed ships of all sorts in commission, less than *four hundred;* in 1801, *seven hundred.*

As this great increase, however, is owing, in a great measure to the war, the question returns, will Great Britain be able to *keep* this superiority over France and her dependencies? During the war, the British navy destroyed the commerce and navigation of her enemies. This forced them to make use of American ships and capital to do that for them, which Great Britain would not permit them to do for themselves. Hence, the vast profits of American ships and merchants; and hence, too, the absurd clamour of the democrats, who cursed Great Britain, as the tyrant of the seas, because she forced our rivals to become our *customers.* The boasted principle of *free ships, free goods,* would deprive the United States of a great part of the fair profits of their neutrality. Belligerent nations could, in that case, transact their own affairs, and neutrals would have

no gains but freight. This observation is a digression, but it was obviously proper to make it, as the democrats have never ceased to misrepresent the subject.

It is little to be expected, that America will retain all her navigation and commerce. The nations, which the British navy depressed, are now making regulations to revive their commerce and their colony monopolies. France, the boasted friend of commercial liberty, is setting the example. Indeed it is clear, that the sole object of her policy is, to stir up every nation to a contest with England, to break down the English navigation act, and to establish a more rigorous monopoly system of her own.

The vast capital of England, augmented, as it is, beyond all former times, and beyond all proportion with her rivals, her manufacturing skill, and the excellence and stability of her government, so favourable to property, are advantages, which France has little to counterbalance, except the goodness of her soil and climate, and the populousness of her territory. Great Britain has gained much, in respect to political strength, by her union with Ireland, a measure, that will extend her growth for some ages; for Ireland is yet semi-barbarous, and the more it civilizes, the more it will augment the strength of the empire. The conquest of Tippoo's country, the Mysore, in India, consolidates her valuable dominions in that quarter of the globe. Ceylon is an important acquisition, and we wish it was in our power to state, how important, to English commerce. In the West-Indies, Trinidad is large enough to absorb many millions of British capital, and to become another Jamaica.

On the whole, France has gained power, and has lost nothing of her arrogance; Great Britain sees her danger, and, without having lost any of her strength, has recovered her spirits.

MONITOR.

First published in the Palladium, April, 1804.

ACCIDENT may give rise and extent to republicks, but the fixed laws that govern human actions and passions will decide their progress and fate. By looking into history and seeing what has been, we know what will be. It is thus that dumb experience speaks audibly; it is thus that witnesses come from the dead and testify. Are we warned? No. Are we roused? No. We lie in a more death-like sleep than those witnesses. Yet let us hear their testimony, though it should not quicken our stupidity, but only double the weight of our condemnation.

THE experiment of a republick was tried, in all its forms, by the Romans. While they occupied only one city, and a few miles of territory near its walls, they had all the virtues and sustained all the toils and perils of a camp. Every Roman was born a soldier, and the state entrusted arms to the hands of those only who had rights and rank as citizens. But when Rome extended her empire over all Italy, and then over all Asia Minor, her size rendered her politicks unmanageable; and power in her town-meetings, where the rabble at length out-voted the real citizens, corrupted all virtue, extinguished all shame, and trampled on all right, liberty, and justice. Our constitution, as Washington left it, is good; but as amendments and faction have now modelled it, it is no longer the same thing.

WE now set out with our experimental project, exactly where Rome failed with hers: we now begin, where she ended. We think it wise to spread over half this Western hemisphere a form, and it is only a form, of government that answered for Rome, while Rome governed a territory as narrow as the district of Columbia. The Romans were awed by oaths, and restrained by the despotism of a camp; for in every camp, where there is not mutiny, there must be despotism.

We Americans, who laugh at the difference, if difference there be, between *twenty* Gods and *no* God; we, who have lost our morals, prate about our liberty. We think, that what the Romans, with the Scipios, and Catuli, and Catos, could not keep, we, with our Jeffersons, cannot lose. Those great Romans thought it better not to live at all, than to live slaves; but we care more for our ease than our rights. We can bear injustice better than expense; and we dread war infinitely more than dishonour. Hence, when we had our election, we chose infamy, and paid fifteen millions for it: we compensated the aggressor for the fatigue of kicking us; and we celebrate, as a jubilee, that treaty that has made our debasement an article of the law of nations. If Rome had ever tamely borne the wrongs that we took, not merely patiently, but thankfully, joyfully, from Spain and Buonaparte, Rome would never have been more than a walled town, where valiant robbers secured their booty. But we who take insults from slaves, and think it victory and glory, to buy the forbearance of a tyrant, we talk of Roman liberty, as if we were emulous of it. The Romans honoured virtue, and loved glory, and thought it cheaply purchased with their blood; we love money, and, if we had glory, we should joyfully truck it off for more money, or another Louisiana. With such a difference of spirit, are we to hold the republican sceptre, that is to sway a million square miles of territory? If we resemble any thing Roman, it is such a domination as Spartacus, and his gladiators and slaves, would have established, if they had succeeded in their rebellion. The government of the *three fifths* of the ancient dominion, and the offscourings of Europe, has no more exact ancient parallel.

The plebeians of Rome asserted their right to serve in the highest offices, and at length obtained it; but the people still chose the *most able* and *eminent men*, who were patricians, and rejected their *worthless tribunes*. But we see *our tribunes successful: the judges* are at the *bar*, and the *whiskey leaders sit in judgment upon them*. Surely that people have lost their morals, who bestow their votes on those who have none; surely they

have lost their liberties, when their judges tremble more than their culprits.

The Romans maintained some barrier about popular rights, as long as the tribunes were sacred; but when Tiberius moved the people to depose Octavius, a fellow tribune, then violence ruled the assemblies, and even the shadow of liberty was lost. We have seen the judiciary law repealed, and the judges, though made sacred by the constitution, in like manner deposed.

The Romans, in the days of their degeneracy and corruption, set no more bounds to their favour, than to their resentments. While Pompey was *their* idol, they conferred unlimited authority upon him, over all the Mediterranean sea, and four hundred stadia (about forty five miles) within land. We, in like manner, devolve on Mr. Jefferson the absolute and uncontrolled dominion of Louisiana. It was thus the Romans were made, *by their own vote*, familiar with arbitrary power.

In the contests of their factions, *the conquerors inflicted all possible evils on the fallen party;* and thus they tasted and liked the sweetness of revenge. Except in removals from office, and newspaper invectives, in this point our experience is yet deficient; but, from the spirit of ardent malice apparent in the dominant faction, it is manifest, that we have men, who, though sparing enough of their own blood, would rival Marius or Anthony in lavishing that of their enemies.

The Romans were not wholly sunk from liberty, till morals and religion lost their power. But when the Thomas Paines, and those who recommended him, as a champion against "the presses" of that day, had introduced the doctrines of Epicurus, the Roman people became almost as corrupt as the French are now, and almost as shameless as the *favoured patriots* of our country, who are the first to get office.

Gradually, all power centred in the Roman populace. While they voted by centuries, (the comitia centuriata) property had influence, and could defend itself; but, at length, the doctrine of *universal suffrage* prevailed. The rabble, not only of Rome, but of all Italy, and of all the conquered nations, flowed in. *In Tiberim, defluxit Orontes.* Rome could no

more be found in Rome itself, than we can see our own countrymen in the Duanes and Gallatins, and Louisianians, of the present day. The senate of Rome sunk to nothing; *the owners of the country no longer governed it.* A single assembly seemed to govern the world, and the worst men in it governed that assembly.

Thus we see the passions and vices of men operate uniformly. What remains, and there is not much of this resemblance that remains, unfinished, will be completed.

The chief hazard that attends the liberty of any great people, lies in their blindness to the danger. A weak people may descry ruin before it overwhelms them, without any power to retard or repel its advance; but a powerful nation, like our own, can be ruined only by its blindness, that will not see destruction as it comes; or by its apathy and selfishness, that will not stir, though it sees it.

Our fate is not foretold by signs and wonders: the meteors do not indeed glare in the form of types, and print it legibly in the sky; but our warning is as distinct, and almost as awful, as if it were announced in thunder by the concussion of all the elements.

THE REPUBLICAN.

N°. I.

First published in the Repertory, July, 1804.

WE enjoy, or rather, till very lately, we did enjoy liberty to as great an extent, as it has ever been asserted, and to a much greater, than it has ever been successfully maintained. Kind heaven that gave it, best knows how frail the tenure and how short its date! Vanity, our only national passion, that is never cloyed with its feasts, nor tired with its activity, rates high enough the pride of our distinction as a free people, without once regarding the perils which environ *this*, as every other sort of pre-eminence. We have absurdly and presumptuously considered our condition as citizens, not as a state of probation for the trial of our virtues, but the heaven where their indolence is to find rest, and their selfishness an everlasting reward. We have dared to suppose our political probation was over, and that a republican constitution, when once fairly engrossed in parchment, was a bridge over chaos that could defy the discord of all its elements. The decision of a majority, adopting such a constitution, has sounded in our ears like a voice saying to the tempestuous sea of liberty, thus far shalt thou go, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed.

HENCE it is, that the unthinking and least-informed of our citizens have been so ready to look with levity and distrust on senates, courts, and judges, the bulwarks of our liberty, and with complacency on the licentious faction that is destined to subvert it. We have read ourselves, or have been told by those whom ancient history has instructed, that republicks breed factions, and that factions breed tyrants. We have seen this faction, and its favourites who are thirsting to be tyrants, but we have sought and found comfort in our vanity, when it asserts, that *we* have the sense to unmask our flatterers, and the virtue that will scorn their bribes; we, therefore, shall stand, though the liberty of Greece has perished. All this we

continue to say, while we see an election carried against a majority of freemen, and an administration, that has prostrated the judiciary and the constitution, that has its hirelings and emissaries scattered over the face of the land, and that has unconstitutionally annexed to the United States an empire, as a fund for patronage, and in which executive despotism is established by law. We see ourselves in the full exercise of the forms of election, when the substance is gone. We have some members in congress with a faithful meanness to represent our servility, and others to represent our nullity in the union; but our vote and influence avail no more, than that of the Isle of Man in the politicks of Great Braitain. If, then, we have not survived our political liberty, we have lived long enough to see the pillars of its security crumble to powder. If the middle and Eastern states still retain any thing in the union worth possessing, we hold it by a precarious and degrading tenure; not as of right, but by sufferance; not as the guarded treasure of freemen, but as the pittance, which the disdain of conquerors has left to their captives.

While we look round with grief and terrour on so much of the work of destruction, as three years have accomplished, we resolve to hope and sleep in security for the future. We will not believe, that the actual prevalence of a faction is any thing worse, than an adverse accident, to which all human affairs are liable. Demagogues have taken advantage of our first slumbers, but we are awaking and shall burst their "Lilliputian ties;" and as we really do expect, that the jacobins will divide, and that *** and others will turn state's evidence to convict their accomplices, we resolve to indulge our hopes and our indolence together, and leave it to time, no matter what time, and truth, to do their slow but sure work, without our concurrence. We still cherish the theories that are dear to our vanity. We still expect, that men will act in their politicks, as if they had no passions, and will be most callous or superiour to their influence at the very moment, when the arts of tyrants or the progress of publick disorders have exalted them to fury. Then, yes, then, in that chosen hour, reason

will display her authority, because she will be free to combat errour. Her voice will awe tumult into silence: revolution will quench her powder when it is half exploded; the thunder will be checked in mid volley.

Such are the consolations that bedlam gives to philosophy, and that philosophy faithfully gives back to bedlam—and bedlam enjoys them. The Chronicle, with the fervour of scurrility and all the sincerity of ignorance, avers, that there is no danger—our affairs go on well; and Middlesex is comforted. *They* can see no danger: if Etna should blaze, it would not cure the moles of their blindness.

But all other men who have eyes are forced to confess, that the progress of our affairs is in conformity with the fixed laws of our nature, and the known course of republicks. Our wisdom made a government and committed it to our virtue to keep; but our passions have engrossed it, and they have armed our vices to maintain their usurpation.

What then are we to do? Are we to sit still, as heretofore, till we are overtaken by destruction, or shall we rouse now, late as it is, and shew by our effort against a jacobin faction, that, if we cannot escape, we will not deserve, our fate?

THE REPUBLICAN. N°. II.

WE justly consider the condition of civil liberty as the most exalted, to which any nation can aspire; but high as its rank is, and precious as are its prerogatives, it has not pleased God, in the order of his providence, to confer this pre-eminent blessing, except upon a very few, and those very small, spots of the universe. The rest sit in darkness, and as little desire the light of liberty, as they are fit to endure it.

We are ready to wonder, that the best gifts are the most sparingly bestowed, and rashly to conclude, that despotism is the decree of heaven, because by far the largest part of the world lies bound in its fetters. But, either on tracing the

course of events in history, or on examining the character and passions of man, we shall find, that the work of slavery is his own, and that he is not condemned to wear chains, till he has been his own artificer to forge them. We shall find, that society cannot subsist, and that the streets of Boston would be worse than the lion's den, unless the appetites and passions of the violent are made subject to an adequate control. How much control will be adequate to that end, is a problem of no easy solution beforehand, and of no sort of difficulty after some experience. For all who have any thing to defend, and all, indeed, who have nothing to ask protection for, but their lives, will desire that protection; and not only acquiesce, but rejoice in the progress of those slave-making intrigues and tumults, which, at length, assure to society its repose, though it sleeps in bondage. Thus it will happen, and, as it is the course of nature, it cannot be resisted, that there will soon or late be control and government enough.

It is, also, obvious, that there may be, and probably will be, the least control and the most liberty there, where the turbulent passions are the least excited, and where the old habits and sober reasons of the people are left free to govern them.

Hence it is undeniably plain, that the mock patriots, the opposers of Washington and the constitution, from 1788 to this day, who, under pretext of being the people's friends, have kept them in a state of continual jealousy, irritation, and discontent, have deceived the people, and perhaps themselves, in regard to the tendency of their principles and conduct; for, instead of lessening the pressure of government, and contracting the sphere of its powers, they have removed the field-marks that bounded its exercise, and left it arbitrary and without limits. The passions of the people have been kept in agitation, till the influence of truth, reason, and the excellent habits we derive from our ancestors is lost or greatly impaired; till it is plain, that those, whom manners and morals can no longer govern, must be governed by force; and that

force a dominant faction derives from the passions of its adherents: on that alone they rely.

TAKE one example, which will illustrate the case as well as a hundred: the British treaty was opposed by a faction, headed by six or eight mob leaders in our cities, and a rabble, whom the arts of these leaders had trained for their purpose. Could a feeble government, could mere truth and calm reason, pointing out the best publick interest, have carried that treaty through and effected its execution in good faith, had not the virtue and firmness of Washington supplied an almost superhuman energy to its powers at the moment? No treaty made by the government has ever proved more signally beneficial. The nature of the treaty, however, is not to the point of the present argument. Suppose a mob opposition had defeated it, and confusion, if not war, had ensued, the confusion that every society is fated to suffer, when, on a trial of strength, a faction in its bosom is found stronger than its government; on this supposition, and that the conquering faction had seized the reins of power, is it to be believed, that they would not instantly provide against a like opposition to their own treaties? Did they not so provide, and annex Louisiana, and squander millions in a week? Have we not seen in France, how early and how effectually the conqueror takes care to prevent another rival from playing the same game, by which he himself prevailed against his predecessor?

LET any man, who has any understanding, exercise it to see, that the American jacobin party, by rousing the popular passions, inevitably augments the powers of government, and contracts within narrower bounds, and on a less sound foundation, the privileges of the people.

FACTS, yes, facts that speak in terrour to the soul, confirm this speculative reasoning. What limits are there to the prerogatives of the present administration? and whose business is it, and in whose power does it lie, to keep them within those limits? Surely not in the senate; the small states are now in vassalage, and they obey the nod of Virginia. Not in the judiciary; that fortress, which the constitution had made too strong

for an assault, can now be reduced by famine. The constitution, alas! *that* sleeps with Washington, having no mourners but the virtuous, and no monument but history. Louisiana, in open and avowed defiance of the constitution, is by treaty to be added to the union: the bread of the children of the union is to be taken and given to the dogs.

JUDGE, then, good men and true, judge by the effects, whether the tendency of the intrigues of the party was to extend or contract the measure of popular liberty. Judge, whether the little finger of Jefferson is not thicker than the loins of Washington's administration; and, after you have judged, and felt the terrour that will be inspired by the result, then reflect, how little your efforts can avail to prevent the continuance, nay, the perpetuity of his power. Reflect, and be calm! Patience is the virtue of slaves, and almost the only one that will pass for merit with their masters.

A SKETCH

OF

THE CHARACTER OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

THE following sketch, written immediately after the death of the ever to be lamented Hamilton, was read to a select company of friends, and at their desire it first appeared in the Repertory, July, 1804.

IT is with really great men as with great literary works, the excellence of both is best tested by the extent and durableness of their impression. The publick has not suddenly, but after an experience of five and twenty years, taken that impression of the just celebrity of ALEXANDER HAMILTON, that nothing but his extraordinary intrinsick merit could have made, and still less, could have made so deep and maintained so long. In this case, it is safe and correct to judge by effects: we sometimes calculate the height of a mountain, by measuring the length of its shadow.

IT is not a party, for party distinctions, to the honour of our citizens be it said, are confounded by the event; it is a nation, that weeps for its bereavement. We weep, as the Romans did over the ashes of Germanicus. It is a thoughtful, foreboding sorrow, that takes possession of the heart, and sinks it with no counterfeited heaviness.

IT is here proper and not invidious to remark, that, as the emulation excited by conducting great affairs commonly trains and exhibits great talents, it is seldom the case, that the fairest and soundest judgment of a great man's merit is to be gained, exclusively, from his associates in counsel or in action. Persons of conspicuous merit themselves are, not unfrequently, bad judges and still worse witnesses on this point; often rivals, sometimes enemies; almost always unjust, and still oftener envious or cold. The opinions they give to the publick, as well as those they privately formed for themselves, are, of course, discoloured with the hue of their prejudices and resentments.

But the body of the people, who cannot feel a spirit of rivalship towards those, whom they see elevated by nature and education so far above their heads, are more equitable, and, supposing a competent time and opportunity for information on the subject, more intelligent judges. Even party rancour, eager to maim the living, scorns to strip the slain. The most hostile passions are soothed or baffled by the fall of their antagonist. Then, if not sooner, the very multitude will fairly decide on character, according to their experience of its impression; and as long as virtue, not unfrequently for a time obscured, is ever respectable when distinctly seen, they cannot withhold, and they will not stint their admiration.

If then the popular estimation is ever to be taken for the true one, the uncommonly profound publick sorrow for the death of Alexander Hamilton sufficiently explains and vindicates itself. He had not made himself dear to the passions of the multitude by condescending, in defiance of his honour and conscience, to become their instrument: he is not lamented, because a skilful flatterer is now mute for ever. It was by the practice of no art, by wearing no disguise; it was not by accident, or by the levity or profligacy of party, but in despite of its malignant misrepresentation; it was by bold and inflexible adherence to truth, by loving his country better than himself, preferring its interest to its favour, and serving it, when it was unwilling and unthankful, in a manner that no other person could, that he rose; and the *true* popularity, the homage that is paid to virtue, followed him. It was not in the power of party or envy to pull him down; but he rose with the refulgence of a star, till the very prejudice, that could not reach, was at length almost ready to adore him.

It is, indeed, no imagined wound that inflicts so keen an anguish. Since the news of his death, the novel and strange events of Europe have succeeded each other unregarded; the nation has been enchained to its subject, and broods over its grief, which is more deep than eloquent, which though dumb, can make itself felt without utterance, and which does not

merely pass, but, like an electrical shock, at the same instant smites and astonishes, as it passes from Georgia to Newhampshire.

THERE is a kind of force put upon our thoughts by this disaster, which detains and rivets them to a closer contemplation of those resplendent virtues, that are now lost, except to memory, and there they will dwell for ever.

THAT writer would deserve the fame of a publick benefactor, who could exhibit the character of HAMILTON, with the truth and force that all who intimately knew him conceived it: his example would then take the same ascendant, as his talents. The portrait alone, however exquisitely finished, could not inspire genius where it is not; but, if the world should again have possession of so rare a gift, it might awaken it where it sleeps, as by a spark from heaven's own altar; for, surely, if there is any thing like divinity in man, it is in his admiration of virtue.

BUT who alive can exhibit this portrait? If our age, on that supposition more fruitful than any other, had produced two HAMILTONS, one of them might then have depicted the other. To delineate genius one must feel its power: HAMILTON, and he alone, with all its inspirations, could have transfused its whole fervid soul into the picture, and swelled its lineaments into life. The writer's mind, expanding with his own peculiar enthusiasm, and glowing with kindred fires, would then have stretched to the dimensions of his subject.

SUCH is the infirmity of human nature, it is very difficult for a man, who is greatly the superiour of his associates, to preserve their friendship without abatement; yet, though he could not possibly conceal his superiority, he was so little inclined to display it, he was so much at ease in its possession, that no jealousy or envy chilled his bosom, when his friends obtained praise. He was, indeed, so entirely the friend of his friends, so magnanimous, so superiour, or, more properly, so insensible to all exclusive selfishness of spirit, so frank, so ardent, yet so little overbearing, so much trusted, admired, beloved, almost adored, that his power over their affections was entire, and

lasted through his life. We do not believe, that he left any worthy man his foe, who had ever been his friend.

Men of the most elevated minds have not always the readiest discernment of character. Perhaps he was sometimes too sudden and too lavish in bestowing his confidence: his manly spirit, disdaining artifice, suspected none. But, while the power of his friends over him seemed to have no limits, and really had none, in respect to those things which were of a nature to be yielded, no man, not the Roman Cato himself, was more inflexible on every point that touched, or only seemed to touch, integrity and honour. With him, it was not enough to be unsuspected; his bosom would have glowed, like a furnace, at its own whispers of reproach. Mere purity would have seemed to him below praise; and such were his habits, and such his nature, that the pecuniary temptations, which many others can only with great exertion and self-denial resist, had no attractions for him. He was very far from obstinate; yet, as his friends assailed his opinions with less profound thought, than he had devoted to them, they were seldom shaken by discussion. He defended them, however, with as much mildness as force, and evinced, that, if he did not yield, it was not for want of gentleness or modesty.

The tears that flow on this fond recital, will never dry up. My heart, penetrated with the remembrance of the man, grows liquid as I write, and I could pour it out like water. I could weep too for my country, which, mournful as it is, does not know the half of its loss. It deeply laments, when it turns its eyes back, and sees what Hamilton *was*; but my soul stiffens with despair, when I think what Hamilton *would have been*.

His social affections and his private virtues are not, however, so properly the object of publick attention, as the conspicuous and commanding qualities that gave him his fame and influence in the world. It is not as Apollo, enchanting the shepherds with his lyre, that we deplore him; it is as Hercules, treacherously slain in the midst of his unfinished labours, leaving the world overrun with monsters.

His early life we pass over ; though his heroick spirit, in the army, has furnished a theme, that is dear to patriotism, and will be sacred to glory.

In all the different stations, in which a life of active usefulness has placed him, we find him not more remarkably distinguished by the extent, than by the variety and versatility of his talents. In every place he made it apparent, that no other man could have filled it so well ; and in times of critical importance, in which alone he desired employment, his services were justly deemed absolutely indispensable. As secretary of the treasury, his was the powerful spirit that presided over the chaos :

> Confusion heard his voice, and wild uproar
> Stood ruled.....

Indeed, in organizing the federal government in 1789, every man, of either sense or candour, will allow, the difficulty seemed greater than the first-rate abilities could surmount. The event has shewn, that his abilities were greater than those difficulties. He surmounted them—and Washington's administration was the most wise and beneficent, the most prosperous, and ought to be the most popular, that ever was intrusted with the affairs of a nation. Great as was Washington's merit, much of it in plan, much in execution, will of course devolve upon his minister.

As a lawyer, his comprehensive genius reached the principles of his profession : he compassed its extent, he fathomed its profound, perhaps, even more familiarly and easily, than the ordinary rules of its practice. With most men law is a trade ; with him it was a science.

As a statesman, he was not more distinguished by the great extent of his views, than by the caution with which he provided against impediments, and the watchfulness of his care over right and the liberty of the subject. In none of the many revenue bills, which he framed, though committees reported them, is there to be found a single clause that savours of despotick power ; not one that the sagest champions of law and liberty would, on that ground, hesitate to approve and adopt.

It is rare, that a man, who owes so much to nature, descends to seek more from industry ; but he seemed to depend on industry, as if nature had done nothing for him. His habits of investigation were very remarkable ; his mind seemed to cling to his subject, till he had exhausted it. Hence the uncommon superiority of his reasoning powers, a superiority, that seemed to be augmented from every source, and to be fortified by every auxiliary, learning, taste, wit, imagination, and eloquence. These were embellished and enforced by his temper and manners, by his fame and his virtues. It is difficult, in the midst of such various excellence, to say, in what particular the effect of his greatness was most manifest. No man more promptly discerned truth ; no man more clearly displayed it : it was not merely made visible—it seemed to come bright with illumination from his lips. But prompt and clear as he was, fervid as Demosthenes, like Cicero, full of resource, he was not less remarkable for the copiousness and completeness of his argument, that left little for cavil, and nothing for doubt. Some men take their strongest argument as a weapon, and use no other ; but he left nothing to be inquired for more—nothing to be answered. He not only disarmed his adversaries of their pretexts and objections, but he stripped them of all excuse for having urged them ; he confounded and subdued, as well as convinced. He indemnified them, however, by making his discussion a complete map of his subject ; so that his opponents might, indeed, feel ashamed of their mistakes, but they could not repeat them. In fact, it was no common effort that could preserve a really able antagonist from becoming his convert ; for the truth, which his researches so distinctly presented to the understanding of others, was rendered almost irresistibly commanding and impressive by the love and reverence, which, it was ever apparent, he profoundly cherished for it in his own. While patriotism glowed in his heart, wisdom blended in his speech her authority with her charms.

Such, also, is the character of his writings. Judiciously collected, they will be a publick treasure.

No man ever more disdained duplicity, or carried *frankness* further than he. This gave to his political opponents some temporary advantages, and currency to some popular prejudices, which he would have *lived* down, if his death had not prematurely dispelled them. He knew, that factions have ever in the end prevailed in free states; and, as he saw no security (and who living can see any adequate?) against the destruction of that liberty which he loved, and for which he was ever ready to devote his life, he spoke at all times according to his anxious forebodings; and his enemies interpreted all that he said according to the supposed interest of their party.

But he ever extorted confidence, even when he most provoked opposition. It was impossible to deny, that he was a patriot, and such a patriot, as, seeking neither popularity nor office, without artifice, without meanness, the best Romans in their best days would have admitted to citizenship and to the consulate. Virtue, so rare, so pure, so bold, by its very purity and excellence, inspired suspicion, as a prodigy. His enemies judged of him by themselves: so splendid and arduous were his services, they could not find it in *their* hearts to believe, that they were disinterested.

Unparalleled as they were, they were, nevertheless, no otherwise requited, than by the applause of all good men, and by his own enjoyment of the spectacle of that national prosperity and honour, which was the effect of them. After facing calumny, and triumphantly surmounting an unrelenting persecution, he retired from office, with clean, though empty hands, as rich as reputation and an unblemished integrity could make him.

Some have plausibly, though erroneously, inferred from the great extent of his abilities, that his ambition was inordinate. This is a mistake. Such men, as have a painful consciousness, that their stations happen to be far more exalted than their talents, are generally the most ambitious. Hamilton, on the contrary, though he had many competitors, had no rivals; for he did not thirst for power, nor would he, as it was well known, descend to office. Of course, he suffered no pain

from envy, when bad men rose, though he felt anxiety for the publick. He was perfectly content and at ease, in private life. Of what was he ambitious? Not of wealth—no man held it cheaper. Was it of popularity? That weed of the dunghill, he knew, when rankest, was nearest to withering. There is no doubt, that he desired glory, which to most men is too inaccessible to be an object of desire; but, feeling his own force, and that he was tall enough to reach the top of Pindus or of Helicon, he longed to deck his brow with the wreath of immortality. A vulgar ambition could as little comprehend, as satisfy, his views: he thirsted only for that fame, which virtue would not blush to confer, nor time to convey to the end of his course.

The only ordinary distinction, to which, we confess, he did aspire, was military; and for that, in the event of a foreign war, he would have been solicitous. He undoubtedly discovered the predominance of a soldier's feelings; and all that is honour, in the character of a soldier, was at home in his heart. His early education was in the camp; there the first fervours of his genius were poured forth, and his earliest and most cordial friendships formed; there he became enamoured of glory, and was admitted to her embrace.

Those who knew him best, and especially in the army, will believe, that, if occasions had called him forth, he was qualified, beyond any man of the age, to display the talents of a great general.

It may be very long, before our country will want such military talents; it will probably be much longer, before it will again possess them.

Alas! the great man who was, at all times, so much the ornament of our country, and so exclusively fitted, in its extremity, to be its champion, is withdrawn to a purer and more tranquil region. We are left to endless labours and unavailing regrets.

> Such honours Ilion to her hero paid,
> And peaceful slept the mighty Hector's shade.

THE most substantial glory of a country, is in its virtuous great men: its prosperity will depend on its docility to learn from their example. That nation is fated to ignominy and servitude, for which such men have lived in vain. Power may be seized by a nation, that is yet barbarous; and wealth may be enjoyed by one, that it finds, or renders sordid: the one is the gift and the sport of accident, and the other is the sport of power. Both are mutable, and have passed away without leaving behind them any other memorial than ruins that offend taste, and traditions that baffle conjecture. But the glory of Greece is imperishable, or will last as long as learning itself, which is its monument: it strikes an everlasting root, and bears perennial blossoms on its grave. The name of HAMILTON would have honoured Greece, in the age of Aristides. May heaven, the guardian of our liberty, grant, that our country may be fruitful of HAMILTONS, and faithful to their glory.

REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR IN EUROPE.

First published in the Repertory, May, 1805.

TWELVE years ago, the war that was kindled by the French revolution was represented to be exclusively worthy of the attention of Americans. While the French were pulling down their government, nothing seemed so fine as their very worst conduct, to the party who were leagued together to pull down our own. They called our eyes to the banks of the Rhine, where the battles of liberty, as they were fools enough to say, were fighting; and we roasted oxen for joy, because Pichegru took Amsterdam, and made the Dutch as free as the West-India negroes.

THIS sort of noise is a good deal hushed, for two reasons: one is, the jacobins have got their object, and our government is *down;* the other is, the mask of French hypocrisy has dropped off, or is so torn in their scuffles, that we can plainly see the knaves' faces of their liberty-loving demagogues. French examples are not now quoted, *now*, when they are most instructive, because they really, in some degree, alarm and deter the dupes whom they lead: asses trot the better in dangerous roads, for wearing their blinders. Hence it is, that our lords and masters of Virginia affect to dislike all discussions of the political probabilities of the war, and to consider our curiosity as useless and badly directed. Our lazy masters are, in fact, so engrossed with the care of governing us for their own exclusive benefit, that they have not much relish for any other reflections; and, besides all other considerations, Mr. Jefferson and his cabinet have a mortal dread of the power of Buonaparte, which has not been in the least abated by their experienced necessity, since the purchase of Louisiana, to court and flatter him. They are quaking with fear that he will require from them more assistance, than they dare either to give or refuse him. They

have yielded the point with regard to the trade with St. Domingo, with as much poverty of spirit as might be expected; and our seamen will be whipped and buried in dungeons, or tucked up at the yard arm, as the *great nation* may by its emperour think fit to decree. The trade is not denied to be lawful, yet its interdiction is better, no doubt our patriots will say, than a war.

We have seen, too, how quarrelsome an act Mr. *** was disposed to get passed for the protection of *our* seamen, that is of British seamen, who were to be forcibly protected, when they had deserted to our vessels.

In all this, and in every thing else, the power of Buonaparte crosses the Atlantick. It is childish to inquire, what harm do we suffer by his making himself king of Italy? We answer, by his power he makes himself the king of terrours to Mr. Jefferson; and if we are not embroiled with England to please him, it is because, afraid as our brave rulers are of Buonaparte, they are still more afraid of getting into a war with England, that would instantly smash their popularity to atoms.

Let no person that remembers Mr. Madison's famous commercial resolutions, in which he proposed to fight for France by a war of regulations, let no such person deny the effective and dangerous influence of the preponderant power of France on the peace and safety, the honour, and, let us add, the honesty of our government. For, be it remembered also, the ever to be abhorred project of confiscating British debts grew out of the same passion for France and hostility to England.

Nor is the loss of that silly fondness a security for spirited and independent counsels in America. Our rulers are of a sort and character to act from their fears; and their fear is a much more steady cause of action than their love. Of course, we are to expect, that the vast power of France will not cease to manifest itself, to the injury of our trade, to the oppression of our brave seamen, and to the infinite disgrace of the government that abandons them.

Let us then dare to survey this huge Colossus, about whose legs we have the honour to creep.

There was a time, when the people of France were really infatuated with the notion of republican liberty. They say themselves, it was a delusion, and has passed away. But it lasted long enough to break down and destroy every thing in France that was not military, and by its contagion in Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, to enfeeble and divide all the force that ought to have resisted France. The conquests of France have flattered the national vanity, and, by accumulating the spoils of so many nations, have, in part, filled up the void that was made by the destruction of commercial and manufacturing capital. Instead of the opulence of the crowded mart or busy workshop, the country was filled like the camp of Attila or Tamerlane, with spoils and trophies. The naval superiority of the British, by destroying their trade, has contributed to decide and prolong this exclusively military character of the French.

We are, then, to view France as a political phenomenon, not less tremendous by her having renounced every trade but that of a conqueror, than by her colossal size. Like the old Romans, and, indeed, like every other nation intoxicated with a passion for conquest, the French are completely military, and their ardour is a kind of fanaticism, such as made the successors of Mahomet the monarchs of the East.

The Romans, in like manner, contended, for almost five centuries, with the petty nations of Italy, their equals in valour, their inferiours only in discipline. In this hardy school, they were trained for conquest. But, after they had gained the dominion of Italy, they never again contended with their equals. The Carthaginians, though sustained for sixteen years by the transcendent genius of Hannibal, were almost equally enfeebled by their spirit of commerce and their spirit of faction. The Macedonians, like the modern Prussians, had a fine army, a full treasury, and a state of but moderate extent, hemmed in by jealous, hostile neighbours. In conquering them and the rest of Greece, the Romans

found the Ætolians and some other states ready to accept chains, and to impose them on their countrymen. The light of Greece, the most refulgent the world ever saw, was quenched with its liberty. Egypt was so sunk in vice, that it fell without a contest. Antiochus the great, king of Syria, had an infinite number of men, but few soldiers. The glory and the spoils of his conquest were greater than its difficulty. Gaul, the modern France, was filled with barbarians, who had not the sense nor perhaps the power to unite against Cesar, and they fell in succession. Spain resisted longer and more desperately, but not as a nation combined to resist an invader, but by endless partial insurrections to throw off its chains.

The power of Mithridates was too recently formed, and composed of states too near barbarism, to contend with Rome; yet for many years he proved her most dreaded foe.

Thus it was, that the chief difficulties in conquering the old world were really surmounted, before Rome was known to have formed the design, or, perhaps, was conscious she had it to undertake.

France, in like manner, has been for many centuries exercised in arms. She has had to contend with all her neighbours, her equals in valour, her inferiours in military institutions and spirit. Thus, a nation has been educated for the conquest of the world. Spain, once her superiour, is now her vassal. Austria, her rival, is chained to a prison floor by her hatred of Prussia, her dread of France, and, perhaps, her still greater dread of Russia. Fear and policy will both make her subservient to Buonaparte, unless he should prefer the active assistance of Prussia to that of Austria. He seems to have the best grounds to expect, that, if Russia should be his enemy, he will have one of the other two for an ally. On this supposition, we can scarcely conceive of an efficient alliance against France on the continent of Europe. While its numerous states were independent, and the safety of each was the care of all, the ambition of France was more troublesome than formidable. In this school of policy and arms, this gymnasium, in which all strenuously contended and in

turns excelled, France, like a prize-fighter, acquired the hardiness, the dexterity, and the force, that have made her the victor. The revolution has suddenly opened her eyes to contemplate her situation, and all her ardour is awakened by perceiving, that, already, more than half her ambitious work is done. Less fighting, less hazard, than her rivalships with the house of Austria have cost the Bourbons, will make her mistress of Europe from the Baltick to the Hellespont. With sixty millions of people in France and its dependencies, half the population of the Roman empire under Trajan, she has twice the force. The Russians, like the ancient Parthians, are her only enemies on land, and they are too distant to be formidable.

The other states of Europe, England excepted, are more than half subdued by their divisions and their fears.

It is absurd to suppose, that this power, so tremendous to every lover of his country, will be inert for want of pecuniary resources. The Dutch and Italians sow, and the French reap. *Sic vos non vobis fertis aratra boves.* Old Rome, after the conquest of Macedonia, subsisted for more than a hundred years by tributes without taxes. Mahomet, Genghis Khan, and Tamerlane did not stop to ask their collectors of taxes, whether they should conquer Asia.

Nor will the people of France grow weary or ashamed of their yoke, and rise to throw it off: they are nothing, the army is every thing. Besides, they are really proud of the glory of their master, and from their very souls rejoice in the distinction of their chains.

Can it be, some will say, that the man, who basely fled from his brave comrades in Egypt, the man red with assassination at Joppa, the obscure Corsican, an emperour only by his crimes, will be preferred to the Bourbons? Yes; the army prefers him. The revolution, like a whirlwind has swept all the ncient hierarchy, nobility, and land proprietors away, and the new race have an interest to maintain the new establishments of the usurpation. Did the populace of Rome ever shift their government, because an usurper had obtained

the people by money or by blood ? No ; as soon as men perceive, that there is a force superiour to their own, they desist from making any efforts against it : the proud Romans were as passive in the yoke, as the Dutch are now.

The destinies of the civilized world, then, obviously depend on their ability to resist this new Roman domination. Russia has no fears of being subjugated, and, for that very reason, will act with less zeal and less faithfulness in what ought to be the common cause against France. She will pursue the projects of her ambition, which seek aggrandizement in the South of Europe, and as a naval power. Hence, it is to be feared, her coalition with England will not be cordial enough to be successful : and the only sort of success that is of any moment in this discussion, is the reduction of the power of France. Russia aspires to an influence in the German empire, which cannot fail to alarm and disgust both Prussia and Austria ; and hence it was, that she lately interfered in the affair of the German indemnities. She also seeks a footing in the Mediterranean, preparatory to her designs against the Turks. It was on this account she wished to occupy Malta, and that she now fills Corfu with her troops. These are selfish and dangerous schemes, which England cannot second or approve.

If, nevertheless, Russia should obtain of Prussia and Austria, that the one should be neutral, and the other an associate against France, a continental war is to be expected. In case English money and an English army should aid the allies, Buonaparte would find his supremacy again in hazard.

But England, the great adversary of France, cannot become a military nation, in the sense that the French are, nor, it is to be feared, in the degree that the crisis absolutely requires she should. Her commerce binds her in golden fetters. An artisan or a farmer is worth, probably, one hundred pounds sterling to the nation. To make such men soldiers, great bounties must be paid, and great sacrifices suffered. To feed and provide an English army, is also very expensive ; want, and military fanaticism crowd the ranks

of Buonaparte, and their enemies or their allies provide their subsistence. Unfortunately too, Mr. Pitt yielded to the pressure of the moment, and accepted the delusive services of his half million of volunteers. It is impossible he should think these men of buckram fit to withstand the men of steel, if they should invade the island.

In times of great danger, popular notions are often worse than frivolous. The volunteer force is factious, expensive, and useless, as every soldier knows. But it is worse. It has made the nation unmanageable, puffed them up with a vain dependence on the shew of force, a shew as empty as that of the army of Crœsus, and has made their rulers afraid to impose, and the people unwilling to bear, the necessary burdens of real soldiership. The strength of a modern state at war consists in its *soldiers*, not in the trappings of the peaceable apprentices, who are arrayed in scarlet to act the comedy of an army. England consumes its men and means to act this comedy, and is thus chained down to the expense and the despair of a defensive system.

Had she an efficient disposeable army of one hundred thousand men, one third of whom could be employed in expeditions, or in co-operation with continental allies, the cause of Europe and of the civilized world would not be quite desperate. If the enslaved nations would exert half as much force to recover their liberty, as the French will make them employ to subjugate the yet unconquered states, the contest against France might be renewed with hopes of advantage.

Let not the men in power in America deceive themselves. If Buonaparte prevails, they will be his vassals, even more signally than they are at present. The trade of this country has already twice been made the spoil of France. The insolent aggressor is obstructed by the British navy, and not by his friendship for us, or respect for our rights, from repeating and extending his rapacity and violence. Least of all is he restrained by any opinion of the force of our nation, or the spirit of our government.

CHARACTER OF BRUTUS.

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BRUTUS killed his benefactor and friend, Cesar, because Cesar had usurped the sovereign power. Therefore, Brutus was a patriot, whose character is to be admired, and whose example should be imitated, as long as republican liberty shall have a friend or an enemy in the world.

THIS short argument seems to have, hitherto, vindicated the fame of Brutus from reproach and even from scrutiny; yet, perhaps, no character has been more over-rated, and no example worse applied. He was, no doubt, an excellent scholar and a complete master, as well as faithful votary of philosophy; but, in action, the impetuous Cassius greatly excelled him. Cassius alone of all the conspirators acted with promptness and energy in providing for the war, which, he foresaw, the death of Cesar would kindle; Brutus spent his time in indolence and repining, the dupe of Anthony's arts, or of his own false estimate of Roman spirit and virtue. The people had lost a kind master, and they lamented him. Brutus summoned them to make efforts and sacrifices, and they viewed his cause with apathy, his crime with abhorrence.

BEFORE the decisive battle of Philippi, Brutus seems, after the death of Cassius, to have sunk under the weight of the sole command. He still had many able officers left, and among them Messala, one of the first men of that age, so fruitful of great men; but Brutus no longer maintained that ascendant over his army, which talents of the first order maintain every where, and most signally in the camp and field of battle. It is fairly, then, to be presumed, that his troops had discovered, that Brutus, whom they loved and esteemed, was destitute of those talents; for he was soon obliged by their clamours, much against his judgment, and against all prudence and good sense, to give battle. Thus ended the life of Brutus and the existence of the republick.

Whatever doubt there may be of the political and military capacity of Brutus, there is none concerning his virtue: his principles of action were the noblest that ancient philosophy had taught, and his actions were conformed to his principles. Nevertheless, our admiration of the man ought not to blind our judgment of the deed, which, though it was the blemish of his virtue, has shed an unfading splendour on his name.

For, though the multitude to the end of time will be open to flattery, and will joyfully assist their flatterers to become their tyrants, yet they will never cease to hate tyrants and tyranny with equal sincerity and vehemence. Hence it is, that the memory of Brutus, who slew a tyrant, is consecrated as the champion and martyr of liberty, and will flourish and look green in declamation, as long as the people are prone to believe, that those are their best friends, who have proved themselves the greatest enemies of their enemies.

Ask any one man of morals, whether he approves of assassination; he will answer, no. Would you kill your friend and benefactor? No. The question is a horrible insult. Would you practise hypocrisy and smile in his face, while your conspiracy is ripening, to gain his confidence and to lull him into security, in order to take away his life? Every honest man, on the bare suggestion, feels his blood thicken and stagnate at his heart. Yet in this picture we see Brutus. It would, perhaps, be scarcely just to hold him up to abhorrence; it is, certainly, monstrous and absurd to exhibit his conduct to admiration.

He did not strike the tyrant from hatred or ambition: his motives are admitted to be good; but was not the action, nevertheless, bad?

To kill a tyrant, is as much murder, as to kill any other man. Besides, Brutus, to extenuate the crime, could have had no *rational* hope of putting an end to the tyranny: he had foreseen and provided nothing to realize it. The conspirators relied, foolishly enough, on the love of the multitude for liberty—they loved their safety, their ease, their sports, and their demagogue favourites a great deal better. They quietly looked on, as spectators, and left it to the legions of Anthony, and

Octavius, and to those of Syria, Macedonia, and Greece, to decide, in the field of Philippi, whether there should be a republick or not. It was, accordingly, decided in favour of an emperour; and the people sincerely rejoiced in the political calm, that restored the games of the circus, and the plenty of bread.

Those, who cannot bring their judgments to condemn the killing of a tyrant, must nevertheless agree that the blood of Cesar was unprofitably shed. Liberty gained nothing by it, and humanity lost a great deal; for it cost eighteen years of agitation and civil war, before the ambition of the military and popular chieftains had expended its means, and the power was concentred in one man's hands.

Shall we be told, the example of Brutus is a good one, because it will never cease to animate the race of tyrant-killers. But will the *fancied usefulness* of assassination overcome our instinctive sense of its horrour? Is it to become a part of our political morals, that the chief of a state is to be stabbed or poisoned, whenever a fanatick, a malecontent, or a reformer shall rise up and call him a tyrant? Then there would be as little calm in despotism as in liberty.

But when has it happened, that the death of a usurper has restored to the publick liberty its departed life? Every successful usurpation creates many competitors for power, and they successively fall in the struggle. In all this agitation, liberty is without friends, without resources, and without hope. Blood enough, and the blood of tyrants too, was shed between the time of the wars of Marius and the death of Anthony, a period of about sixty years, to turn a common grist-mill; yet the cause of the publick liberty continually grew more and more desperate. It is not by destroying tyrants, that we are to extinguish tyranny: nature is not thus to be exhausted of her power to produce them. The soil of a republick sprouts with the rankest fertility: it has been sown with dragon's teeth. To lessen the hopes of usurping demagogues, we must enlighten, animate, and combine the spirit of freemen; we must fortify and guard the constitutional ramparts about

liberty. When its friends become indolent or disheartened, it is no longer of any importance how long-lived are its enemies: they will prove immortal.

Nor will it avail to say, that the famous deed of Brutus will for ever check the audacity of tyrants. Of all passions fear is the most cruel. If new tyrants dread other Bruti, they will more naturally sooth their jealousy by persecutions, than by the practice of clemency or justice. They will say, the clemency of Cesar proved fatal to him. They will augment their force and multiply their precautions; and their habitual dread will degenerate into habitual cruelty.

Have we not then a right to conclude, that the character of Brutus is greatly over-rated, and the fashionable approbation of his example horribly corrupting and pernicious?

ON THE PROSPECT
OF
A NEW COALITION AGAINST FRANCE.

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It appears probable, that a new coalition is forming against France, and that Russia, Sweden, and Austria are in alliance with England. We are told, that a great body of Russians is moving through Poland, and will be ready to reinforce the Austrians in season to repel any attack, that the French usurper, who is accustomed to strike before he threatens, may be expected to make upon the latter. The struggle for the recovery of Italy from the French is to be renewed ; and, instead of invading England, Buonaparte will have to contend once more for his crown. The neutrality, if not the co-operation of Prussia and Denmark, is foretold.

It is natural, that the first indications of a powerful confederacy against France should be interpreted to promise every thing to Englishmen, weary of the known weight, and dejected by the prospect of the unknown length, of the contest. Coalitions ever promise much in their inception ; they usually disappoint all in their progress. A single power has generally proved an over-match for their arms. The honey-moon may, *possibly*, last, till the allies have taken the field and fought the first battle ; but the good or bad fortune of that battle is almost sure to dissolve the ties of their mutual confidence, if not the bands of that alliance. If defeated, they throw the blame on one another ; if victorious, they are made envious and jealous by the allotment of the spoil.

No doubt, Austria will be hearty in the cause, for she will fight for her life ; but her very fears may be skilfully used by Buonaparte to detach her from the confederacy. He may offer her some Turkish provinces ; he may yield other points of real

magnitude, that will give her a temporary security, or the shew of it, which she may deem preferable to a more hazardous obstinacy in the contest.

This Austria may deem herself almost compelled to prefer, by an early discovery of the tardiness of the disposition of the Russian cabinet, and, perhaps, still more emphatically, by the detection of its immeasurable ambition.

Russia has, probably, no fears of the French, and can have no hopes of aggrandizement by wresting any thing from them. Russia will enter the lists, therefore, with very different views, and infinitely less ardour than Austria: she must engage in the war from calculation. It may offend her pride, that the French emperour plays the first part in Europe; she may dread a great loss of consideration and political influence, unless she contends with him; but her means for a long war are not considerable. It may be said, that England is rich, and will supply the primary means. Large subsidies will, no doubt, invigorate and hasten the military operations of this power; it is, nevertheless, a great mistake, to suppose, that a prodigious expense will not be left, after all the English guineas are counted in St. Petersburg, to be defrayed by the Russian government. These are reasons, therefore, for a natural apprehension, that the efforts of the Russians will be made upon a less scale, and with less energy, and continued for a much shorter time, than any man will prescribe for effecting the only rational object of a continental war, a reduction of the colossal power of France. All independent nations must quake within sight and almost within touch of their fetters, till this is done.

And, to do it *surely*, more than one campaign is necessary. France will assuredly set her foot on the world's neck, if the force and the spirit do not exist somewhere, to face her in arms with a steadiness equal to her own ambition. England alone has that force and spirit; a confederacy is a rope of sand, and will break to pieces, or, at least, manifest its total inefficiency, in a year. But, as soon as the English nation can be made to view the contest in its true light, and, what is ten times as much to the purpose, to *feel* it, as they see it, they

will boldly rely on themselves, and cautiously ask or take assistance from their allies. For these allies, the Russians especially, may claim the partition of Turkey, in recompense of a longer perseverance. A dismembering ambition would quench all hope of tranquillity in Europe. It would also inevitably dissolve any coalition that could be formed. Neither Austria nor England would assent, much less assist, to confer universal empire on Russia.

France has had time to consolidate her new empire. All that policy and violence can do, has been done, and all that arms can do, will be done to maintain her acquisitions. To maintain them, is, probably, as much a national cause with the French, as it was with the Romans, to keep Hannibal out of Rome, after the battle of Cannæ. French vanity will not, therefore, be subdued, it will be irritated and roused by national losses and by the disgrace of their arms. Buonaparte's own vanity, and that of his nation, would probably require, that England should be invaded, if the ripening of the expected coalition should not furnish, perhaps, the occasion, and, certainly, the excuse for the abandonment of that extravagant project. In this view of the matter, the coalition will prevent more good, than we can imagine it will ever achieve; for of all the possibilities of a *speedy* remedy of the present enormous evils of Europe, by the reduction of the preponderant power of France, the only one that holds out any rational promise, is that of the *invasion*. Two hundred thousand men landed in England, and the winners of the first three or four battles, would certainly fall at last, and involve the imperial usurper in their fall. His boasted glory would sink even faster than his power. The enslaved nations would then make haste to break their chains.

But supposing no invasion, which, in the event of a new coalition, is no longer to be supposed, it then becomes impossible even to conceive of any remedy, but a late and exceedingly gradual one.

To *fight down* gigantick France to her former size, so that other nations may again breathe in safety and independence,

can scarcely take less than half a century of prosperous warfare. These mushroom products of accident, money, or intrigue, these brittle, ephemeral coalitions are quite inadequate to the end. While they last, they will cherish false hopes; and when they fail, they will engender groundless fears; and for the next seven years may prevent the discovery, and delay the resort to the only effective resources of safety. For England alone, we repeat it, is pledged, is pinned, and nailed down to the combat. To sit and take blows is hard, but she still has the privilege, the precious, glorious privilege the Dutch, Swiss, and Italians have lost, *of returning them.* Every war brings its burdens and losses, but this war brings its terrours too, for it hazards, and will decide upon her life and honour. The decision cannot be evaded, the contest cannot even be intermitted, without her ruin. By eighteen months of treacherous peace, she suffered a greater reduction of comparative strength, than by eight years of war. Her warlike efforts for this whole century would not impoverish her; a delusive calm, called peace, for three years, would put an end to her efforts for ever. She has men, she has courage, she has all the means of self-defence; she wants only that overpowering impression upon her people, that time will make, though it is not yet made, to have the command of those means. She must rouse, as Carthage did in the third Punick war, but not so late. Her Foxes and her Burdetts will be silent, when the very rabble are convinced, that England cannot exist at all, unless the power of France be reduced; that, as long as she contends for the reduction of that power, she enjoys both existence and glory. She is, therefore, to choose war, not as a state preferable to peace, but preferable to the ignominy of wearing French chains. When these ideas, unfortunately so well vouched by her situation, are admitted by all men in the nation, (and the time is coming, when they will be irresistible) every thing in England will become a weapon of war, and every man a soldier or sailor to wield it. The minister will have reason to rely on the abundance of resources, and, what is more to the purpose of the war, on the perseverance and

patience of the publick. English spirit, thus roused, might laugh at mercenary coalitions and French menaces. France can have no commerce; and a nation of soldiers must thrive by spoil, and not by manufactures. If, to get fresh spoil, they enlarge the circle of their depredations, they rouse new enemies, and create more zealous coalitions than English guineas can buy.

These opinions will, no doubt, seem extravagant to many persons; but the evil of French domination is now of many years standing: it is not very rational to suppose, that a battle or a campaign is to cure it. There are many evils, which attend human life through the entire course of it. Perhaps it is made, in wisdom, and in mercy too, by the great Ruler of the universe, the condition of an Englishman's life, that he shall spend the whole of it in fighting the French; and if his sons and his grandsons should think liberty and independence intolerable on these terms, let them lie down in the dust, in the peace of slavery, and try to forget their honours and their ancestors.

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THE COMBINED POWERS AND FRANCE.

First published in the Repertory, December, 1805.

THE power of France is so tremendously preponderant, that every friend to the liberty and independence of nations must wish too see it reduced. If the people of the United States deserve one half the praise they take to themselves for good sense, such must be their wish. Men's heads and hearts must be indeed strangely perverted, if they could have a speculative liking to behold one great tyrant set up over all other nations. To put it to the test, let them ask themselves, how they would incline, if the question now was, to set up a domestick tyrant over our own. Every lover of liberty and independence must, therefore, of necessity, be the enemy, as far as wishing goes, of the French arms in the present great contest. He will anxiously inquire, is the new coalition likely to reduce the French power?

WHEN he reads of three hundred thousand Austrians, two hundred thousand Russians, and perhaps fifty thousand Hessians assembling and marching against Buonaparte, he will be ready to exclaim, France cannot withstand such a force. For the first time, the odds of numbers is against her. To this array of armies we add the Swedes, the English, who are embarking, it is said, fifty thousand, the Austrians and Hungarians, who may yet rise en masse to reinforce their emperour, and the immense body of Russians, who are kept ready to enter Germany and Italy. We very soon count up a million of men *on paper*, and we feel the inspirations of the English printers' valour, who, already, consider Buonaparte as dethroned.

MEN'S wishes are great deceivers. France contains more millions of men, than Buonaparte can ever think fit to array in arms, and he can array as many of them as he may want; and as he allows no trade, commerce, or profession, to impede,

or for one hour to delay his requisitions ; as France is nothing but military, and every man a soldier, whenever Buonaparte has occasion to call and make him such, it is the easiest thing in the world, for the French to outnumber their enemies in the field. Add to this, France is as near to Germany, as the greater part of the subjects of Austria, and more Germans will assist the French armies, than the armies of Austria. If distance only be considered, more Frenchmen can be brought to act in the field, than Austrians, Swedes, or Russians.

Another consideration, of no little moment, is, that France is surrounded by states newly conquered from her enemies, whom she can squeeze, and even crush, without any danger of resistance. The weight of the war may be thrown upon the German circles on the left bank of the Rhine, newly annexed to France, upon Hanover and the German *neutral* electorates, upon Spain, Holland, Portugal, and Italy. It will be asked, will not this mode of overburdening the people, who are told of their honour and happiness in being annexed to France, render the French odious, unpopular, and weak in those countries? The answer is, the French people will see, that their own burdens are the lighter for their excessive weight on those wretched vassals. In the war, that ended in 1763, the great king of Prussia exacted every thing from conquered Saxony: he would not spare his enemies, because he wished to spare his subjects. In like manner, the French will use the blood, and sinews, and marrow of the Dutch, Hanoverians, and Italians, as if they were oxen; nor will they provoke resistance from those wretches, for two reasons; they will be watchfully kept down by French soldiers; and, again be it noted well, the French have not conquered any country, without raising to power the base and desperately wicked among the conquered people, who, of course, are interested and disposed to keep their fellow countrymen under the yoke of servitude.

Thus, over and above the gigantick force of France itself, it is evident, the French can command prodigious resources of men, money, and every article of use in war, from the late sub-

jects of her enemies. She no sooner overpowers one enemy, than she uses and consumes his force in conquering another.

If we consider the vast extent and unexhausted fertility of the French territory, including the dependencies of France, we cannot doubt, that means enough of every sort exist; and, moreover, we can doubt as little, that the government is the most formidable despotism existing on the face of the earth, and can draw forth those means. Of men and warlike resources, then, France has enough.

It is, perhaps, of the nature of despotism, to contract early infirmities. It is a giant, whose first energies are augmented, yet wasted by frenzy. It is a torrent from the hills, that nothing can resist; yet it soon scoops for itself a channel, wide enough, indeed, to display its ravages, but deep enough to confine them. A tyrant cannot reign and oppress by his single force; he must really interest, and interest prodigiously, a sufficient number of subordinate tyrants in the duration of his power. As he will select these, because he knows them to possess an extraordinary share of ability to serve him, these first appointments will give all imaginable efficacy to his authority. In reward for serving him, he must allow them to serve themselves; he must wink at their abuses and exactions. But after the lapse of one generation, these abuses become the inheritable rights of the first set of subordinate agents or their descendants; the state is exhausted and consumed by abuses, which time has made inveterate, and which the new-made *great* have an interest in aggravating. The monster, despotism, whose youth was passed in riot, is then crippled by the gout, and is equally disabled from enduring either labours or remedies. Nothing can be more certain, than that free states are the most capable of energy.

But a youthful tyrant has a sort of preternatural strength, that is truly formidable—such is Buonaparte's. France has thrown off the incumbrances of ranks and orders, of laws and religion, and seemed to awake at once from the sleep of ages. Every thing that is genius has been roused, by seeing all that is alluring in power and wealth brought within its reach. All

France has teemed with ambition, like the earth in seed time. These circumstances have imparted to the French character, always highly susceptible, a most extraordinary energy. And if any persons, wedded to a favourite system, shall please to say, that, as the hope of liberty is now extinguished, the French are no longer ardent enthusiasts, but reluctant slaves, let them be told, that the ardour for glory remains, though the passion for liberty is no more. The people are now engaged in a more intelligible, and, be it added, a more enchanting pursuit. They believe, that they know how to beat their enemies; and that they do not know how to prevent or remedy the oppressions of their rulers. It will be conceded, also, that the revolution has brought forward the ablest generals, and that Buonaparte has employed them.

Admitting, then, that the French armies are numerous enough, that they are well commanded, and that the soldiers have the double advantage of strict discipline and actual service, it is not easy to discern the grounds, on which the English seem so confidently to rely, that the French will be beaten. The Austrians and Russians are, no doubt, good soldiers; not better, however, than the French. It is to be feared, the coalition will be defeated in its first attempts.* The great distance of the Russian dominions, and the deficiency of pecuniary means scarcely allow us to expect, that Russia will persevere long, in a very unhopeful contest. Austria, without Russia, is certainly unequal to the contest. It is probable, that much is expected from the first impression of the arms of the coalesced powers; if that expectation should fail, we cannot see any motives Russia has for fighting on, campaign after campaign, in case France should hold out to resist.

And is there the least reason to suppose, France will not hold out to resist many years? The glory of France is the cause of all Frenchmen—pity it is, we pence-saving Americans had not

* In justice to the writer of these speculations, it must be remarked, that they were penned at least ten days before the report arrived of the capture of thirty thousand Austrians.

Note of the Newspaper Editor.

a small spice of their character. They will suffer much, and attempt every thing, sooner than permit their enemies to triumph over them: defeats, by irritating their vanity, will rouse their spirit.

We shall be told in reply, it is only the splendour of success, that attaches the French to the fortune of Buonaparte. But they are really, in their inmost souls, proud of that success. Besides, let it be remembered, every thing that is now exalted in France would be brought low again, by the return of the Bourbons: there is nothing left in church or state, that is not the work of the revolution. The Bourbons might pardon rebels and usurpers; but could they employ them all, or trust any of them? Could they refuse to employ, or trust the emigrant nobility, who have borne exile and poverty with them? Yet this must be refused, or the nobles and princes of the new order of things must step down again to the democratick floor. Probably a million of active high-spirited men in France, now in some office, would hazard life, and, perhaps, scorn it as a condition of disgrace, sooner than restore the Bourbons.

Where, then, is the reason to suppose, that France will not make efforts, endure reverses, and even create another tyrant, in case Buonaparte should fall in battle, or die in his bed? Where is the country in Europe, that has so little to fear from division within, as France? as France, we say, still smarting with the sense, and, in case of Buonaparte's death, ready to quake with the dread, of the curse of civil war?

The French despotism, we greatly fear, will prove a Colossus of iron, which this coalition will be unable to hew down with the sword, or to lift from its place. Another revolution, like an earthquake, might break its limbs; and time will slowly corrode it with rust: in fifty years it may be still hateful to its neighbours, and dreadful only to Frenchmen. We have not the most to hope from the powers, that are nearest its own size; but from that, which has the capacity to maintain the longest resistance: we mean England. For the reasons we have before assigned, it is our belief, the French despotism will never be more formidable than it is now: if it should not finish

its conquering work, while Buonaparte lives, it will never be finished. This is clear, if it cannot conquer England, it will not conquer the world. Thus we are brought to the question, so perpetually recurring to our anxiety, so awfully interesting to every civilized nation in the world, *will France be able to conquer England?*

It is commonly said, if the British navy did not protect that island, it would be certainly conquered. This is no part of our creed. A state containing fifteen or sixteen millions of souls is not to be conquered, unless the government is of a sort to breed factions, and one of them joins the foreign enemy to enslave the state. There is every appearance, that the French faction in England, which in the beginning of the revolution was so clamorous and formidable, is now equally destitute of pretext, and of means of mischief. If the British channel should be filled with gravel, and raked, and hardened, like a turnpike, the English would become more military, and have to fight many desperate battles for their liberty, which, though they should loose those battles, they would ultimately preserve. Certainly, there is no want of physical force, no deficiency of courage to maintain it, even if the coast of Brittany touched the coast of Essex.

With these opinions it follows, that the threatened *invasion* was one of the most desirable events: it afforded the only certain and near prospect of the disgrace and overthrow of the French power. If the coalition really hindered the invasion, it has done England an injury, which it will never repair. But, as the attempt was long delayed, and the conduct of Austria and Russia was so ostentatiously complained of for hindering its execution, there is great reason to believe, there was no serious intention to make it.

Great Britain, now, can expect no such hopeful opportunity to cripple her adversary, as long as the coalition lasts: her hopes are rested on the military operations of the coalesced powers. This is one of the serious evils of that coalition. Englishmen are, unhappily, made to depend on the efforts of Russians and Austrians, which we apprehend (and we have taken some pains to explain the grounds of our apprehensions)

will ultimately fail of their object. They depend too much on others, too little on themselves. Should Russia find some ambitious reasons for deserting the alliance, Austria must become a vassal of France. England must then face her adversary alone, with his insolence and means augmented, and weariness and despair pervading every English heart. Then, perhaps, she would think herself obliged to make peace. Thus the tired traveller, benumbed with cold, grows drowsy and sits down to rest—he sleeps, to wake no more. England would be more certainly ruined by peace, than Buonaparte by the invasion. If, instead of using her arms, she trusts a second time to her enemy's moderation, he will never permit her to resume them. A peace by England, after the defeat of the new coalition, will give to France, an unlimited command of means of every sort. The Persian kings did not encourage commerce, but the Phœnicians, Rhodians, and people of Cyprus did, and, of course, the king of Persia could command the sea. Tributary Europe would furnish treasure to build fleets; and the whole coast from the Baltick to the Adriatick would supply seamen. We Americans are already advised to interdict the manufactures of England; and France will oblige every other country to do it. While the war lasts, necessity is stronger than even French despotism: all Europe, and even France herself, consumes British goods; but peace would restore to Buonaparte the power to shut all the ports of Europe against England.

What, then, are we to think of the coalition, as it affects England, but that it will deceive her hopes and aggravate her embarrassments? Standing alone, and depending solely on herself, she is invincible. It is in her power without any material diminution of her wealth, and with a diminished hazard of her safety, to fight France, till French despotism becomes wasted with its vices and decrepid with age; till it loses much of its impetuosity, and employs half its force in quelling insurrections; till the legion of honour shall create one emperour, the army of the Rhine a second, and the army of Italy a third.

THE SUCCESSES OF BUONAPARTE.

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THE rapid and decisive successes of Buonaparte have inflated the ignorant rabble of our democrats with admiration, and filled every reflecting mind with astonishment and terrour. The means, that most men deemed adequate to the reduction of his power, have failed of their effect, and have gone to swell the Colossal mass that oppresses Europe: his foes are become his satellites. Austria, the German states, Prussia, Naples, and perhaps Sweden, seem to have been fated, like comets, to a shock with the sun, not to thrust him from his orb, but to supply his waste of elemental fire. Buonaparte not only sees the prowess of Europe at his feet, but all its force and treasure in his hands. We except Russia and England. But Russia is one of those comets on its excursion into the void regions of space, and is already dim in the political sky; England passes, like Mercury, a dark spot over the sun's disk; and to Buonaparte himself, she seems, like the moon, to intercept his rays. He cannot endure to see her so near his splendour, without being dazzled or consumed by it.

He wants nothing but the British navy, to realize the most extravagant schemes of his ambition. A war, that should give him possession of it, or a peace, like the last, that should humble England, and withdraw her navy from any further opposition to his arms, would give the civilized world a master. All the French, and, of course, all our *loyal* democrats have affected to treat that apprehension as chimerical. Yet who, even among those whom faction has made blind, could refuse to see, that the transfer of the British navy to France, would irreversibly fix the long-depending destiny of mankind, to bear the weight and ignominy of a new Roman domination.

We may say the *aggravated* weight, for Rome preserved her morals, till she had achieved her conquests; France be-

gins her career, as deeply corrupt as Rome ended it. The Roman republick, after having grown to a gigantick stature from its soundness, rotted when it died; but that of France, surviving the principles, and at length the name of a republick, has drawn aliment from disease, and we of this generation have seen it crawl, like some portentous serpent from a tomb, glistening and bloated with venom from its loathsome banquet. France has owed the progress of her arms to the prevalence of her vices. These were the causes of the revolution; and the revolution has, in turn, made these the instruments of French aggrandizement. By the persecution of all that was virtue, the leaders gave encouragement to all that was vice; and, thus, they not only acquired the power to spend the nation's last shilling, but imparted to the rabble all the ardour of enthusiasm, and all the energies, that the love of novelty, of plunder, and of vengeance could inspire. The means they commanded were not such as arise from the just and orderly government of a state, but from its dissolution. The priests, the rich, and the nobles, were offered as human sacrifices on the altar of the revolution, and still more emphatically of French ambition.

Thus France, like Polypheme in his cave, grew fat with carnage. Other states could not, without submitting to a like revolution, oppose her with equal arms. So far from it, they found, that all those, whom vice and want had made the enemies of the laws of their country, were banded together as the friends of France.

Thus it was, that the French armies no sooner entered Italy, than they arrayed in arms an Italian rabble, to hold all those, who had any thing to lose, in fear and inactivity, till they could be regularly plundered. The leaders of this rabble were invested with the mock dignities of the Cisalpine government. The like was done in Holland and Switzerland.

The new yoke, therefore, which the abject nations are so near taking on their necks, cannot be light. That France may rule every where, the worst of men must be permitted

every where to rule in the worst of ways. The Roman yoke was iron, and it crushed, as well as wearied the provinces; but the domination of culprits and outlaws, claiming much for themselves, and exacting more for their masters in France, will place the people between the upper and the nether millstone.

If the miserable dupes of France, so *loyal* to the commands of her envoy, can wish destruction to the British navy, and can really think American liberty the safer for its future tenure by the good pleasure of Buonaparte, such men are certainly fitter subjects for medicine than argument: where such sentiments do not spring from the rottenness of the heart, they must escape through some crack in the brain.

There was a time, when the infatuation in favour of France was a popular malady. If that time has so far passed over, that men can either think or feel as Americans ought, it must be apparent, that Buonaparte wants but little, and is enraged that he so long wants that little, to be the world's master. Yet, at this awful crisis, when the British navy alone prevents his final success, we of the United States come forward, with an ostentation of hostility to England, to annoy her with non-intercourse laws. Are we determined to leave nothing to chance, but to volunteer our industry in forging our chains?

DANGEROUS POWER OF FRANCE. N°. I.

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THE political sky has seldom remained long unclouded; but it may be doubted, whether it was ever charged with a blacker tempest, than that we have lately seen burst upon Europe. France has accomplished, in twelve years, as much as Rome did in five hundred. The Samnites, who occupied a little province, that is now a part of the kingdom of Naples, resisted the Roman arms for half a century; and it was not till after four and twenty Roman triumphs, and twice that number of pitched battles, that they were subdued.

KING Pyrrhus landed in Italy too late, after the Samnites had lost their spirit no less than their force. He proved an enemy worthy of Roman discipline and courage, yet he was unsuccessful.

THE Romans, after five hundred years of incessant war with the petty nations around them, at length aspired to extend their dominion beyond the bounds of Italy. First Sicily and then Spain were disputed, in arms, with the Carthaginians. Fifty years were passed in battles and alarms, before this great controversy was decided in favour of Rome.

WHEN Carthage had fallen, Greece, the mistress of Rome in arts, her rival in arms and renown, fell an almost unresisting prey to Roman ambition. She fell with all her confederated republicks, *as ours will certainly fall*, if France should continue to wield our factions, and our factions to dispose of our government; for factions in a democracy are sincere only in their hatred and fear of each other. Whether the Jeffersons and Madisons stand or fall, our rulers can have no patriotism. Their emulation is too fierce, and their objects of ambition too fugitive, and too personal, to allow them to take the views, still less to cherish the sentiments of statesmen. Old Rome had

patriots, but who would expect to find them in the amphitheatre among the gladiators? Those who love power, will seek it in the contests of party. The lovers of their country will be found, nursing their griefs and their despair, among the discarded disciples of Washington. To return from this seeming digression, Rome availed herself of the divisions of the Grecian republicks to subjugate them all. Affecting a zeal for their liberty, she offered her alliance; and the allies of Rome, like those of France, were her SLAVES. The Greeks joyfully aided Rome to conquer Macedonia; and Philip, the Macedonian king, was employed against Antiochus, called the great, the Syrian monarch. Egypt was too base to make any resistance, but submitted to *tribute*, as quietly as we do.

THUS, every independent republick and powerful prince fell a prey to Rome. Beyond the Euphrates, the Parthians, at length, formed a mighty empire, which the distance and the deserts rendered, like the modern Russia, inaccessible to the Roman arms. It was remarkable, that Rome seldom had more than one enemy to fight at a time: they fell in succession; and their servitude was concealed, though it was embittered by the title of allies.

FRANCE has achieved her purpose—the struggles of liberty are over; and the continental nations of Europe are now sleeping in their chains.

IF France possessed the British navy, those chains would be adamant, which no human force could break. French tyranny, like the great dragon, would have wings, and the remotest regions of the civilized world would be near enough to catch pestilence from his breath. Yet we are infatuated enough to think America a hiding place for liberty, where her assassins will not seek her life; or an impregnable fortress that would protect it.

ON what reasonable foundation do these presumptuous expectations rest? When France is master of both land and sea, will distance preserve us? With eight hundred ships in the department of the Thames, distance would be nothing to Buonaparte. He could transport an army of sixty thousand men

to occupy New-York, which could not make one hour's resistance. He could transport them with more expedition and ease, than Mr. Jefferson could assemble our STANDING ARMY of two regiments from the frontiers, to oppose them. Yet this *standing army*, so potent to command the types, the exclamations, and the silly fears of the democrats, though it assisted as a bug-bear to make Mr. Jefferson president, would no better protect his house, at Monticello, from a French squadron of horse, than the army of the imperial Virginia formerly defended its assembly from colonel Tarleton.

BUT our myriads of militia might defy the world in arms. Excellent hopes these! When Austria, in vain, opposes two hundred thousand veterans to the progress of Buonaparte; when Russia is repelled in the pitched battle of Austerlitz; when Prussia, with its armies complete in numbers and discipline, stands still, not daring to stir, and waiting to acknowledge Buonaparte conqueror; or, to come more plainly to the point, when we see half a million of English volunteers, as formidable and as stiff, in buckram, as it is in the power of tailors to make uniforms, parading the coasts of Sussex, Essex, and Kent, and yet trusting only to the vigilance of the British navy to hinder the French from crossing the channel; surely, when we see these things, we must be unwilling to reflect, or utterly incapable of reflection, if we can suppose, that the array of the militia in the secretary's office would transplant fear from Mr. Jefferson's bosom into Buonaparte's.

To say nothing of the improbability of the militia's obeying the call for actual service, or, if they should appear promptly and in sufficient numbers, of the impossibility of detaining them in service long enough to make their arms of the least imaginable use, direful experience has at length instructed nations, that, when they are in danger, they are to be preserved from it by their real soldiers. These are made, not in a tailor's shop, by facing blue cloth with red or yellow, but by learning in the field that subordination of *mind*, that will make men do, and insure their doing all that men possibly can do.

Old Rome did not out-number her enemies. Two legions, each of less than six thousand men, and as many of the Latin or other Italian allies made a complete consular army. Such an army routed the numberless forces of Mithridates and Antiochus. It cost the Romans more exertions to subdue Perseus, king of Macedon, than to conquer all the East: his phalanx, of sixteen thousand men, was harder to break than all the millions of militia of the other successors of Alexander. Rome, by the perfection of her discipline, became mistress of the world.

Would Buonaparte calculate on the vigour of our government, as an insuperable obstacle to his military attempt on the United States? Would the congress majority, like a Roman senate, create means and employ them, with a spirit that would prefer death to servitude or tribute? The French Hannibal, surely, with our fifteen millions of tribute money already in his treasury, would have no discouraging fear of this sort. When he reads our treaty with Tripoli, by which it appears, that we chose tribute, when victory was within our reach; when he sees that the bey of Tunis presumes to say, by his minister at Washington, pay or fight, what can Buonaparte conclude, but that honour is a name, and in America an empty one; and that our national spirit can never be roused to a higher pitch, than to make a calculation. With us honour is a coin, whose very baseness confines it at home for a currency. Such a people, he will say, are degraded, before they are subdued. They are too abject to be classed or employed among my martial slaves. Let them toil to feed their masters, and to replenish my treasury with tribute.

Is there a spirit in our people, that would supply the want of it in our rulers? Our total unpreparedness, both by land and sea, to make even the shew of resistance against an attack, is, certainly, not from the want of military means in the United States, but from a dread of the loss of popularity, if they should call them forth.

Why is it unpopular? Because the progress of French domination is not seen at all, or is seen with a fatal complacency; because we love our money better than our country;

because we enjoy our ease almost as much as we love our money; and because, by shutting our eyes to our publick dangers, we escape the insupportable terrour of their approach, and the toils of an efficient preparation to resist them.

It is a thing incomprehensible, that even the childish babble of the Chronicle is not dumb. Admitting the stupidity, admitting the baseness of the democrats, yet, without admitting that they are both stupid and base in a miraculous degree, it is unaccountable, that they should not see, in the victories of Buonaparte, the stride, and almost feel the gripe of a master. If a storm should sink, or a fire-ship burn the British navy, we should feel that gripe in a month: general Turreau would quietly exercise all the authorities at Washington. Considering how tamely we give up our millions, while that navy still renders America inaccessible to France, is any man alive so absurd as to suppose, that our subjugation to French despotism would cost the great nation a single flask of powder? Take away the British navy, or give it to France, and we free Americans, so valiant of tongue, tie up in our stalls, as tamely as our oxen. The pen of Talleyrand would be found a sharper weapon than general ***'s sword. It is preposterous to suppose, that a military resistance to France would be attempted. Her faction in this country would revive the clubs and the maxims of 1794; and Genet would again summon the enemies of *British influence* to rally under his banner. We should be called the allies of France, and our loyal addresses would accompany our tribute to conciliate the friendship of the great nation, and to claim a share in its glories. The men, who could be nothing without France, would be invested with the titles and powers of magistracy; and property would be made to shift hands, till it rested with those, who would be really interested to support France, that France might support them in keeping it. Thus, she would avoid the odium of a violent revolution, and yet would reap all the advantage of it, to rivet our dependence on her power. The distance of the Roman provinces, at length, favoured their emancipation from her

yoke; but with the sole possession of a navy, the trans-Atlantick provinces of France would not be distant.

With these irrefragable proofs of the fatal certainty, with which the power of France would reach us, and of the unresisting tameness, with which we should endure it, if France should ruin the British naval power, what comments shall we make on the sense or spirit of the non-importation project of congress, which, though ineffectual for its purpose, is intended to impair the force and resources of that navy? How deep and considerate will be our scorn and execration of the Armstrongs, and Livingstons, and Munroes, who, to make their flattery welcome to a tyrant's ear, have blended it with American invectives against that navy. We seem to be emulous of the spirit of slavery, before we descend to its condition; as if we were resolved to merit their contempt, by an earlier claim, and even by a juster title, than their yoke; for, as long as the British navy may triumph, that yoke is not inevitable.

The most successful way to prevent our servitude, is faithfully to expose our dangers. So far as our fate may depend on our wisdom or our choice, it is proper to call the attention of our citizens to the fact, that Buonaparte, though he has done much, has done it in vain, unless he can do one thing more. Give him the British navy, and he will govern the United States as absolutely, and, certainly, with as little mercy, as if our territory were a French department, and actually lay between the Seine and the Loire. Let our scribblers, then, extol the long-foreseeing wisdom of the Jeffersonian administration. Let them boast of their devotedness to the cause of the people. The man, whose chief merit is grounded on his having *penned* the declaration of independence, has done more than any other man living to undo it. He has made conventions to pour the fulness of our treasury into the coffers of Buonaparte; he has dictated laws in aid of, and to carry into effect, French authority over the blacks of St. Domingo—a degree of servile condescension beneath the independent spirit of those blacks; and now his minions in congress have begun a warfare against the British trade, as if, without our own

active co-operation to cripple the maritime resources of England, Buonaparte might meet with too great obstruction and delay in subverting the independence and liberty of our country.

If we love our country as we ought, we cannot but wish, that the conquered nations of Europe may break their chains; we cannot but wish, that Great Britain may courageously and triumphantly maintain her independence against France. But on this point what are we to expect? A military opposition on the continent of Europe has proved unavailing. Will France, now mistress of the land, become mistress of the sea also, and establish her iron domination over the civilized world? This is a question of life or death to American independence, and the awful decision is near.

DANGEROUS POWER OF FRANCE.

No. II.

IT is a subject of fearful curiosity, to inquire into the causes, which have so rapidly conducted France to the conquest of the continental part of Europe. By carefully tracing their operation, we may be the better enabled to calculate the chances of her triumph over England, and, of necessary consequence, over America.

It was a long time the fashion, to ascribe French victories to the republican fanaticism of her citizens. When France ceased to be republican in name, and it was only in *name* that she ever was republican, the superiour personal bravery of the French soldiers, and the superiour genius of Buonaparte were deemed to be the two adequate causes of her triumphs.

There is, probably, little ground for these opinions; or the influence of these causes is much over-rated. The body of American democrats are, no doubt, the greatest political bigots in the universe: they are accustomed to believe, that

no tenets can be true or wise, but their own. That all power is derived from the people, and should be exercised for their benefit, is a principle, of which they fancy the world was ignorant, till it was discovered in the course of our revolution. Considering themselves the sole depositaries of political truth; having in their hands her casket, where she keeps liberty, the most precious of her jewels, they think our country is entitled to be not a little vain of the office. They feel, too, as if all patriotick merit consists in propagating their principles through the world with a rage of proselytism. They would rejoice, if not only France, but the grand Turk, and the dey of Algiers should gather their unlettered rabble into primary assemblies, and make them swear, with all the zeal and sincerity of opium and brandy, to maintain *the rights of man* with their daggers and their pikes.

Accordingly, when France said, and sung, and swore the words of their republican creed, they were sure the grovelling world was very near being hoisted from its centre: it would be launched into the sky, and glitter among the brightest of the stars. The reign of perfectibility was beginning: man, so long a reptile, trodden in the mire, was rising to over-top the tallest of the seraphs. Their teeming fancies had made a creation of their own, and lighted it with a new sunshine. Above all things, it delighted their hearts, and seemed to realize all their hopes, to see the low vulgar, the squalid hosts of vice and ignorance, issue from the opening cellars of the Fauxbourg of St. Antoine, and from the jails, to exercise the sovereignty of *the people*, by a signal vengeance on the magistrates, their enemies. They were sure the structure of society must have risen, when they saw its low foundations already higher than its roof. It was not long, before this rabble army was arrayed as a body of Marseilles patriots, and as a part of the national guards. The splendid virtues of France were attributed to the exalted heroism of these men, who, it was said, fought well, not because they were soldiers, but because they were citizens. More than a million of the grown people of America believed, that the liberty-loving passion of French-

men made them an overmatch for the disciplined *mercenaries* of Austria and Prussia; and that the citizens were the better for their ignorance of discipline. The French generals were not the dupes of our silly opinions: they drilled and *punished* their *citizens*, till they would stand fire and push bayonet; and if they would not, they shot them.

The notion, that the political opinions of the common men will make them any *better* soldiers, is strangely absurd: they are more likely to effect a mutiny, than a triumph. Men may fancy they are soldiers; but they are not really such, until discipline and habit have new-moulded their thoughts and inclinations. The reviews of peaceable tradesmen are no more, than the solemn foppery of a pantomime, acted in the open air, instead of the theatre. We would not be understood to say, that the militia has not both its merit and its use—both, we confess, are great; but we do say, that their proper use is not to face a veteran enemy. It is, indeed, very possible, that political enthusiasm, as well as religious fanaticism, may inspire a sudden fury into the bosoms of a raw, undisciplined multitude; but a veteran corps would, surely, defeat such a multitude.

If the inhabitants of France ever felt the republican enthusiasm, which is, indeed, very questionable, there is not much reason to believe, that it contributed to fill the ranks of their own army, or to make those of their enemy give way. Experience, which brings plausible theories to the test, and a correct knowledge of human nature, have abundantly confuted the notion, that the common men are the better soldiers for the soundness of their logick or their politicks. Men are very much alike, in all the European countries, in respect to their capacity of being trained for war. When so trained, the difference between two hostile armies, of equal numbers, will be found to lie in the talents of their subaltern officers and principal commanders.

Common soldiers are soon trained; but it is the work of art and time, to form officers. There is not the least reason in the world to suppose, that the Austrians or Russians are infe-

riour to the French soldiers in steady, persevering valour; but there is ample evidence of the superiority of the French officers over those of their enemies. War has become, indeed it ever was, among civilized nations, a *science*. It excites and employs the utmost vigour and extent of human intellect. Though it is a science, it is such only for the officers, not for the common men. For two centuries past, France has devoted more attention and more money to the perfection of this science, than all the rest of Europe. Louis XIV. established such military schools, as the great Cyrus would have desired for the education of the officers of that army, that achieved for him the conquest of Asia. Buonaparte and Moreau, both undoubtedly great generals, are indebted for their triumphs to these schools. It is often said, the common men will dare to do, whatever their officers will lead them on to do. It is no less proper to say, the officers will seldom flinch from leading the men, if they but know how to lead them.

Nothing is more certain, than that the military institutions of France supplied the first revolutionary armies with an infinite number of accomplished young officers, who glowed with impatience to gain glory and promotion in that profession, which had, from their infancy, engrossed their thoughts and kindled all their passions. The revolution furnished only sparks, and not the fuel for their combustion.

Nor is there the least reason to pretend, that the first French armies were composed of raw recruits. An immense standing army was maintained: and when it is considered, that, on the side of the Low Countries, and on the Rhine, France guarded what has been emphatically called her *iron* frontier, with a double row of fortified towns, and that every one of these was occupied by a veteran garrison, that would figure as a respectable American army, we see plainly, that France possessed every advantage for success in war, from the very first day of her military operations.

The democrats, to a man, believe, that France was entirely defenceless, when the "*coalition of despots*" secretly entered into the treaties of Pilnitz and Pavia for her dismemberment.

Those treaties, it has been a thousand times proved, are forgeries. Austria was taken by surprise: the emperour Joseph had levelled the ramparts of his towns in the Netherlands, Luxembourg excepted; and his troops in that country were no more than a feeble corps of observation. The Austrians had a larger proportion of raw recruits in their armies, than the French.

Be it remembered, too, that the revolution supplied the French with an unexhausted superfluity of men and means, that no regular government in the world could countervail. That man must be strangely disordered in mind, who can now look back on French affairs, and say, that the revolutionary leaders, possessing such means, left any option to the governments of England or Austria to remain at peace. As well might they say, when a whole street is burning, that a man, by sitting calm in his elbow chair, might save his house from the flames. The English government, in particular, was near the scene, and could not see the revolution, like Etna, vomit fire, without some natural fears and some prudent measures of precaution. Who is now ignorant, that Brissot, and Barras, and Danton, and Robespiere would choose to understand those fears and those precautions, as signs of the inveterate hostility of kings to the French liberty. If the English could have shunned the war in February 1793, it would have been forced upon them before June.

It is childish prattle, to charge the enemies of France with the commencement of the war. The nature of the revolution was war against mankind. Its vital principle was a burning passion for power, within the state; and, when they had gained *that*, to establish by arms the power of France over every other state. Why is the vulture carnivorous? Why does not the tiger of Bengal eat grass? We might, with as much good sense, inquire, why does not the torrent stay upon the hills? Why are the collected waters of the revolutionary storm precipitated from the height of the Alps, to desolate the plains, and to bury men, and their labours, under masses of barrenness and ruin?

The military means of Austria were stinted; those of France unlimited. In almost every battle the French had the advantage. The officers, even the subalterns, had been educated so as to qualify them to be generals; the generals were fit for nothing else: they understood their trade, and aspired to no other sort of distinction. The French, always well commanded by their officers, well supplied by their enemies countries, which they ravaged, have rapidly overrun all Europe.

Another cause of the French superiority, and which has grown out of the real superiority of their military science, is to be found in the excellence of their artillery. The number, and the manageableness of the French field artillery, must have given them a decisive advantage over the Russians in the late battle of Austerlitz. It is not to be supposed, that the Russians have equally improved their artillery; nor, if they had, would they have encumbered their march of eight hundred leagues, especially when they had so many reasons for haste, with an immense train of field pieces. They would be the less disposed to do this, as the Austrians must have been relied upon to supply them in sufficient number. The French by the celerity of their movements had, however, obtained possession of a great part of the Austrian artillery. The deficiency of the Russians in this point, was probably a material cause of their loss of the battle.

When gun-powder and great guns were first brought into use, they were more capable of striking an enemy with a panick, than of breaking his line: the cannon were unwieldy machines, and the management of them was unskilful. Still the army which had them, must have possessed a great advantage over that which had none. In the time of the famous duke of Marlborough, the event of a battle depended on the expertness and resolution of infantry in discharging their muskets. In still more modern wars, the bayonet has been considered the arbiter of victory. But the French have introduced another revolution in the science of war, the lightness and prodigious number of their horse artillery enabling them to disorder and break an enemy's ranks, without coming to close

fight, by raining upon them an intolerable tempest of grape-shot.

By means of their innumerable field pieces, and of their unusual proportion of cavalry, it has become impossible for their enemy to defend a country by lines of field intrenchment. It has been stated, that Buonaparte's grand army was attended by fifty thousand horse. Such a body, always on the alert, could strike an enemy at almost any distance, and in every mortal part at once. If he contracted his posts, his flanks would be turned; if he spread out his troops to prevent it, his lines would be forced. By resisting, he met his fate; and if he retreated, it was swift and overtook him.

Thus we have seen the French maintain the same invariable superiority over the Austrians, and lately over the Russians, in the field, that the Spaniards possessed over the Mexicans. The Russians and Austrians are as brave as the French; but the French are really superiour in the science of their officers, in the number and management of their cannon, and in their cavalry. They will continue, therefore, to beat their enemies, as the Romans did. Even the Grecian phalanx, supposed to be the perfection of military science, and absolutely invincible, was found unequal to the contest with the Roman legion.

The French victories have happened in such a series, that we cannot rationally suppose them to happen by chance. They are the inevitable results of superiour numbers, and of the French military advantages we have mentioned. They would happen again, if their dejected, beaten adversaries could rise again to resistance.

From these positions this melancholy inference is to be drawn: the continental enemies of France are totally incapable of resisting her in the field: she has taken a *permanent* ascendant over them. Austria, humbled and beaten, is in no condition to learn the conquering art of her masters. Prussia, without risking the combat, has fallen prostrate with her useless arms in her hands. Russia, like the ancient Parthia, is invincible, but insignificant to the system of enslaved Europe.

If the French armies could pass the channel, there seems to be no sort of reason to hope, that Great Britain could resist them. The regular army is spread over all the empire, and, if it were all collected, it would be a handful against the French hosts; and, surely, no military man would place the smallest dependence on the volunteers of England.

It is one of the inveterate, perhaps incurable evils of Mr. Pitt's administration, and the greatest blemish in the fame of that truly illustrious statesman, that, instead of forming an efficient army of two hundred thousand men, who could be sent wherever they might be wanted, he was either the schemer or the dupe of the useless, expensive, and, if the French should land in England, fatal project of volunteers. By equipping volunteers, he not only had no army, but it was out of the power of England to have one. The men were all engaged in acting the *comedy* of an army; and the finances were exhausted in *getting up* the decorations of the piece.

The sole protection of Great Britain, then, is in her navy. The writer has been brought very late, and loath, to believe, that the military resistance of the continental nations of Europe would be ineffectual. Events have, at last, convinced him, that the French actually possess a greater and more decisive military superiority over those nations, than the old Romans did over the forces of Antiochus, Mithridates, and Jugurtha; and, especially, over the Carthaginians, Greeks, and Macedonians. Nothing is wanting to the solid establishment of a new universal empire by France, that should spread as far, last as long, and press as heavily on the necks of the abject nations, as that of Rome, but the possession of the British navy. France, whenever she can get access to her enemy, is already irresistible. If Mr. Gregg would give her that navy, he would impart a kind of ubiquity to her power. The soft winds, that wake the spring in the remotest regions of the globe, would waft there the ministers of French rapacity to blast it. France would enjoy every thing that Rome wanted, to make the plundered world her province.

Are these ideas chimerical? or are the inferences drawn beyond the admitted truth of the premises? Is India more capable of resisting France, than an English merchant company, its present sovereign? Spain and Italy are provinces already. Greece, Egypt, the Turkish empire, and all the shores of the Mediterranean were once the patrimony of the Cesars, and for many hundred years slept soundly in their chains, till they were rudely waked by the Goths, the Heruli, the Huns, and the Arabs. Africa is a quarter of the globe, that could be governed by factories; and America is another, that would yield, not merely with tameness, but alacrity to imperial rescripts. If, by miracle, force should be needed, France could employ Spain, or Dessalines, or slaves still more abject than they, to use it with infallible success. We should be ready, not merely to take, but to buy our chains, and to pay our last dollar as a fine for the temerity of our resistance. We should patiently sow our fields, and see our kindly seasons ripen the harvest for French reapers. Our posterity, born in servitude, would inherit our baseness, and bear the yoke from the infancy to the old age of their dishonoured lives, without sorrow or repining.

Suppose the whip of the oppressor should, at length, tear off the callous skin from the slaves' backs, and rage should be kindled by pain, and courage engendered by despair; yet our resistance would only avail to exasperate our tyrants, and to embitter the sense and aggravate the pressure of our calamities. France would not fail to array an army of base Americans, and to place them in the strongest positions of our country; and, if these should be insufficient to crush the first movements of *rebellion*, her ships would transport reinforcements from Europe with greater celerity, than the American insurgents could collect and train forces to resist them. Our independence, then must be renounced, or we must betake ourselves to the fastnesses of the wilderness to enjoy it, like the revolted negroes of St. Domingo, in peril, want, and barbarism.

The preservation of even this condition would, then, appear to exact and merit the display of all our energies. Comfortless and desperate, as that savage independence may seem, it would nevertheless be preferable to the horrid stillness of our servitude under the power of French tyrants, exercised by their deputies, the Jeffersons and Nicholsons, the present artificers of our ruin.

It is very seldom, that the events of war turn out according to the predictions of speculatists on their probabilities. Futurity is, no doubt, wisely and mercifully hidden from our view. Yet the issue of the contest between France and Great Britain is so momentous to America, it is impossible to restrain our curiosity from examining the position and relative strength of the combatants.

Grant that Great Britain possesses adequate means to cope with France, it is an interesting previous question to decide, or rather to conjecture, whether there is a spirit in her government and people to persevere in the employment of them.

The death of Mr. Pitt has made a complete change in the ministry. He discerned, and it is strange that Mr. Fox, his supposed equal in talents, should not have discerned, the necessity of opposing France in arms, and the fatal consequences of a delusive peace ;. and any peace, that should leave France a giant among pigmies, would be delusive. But, as Mr. Fox has been the opposer of the war, ever since 1793, and as he and a large number of his most strenuous adherents are admitted to power, it may be expected, that he will insist on proposing a negotiation. Proud as Buonaparte is, he would joyfully accept the proposal. He may be as liberal as Englishmen can ask in his terms, for any peace will make him their master. Nothing could make it safe, but that France should reduce her power. That is a condition Mr. Fox will not prescribe, nor Buonaparte concede.

We will not undertake to say, that Mr. Fox is bound in point of consistency, now, to propose peace. He may say with plausibility, perhaps with strict truth, that the circum-

stances of the two countries are changed; that he was a friend to peace, while Europe stood independent and powerful in arms to secure the observance of it by the French emperour; but that now peace would lessen none of the burdens of the nation, while it would put its commercial and naval resources, inaccessible in war, within reach of the power and intrigues of Buonaparte.

What is Mr. Fox's present opinion or disposition, we know not. We have no hesitation in saying, that, as a faithful member of his majesty's counsels, it is his duty to prosecute the war, till England can be safe in peace; and she cannot be safe, unless she is great in comparison with France.

Are there not probable grounds of conjecture, that Mr. Fox came into the ministry, on the terms of supporting the war measures of the government. Before the peace of Amiens, the fruitless negotiation, at Lisle, had opened the eyes of the English nation to the immeasurable ambition and profligacy of the French rulers. Mr. Fox then persisted in condemning the war. After the peace of Amiens, he paid a visit to Buonaparte, in Paris, and received and permitted such attention from the French chief, as raised the wonder and disgust of all men, and the suspicions of many. His motives for making that visit have never yet been explained.

This is certain, his parliamentary influence had surprisingly dwindled; and, perhaps, he owes it as much to his frank, open disposition, so unused to, and incapable of duplicity, as to his splendid talents, that the nation, with its characteristick generosity, has been willing to forget and forgive his strange visit and strange conduct in Paris.

There is reason to believe, that, when Mr. Pitt last came into office, the English king had neither forgiven nor forgotten it. He considered Mr. Fox as a jacobin, and resolved to deny the importunities of both parties to admit Mr. Fox to his counsels. Lord Grenville thought himself bound, in consequence, to stand with Mr. Fox, and to decline office.

When the death of Mr. Pitt and the desertion of the allies in Germany seemed to force Mr. Fox upon the king, for all

men agreed it was necessary to drop party divisions, and to unite against the common danger, we are told, lord Grenville was closetted with his majesty, and finally arranged the ministry to mutual satisfaction. As lord Grenville is an honest man, and as able as he is honest, we cannot believe such a man would recommend a jacobin to the king, or that he could prevail over his majesty's aversion to Mr. Fox, without being personally responsible for his conduct and principles.

When it is considered, also, that those two eminent men formerly acted in opposition to each other, and that, for three years past, they have come to a mutual good understanding, the grounds of division in the present ministry must have been fully explored, and such engagements mutually required and given, as will prevent their collision. Those who had always acted together, before they came into the ministry, we think more likely to fall out afterwards.

The union of the present ministry is the more probable, too, when we advert to the known sincerity and amiable temper of Mr. Fox. The attachment of no man's friends has been stronger, than Mr. Fox's have ever manifested towards him; and those who remember his famous coalition with lord North, will believe, that too much stubbornness to maintain the appearance of consistency, is not one of that gentleman's faults.

Mr. Fox is the only member of the new administration, who can be the champion of peace measures. Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham love their country too well, and its dangers are too imminent to permit us to believe, that they are disposed, to adopt the fatal counsels of the old opposition.

On these grounds, therefore, we presume to conjecture, that the English ministry will be united in favour of a prosecution of the war.

We have not yet inquired, whether there is sense and magnanimity enough in the nation, to support the ministry in such a resolution. The nation, no doubt, is weary of the war, and staggers under the weight of its burdens; but peace can scarcely cheat the blind multitude with the delusive hope of a respite from those burdens. A vigorous and able opposition

to war in parliament, might afford aliment to the popular discontent; but the men, who used to lead that opposition, are now in the ministry. They may say, they did not choose, and have not made the war; their predecessors, whom they were accustomed to oppose, left it a sad necessity on their hands.

Besides, peace has once been tried, and proved not only delusive, but almost fatal: Buonaparte gained more territory in peace than in war; and England voluntarily gave up her conquests, except Malta, Trinidad, and Ceylon. Such another peace would ruin her.

Under these circumstances, it may be expected, that even the populace will see, that the continuance of the war is the hard, but inevitable, condition of English liberty and independence. If we are not deceived in these speculations, the British ministry and nation will concur in pursuing the war. With what hope of ultimate success they will pursue it, is a more difficult problem.

DANGEROUS POWER OF FRANCE.

N°. III.

THE sufficiency of the British finances to supply the enormous expenditures of the war, is usually the first inquiry. We cannot, however, refrain from remarking, that the bankruptcy of the French government has been incessantly expected to prove the boundary of the French power. It has happened, on the contrary, that power has made its own resources. No government, certainly no arbitrary government, will sit still and die for want of means, when they are to be found within its grasp: it will put forth the hand of violent injustice, and reach them. The rulers of France found wealth enough within and without, and they have never hesitated to use it. Their armies flourished, while their artisans starved, and their farmers desponded. The decline of all employments

but that of arms, so far from stopping the course of their victories, materially contributed to accelerate it.

The free government of England is less disposed and less qualified for these extremes; but it will not be equally under the necessity of resorting to them. The wealth of individuals is incalculable, and the machinery of the English laws and government for extracting it in loans and taxes, with some degree of equality, and without popular opposition, is, probably, adequate to a great annual augmentation. We forbear to say, what is the utmost that machinery could effect. An urgent publick necessity, so palpable as to confound all doubts and cavils, we should conceive, would enable government to draw from the people larger supplies, by equal laws, than could be obtained by arbitrary violence. It is, however, we confess, a frightful prospect for an honest English minister, that he must spend, for the publick defence, more than he can raise by taxes. Hitherto, we believe, he has not been able to produce by his *ways and means* more than thirty five or forty millions sterling, nor to bring his expenditures under seventy.

In this extremity, some men have asked, whether the government ought not, without further hesitation, to sponge off their national debt. The jacobin members of our administration will wonder, why they have delayed it so long. The English government would long trust and painfully try the publick spirit of the nation, rather than destroy the debt. We have men in power, among us, who would sooner destroy any debt, publick or private, than hazard their popularity; nay more, they would sponge off all debts for its sake; but, in England, nothing short of dire necessity will bring the rulers to touch the property, that has so long been confided to the safeguard of the publick faith and morals; nor will they, of choice, withhold a penny of the interest.

It is true, necessity, though it is the tyrant's plea, is a sufficient one, when it exists, for the best government. There is no reasoning against necessity; but when there is any reasoning about its existence, it is manifest that it does *not* exist: it

not only makes its own law, but its own evidence. It comes like the fire, or flood, or pestilence, and renders doubt as much impossible as resistance.

Admitting, then, the sufficiency of the plea of necessity to vindicate the withholding of the interest of the British national debt from the publick creditors, the fact, that such necessity exists, is still to be made out. We have already said, this sober argumentative making out of a necessity is inadmissible. Though it is better the national debt should perish than the nation, still it is no less true, that the sponging off the national debt is a measure of violence, which needs all the justification that an irresistible necessity can afford. Necessity is a law that makes all other laws silent. It would vindicate the stoppage of the interest of the national debt—it is equally manifest, that nothing short of actual necessity will justify such an act.

Now, while the English government is in the regular course of paying the interest, and it is only inconvenient to proceed in that course, because new expenses arise, and it is an unpopular task to provide taxes to supply them, it is absolutely a relinquishment of the plea of necessity, to pretend, that the government is forced to stop the interest.

We know so little of the difficulties of the English government and nation, because we feel none of them, that it is not a little hazardous for any American speculatist to decide upon the proper degree of boldness, with which they should impose taxes, or the measure of ability or patience of the subjects to pay them. Nevertheless, we should imagine, and we presume to hope it is the case, that, by new arrangements of the land tax, by the assessed taxes, by improvements in the mode of collection of the imposts, and by a reform of the all-consuming poor rates, the publick revenue may be even yet considerably augmented. The power to tax, no doubt, has its limits; and when a government has multiplied its taxes till it has reached those limits, a new imposition will only give a new form to the publick receipts, without adding to their amount. We may be mistaken, but we sincerely hope it will

prove, that the wealth of the English subjects is abundantly adequate to all the enormous expenditures of this necessary war. The time, we believe, has come to justify all practicable reforms of expenditure and improvements of the revenue, rather than a resort to violent and arbitrary remedies of any sort; especially such as sponging off the debt.

For it can scarcely escape remark, that Great Britain has been, from the first, contending against revolutionary principles. How can Great Britain, the champion of faith, and law, and order, with consistency or advantage, adopt, as a remedy, the very measure that is the first badge and sure forerunner of the evil?

For what is revolution? what is its favourite work, but first, and with most malignant ardour, to destroy what faith, and law, and morals, have established and guarded? The English debt of six hundred millions sterling is spread all over the kingdom: it has taken root for a century. To pluck that root from the soil, we believe, would shake the security of all property; and, in the event, it might possibly subvert the monarchy.

When the convenience of relieving the nation from this mountain of debt, is once admitted, where will the government stop? Will not the progress be, as in France, to make one convenient sacrifice a precedent and argument for another? The clergy will stand next, on the black list; the nobles will follow. Will the *many* continue patient under the pressure of taxes, when the plunder of the *few* is so familiar a substitute? In a revolution, as in a shipwreck, one part of the crew is kept alive by eating the other.

The national debt is, in fact, private property. We cannot see, why the publick should seize and appropriate to itself that description of private property, rather than the ships in the Thames, or the goods in Bond street. The seizure may be less unpopular, and may be more surely carried into effect, than the capture of the ships or goods; but we cannot see, that the plea of necessity will better justify the act in one case than the other. Indeed, the preference seems to be due

to the property in the funds, as the government has solemnly renounced its power of control over it, and chosen to stand in no other relation to the owner of stock, than as an equal contracting party.

To those, however, who may consider this last idea a mere refinement, too flimsy to be examined or regarded, when the existence of a nation is at stake, another reflection may be suggested.

Many persons may be led, by their abhorrence of jacobinism and of French tyranny, to think favourably of sponging off the tremendous mass of English debt, which cripples all their exertions in the war. England, once free from this mill-stone, they imagine, would be in no danger of sinking. The usefulness of such an act of injustice tolerably well reconciles them to its principle.

The most successful answer to the measure will be, to question its utility. The whole taxes fall far short of the expenditures of the nation. Suppose the debt sponged off, and all the products of the present taxes applied to necessary expenses, how shall the deficiency be made up? By new loans? Shall the British chancellor of the exchequer, with the sponge in one hand, hold out a subscription paper in the other? Who would lend? or escape the mad house, if he did? If loans could be obtained, a new national debt would be scored up, at the rate of thirty five or forty millions a year; and, as soon as the size of the debt had begun to terrify some by its effect to cripple the energies of the government, and to tire others by the pressure of taxes, it must be sponged off again. Be it remembered, the violent remedies of great evils are, almost always, aggravations of those evils. If the minister, unable or unwilling to borrow, should raise taxes within the year, equal to the expenditures of war, what becomes of the plea of necessity?

On the whole, is it not right, that the property of a nation should defend its liberty? and is this to be done to the extent that the publick safety may require, unless the government

can obtain loans in its necessity, that it will provide for in its prosperity? A great publick debt is, no doubt, a great evil; but the loss of liberty and independence is one infinitely greater. It is some alleviation of that evil, for any government (for all are prone enough to become corrupt) habitually to guide its measures and its counsels, by the experience, that its good faith is its good policy. It ought to make men better, to contemplate the example of a state, tried, and tempted by adversity, and groaning under the load of taxes, yet still faithful to its engagements, and enjoying an ample resource in the confidence of its creditors, by deserving their confidence and keeping their property sacred from violation. Such a state gives an illustrious lesson of morality to its subjects. It fulfils the great duty of all governments, which is to protect property. This is not all. It will seem, to some practical men, still more to the purpose, that such a state will have the control, in the extreme exigencies of the publick affairs, of the last shilling of private property. Such is the spectacle of the British government.

It is left to others to compute, how essential a part of the national wealth consists of property in the national debt, and how much poorer the nation would be by sponging it off. Such a measure would aggravate necessity; but we cannot conceive how it would supply means. As this violation of the publick faith would be the most tremendous, as also the most unequal and unfair tax, that ever was levied on a state, it is natural to suppose, the dread of it and the dread of the enemy would sanction other very strong measures to get at the wealth of the subjects by taxes, and that they would cheerfully acquiesce, at least, in their temporary adoption.

It is, therefore, we confess, beyond our comprehension, how the stoppage of the interest of the publick debt, in other words the sponge, for such it would prove, could relieve the distresses of Great Britain, or supply the resources for the prosecution of the war. It might ensure an English revolution. The work of destruction may be begun by choice, but it never stops while there is any thing left to destroy. Its hostility

would be felt by the British government, and derided by that of France.

We know not how the British ministry can find money for their enormous charges; but, nevertheless, we believe they will find it, because it exists, and enough of it, in the hands of the opulent subjects of that monarchy.

We believe, too, they justly dread the terrible and incalculable evils of a bankruptcy, and that they will find means to avoid it. If a sense of common danger ever unites men, the British nation will be united; and if united and wisely governed, we hope they will prove unconquerable.

Admitting, then, that Great Britain will not be forced to submit to peace, which is to submit to the yoke of France, from the failure of her finances, it remains to inquire, how long and with what prospect of success she can pursue the war.

It does not appear, that she could not prosper in commerce and private wealth, if the war should last half a century; and to those who fear the war may last for ever, and therefore seem to think a bad peace ought to be chosen now, unless some definite time or some precise object could be proposed, as the end of the war, it is a sufficient answer to say, that war is a hard condition of national existence, but preferable to their subjugation by France. Base are Englishmen, unlike their ancestors, if they would not sooner toil for taxes to support the war, or bleed on a ship's deck, than sweat under the dominion of a French prefect. Perhaps *we* may wonder at their ideas; *but Englishmen will dread ignominy more than taxes or wounds.*

While the British navy continues mistress of the seas, it is scarcely possible, that Buonaparte should execute his threat of an invasion. If, then, the English cannot make war on the land, nor the French on the sea, it would seem that military operations and military spirit must languish. There is reason to fear, that this state of defensive languor will engender discontent in England. But though the expenses might be diminished, if Britain should have no allies, and should fit out no expeditions, they would still be enormous. When the fashionable folly of the volunteer army shall be no longer in vogue,

an efficient and large regular army would enable Great Britain to strike her enemy in many vulnerable points. She ought to provide such an army, on which alone she could depend to expel the French, if they should ever land on the island. The distant colonies of France are vulnerable, and would yield to an attack. The employment of the forces would cherish the military spirit of her subjects; and conquests are among the best expedients to preserve harmony and union in the nation.

A SOLICITUDE about the ability of Great Britain to resist France, will be understood by *some* of the weak, and will be misrepresented by *all* the base and unprincipled, as implying a desire, that the United States, in respect to maritime rights and national dignity, should lie at the mercy of the mistress of the ocean. *On the contrary;* let every real American patriot insist, that our government should place the nation on its proper footing, as a naval power. With a million tons of merchant shipping, and a hundred thousand seamen, equally brave and expert, it is the fault of a poor-spirited administration, that we are insignificant and despised. It is their fault, that our harbours are blockaded, by three British ships, and that outrages are perpetrated within the waters that form part of our jurisdiction, such as no circumstances can justify. Can there exist a stronger proof, that our insignificance is to be ascribed to a bad administration, than this single fact: with the greatest merchant marine in the world, except one, and, of consequence, capable of being soon the second naval power, (in our own seas, the first,) we are utterly helpless: that, in the opinion even of our rulers themselves, our only mode of redress, when our commerce is obstructed, is TO DESTROY OUR COMMERCE!! We have the means for its protection, which our administration, unhappily, think it would prove more expensive to use, than its protection would be worth. They would provide against the violation of our territory by *tribute*, and of our commerce by *non-importation*.

WHILE, therefore, we explicitly disclaim all apology for the abuses of the British naval power; while we strongly reprobate the cowardice, or folly, or both, that leaves our country

defenceless, when it is injured, we must view it as an interesting inquiry, whether England can resist France; for, *if she can not*, it is certain *we shall not*.

What could France do, to annoy Great Britain? Nothing; but to create expense to her government. What could Great Britain do, to annoy France? Much; enough to make the distress of war reach her subjects; to cut off nearly all her maritime trade; and to spread want, discontent, and despair from the Baltick to the Adriatick.

The colonies of the enemies of Great Britain would shrivel, like plants and flowers on the Arabian desert, if they were no longer moistened by the rills of commerce. We may assist our conjectures of what Great Britain may do, by asking ourselves, what *we* should do, in such a case, *if we possessed the British navy*, and were contending, as she is, for liberty and life against France.

NON-INTERCOURSE ACT.

First published in the Repertory, August, 1806.

OUR anti-commercial rulers seem to think, still, that the non-intercourse act will bring Great Britain to terms. Sometime in December, the gun, which congress primed and loaded, must go off, unless John Bull, who is so notoriously afraid of a gun, shall, before the day fixed for his fate, turn from the errour of his ways, and by repentance obtain Mr. Jefferson's mercy.

No one will deny the great importance of this subject; or that the question in respect to our maritime rights, which *we* have decided so much off-hand, may possibly have two sides to it; that Great Britain contests our doctrine, and believes, or affects to believe, her admission of it would be fatal to her naval greatness and independence. When, therefore, she is so loath and so much *afraid* to yield the point, it seems as if her finally yielding must depend on her being still *more afraid* of our resentment, than of every other ill consequence.

THE matter will, of course, undergo examination in England, how much reason she has to be afraid of us; and if our resentment shall appear to be of two evils the greatest, we, who lay national honour out of the account, are naturally enough ready to expect she will humble herself in the dust before Mr. Monroe, to avert our wrath, that "distant thunder," which the National Intelligencer so distinctly heard in December last.

BUT that typographical thunder, which was expected to shake the plates and porringers on the shelves at St. James's, has been muffled on this side of the Atlantick. Our publick will not break its nap on the apprehension of Mr. Wright's, or Mr. Gregg's, or Mr. Nicholson's breaking the peace with Great Britain. Nothing can exceed our apathy. Whether it be, that we are a stupid people, or that we feel to excess and to frenzy, as party men, so that, as patriots, we feel and fear

nothing; or that our mortified pride takes some delight in blustering and threatening Great Britain, while France empties her vessels of *honour* on our heads; or that evils in prospect for the next year have no terrours to the politicians, who never look so far; whatever it may be owing to, the fact is, we behave on the question, whether we shall have any trade, even more strangely careless than the Dutch do, in respect to the matter of having a French king or a republick. It seems as if our rulers had reason to be bold, when they are preparing to make us suffer, by our defiance of their power to make us think—Says Moses to the vicar, "the corpse can't take cold." Our indifference may not be a shield of defence, but it is opium against our dread of blows.

If our indifference did not surpass belief, the subject would have been long ago eagerly discussed. We should have scrutinized, much more closely than Mr. Nicholson is capable of doing, the grounds of our assumed opinion, that Great Britain has such great reason to be afraid of us; and, probably, we should have found occasion to suspect, that party has deceived our expectations on this question, as on almost every other. Every body knows, that Mr. Jefferson dare not go to war: the federalists are the only enemies whom he ventures to defy; and even their accusations are not to be encountered in close fight. He cannot fight Spain without first asking leave of France; of course, a Spanish war is out of the question.

To fight Great Britain, is equally so; yet, as great complaint is made of captures, and as Buonaparte will be soothed by a shew of hostility against England, the *shew* is resolved upon. But be it noted, *the shew may lead to the thing itself!* He begins to bully. Great Britain scorns to yield to his paper bullets. New acts must be passed, still more angry than Nicholson's. Popular rage grows out of commercial distress, and war follows. If this course be only foreseen, will Mr. Jefferson's admirers stick to him? Certainly not.

The federalists say, and really believe, that Mr. Nicholson's act is a feeble measure. Suppose, on trial, it proves feeble,

what is to be done? Is some new act to be passed, that will not be feeble? What act, short of war or reprisals, can it be?

Wise nations, foreseeing the ordinary progress of such hostile acts, will stop short, and compute their force, before they resort to them. Pride and passion once up, interest weighs little; and our threats will raise either British resentment or contempt. If we put them on their mettle, they will, no doubt, shew how little they regard their commercial profits, even if we could seriously diminish them. Mr. Nicholson's act is avowedly of the nature of compulsion; and we know how the attempt at compulsion will affect a government, which, we choose to say, has, at least, as much pride as power.

If any body in America cared about the consequences of this commercial warfare, which does not seem to be the case, it would be proper to point out the futility of the system adopted by our Solomon in council. The two countries are, no doubt, in a condition to do each other a good deal of harm. We forbear to enter at length on the inquiry, which can do the most. Let our Southern wiseacres consider carefully what would be the consequence, if Great Britain, in retaliation for Mr. Nicholson's act, should prohibit, after December next, the importation into Great Britain of American rice, cotton, and tobacco. They will, no doubt, say, these articles are a monopoly; they cannot get them elsewhere. It is easy to say so—but is it true? Bluster, gentlemen, but, before it be too late, try likewise to *think*.

LESSONS FROM HISTORY.

N°. I.

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CHARLES II, king of Great Britain, was secretly a catholick; and his subjects were, ninety nine out of a hundred, protestants. He was fond of arbitrary power; and his people passionately fond of liberty. The times required a close application to publick business; and his temper drove him headlong into licentious pleasures. His revenue had narrow limits; and his prodigality no limits at all.

HE was one of the most pleasant gentlemen in England, and as much of a scholar, as our Mr. Jefferson, though less of a pedant, and a quidnunc. Yet, after being possessed of unbounded popularity, he lost it all, and deserved to lose it, because in every thing, as a king, he acted in the meanest subserviency to his prejudices and pleasures as a man.

ACCORDINGLY, through his whole disgraceful reign, the English nation suffered much, and apprehended every thing, from his corrupt and treacherous policy; treacherous, because he pursued an interest of his own, separate from the general interest. Indeed, that nation still suffers from his misconduct. For Charles basely accepted a *pension* from Louis XIV. the Buonaparte of the seventeenth century, in consideration of which he not only forbore to act against the schemes of universal empire, that Louis XIV. had then begun to pursue, but he hindered the parliament from disturbing the conquering career of France: nay, to the astonishment of all Europe, he joined Louis in attacking the Dutch. It was then in the power of England to have prevented the aggrandizement of France; and such was the desire of the English parliament and nation, such was their true policy.

BY neglecting that opportunity, oceans of blood have since been shed in vain. In 1672, the renewal of the triple alliance, negotiated by sir William Temple, would have confined

France to her ancient limits, probably without a war. But, though it would have been easy to prevent her from growing great, it has proved hard, indeed impossible, after she had become great, to reduce her to her former size. The errours of 1672 are visited on the heads of Englishmen in 1806.

Every democrat will exclaim, kings are base creatures, who have no interest in the good of the people. This vile example is not to *our* purpose.

A king can be nothing else but a king: when he loses his throne, he cannot expect to preserve his life. But a magistrate chosen to play the part of a king for four years, may have, and, if he feels a low ambition, will certainly think he has, an interest as a man, very little connected with the temporary splendour of his office. He is to the full as unwilling to be dethroned, as any other king; and, therefore, he will think much of the popularity, that will secure his re-election at the end of four years, and very little of the publick evils, that will lie hidden from the eyes of the people for the next seven.

It would be childish, to think a demagogue will be a disinterested patriot. It would be absurd, to expect that any body, but a patriot of the loftiest elevation of soul, would prefer the publick to himself, and would turn himself out of office by doing thankless and unpopular acts of duty.

A demagogue, then, if, for the punishment of the sins of our nation, any *future* president should prove to be such, would certainly dismantle our ships, and leave the forts of our harbours to crumble into ruins. He would disband our feeble regular regiments, and make haste to repeal taxes, that he may grow rich in popularity, while the government is ostentatiously made to decline in resources. He will bluster to shew the spirit, that he does not possess; and pay tribute to hide the insults and wrongs, that he dare not revenge. In this way, his own shame will be exposed three or four years the later; and the publick evils will happen, at last, with all the aggravation that improvidence and folly can bring.

We make no comparisons—we leave the reader to apply facts, as he may think them applicable. But, we must con-

less, the spirit of party has found our countrymen base, or has made them so, if they can behold the all-conquering progress of French ambition, and then think, with any temper, that our country has not only been left, but for five years artificially and systematically made, defenceless, as if it was intended for a prey.

LESSONS FROM HISTORY.

N°. II.

THE Stuart family kept possession of the English throne from 1603, when queen Elizabeth died, to 1688, when James II. abdicated the government, a period of eighty five years. Though not very bad men, they were bad kings. Their notions of government were such as have been since called tory. They were sincere in their principles of arbitrary power, which were, no doubt, utterly inconsistent with English liberty. We would not be understood to justify all the conduct of the parliament against Charles I. nevertheless, we hold the English in grateful respect for their spirit and good sense, by which they nobly asserted their own liberty, the ever-glorious, fundamental principles of which our ancestors, God bless their memory ! brought over to New-England.

But the ambition and hypocrisy of the parliamentary leaders, and the tyranny which inevitably grew out of their democracy, produced an abhorrence of levelling notions, and an attachment to the church and monarchy, which gave rise, or, at least, credit and currency to the doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance ; doctrines subversive of all liberty.

Hence it was, that, when the infatuation of James II. had assisted William, prince of Orange, to dethrone him, (and the folly of James did more towards it than the arms of William) the English parliament cautiously and timidly admitted the principles of the revolution. To unmake kings, seemed to them a work, that might be repeated successively with less and less necessity, and at length licentiousness, such as fol-

lowed the beheading of Charles I. would ensue. When, therefore, queen Mary, wife of king William and daughter of the exiled king James, died, William remained king by no right of blood, but only by virtue of an act of parliament, which might be repealed by any change of the majority. In this perilous state of things, men's minds were agitated with the fears of a renewal of those bloody dissensions, which the contest for the crown, between the rival houses of York and Lancaster, had engendered and protracted for more than a century.

At length king William died, and also his rival king James; and Anne, another daughter of king James, succeeded to the crown, according to the act of parliament. The death of the duke of Gloucester, the only child of Anne, happened before the death of king William; and, as there was no hope of her having more children, men began to turn their eyes to her brother, the pretender, so called. He was an infant, when the bigotry of his father, king James, obliged him to take refuge in the court of Louis XIV. It seemed, therefore, to many lovers of their country, a needless and a merciless persecution of this young prince, to visit his father's follies on his innocent head, and to prefer the princess Sophia of Hanover, one of the most distant relations of the royal family, to the pretender, who, in right of blood, was heir to the British crown. Yet the whig party got the famous Act of Settlement passed in favour of the princess Sophia, by virtue of which king George III. now holds his power.

In these singular circumstances, it was not strange, that there was a secret intestine agitation of parties and opinions, throughout the whole of queen Anne's reign. She herself, no doubt, wished that her brother, the pretender, might succeed her, in preference to the house of Hanover, whom she deemed strangers. Nevertheless, as she held her crown in prejudice of her brother's right, by an act of parliament, and as the nation had an unconquerable dread of popery and arbitrary power, to which James and his son were supposed to be wedded, she was forced to conceal her inclination and intentions. This was the more necessary, as her whig ministry, men of vast abilities,

were possessed of unbounded popularity, and the victories of the duke of Marlborough threw a glory over her reign and nation.

But so inconstant is popularity, that the credit of the whigs began to decline, in the midst of successes and triumphs. The queen seized the moment to dismiss her ministers, of whom she was weary, and to introduce the tories in their stead.

The new tory ministry affected great zeal for the prosecution of the war against France, though, in their hearts, they wished for peace, because the war supported the popularity of the whigs and the power of Marlborough, their leader, and because it was the interest of their party to have peace. Peace, on many accounts, was indispensable to them, especially, before France was reduced in her power, because they looked forward to the death of queen Anne, when they might need the powerful help of France to place the pretender on the throne.

The duke of Marlborough had been continued in command; and such was his superiour talent, that he had every reason to expect to strip Louis XIV. of all his conquests, and to reduce him to a condition of weakness, which would for ever defeat the enormous project of aggrandizement, which had agitated Europe for fifty years, and which has lately overturned it from its foundation. So far the views of Marlborough and his former whig associates seem to be justified by the wisest policy and the truest patriotism. But the tories made a clamour about the expenses of the war; they preached economy, they affected to prefer the arts and the benefits of peace to the glitter of triumphs and to the delusive acquisitions of war; delusive, they said, for, while England gained nothing, her allies were aggrandizing themselves by conquests, which were won by English arms. The finest writers of almost any age joined the tory cause with their pens; and at length the new ministers dismissed the duke of Marlborough, and privately signed preliminary articles of peace with France. This dishonourable transaction was not long a secret. It produced jealousy and discord among the allies, as might be expected, and at length a wretched peace, which somewhat humbled

France, but stripped her of little of the means, and of none of the disposition, at a more convenient season, to become the mistress of Europe. This she has at length effected.

Thus we see, that a party invested with power, when it has an interest distinct from the national interest, will be carried on by its hatred of its political enemies to sacrifice the publick cause to its own. Heaven forbid, that France should at last triumph over the United States by the operation of such a party interest in America.

LESSONS FROM HISTORY.

N°. III.

Great Britain, whose name and independence, whose king and people every jacobin thinks it a debt of *gratitudè* to France to abhor, was once the sovereign of the territory now called the United States of America.

Mr. Jefferson's wise, vigorous, and pacifick conduct has been so much puffed by his friends, it has become of importance, and will be of more and more, to scrutinize it. If Mr. Jefferson, now we are independent, has done less for our honour and safety than Great Britain did, when we were colonies; if he has done that little, later, and in a manner to make it rather worse than doing nothing at all, our respect for Mr. Jefferson's policy ought to decline, or his friends ought to look out for some other more solid props to support it.

It would seem strange, if, on inquiry, it should appear, that our tyrant and oppressor, as the democrats hold it orthodoxy to consider Great Britain; it would seem strange, that she should have acted with more spirit, promptness, and liberality in asserting our rights, than our government is now willing that we, independent states, should act for ourselves.

Facts, which often spoil the work of party, facts will shew, that no sooner had the war for the succession of the daughter

of the emperour Charles VI. to the dominion of the house of Austria ended by the peace of Aix la Chapelle, in 1748, than France began to extend her forts on our frontiers from the St. Lawrence to the Mississippi. She pretended, that her colonies, Canada and Louisiana, extended to the Allegheny mountains, and included the Mississippi, the Ohio, the Monongahela, and other rivers, as well as the great lakes. France did not merely claim the territory—she proceeded to occupy it with military posts, and to expel the few English settlers that she found within her pretended limits.

Did the English king tell his parliament, that these aggressions sprung from the wantonness of subalterns, unauthorized by their government, and that he relied on the justice of his most christian majesty for redress? Did he send a humble embassy to Paris to beg for it? and, when it could not be had for begging, did he get an appropriation of two millions, and then spend fifteen to buy it? and, after finding that he had paid for it in vain, did he send to Paris two millions more for leave only to talk about buying it again? When Spain encroached upon us, when she stopped the navigation of the Mississippi in avowed violation of our solemn right by treaty, what did we leave undone, that baseness, crawling on its belly, like a reptile on the ground, could possibly do to prevail on the proud aggressor to forbear treading upon us? We asked his contempt, as if it was our interest, by obtaining it, to quiet his groundless fears of retaliation.

In 1754, Great Britain reasoned and acted very differently. She might have said, these encroachments of France will make the factious colonists feel their dependence upon the mother country a little more than they do. The acts of La Galissoniere, the French governour of Canada, are not the acts of Louis XV. I may wink at these wrongs, and postpone my vengeance, till I have refreshed my wasted strength after the disastrous war that I have just terminated; an unpopular and, perhaps, impolitick war, which has increased the burdens of my people, and their impatience in bearing them. If par-

liament had sitten with closed doors, the king might have talked two languages, like Mr. Jefferson, war and peace.

Great Britain said nothing of the sort. She looked at these aggressions, and she saw in the whole aspect of affairs, as in a looking-glass, blotches of dishonour, like leprosy in her face, if she should bear these wrongs with a tameness that she foresaw would multiply them. She did not hesitate—orders were immediately sent to all the governours to repel force by force; and major Washington, a name sacred to honour and patriotism, was sent out to repel the French on the Ohio. Nevertheless, though war was waged in America, it was not declared in Europe. To the spirit of Great Britain, so promptly and powerfully roused in our cause, we owe the expulsion of the French from Canada: an event which has saved us from a war with France to maintain our independence.

Here, then, are two cases, their circumstances not unlike, the policy of Great Britain and Mr. Jefferson totally unlike. Compare them.

LESSONS FROM HISTORY.

N°. IV.

ROME was a republick from its very birth. It is true, for two hundred and forty four years it was subject to kings; but the spirit of liberty was never more lofty at any period of its long troubled life, than when Rome was governed by kings. They were in war, generals; in peace, only magistrates. For seven hundred years Rome remained a republick; and during every minute of that time the spirit of conquest excited and ruled every Roman breast.

For thirty years America has been a republick; and during every minute of those thirty years the only question has been, how could she make independence *cheap*, and not for one minute, how could liberty be made durable and glorious.

Liberty has rocked the cradle and suckled the infancy of both republicks. They are different; but why they are different,

and how different they are, it would take an octavo volume to tell.

Glory was the object of the Roman republick; and gain is of ours. A Roman felt as if the leprosy had broken out in his cheek, when his country was dishonoured; and *we charge it in our ledger*. To Rome it cost blood; to us, ink or tribute.

Soon or late every great nation will act out its character. As we do not aspire to glory, we shall never reach it; and our short-sighted policy, which will not provide by the expense of to-morrow for the danger of the day after, will be overwhelmed at last by the destruction of the sordid interests, for which we have sacrificed more precious ones.

Without forces, ships, or revenue, we get tallow on our ribs like the oxen, we make honey like the bees, we carry fleeces like the sheep, and we build nests like the birds, not for ourselves, but for others, for Buonaparte.

LESSONS FROM HISTORY.

No. V.

MACHIAVEL, in his history of Florence, has shewn, that the rivalship of the great men and the common people is the everlasting source of discord in republicks. In Rome, he says, it led to dominion; in Florence, to slavery and dependency. Whence, he asks, was the difference? In Rome, every thing was settled by reason and expostulation; and in Florence by the sword. In Rome they wished to employ their great men; and in Florence to exterminate them. Accordingly, Rome grew from little to great; and Florence dwindled from great to little.

The disciples of the school of equality would learn by studying Machiavel, who studied nature, how wide those men run from the principles of liberty, who carry those principles to impracticable extremes.

But what avails federal truth? If every grave-stone of a departed republick bore a lesson of wisdom and of warning, the democrats would shut their eyes rather than look upon it. They have no idea of any principles, except in their extremes, when they are no longer principles. We not only seem to choose our own destiny, but to control it. By our extravagance we render every thing impossible, but our degradation.

It may please God, in the course of his providence, to train our nation by misfortune, and to fit it for greatness by some ages of adversity; but if we should be left to train ourselves, we must be abject and base.

BRITISH ALLIANCE.

First published in the Repertory, November, 1806.

THOSE are not the wisest of men, who undertake to act always by rule. In political affairs, there are no more self-conceited blunderers than the statesmen, who affect to proceed, in all cases, without regard to circumstances, but solely according to speculative principles.

POLITICKS is the science of good sense, applied to publick affairs; and, as those are for ever changing, what is wisdom to-day would be folly and, perhaps, ruin to-morrow. Politicks is not a science so properly as a business. It cannot have fixed principles, from which a wise man would never swerve, unless the inconstancy of men's views of interest and the capriciousness of their tempers could be fixed.

WE make these remarks, because we are sometimes sorry, and sometimes diverted, at the dispute about an alliance offensive and defensive with Great Britain. If ever there was a question of moonshine, this is one. There is no more probability, that Mr. Jefferson will conclude such a treaty, than that he will breakfast to-morrow morning upon gun-powder; and it is the prevailing opinion, that he is fonder of hominy. We might as well speculate upon our probable condition, "if "angels in the form of presidents should come down to the "federal city to govern us;" or who would get or lose a fat commission, if the time had come when Mr. Jefferson would make no other inquiry than, "is he capable, is he honest?" It is a pity, that our printers should argue, and contend, and explain about *any* of these matters of moonshine.

IF the time should ever come, (and a new race of men must be let down from the sky before it *can* come) when an honest spirit of patriotism will have such a question to decide, our

Catos, and our Ciceros, and Favonii would say, the decision must depend on *circumstances*, not on principles deduced a priori. *Salus reipublicæ suprema lex esto.* To serve and save the commonwealth, controls all maxims.

It is absurd to say, Washington made no such treaty, and, therefore, Mr. Jefferson ought not to make it. The times never required it of Washington; and if they had, that firm and tempered soul, that heard reproach in the huzzas of popularity, unless conscience sanctioned its applause, would have impelled him to a treaty offensive and defensive with Great Britain. The heart swells and convulses at the mention of his name (in contrast even) with Jefferson's. But even Jefferson ought not to be reproached for negotiating such a treaty, when the circumstances may require it. We are not disposed to assert, that at present they do require it. We hope, but while they negotiate with France we scarcely know *why* we hope, that British hearts, such stout hearts as our ever-renowned ancestors wore, will resist Buonaparte, till his despotism has spent its fury, or the subject nations of Europe have recovered their spirit. Nevertheless, if American independence could not be preserved, without joining Great Britain to resist its great enemy, the coward world's master, is there an American who would object to such an alliance? An alliance of this sort with any nation, is an evil; but to say, there is no condition of our affairs, in which it would not be a less evil than subjugation, or than the increased peril of subjugation, without such a concert of counsels and of efforts, is book-wisdom. It is that sort of folly and infatuation, which every nation that now wears French chains has fitted itself for slavery by first adopting.

Whenever, therefore, a miracle is about to be publickly wrought, and Mr. Jefferson grows so careless of his popularity and so careful of his country, as to act the great part, which the reduction of the British power would justify and require, let not the federalists take off from his shoulders to their own the reproach of suffering our liberties to be seized by France as a prey.

If Britain falls in fighting our battles, we must fight our own; and what law of sound policy or true wisdom is there, that we should choose to fight them, unassisted and alone? *We do* NOT *say that the time has come*—heaven forbid it should; but it may come, and that speedily, when the opposition to a British alliance would be treason against American independence. Let French emissaries cavil, but let Americans ponder.

THE DURATION OF FRENCH DESPOTISM.

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THE attempt has been repeatedly made in former communications to shew, that the establishment of a universal French monarchy has become an exceedingly probable event; and, moreover, that if the resistance of the British navy should, from any cause whatever, be withdrawn, the United States will become, in effect, a province or department of France. As, from the nature of our government, and the temper and views of the parties that engross its powers, it is a thing ascertained, that we must quietly submit to the domination of a master, it is a subject of natural, yet painful curiosity to inquire, *how long will this dominion last?*

THE answer to this question is, we confess, concealed among the impenetrable secrets of that Providence, which disposes of human affairs. Nevertheless, it would belong to the prudent foresight of our rulers, if our rulers were wise, to discern evils in their causes, to retard their progress, and to alleviate their pressure. And since those, to whom we have confided the safe keeping of our liberties, seem resolved to renounce all dependence on ourselves, and to abandon the ultimate disposal of them to chance and to Buonaparte, it may be of some assistance to our spirit of passive resignation, the only sort of spirit that our fall is likely to rouse, to create, if we can, a hope, that a destiny so near its fulfilment, so intolerable in degree, will be transient in duration. If, after only half a century of subjugation by France, the empire of the modern Tamerlane should fall to pieces, the successors of Jefferson (and fifty years of slavery might qualify some of our posterity to be his successors,) would no doubt exult, that we had recovered our liberty, as we lost it, without effort; that we had outlived our conqueror; that, instead of irritating his resentment, we had prudently endeavoured to conciliate his favour by the alacrity of our submission and the largeness of the tribute,

which no expensive hostile preparations had been permitted to impair; that, like the flexible willows, we had lain flat to the earth, till the storm had passed over our heads; whereas, if we had stiffened ourselves against its violence, we might have been uprooted, like the oaks. And here our rulers may hope to dig from the mire of our publick degradation an impure but copious treasure of future popularity for their wisdom and firmness. They have already extracted it from materials scarcely less unpromising and foul.

In political conjectures no guide is in the least a safe one, but experience; and each event is so much determined by its own peculiar circumstances, that analogy often fails, where, it would seem on first inspection, similitude does not. The Roman empire had its origin about seven hundred and fifty years before Christ; and lasted almost four hundred and eighty years after Christ. This long period of twelve hundred and thirty years, that the Roman state endured, may be called political longevity; and, as the French imitate the Romans, we naturally inquire, whether we are to expect to have the yoke of France so long, or half so long, upon our necks. There was scarcely one of the twelve hundred years that Rome subsisted, that her dominion was not odious or dangerous, and the greater part of the time both odious and dangerous, to her neighbours. The weight of her yoke was aggravated by the arrogance of her spirit. She not only chained conquered kings to her car of triumph, but, as her proconsuls had to practise oppression in the provinces, that they might be able to practise bribery at Rome, she trod with the weight of a war elephant, having a castle on his back, on the necks of her subjects.

Imagine not, my countrymen, a French conqueror will tread lightly, when you are prostrate. Wo to the vanquished, is ever his maxim. There was no measure, there was no end to the Roman exactions. There is only a small part of the surplus wealth of a state, that a lawful government will touch; and even a usurper will have an interest in sparing more than he takes; but the rapacity of a conqueror is pitiless and insatiable. The populace of Rome voted the confiscation of the wealth of the king of

Cyprus; and if a patriot could have proved to them, that, with more regard to justice, there would have been less booty, would such considerations have produced a mitigation of the rigour of their decree? A conqueror can take all; and what he leaves, he thinks mercy.

It is far from being certain, that we know any thing of the foundation of Rome. But however obscure we may deem its origin, there can be no doubt, that for several hundred years its territory was small, and the number of its subjects less than half a million. Nevertheless, there can be no stronger proof of the force of her institutions, than that Rome, even in her infancy, and with fewer people than Massachusetts contains, had cherished pretensions of superiority and formed plans of aggrandizement, that seem scarcely credible, even after they have been accomplished. They considered the capital not merely as a fortress, but it was the "immobile saxum," the eminence on which Jupiter had commanded his temple to be built, in token of his protection of his favourite people. Even then, they called Rome the *eternal* city, the metropolis of nations. After the burning of Rome by the Gauls, the removal of the citizens to Veii was opposed, on the ground that the gods had promised the dominion of the world to the inhabitants of that spot. The people, who reverenced the gods, submitted, and proceeded to rebuild their houses, instead of occupying much better houses at Veii.

France, on the contrary, from the first union of the tribes of the Franks under Clovis, has been a powerful state. It is true, the *national* character has been ever in a high degree warlike; but the individual character of the Roman citizens was infinitely more so. Modern armies, the French as well as the rest, are formed of the lowest of the populace—the Romans excluded all such from the honour of bearing arms. In the early ages of the republick, and, indeed, till the time of Marius, the Roman soldiers were the proprietors of the land. The prodigious force of a state, though small in territory and number of people, whose citizens were all soldiers, will appear from this fact. Not long after Rome was taken by the Gauls,

and had seemed to be ruined, the little state of Latium revolted, and took arms against the republick. Rome instantly arrayed ten legions of citizens, an army scarcely less in numbers, and superiour in force and discipline to that, which a confederacy of half Europe was able to furnish under king William against Louis XIV. At the present day, such a city and territory as then formed the Roman republick, nay, modern Rome itself and the very same territory would be awed into submission and kept in fear by a regiment of foot and two or three squadrons of horse. There can be no doubt, that ten such legions composed a more powerful army than the million, with which Xerxes invaded Greece, or than all the forces Darius could oppose to Alexander the great. It is far from certain, that Alexander's own army would have proved a match for the Romans.

If, then, we make the comparison, which the vanity of the *great* nation ardently desires to exhibit, we must not compare Frenchmen and Romans, but the modern empire of France with the old Roman empire, after the subversion of the republick. There may be some resemblance between the means and policy of the two states, though there is none in the character of the individuals. It is true, that the French recruit their army by conscriptions; but it is also true, that the men, who are not thus drafted into the army, are mere unwarlike citizens. It was otherwise in Rome. The nobles were all generals, and the common people the best soldiers in the world.

But, after the civil wars of Marius and Sylla, the refuse of the city of Rome were admitted into the armies, and the owners of land in Italy were expelled by force to make donations of farms to the conquering soldiers. After these events, Rome was filled with a spiritless and abject multitude. Instead of the people, who had looked with defiance upon the triumphant banners of Hannibal waving in sight of their walls, like every other overgrown city, it trembled and submitted on every hostile summons.

Rome acquired her conquests not only by the superiority of her institutions, but because those institutions had made the individual Romans superiour to their enemies; but when all the nations around the Mediterranean had submitted to her sway, this personal superiority was no longer to be seen any where, except in the Roman armies. They long excelled all rivals and enemies in every soldierly qualification: and here, perhaps, the similitude between Rome and France begins.

The French armies are, no doubt, superiour in Europe; whether they outnumber their enemies, or place a much larger proportion of cavalry in every field of battle, or bring with them more field pieces and serve them more skilfully than their enemies. Whatever may be the cause of this superiority, the fact is indisputable, that the French are, at least, as much superiour to the Prussians, as the Romans were to the Macedonians.

Our principal question, then, recurs, assuming it for certain, that the French will establish a universal empire, how long will it last? In a battle, the best of the two armies will win the victory; but, though conquests may be won by victories, it is extremely difficult to conceive, what means any conqueror can possess long to maintain them. The petty states bordering on Rome were gradually, in a course of four hundred years, subdued by her arms; nor was the final conquest achieved without admitting them as allies, to be partners of her dominion and the associates of her glory. At length their union with the state was as perfect, as that of Normandy, once a hostile province, now is with the rest of France. But the Samnites had more power, and more implacable hatred to Rome than her other foes; and, therefore, they were nearly exterminated, like the insurgents of La Vendee.

Thus Italy was moulded into one state, before Pyrrhus, and after him the Carthaginians, contended with Rome. Macedonia was not a great state, but Philip and Perseus had fine armies. When these were routed, Macedonia was what Prussia is now. Greece, like the German empire, was an anarchy of republicks, which, because it was easy to divide, it cost no

trouble to subdue, or to keep in subjection. Egypt, under the Ptolemies, was as despicable as the French found it lately under the mamelukes. The Romans overthrew Antiochus the great, and seized all the provinces of Asia more easily than their best general could take the single cities of Carthage or Numantia.

To preserve her conquests, Rome built no fortresses, and resorted to no other means than armies and colonies. Her empire contained, Mr. Gibbon computes, about one hundred and twenty millions of souls; yet her army did not exceed sixty legions, being less than four hundred thousand men.

The French keep on foot more soldiers; but, it is to be considered, their career of conquest was begun only ten years ago. They have imposed their yoke on nations, not divided into a hundred independent tribes, like the Gauls and Spaniards, not barbarians, like the Germans, not effeminate, like the Asiaticks, but on nations, who confided so entirely on their union, resources, and spirit, that they supposed it impossible they should be conquered. The states now subject to France exceed her in the number of soldiers, they still exceed her in the number of people. Their fall has roused every passion of pride, fear, and vengeance; and there is not the least reason to suppose, that the insolence and rapacity of the conqueror will suffer them to subside. The difference of language, character, and condition will prevent their assimilation into one people for many years.

Long before such an assimilation could take place, the military despotism of France will be weakened by its own intemperance and excess. As Buonaparte reigns by uniting in himself the command of all the armies, whenever his death, infirmity, or adversity shall afford the opportunity, may we not expect, that the command of a great separate army will inspire into its chief the design of independence? For instance, Poland, and the North of Germany, which, let it be observed, the Romans could never subdue, could not be holden without a large French army; nor would that army, stationed for many years in the same quarters, lose the occasion of a vacancy in the government, to consider their general as their emperour

or king, and to place him on the throne of the country subject to their military jurisdiction. It is in vain for Buonaparte to multiply decrees of his senate, declaring his empire indivisible and hereditary. It is possible and, indeed, probable, that the government of France itself may after many years of convulsion become so.

But the vast countries overrun by the French will not lose their ancient honours and their recent shame; and if the descendants of their expelled princes should not recover their thrones, if their former subjects should not resume their arms, and chase the French out of their territories, yet the ambition of the French generals will divide the empire. The conquests of Charlemagne were sudden; but the nations, who were rather confounded than subdued, resumed their independence under his feeble successors.

The wars of the ancients were marked with a peculiar animation and even ferocity. The weaker always dreaded, and generally suffered every extremity from the fury of the victor. The people were slaves, and all their property, including lands and houses, was booty. Such contests could not be maintained with the half hostile, half traitorous languor of the modern wars against France. They needed, and they roused all the energies of all the citizens. But when the war was over, the conqueror stripped his captives as naked of power as of all other possessions. Hence it was, that the Romans found it so extremely difficult to subdue enemies, who fought to the last with all the energy of despair; and hence too it was, that, when once effectually conquered, we hear no more of their resistance. The Romans were not greatly troubled with insurrections, except of their armies.

It is, however, the law, as well as the motive of modern conquests, to preserve rather than to destroy. The subjects change masters; they are oppressed by military contributions; but they are not wholly stripped. It is scarcely possible, that the mildest exercise of a conqueror's rights should not enrage them, or that any modern mitigation of them should wholly disarm their vengeance.

It ought to be observed, too, as a consequence of the last remark, that, in the times of the Roman emperours, the population of every country was in a great measure composed of slaves; that of Europe, which France has overrun, is much sounder. Rome, soon after the expulsion of the kings, was filled with citizens, who were all soldiers; but, in the time of the emperours, its vast walls were crowded with, perhaps, a million of slaves, who were all abject and base. As this was the case in Rome, it was still worse in Alexandria, Antioch, Nicomedia, Carthage, Sirmium, Aquileia, Ravenna, and Naples. A degenerate race of conquerors could keep slaves in subjection.

But the people of Germany are, at least, as warlike as those of France. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to conceive, what means the conqueror possesses or can employ always to keep his equals in his chains. Their princes may lose their thrones; but we cannot resist the opinion, that, ultimately, the nations will recover their independence.

Supposing, then, that the French empire is, in its very structure and principles, a temporary sway, that the causes, whatever they may be, which have made its action irresistible, produce and prolong a re-action sufficient in the end to counteract their impulse, ought we not, as men, as patriots, to hope, that Great Britain may be able to protract her resistance, till that re-action shall be manifested? And, as mere idle wishes are unbecoming the wise and the brave, ought not the American nation to make haste to establish such a navy as will limit the conqueror's ravages to the dry land of Europe? We have more than a million tons of merchant shipping; more, much more, than queen Elizabeth of England, and Philip II. of Spain, both possessed, in the time of the famous armada. We may be slaves in soul, and possess the means of defence, without daring to use them. We do possess them, and, if our spirit bore proportion to those means, in a very few years our ships could stretch a ribbon across every harbour of France, and say with authority to the world's master stop; here thy proud course is stayed.

DANGEROUS POWER OF FRANCE. N°. IV.

SUBJECT RESUMED.

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WHEN men indulge their passions, they seldom stop where they should: excess breeds more excess. Party hatred surpasses all other, as if fiends from the bottomless pit had breathed their fell inspiration into the human heart. Their virulence strikes the understanding blind, and blindness augments their virulence, till a civil war rages in the state, and, without resort to arms, quenches half the joys and all the charities of life. In this condition, liberty is ejected from her temple, and stripped of her ornaments and her charms. And as impunity is not often long indulged to habitual vice and folly, whether in a publick or an individual, the enemy of the state seldom neglects the inviting opportunity to make a fatal progress, while the attention of the magistrate, who ought to be our common parent and protector, is wholly engrossed by a contest with *his* enemy. The chief ruler is in that case degraded from his exalted station. He is a man, and, when such passions blind him, a weak and bad man too, a magistrate for disorder, and our guardian to betray us.

In these observations we should suppose every man would concur, who is capable of understanding them; and, in this great crisis, we should think he could apply them too. Possibly, so predominant are party feelings, those will refuse assent to their truth, who can foresee their just political application. Nevertheless, let us presume to apply them.

Mr. Jefferson has wrapped up all diplomatick communications from France in mystery. Yet we believe it is unjust, on that account, to accuse him of a partial fondness for Buonaparte. Love Buonaparte! No human being ever loved him. Love the crocodile; love the shark, who feeds upon the dead; or the royal tyger of Bengal, who snatches your children

from the cradle, and cracks their bones in your sight. Mr. Jefferson may fear Buonaparte, but he cannot love him. Nor is it possible, that he should wish to give him power in the United States. From the inestimable sacrifices he made to get his present power, we may be certain, that he loves it. Nor can we admit, that Mr. Jefferson, a veteran, and, many choose to say, an oracle in politicks, can be blind to the formidable danger of the present day. He knows, that France is not now in the political world what she was, when he was a publick minister to Louis XVI. Excepting England, she has absorbed that world into her own limits. A change of fourteen centuries has passed over her head. She has gone back so much, and Attila, "the scourge of God," has come again.

Mr. Jefferson knows, that there is but one obstacle to the progress of French power, and that is the hated British navy. The immortal spirit of the wood nymph liberty, dwells only in the British oak. Suppose that navy destroyed, would our liberty survive a week? The wind of the blow that should destroy British independence, would strike our own senseless to the earth. Boastful and vain as we are, the very thought of independence would take flight from our hearts.

We have a curiosity to know, whether Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison do really believe we could support our liberty, if Great Britain had lost hers. Without intending to indulge in the too common rudeness and disrespect of party addresses, we should deem it a signal work of patriotism, if, by any thing we shall offer, we could induce those gentlemen to examine, with the precision and acuteness of mind that they are allowed to possess, this awful question for America, If Great Britain falls, will not America fall? Shall we not lie in the dust at the conqueror's foot, and with servile, affected joy receive our chains without resistance.

It will be ever fashionable to boast of the invincible spirit of freemen, as long as power is to be won by flattery. We remark, that some speakers in congress assume it as a thing impossible, that an invading foe could make any progress in our country. Others, in party opposition to them, either blind

to the truth, or afraid to speak it, readily assent to the assertion, that the United States are unconquerable. Thus a dangerous delusion acquires not only a plausible authority, but it seems to be a violation of the sanctity of the national faith to expose it.

This is no time to trifle—let it be exposed.

If Great Britain were conquered, Buonaparte could have her fifteen hundred ships; if only humbled, he could have the ships of all the rest of Europe to transport an army under one of his lieutenants to our shores, as numerous as he might think necessary to ensure conquest. Power seldom long wants means. He could send over twenty thousand, and more, if wanted, of his dismounted horsemen, with their saddles, bridles, and equipments. He would not fail to secure horses from our islands, such as Long Island, and the extensive necks and promontories, which could not be defended against him.

Being master of the sea, he could make large and frequent detachments from his camp to defenceless regions, which he would strip. To this let it be added, the American army, if we should have an army, being concentred to some well-chosen mountainous place, would, of course, leave the cities a prey.

Thus it cannot be doubted, that he would have horses to remount his cavalry. Suppose a numerous French army, having two fifths of its force cavalry, with all the formidable thousands of light artillery that brought Austria and Prussia to his feet in a day. Would the American militia face this army? Suppose they do not—then our cities, our whole coast, and all the open cultivated country are French. Would the millions on and near the coast take flight to the mountains? Could they subsist, or would they remain long unmolested there? Mountains, when no equal army was in the field, never did stop the soldiers of Buonaparte.

Let us come back, then, to our militia army, since we are obliged to see, that the French would effectually conquer our country, if our army should not be able to check their rapid progress. Could we collect an army? On all the coast would

be terrour, busy concern to hide property, and to shelter women, helpless age, and infancy. The seaports would not only retain their own men, but call in those of the neighbouring country to defend them. Probably, they would ask an addition of troops from government.

It would, therefore, be a difficult and very slow work, to collect a militia army equal in numbers to the French. Near fifty thousand men were sent to Egypt, and as many more to St. Domingo. Had either of those armies landed here, could we have faced them with an equal force, equal in numbers? We think not.

Let Mr. Jefferson ask any skilful old continental officer, whether our army of militia would push bayonet with the French. No military man would say, that our militia would stand the tug of war, and defeat the French.

Did we not, cries some wordy patriot, contend with the British? The answer would be long, to make it as decisive as we think it really is. The British were cooped up in Boston a year. In 1778, sir William Howe had only four or five hundred cavalry, and he moved as if he was more afraid of our beating him, than resolved to beat us.

At Long Island, Washington was totally defeated, and might have been made prisoner with his whole army. He was not pursued. In the third year of the war, his troops, and even the militia of the states in the scene of the war, had become considerably disciplined. It is not denied, that with three years preparation we could have an army; but we make no preparation; and unless we *enlist* our men, the parade of militia is a serious buffoonery. When sir William Howe forced our men from the field, he had no cavalry, and our men could flee faster than his could pursue. But the French—experience has shewn, that, when they win battles, they decide the war. Myriads of cavalry press upon the fugitives, and in half a day the defence of a nation is captive or slain. Defeat is irremediable destruction.

Would our stone walls stop their horse? Then the pioneers would pull down those walls. Shooting from behind fences

would not stop an army; nor would our militia venture on a measure that would be fatal: the numerous and widely extended flanking parties would cut off all such adventurers to a man. No, Mr. Jefferson, do not lull your fears to sleep, do not aggravate our publick dangers by a mistake of our situation. There are times, and the case of invasion would be a time, when the mistakes of our rulers could not be committed with impunity.

With an army less than two hundred thousand, but with double the common proportion of cavalry, Buonaparte has overrun the German empire, Austria, Prussia, and all continental Europe from the Adriatick to the Baltick, rich, populous, and computed formerly to arm a million of soldiers.

The democratick gazettes have uniformly maintained, that Buonaparte's unvaried success was not owing to chance, but to the real, irresistible superiority of the French arms, to their newly improved tacticks, and to the impetuosity of their attack. All this, rare as our agreement with the democrats may be, all this we believe; and we solemnly warn Mr. Jefferson not lightly to reject the long habitual opinion of his party. We firmly, though unwillingly believe, that as the old Romans, were superiour to their enemies, so the French are, at least, as much superiour to their enemies by *land*. The vast extent of both empires, Roman and French, grew out of this superiority.

Hence we conclude, that, if our militia army should fight a battle, they would lose it. They would inevitably lose it, and the loss of the battle would be the loss of the country. The French would hold the coast by their fleet, and the interiour by their army. Be it remembered too, that Canada would be French, if Great Britain should be subdued, and the Floridas and Louisiana, though she should not. Where, then, would be the security of the mountains? Much dreadful experience, and more dreadful fears would follow the conquest, till at length, like the rest of the world, we should enjoy the quiet of despair and the sleep of slavery. Popularity, as dear perhaps as liberty, will be sought no more; and we shall place our

happiness, if slaves may talk of happiness, in the smiles, or, still better, in the neglect of a master.

We have purposely omitted an infinity of proofs in corroboration of our melancholy conclusion, that, in case of a French invasion, the country would be literally conquered. We should tamely accept a Corsican prince for a king, and, in virtue of our *alliance* with France, agree by treaty to maintain French troops enough to keep down insurrection. Far be it from us to believe, that our fellow citizens in the militia are not brave. Their very bravery, we apprehend, would ensure their defeat: they would dare to attempt what militia cannot achieve. Nor let the heroick speech-makers pretend, that our citizens would swear to live free or die; and that they would resist, till the country was depopulated or emancipated. There is no foundation in human nature for this boast. The Swiss were free, and loved their liberty as well as men ever did; yet they are enslaved, and quiet in their chains. Experience shews, that men are glad to survive the loss of liberty. They must be mad, to continue to resist the power, that, on trial, has been found superiour and irresistible. Myriads of persons, we see, are glad, on pecuniary encouragement, to go into the army, where every democrat will insist there cannot be liberty, because there is restraint.

Our readers might soon be tired, if they are not already, but we should never be tired ourselves to diversify our argument to prove, in contradiction to the groundless and perhaps treacherous pretensions of faction, that our country is absolutely defenceless against Buonaparte, when master of the sea. We could urge, that the French troops marched through countries having three or four times as many people as the United States, with the quietness of a procession. Does he not confide in the conquest of Great Britain, if he could only reach the shore with his troops? Yet Great Britain has twice our population, in a narrow compass too, and nearly one hundred times our military force.

With so many proofs, after so decisive experience of the resistless march of the French, is it not presumption, folly,

madness to suppose we could be free, if France had the British fleet. To our minds the proof is demonstration.

We do not urge this fearful conclusion, because we despise our countrymen, or wish to see America dishonoured. Far, far from our hearts are such abominable wishes. Look, look, fellow countrymen, as we do, to your dear, innocent children. Ask your hearts, if they can bear so racking a question, whether a shallow confidence in our unarmed security against Buonaparte, in case Great Britain should fall, does not tend to devote them to the rage of a restless, unappeasable tyrant. We tremble at the thought, that our own dear children will be in Buonaparte's conscription for St. Domingo, in case the Gallican policy of our government should be pursued, till its natural tendencies are accomplished*.

To fools we say nothing, nothing to traitors, with whom a troubled republick is always cursed; but we would ask Mr. Jefferson, we would ask all sober citizens, whether, if the danger of an invasion be considered as really impending, we ought not to have an army to meet it? We ask further, would a raw army, raised when the foe is on our shores, be fit to oppose him? Would you stake the life of our liberty upon the resistance that paper could make against iron?

No, every man would say, that, if we are to fight an invading enemy, sixty thousand strong, in 1810 or 1812, we have no time to lose in raising an army, *by enlistment*, stronger than the invaders, and training them to an equality of subordination, discipline, and confidence in themselves and their officers. Such an army with cavalry, artillery, engineers, &c. would be too expensive for our means, or for the temper of our citizens, who have been studiously taught to hold taxes as grievances and wrongs. The thing, we grant, is impossible. To depend on a militia not *enlisted* nor disciplined as before mentioned, is madness.

It follows, then, we think, irresistibly, demonstratively, that our single hope of security is in the triumphs of the British

* The writer could scarcely speak of his children, during the last few months of his life, without expressing his deep apprehensions of their future servitude to the French.

navy. While *that* rides mistress of the ocean, the French can no more pass it to attack us, than they could ford the bottomless pit.

HITHERTO we have designedly avoided all party topicks. We have gone upon the supposition, that the democrats do not wish their children slaves to Buonaparte, any more than our own. We take it for clear, that it is of more national importance to be free, than to carry coffee to Amsterdam. If, then, we have so great interests depending, we cannot but wonder, that Mr. Jefferson should endanger them for the sake of minor interests, which are, in comparison, but as the small dust of the balance. He professes to aim his measures at the destruction of the British "tyranny of the seas;" and he seems to exult in the thought, that they are adequate to his end. God forbid that they should be! God, of his mercy, forbid, that, after having led our forefathers by the hand, and, as it were, by his immediate power planted a great nation in the wilderness, he should permit the passions or the errours of our chief to plunge us into ruin and slavery. Shall this French magog be allowed to pluck our star from its sphere, and quench its bright orb in the sea?

IT is apprehended, that Mr. Jefferson is entirely convinced, that Great Britain is now making her expiring efforts. It is said, he holds it impossible, that she should resist Buonaparte two years longer. Then let him wear sackcloth. Let him gather a colony, and lead them to hide from a conqueror's pursuit in the trackless forests near the sources of the Missouri. Frost, hunger, and poverty will not gripe so hard as Buonaparte.

BUT, if he expects the speedy destruction of Great Britain, what motive has he to exert himself to hasten it. He knows mankind, he knows Buonaparte too well to hope, that the tyrant's hand will be the lighter for that merit. That bosom, so notoriously steeled against pity, will not melt to friendship. Among the infinite diversity of a madman's dreams, was there ever one so extravagant, as that a republick might safely trust its liberty to the *sentiment* of a master? Every moon-beam at Washington must have shot frenzy, if such a motive among

politicians could have influenced action. If liberty should fall, as it will, if France prevails, at least, let us have the consolation to say, our hands have not assisted in the assassination.

But is it so very clear, that Great Britain will fall in the conflict? A youthful conqueror, scorning all doubts of the unlimited efficiency of his power, has prohibited the use of British manufactures, and all intercourse even of neutrals with her merchants. He expects to cut off the roots of her greatness, or to see her wither, like a girdled oak, and her tall trunk nodding to its fall, making it dangerous to approach her. He seems, like many of our politicians, to suppose, that her greatness is factitious, and that her foreign trade is the aliment and life of its support. For our part, we deem her grandeur intrinsick, the fair fruit of her constitution, her justice, her arts, and her magnanimity. But, as we mean to avoid contested points, we restrain ourselves to consider the effect of Buonaparte's decrees to ruin her. He is neither omnipotent nor omniscient. Of course, we imagine, that distance, art, avarice, and necessity will conspire to elude his vindictive blockading orders.

If he succeeds, we hope he will not conquer England. If he fails, as we trust he will fail, his attempt will furnish her with augmented means of a perpetual resistance. British goods will be clandestinely admitted into the continent, after they have been charged with British duties. The scarcity will augment the price, so that the duty will not prevent the sale; on the contrary, there will be the strongest allurements of profit. The French government will be so far from able to suppress the traffick, that we are rather to expect it will be itself under the necessity of occasionally relaxing the rigour of its decrees. After having for some time contemplated the effect of Buonaparte's decrees, we have gradually subdued our fears of the impoverishment of Great Britain from their operation.

Nor let Mr. Jefferson imagine, that our country can derive any temporary advantage from our co-operation in his decrees. He disdains to wait for the slow progress of art to accomplish

his purposes. He now expects to win allies only by terrour. Let them hate, if they do but fear, is his maxim. If Great Britain enforces her countervailing orders, our neutrality cannot longer assist to supply his wants. Enraged to be thus met by Great Britain, nothing remains but for him to intimidate Mr. Jefferson into an alliance. The world's master allows no neutrality. In fact there are no neutrals. The maritime law supposes a society of nations bound together by reciprocal rights and duties. That society is dissolved; and it is chimerical, if not unwarrantable, for the United States to claim singly the aggregated and supposed residuary rights devolved upon us by the departed nations. The old system is gone; and it is a mockery, or worse, for one nation to affect to represent a dozen once independent states, now swallowed up by a conqueror. Ambition will violate our moonshine rights; and if we submit to his decrees, we ourselves violate our neutral duties. What tyranny will do in contempt of right, self-preservation permits the other belligerent to do in strict conformity with it. Where, then, is neutrality? Let us be ashamed of a petulent strife about lost and irrecoverable pretensions. It is a sort of posthumous wisdom, that, when the publick dangers thicken, always looks back, and never looks round our actual position. Why should we not look our condition in the face? The question is not about the profits of navigation, but the security of our existence.

Why do our publick men wilfully blind themselves, and regard no dangers but such as they apprehend from the hostility of party? The earth we tread on holds the bones of the deceased patriots of the revolution. Why will the sacred silence of the grave be broken? Will the illustrious shades walk forth into publick places, and audibly pronounce a warning to convince us, that the independence, for which they bled, is in danger? No; without a miracle, the exercise of our reason would convince us, that our independence is in danger from France; and, if Great Britain falls by force, terrour alone would bring us into subjection.

We do not love or respect our country less than those, who inconsiderately boast of its invincible strength and prowess. As *the destroyer of nations* has enslaved Europe, and as only one nation, Great Britain, has hindered his coming here to conquer us, they have no ears to hear, they have no hearts to feel for our country, who would break down that obstacle and let him in.

This is not a party effusion; it proceeds from hearts that are ready to burst with anxiety on the prospect of the political insanity that seems ready to join the foe. It is republican suicide, it is treachery to the people, to make them an innocent sacrifice to the passions of our rulers.

Let Mr. Jefferson avail himself of the power, that his weight with his own party gives him, and stop the progress of our fate. We do not ask him to go to war with France. Consult prudence, and renounce the affection of that false honour, which has been of late so much upon our lips. He will find the federalists love their country better than their party. Let there be peace, merely peace, we say nothing of alliance with Great Britain; and if our champion falls in the combat, let us not, when we perish, deplore the fatal folly of having contributed to hasten his and our destruction.

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THE DANGERS
OF
AMERICAN LIBERTY.

WRITTEN IN THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR 1805.

Now first published.

IN February 1805, the following sketch of a dissertation on "The Dangers of American Liberty," accompanied with a short familiar letter+, was sent by Mr. Ames to a friend for his perusal. It was soon returned, for the purposes expressed in the author's letter, with a hope that he would re-consider, revise, and complete it; and especially that he would fulfil his original design of applying his argument in a manner, that would lead the people to preserve as long as possible the civil blessings they enjoy, and not sacrifice them to delusive theories.

It does not appear, that the author ever resumed his subject, or that the manuscript was opened after that period, until since his death. Yet it is thought not improper to gratify the publick with a work, which, though quite imperfect, would, if it had been finished, have been found deeply interesting to its welfare.

Sic tibi persuade, me dies et noctes nihil aliud agere, nihil curare, nisi ut mei cives salvi liberique sint. Ep. Famil. 1. 24.

Be assured, therefore, that neither day nor night have I any cares, any labours, but for the safety and freedom of my fellow citizens.

I AM not positive, that it is of any immediate use to our country, that its true friends should better understand one another; nor am I apprehensive, that the crudities, which my ever hasty pen confides to my friends, will essentially mislead their opinion in respect either to myself or to publick affairs. At a time when men eminently wise cherish almost any hopes, however vain, because they choose to be blind to their fears, it would be neither extraordinary nor disreputable for me to mistake the degree of maturity, to which our political vices have arrived, nor to err in computing how near or how far off we stand from the term of their fatal consummation.

I FEAR, that the future fortunes of our country no longer depend on *counsel*. We have persevered in our errours too

+ The following is the letter of Mr. Ames, mentioned above:

My dear Friend,

YOU will see the deficiencies and faults of this performance. You will see, that the conclusion, if your life and patience should hold out to the end, is incomplete. There is, I dare say, tautology, perhaps contradiction. It is an effusion from the mind of the stock that was

long to change our propensities by now enlightening our convictions. The political sphere, like the globe we tread upon, never stands still, but with a silent swiftness accomplishes the revolutions, which, we are too ready to believe, are effected by our wisdom, or might have been controlled by our efforts. There is a kind of fatality in the affairs of republicks, that eludes the foresight of the wise, as much as it frustrates the toils and sacrifices of the patriot and the hero. Events proceed, not as they were expected or intended, but as they are impelled by the irresistible laws of our political existence. Things inevitable happen, and we are astonished, as if they were miracles, and the course of nature had been overpowered or suspended to produce them. Hence it is, that, till lately, more than half our countrymen believed our publick tranquillity was firmly established, and that our liberty did not merely rest upon dry land, but was wedged, or rather rooted high above the flood in the rocks of granite, as immovably as the pillars that prop the universe. They, or at least the discerning of them, are at length no less disappointed than terrified to perceive that we have all the time floated, with a fearless and unregarded course, down the stream of events, till we are now visibly drawn within the revolutionary suction of Niagara, and every thing that is liberty will be dashed to pieces in the descent.

We have been accustomed to consider the pretension of Englishmen to be free, as a proof how completely they were broken to subjection, or hardened in imposture. We have insisted, that they had no constitution, because they never made one; and that their boasted government, which is just

laid up in it, without any resort to books. Of course, it wants more facts, more illustrations, more exact method, to change its aspect of declamation and rhetorical flourish into a *business* performance. I know it is *unequal* When the children cried, or my head ached, the work flagged. To be of value enough for the author to own it, he must be allowed *time*, must bestow on it more thought, search for facts and principles in pamphlets and larger works, and, in short, make it entirely over again.

Therefore, it is not shewn to you for publication, or approbation, as a thing that is written, but a subject proposed to be written upon, for which you will furnish hints and counsels.

1805. Your's truly.

what time and accident have made it, was palsied with age, and blue with the plague-sores of corruption. We have believed, that it derived its stability, not from reason, but from prejudice; that it is supported, not because it is favourable to liberty, but as it is dear to national pride; that it is reverenced, not for its excellence, but because ignorance is naturally the idolater of antiquity; that it is not sound and healthful, but derives a morbid energy from disease, and an unaccountable aliment from the canker that corrodes its vitals.

But we maintained, that the federal constitution, with all the bloom of youth and splendour of innocence, was gifted with immortality. For, if time should impair its force, or faction tarnish its charms, the people, ever vigilant to discern its wants, ever powèrful to provide for them, would miraculously restore it to the field, like some wounded hero of the epick, to take a signal vengeance on its enemies, or like Antæus, invigorated by touching his mother earth, to rise the stronger for a fall.

There is, of course, a large portion of our citizens, who will not believe, even on the evidence of facts, that any publick evils exist, or are impending. They deride the apprehensions of those who foresee, that licentiousness will prove, as it ever has proved, fatal to liberty. They consider her as a nymph, who need not be coy to keep herself pure, but that, on the contrary, her chastity will grow robust by frequent scuffles with her seducers. They say, while a faction is a minority, it will remain harmless by being outvoted; and if it should become a majority, all its acts, however profligate or violent, are then legitimate. For, with the democrats, the people is a sovereign who can do no wrong, even when he respects and spares no existing right, and whose voice, however obtained or however counterfeited, bears all the sanctity and all the force of a living divinity.

Where, then, it will be asked, in a tone both of menace and of triumph, can the people's dangers lie, unless it be with the persecuted federalists? *They* are the partisans of monarchy, who propagate their principles in order, as soon as they

have increased their sect, to introduce a king; for by this only avenue they foretell his approach. Is it possible the people should ever be their own enemies? If all government were dissolved to-day, would they not re-establish it to-morrow, with no other prejudice to the publick liberty, than some superfluous fears of its friends, some abortive projects of its enemies? Nay, would not liberty rise resplendent with the light of fresh experience, and coated in the seven-fold mail of constitutional amendments?

These opinions are fiercely maintained, not only as if there were evidence to prove them, but as if it were a merit to believe them, by men who tell you, that, in the most desperate extremity of faction or usurpation, we have an unfailing resource in the *good sense of the nation.* They assure us there is at least as much wisdom *in the people*, as in these ingenious tenets of their creed.

For any purpose, therefore, of popular use or general impression, it seems almost fruitless to discuss the question, whether our publick liberty can subsist, and what is to be the condition of that awful futurity to which we are hastening. The clamours of party are so loud, and the resistance of national vanity is so stubborn, it will be impossible to convince any but the very wise, (and in every state they are the very few) that our democratick liberty is utterly untenable; that we are devoted to the successive struggles of factions, who will rule by turns, the worst of whom will rule last, and triumph by the sword. But for the wise this unwelcome task is, perhaps, superfluous: they, possibly, are already convinced.

All such men are, or ought to be, agreed, that simple governments are despotisms; and of all despotisms a democracy, though the least durable, is the most violent. It is also true, that all the existing governments we are acquainted with are more or less *mixed*, or balanced and checked, however imperfectly, by the ingredients and principles that belong to the other simple sorts. It is, nevertheless, a fact, that there is scarcely any civil constitution in the world, that, according to American ideas, is *so mixed* and combined as to be favourable to the

liberty of the subject—none, absolutely none, that an American patriot would be willing to adopt for, much less to impose on, his country. Without pretending to define that liberty, which writers at length agree is incapable of any precise and comprehensive definition, all the European governments, except the British, admit a most formidable portion of arbitrary power; whereas, in America, no plan of government, without a large and preponderating commixture of democracy, can, for a moment, possess our confidence and attachment.

It is unquestionable, that the concern of the people in the affairs of such a government, tends to elevate the character and enlarge the comprehension, as well as the enjoyments, of the citizens; and, supposing the government wisely constituted, and the laws steadily and firmly carried into execution, these effects, in which every lover of mankind must exult, will not be attended with a corresponding depravation of the publick manners and morals. I have never yet met with an American of any party, who seemed willing to exclude the people from their temperate and well-regulated share of concern in the government. Indeed, it is notorious, that there was scarcely an advocate for the federal constitution, who was not anxious, from the first, to hazard the experiment of an unprecedented, and almost unqualified proportion of democracy, both in constructing and administering the government, and who did not rely with confidence, if not blind presumption, on its success. This is certain, the body of the federalists were always, and yet are essentially democratick in their political notions. The truth is, the American nation, with ideas and prejudices wholly democratick, undertook to frame, and expected tranquilly, and with energy and success, to administer a *republican* government.

It is, and ever has been my belief, that the federal constitution was as good, or very nearly as good, as our country could bear; that the attempt to introduce a mixed monarchy was never thought of, and would have failed, if it had been made; and could have proved only an inveterate curse to the nation, if it had been adopted cheerfully, and even unanimously, by the people.

Our materials for a government were all democratick, and whatever the hazard of their combination may be, our Solons and Lycurguses in the convention had no alternative, nothing to consider, but how to combine them, so as to ensure the longest duration to the constitution, and the most favourable chance for the publick liberty in the event of those changes, which the frailty of the structure of our government, the operation of time and accident, and the maturity and developement of the national character were well understood to portend. We should have succeeded worse, if we had trusted to our metaphysicks more. Experience must be our physician, though his medicines may kill.

The danger obviously was, that a species of government, in which the people choose all the rulers, and then, by themselves, or ambitious demagogues pretending to be the people, claim and exercise an effective control over what is called the government, would be found on trial no better than a turbulent, licentious democracy. The danger was, that their best interests would be neglected, their dearest rights violated, their sober reason silenced, and the worst passions of the worst men not only freed from legal restraint, but invested with publick power. The known propensity of a democracy is to licentiousness, which the ambitious call, and the ignorant believe to be liberty.

The great object, then, of political wisdom in framing our constitution, was to guard against licentiousness, that inbred malady of democracies, that deforms their infancy with grey hairs and decrepitude.

The federalists relied much on the efficiency of an independent judiciary, as a check on the hasty turbulence of the popular passions. They supposed the senate proceeding from the states, and chosen for six years, would form a sort of balance to the democracy, and realise the hope, that a *federal republick of states might subsist*. They counted much on the information of the citizens; that they would give their unremitted attention to publick affairs; that either dissensions would not arise in our happy country, or, if they should, that the citizens

would remain calm, and would walk, like the three Jews in Nebuchadnezzar's furnace, unharmed amidst the fires of party.

It is needless to ask, how rational such hopes were, or how far experience has verified them.

The progress of party has given to Virginia a preponderance, that, perhaps, was not foreseen. Certainly, since the late amendment in the article for the choice of president and vice-president, there is no existing provision of any efficacy to counteract it.

The project of arranging states in a federal union, has long been deemed by able writers and statesmen more promising than the scheme of a single republick. The experiment, it has been supposed, has not yet been fairly tried; and much has been expected from the example of America.

If states were neither able nor inclined to obstruct the federal union, much, indeed, might be hoped from such a confederation. But Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New-York are of an extent sufficient to form potent monarchies, and, of course, are too powerful, as well as too proud, to be *subjects* of the federal laws. Accordingly, one of the first schemes of *amendment*, and the most early executed, was, to exempt them in form from the obligations of justice. States are not liable to be sued. Either the federal head or the powerful members must govern. Now, as it is a thing ascertained by experience, that the great states are not willing, and cannot be compelled to obey the union, it is manifest, that their ambition is most singularly invited to aspire to the usurpation or control of the powers of the confederacy. A confederacy of many states, all of them small in extent and population, not only might not obstruct, but happily facilitate the federal authority. But the late presidential amendment demonstrates the overwhelming preponderance of several great states, combining together to engross the control of federal affairs.

There never has existed a federal union, in which the leading states were not ambitious to rule, and did not endeavour to rule by fomenting factions in the small states, and thus engross the management of the federal concerns. Hence it

was, that Sparta, at the head of the Peloponnesus, filled all Greece with terrour and dissension. In every city she had an aristocratical party to kill or to banish the popular faction, that was devoted to her rival, Athens ; so that each city was inhabited by two hostile nations, whom no laws of war could control, no leagues or treaties bind. Sometimes Athens, sometimes Sparta took the ascendant, and influenced the decrees of the famous Amphyctionick council, the boasted federal head of the Grecian republicks. But at all times that head was wholly destitute of authority, except when violent and sanguinary measures were dictated to it by some preponderant member. The small states were immediately reduced to an absolute nullity, and were subject to the most odious of all oppressions, the domination of one state over another state.

The Grecian states, forming the Amphyctionick league, composed the most illustrious federal republick that ever existed. Its dissolution and ruin were brought about by the operation of the principles and passions, that are inherent in all such associations. The Thebans, one of the leading states, uniting with the Thessalians, both animated by jealousy and resentment against the Phocians, procured a decree of the council of the Amphyctions, where their joint influence predominated, as that of Virginia now does in congress, condemning the Phocians to a heavy fine for some pretended sacrilege they had committed on the lands consecrated to the temple of Delphi. Finding the Phocians, as they expected and wished, not inclined to submit, by a second decree they devoted their lands to the god of that temple, and called upon all Greece to arm in their *sacred* cause, for so they affected to call it. A contest thus began, which was doubly sanguinary, because it combined the characters of a religious and civil war, and raged for more than ten years. In the progress of it, the famous Philip of Macedon found means to introduce himself as a party ; and the nature of his measures, as well as their final success, is an everlasting warning to all federal republicks. He appears from the first moment of his reign to have

planned the subjugation of Greece; and in two and twenty years he accomplished his purpose.

After having made his escape from the city of Thebes, where he had been a hostage, he had to recover his hereditary kingdom, weakened by successive defeats, and distracted with factions, from foreign invaders and from two dangerous competitors of his throne. As soon as he became powerful, his restless ambition sought every opportunity to intermeddle in the affairs of Greece, in respect to which Macedonia was considered an alien, and the *sacred* war soon furnished it. Invited by the Thessalians to assist them against the Phocians, he pretended an extraordinary zeal for religion, as well as respect for the decree of the Amphyctions. Like more modern demagogues, he made use of his popularity first to prepare the way for his arms. He had no great difficulty in subduing them; and obtained for his reward another Amphyctionick decree, by which the vote of Phocis was for ever transferred to Philip and his descendants. Philip soon after took possession of the pass of Thermopylæ, and within eight years turned his arms against those very Thebans, whom he had before assisted. They had no refuge in the federal union, which they had helped to enfeeble. They were utterly defeated; Thebes, the pride of Greece, was razed to the ground; the citizens were sold into slavery; and the national liberties were extinguished for ever.

Here let Americans read their own history. Here let even Virginia learn, how perilous and how frail will be the consummation of her schemes. Powerful states, that combine to domineer over the weak, will be inevitably divided by their success, and ravaged with civil war, often baffled, always agitated by intrigue, shaken with alarms, and finally involved in one common slavery and ruin, of which they are no less conspicuously the artificers than the victims.

If, in the nature of things, there could be any experience, which would be extensively instructive, but our own, all history lies open for our warning, open like a church-yard, all whose lessons are solemn, and chiseled for eternity in the

hard stone, lessons that whisper, O! that they could thunder to republicks, "your passions and vices forbid you to be free."

But experience, though she teaches wisdom, teaches it too late. The most signal events pass away unprofitably for the generation, in which they occur, till at length a people, deaf to the things that belong to its peace, is destroyed or enslaved, because it will not be instructed.

From these reflections the political observer will infer, that the American republick is impelled by the force of state ambition and of democratick licentiousness; and he will inquire, *which* of the two is our strongest propensity. Is the sovereign power to be contracted to a state centre? Is Virginia to be our Rome? and are we to be her Latin or Italian allies, like them to be emulous of the honour of our chains, on the terms of imposing them on Louisiana, Mexico, or Santa Fe? Or, are we to run the giddy circle of popular licentiousness, beginning in delusion, quickened by vice, and ending in wretchedness?

But, though these two seem to be contrary impulses, it will appear, nevertheless, on examination, that they really lead to but one result.

The great state of Virginia has fomented a licentious spirit among all her neighbours. Her citizens imagine, that they are democrats, and their abstract theories are in fact democratick; but their state policy is that of a genuine aristocracy or oligarchy. Whatever their notions or their state practice may be, their policy, as it respects the other states, is to throw all power into the hands of democratick zealots or jacobin knaves; for some of these may be deluded and others bought to promote her designs. And, even independently of a direct Virginia influence, every state faction will find its account in courting the alliance and promoting the views of this great leader. Those who labour to gain a factious power *in* a state, and those who aspire to get a paramount jurisdiction *over* it, will not be slow to discern, that they have a common cause to pursue.

In the intermediate progress of our affairs, the ambition of Virginia may be gratified. So long as popular licentiousness is operating with no lingering industry to effect our yet unfinished ruin, she may flourish the whip of dominion in her hands; but, as soon as it is accomplished, she will be the associate of our shame, and bleed under its lashes. For democratick license leads not to a monarchy regulated by laws, but to the ferocious despotism of a chieftain, who owes his elevation to arms and violence, and leans on his sword as the only prop of his dominion. Such a conqueror, jealous and fond of nothing but his power, will care no more for Virginia, though he may rise by Virginia, than Buonaparte does for Corsica. Virginia will then find, that, like ancient Thebes, she has worked for Philip, and forged her own fetters.

There are few, even among the democrats, *who will doubt*, though to a man they will deny, that the ambition of that state is inordinate, and, unless seasonably counteracted, will be fatal; yet they will persevere in striving for power in their states, before they think it necessary, or can find it convenient to attend to her encroachments.

But there are not many, perhaps not five hundred, even among the federalists, who yet allow themselves to view the progress of licentiousness as so speedy, so sure, and so fatal as the deplorable experience of our country shews that it is, and the evidence of history and the constitution of human nature demonstrate that it must be.

The truth is, such an opinion, admitted with all the terrible light of its proof, no less shocks our fears than our vanity, no less disturbs our quiet than our prejudices. We are summoned by the tocsin to every perilous and painful duty. Our days are made heavy with the pressure of anxiety, and our nights restless with visions of horrour. We listen to the clank of chains, and overhear the whispers of assassins. We mark the barbarous dissonance of mingled rage and triumph in the yell of an infatuated mob; we see the dismal glare of their burnings and scent the loathsome steam of human victims offered in sacrifice.

These reflections may account for the often lamented blindness, as well as apathy of our well-disposed citizens. Who would choose to study the tremendous records of the fates, or to remain long in the dungeon of the furies? Who, that is penetrating enough to foresee our scarcely hidden destiny, is hardy enough to endure its anxious contemplation?

It may not long be more safe to disturb, than it is easy to enlighten the democratick faith in regard to our political propensities, since it will neither regard what is obvious, nor yield to the impression of events, even after they have happened. The thoughtless and ignorant care for nothing but the *name* of liberty, which is as much the *end* as the instrument of party, and equally fills up the measure of their comprehension and desires. According to the conception of such men, the publick liberty can never perish: it will enjoy immortality, like the dead in the memory of the living. We have heard the French prattle about its rights, and seen them swagger in the fancied possession of its distinctions, long after they were crushed by the weight of their chains. The Romans were not only amused, but really made vain, by the boast of their liberty, while they sweated and trembled under the despotism of emperours, the most odious monsters that ever infested the earth. It is remarkable, that Cicero, with all his dignity and good sense, found it a popular seasoning of his harangue, six years *after* Julius Cesar had established a monarchy, and only six months *before* Octavius totally subverted the commonwealth, to say: "it is not possible for the people of Rome to be slaves, whom the gods have destined to the command of all nations. Other nations may endure slavery, but the proper end and business of the Roman people is liberty."

This very opinion in regard to the destinies of *our* country is neither less extensively diffused, nor less solidly established. Such men will persist in thinking our liberty cannot be in danger, till it is irretrievably lost. It is even the *boast* of multitudes, that our system of government is a pure democracy.

What is there left, that can check its excesses or retard the velocity of its fall? Not the control of the several states,

for they already whirl in the vortex of faction; and, of consequence, not the senate, which is appointed by the states. Surely not the judiciary, for we cannot expect the office of the priesthood from the victim at the altar. Are we to be sheltered by the force of ancient manners? Will this be sufficient to control the two evil spirits of license and innovation? Where is any vestige of those manners left, but in New-England? and even in New-England their authority is contested and their purity debased. Are our civil and religious institutions to stand so firmly, as to sustain themselves and so much of the fabrick of the publick order as is propped by their support? On the contrary, do we not find the ruling faction in avowed hostility to our religious institutions? In effect, though not in form, their protection is abandoned by our laws, and confided to the steadiness of sentiment and fashion; and, if they are still powerful auxiliaries of lawful authority, it is owing to the tenaciousness, with which even a degenerate people maintain their habits, and to a yet remaining, though impaired veneration for the maxims of our ancestors. We are changing, and, if democracy triumphs in New-England, it is to be apprehended, that in a few years we shall be as prone to disclaim our great progenitors, as they, if they should return again to the earth, with grief and shame to disown their degenerate descendants.

Is the turbulence of our democracy to be restrained by preferring to the magistracy only the grave and upright, the men who profess the best moral and religious principles, and whose lives bear testimony in favour of their profession, whose virtues inspire confidence, whose services, gratitude, and whose talents command admiration? Such magistrates would add dignity to the best government, and disarm the malignity of the worst. But the bare moving of this question will be understood as a sarcasm by men of both parties. The powers of impudence itself are scarcely adequate to say, that our magistrates are such men. The atrocities of a distinguished tyrant might provoke satire to string his bow, and with the arrow of Philoctetes to inflict the immedicable wound. We have no Juvenal; and if

we had, he would scorn to dissect the vice that wants firmness for the knife, to elevate that he might hit his object, and to dignify low profligacy to be the vehicle of a loathsome immortality.

It never has happened in the world, and it never will, that a democracy has been kept out of the control of the fiercest and most turbulent spirits in the society; they will breathe into it all their own fury, and make it subservient to the worst designs of the worst men.

Although it does not appear, that the science of good government has made any advances since the invention of printing, it is nevertheless the opinion of many, that this art has risen, like another sun in the sky, to shed new light and joy on the political world. The press, however, has left the understanding of the mass of men just where it found it; but, by supplying an endless stimulus to their imagination and passions, it has rendered their temper and habits infinitely worse. It has inspired ignorance with presumption, so that those who cannot be governed by reason, are no longer to be awed by authority. The many, who before the art of printing never mistook in a case of oppression, because they complained from their actual sense of it, have become susceptible of every transient enthusiasm and of more than womanish fickleness of caprice. Publick affairs are transacted now on a *stage*, where all the interest and passions grow out of fiction, or are inspired by the art, and often controlled at the pleasure of the actors. The press is a new and, certainly, a powerful agent in human affairs. It will change, but it is difficult to conceive how, by rendering men indocile and presumptuous, it *can* change societies for the better. They are pervaded by its heat and kept for ever restless by its activity. While it has impaired the force that every just government can employ in self-defence, it has imparted to its enemies the secret of that wildfire, that blazes with the most consuming fierceness on attempting to quench it.

Shall we then be told, that the press will constitute an adequate check to the progress of every species of tyranny? Is it

to be denied, that the press has been the base and venal instrument of the very men whom it ought to gibbet to universal abhorrence? While they were climbing to power, it aided their ascent; and now they have reached it, does it not conceal or justify their abominations? Or, while it is confessed, that the majority of citizens form their ideas of men and measures almost solely from the light that reaches them through the magick lantern of the press, do our comforters still depend on the all-restoring, all-preserving power of general *information?* and are they not destitute of all *this*, or rather of any better information themselves, if they can urge this vapid nonsense in the midst of a yet spreading political delusion, in the midst of the "palpable obscure" that settles on the land, from believing what is false, and misconstruing what is true? Can they believe all this, when they consider how much truth is impeded by party on its way to the publick understanding, and even after having reached it, how much it still falls short of its proper mark, while it leaves the envious, jealous, vindictive will unconquered?

Our mistake, and in which we choose to persevere, because our vanity shrinks from the detection, is, that in political affairs, by only determining what men ought to think, we are sure how they will act; and when we know the facts, and are assiduous to collect and present the evidence, we dupe ourselves with the expectation, that, as there is but one result which wise men can believe, there is but one course of conduct deduced from it, which honest men can approve or pursue. We forget, that in framing the judgment every passion is both an advocate and a witness. We lay out of our account, how much essential information there is that never reaches the multitude, and of the mutilated portion that does, how much is unwelcome to party prejudice; and, therefore, that they may still maintain their opinions, they withhold their attention. We seem to suppose, while millions raise so loud a cry about their sovereign power, and really concentre both their faith and their affections in party, that the bulk of mankind will regard no counsels, but such as are suggested by

their conscience. Let us dare to speak out; is there any single despot who avowedly holds himself so superiour to its dictates?

But *our manners are too mild*, they tell us, for a democracy—then democracy will change those manners. *Our morals are too pure*—then it will corrupt them.

What, then, is the necessary conclusion from the view we have taken of the insufficiency or extinction of all conceivable checks? It is such as ought to strike terrour, but will scarcely raise publick curiosity.

Is it not possible, then, it will be asked, to write and argue down opinions that are so mischievous and only plausible, and men who are even more profligate than exalted? Can we not persuade our citizens to be republican again, so as to rebuild the splendid ruins of the state on the Washington foundation? Thus it is, that we resolve to perpetuate our own delusions, and to cherish our still frustrated and confuted hopes. *Let only ink enough be shed, and let democracy rage, there will be no blood.* Though the evil is fixed in our nature, all, we think, will be safe, because we fancy we can see a remedy floating in our opinions.

It is undoubtedly a salutary labour, to diffuse among the citizens of a free state, as far as the thing is possible, a just knowledge of their publick affairs. But the difficulty of this task is augmented exactly in proportion to the freedom of the state; for the more free the citizens, the bolder and more profligate will be their demagogues, the more numerous and eccentrick the popular errours, and the more vehement and pertinacious the passions that defend them.

Yet, as if there were neither vice nor passion in the world, one of the loudest of our boasts, one of the dearest of all the tenets of our creed is, that we are a sovereign people, *self-governed*—it would be nearer truth to say, self-conceited. For in what sense is it true, that any people, however free, are self-governed? If they have in fact no government, but such as comports with their ever varying and often inordinate desires, then it is anarchy; if it counteracts those desires, it is com-

pulsory. The individual, who is left to act according to his own humour, is not governed at all ; and if any considerable number, and especially any combination of individuals, find or can place themselves in this situation, then the society is no longer free. For liberty obviously consists in the salutary restraint, and not in the uncontrolled indulgence of such humours. Now of all desires, none will so much need restraint, or so impatiently endure it, as those of the *ambitious*, who will form factions, first to elude, then to rival, and finally to usurp the powers of the state ; and of the *sons of vice*, who are the enemies of law, because no just law can be their friend. The first want to govern the state ; and the others, that the state should not govern them. A sense of common interest will soon incline these two original factions of every free state to coalesce into one.

So far as men are swayed by authority, or impelled or excited by their fears and affections, they naturally search for some *persons* as the sources and objects of these effects and emotions. It is pretty enough to say, the republick commands, and the love of the republick dictates obedience to the heart of every citizen. This is system, but is it nature ? The republick is a creature of fiction ; it is every body in the fancy, but nobody in the *heart*. Love, to be any thing, must be select and exclusive. We may as well talk of loving geometry as the commonwealth. Accordingly, there are many who seldom try to reason, and are the most misled when they do. Such men are, of necessity, governed by their prejudices. They neither comprehend nor like any thing of a republick, but their party and their leaders. These last are persons, capable of meriting, at least of knowing and rewarding their zeal and exertions. Hence it is, that the republicanism of a great mass of people is often nothing more, than a blind trust in certain favourites, and a no less blind and still more furious hatred of their enemies. Thus, a free society, by the very nature of liberty, is often ranged into rival factions, who mutually practise and suffer delusion by the abuse of the best names, but who really contend for nothing but the pre-eminence of their leaders.

In a democracy, the elevation of an *equal* convinces many, if not all, that the height to which he is raised is not inaccessible. Ambition wakes from its long sleep in every soul, and wakes, like one of Milton's fallen angels, to turn its tortures into weapons against the publick order. The multitude behold their favourite with eyes of love and wonder ; and with the more of both, as he is a *new* favourite, and owes his greatness wholly to their favour. Who among the little does not swell into greatness, when he thus reflects, that he has assisted to make *great* men ? And who of the popular favourites loses a minute to flatter this vanity in every brain, till it turns it ?

The late equals of the new-made chief behold his rise with very different emotions. They view him near, and have long been accustomed to look behind the disguises of his hypocrisy. They know his vices and his foibles, and that the foundations of his fame are as false and hollow as his professions. Nevertheless, it may be their interest or their necessity to serve him for a time. But the instant they can supplant him, they will spare neither intrigues nor violence to effect it. Thus, a democratick system in its very nature teems with faction and revolution. Yet, though it continually tends to shift its head, its character is immutable. Its constancy is in change.

The theory of a democracy supposes, that the will of the people ought to prevail, and that, as the majority possess not only the better right, but the superiour force, of course, it will prevail. A greater force, they argue, will inevitably overcome a less. When a constitution provides, with an imposing solemnity of detail, for the collection of the opinions of a majority of the citizens, every sanguine reader not only becomes assured, that the will of the people must prevail, but he goes further, and refuses to examine the reasons, and to excuse the *incivism* and presumption of those who can doubt of this inevitable result. Yet common sense and our own recent experience have shewn, that a combination of a very small minority can effectually defeat the authority of the national will. The votes of a majority may sometimes, though not invariably, shew what ought to be done ; but to awe or subdue the force of a thou-

sand men, the government must call out the superiour force of two thousand men. It is, therefore, established the very instant it is brought to the test, that the mere will of a majority is inefficient and without authority. And as to employing a superiour force to procure obedience, which a democratick government has an undoubted right to do, and so, indeed, has every other, it is obvious, that the admitted necessity of this resort completely overthrows all the boasted advantages of the democratick system. For, if obedience cannot be procured by reason, it must be obtained by compulsion; and this is exactly what every other government will do in a like case.

Still, however, the friends of the democratick theory will maintain, that this dire resort to force will be exceedingly rare, because the publick reason will be more clearly expressed and more respectfully understood, than under any other form of government. The citizens will be, of course, self-governed, as it will be their choice as well as duty to obey the laws.

It has been already remarked, that the refusal of a very small minority to obey, will render force necessary. It has been also noted, that, as every mass of people will inevitably desire a favourite, and fix their trust and affections upon one, it clearly follows, that there will be, of course, a faction opposed to the publick will, as expressed in the laws. Now, if a faction is once admitted to exist in a state, the disposition and the means to obstruct the laws, or, in other words, the will of the majority, must be perceived to exist also. If, then, it be true, that a democratick government is of all the most liable to faction, which no man of sense will deny, it is manifest, that it is, from its very nature, obliged more than any other government to resort to force to overcome or awe the power of faction. This latter will continually employ its own power, that acts always against the physical force of the nation, which can be brought to act only in extreme cases, and then, like every extreme remedy, aggravates the evil. For, let it be noted, a regular government by overcoming an unsuccessful insurrection becomes stronger; but elective rulers can scarcely

ever employ the physical force of a democracy, without turning the moral force, or the power of opinion, against the government. So that faction is not unfrequently made to triumph from its own defeats, and to avenge in the disgrace and blood of magistrates the crime of their fidelity to the laws.

As the boastful pretensions of the democratick system cannot be too minutely exposed, another consideration must be given to the subject.

That government certainly deserves no honest man's love or support, which, from the very laws of its being, carries terrour and danger to the virtuous, and arms the vicious with authority and power. The essence and, in the opinion of many thousands not yet cured of their delusions, the *excellence* of democracy is, that it invests every citizen with an equal proportion of power. A state consisting of a million of citizens has a million sovereigns, each of whom detests all other sovereignty but his own. This very boast implies as much of the spirit of turbulence and insubordination, as the utmost energy of any known regular government, even the most rigid, could keep in restraint. It also implies a state of agitation, that is justly terrible to all who love their ease, and of instability, that quenches the last hope of those who would transmit their liberty to posterity. Waving any further pursuit of these reflections, let it be resumed, that, if every man of the million has his ratable share of power in the community, then, instead of restraining the *vicious*, *they* also are armed with power, for they take their part: as they are citizens, this cannot be refused them. Now, as they have an interest in preventing the execution of the laws, which, in fact, is the apparent common interest of their whole class, their union will happen of course. The very first moment that they do unite, which it is ten thousand to one will happen before the form of the democracy is agreed upon, and while its plausible constitution is framing, that moment they form a faction, and the pretended efficacy of the democratick system, which is to operate by the power of opinion and persuasion, comes to an end. For an imperium in imperio exists; there is a state within the state, a combina-

tion interested and active in hindering the will of the majority from being obeyed.

But the *vicious*, we shall be told, are very few in such an *honest* nation as the American. How many of our states did, in fact, pass laws to obstruct the lawful operation of the treaty of peace in 1783? and were the *virtuous* men of those states the framers and advocates of those laws? What shall we denominate the oligarchy that sways the authority of Virginia? Who is ignorant, that the ruling power have an interest to oppose justice to creditors? Surely, after these *facts* are remembered, no man will say, the faction of the vicious is a chimera of the writer's brain; nor, admitting it to be real, will he deny, that it has proved itself potent.

It is not however the faction of debtors only, that is to be expected to arise under a democracy. Every bad passion that dreads restraint from the laws will seek impunity and indulgence in faction. The associates will not come together in cold blood. They will not, like their federal adversaries, yawn over the contemplation of their cause, and shrink from the claim of its necessary perils and sacrifices. They will do all that can possibly be done, and they will attempt more. They will begin early, persevere long, ask no respite for themselves, and are sure to triumph, if their enemies take any. Suppose at first their numbers to be exceedingly few, their efforts will for that reason be so much the greater. They will call themselves the people; they will in their name arraign every act of government as wicked and weak; they will oblige the rulers to stand for ever on the defensive, as culprits at the bar of an offended publick. With a venal press at command, concealing their number and their infamy, is it to be doubted, that the ignorant will soon or late unite with the vicious? Their union is inevitable; and, when united, those allies are powerful enough to strike terrour into the hearts of the firmest rulers. It is in vain, it is indeed childish to say, that an *enlightened* people will understand their own affairs, and thus the acts of a faction will be baffled. No people on earth are or can be so enlightened, as to the details of political affairs. To study

politicks, so as to know correctly the force of the reasons for a large part of the publick measures, would stop the labour of the plough and the hammer; and how are these million of students to have access to the means of information?

When it is thus apparent, that the vicious will have as many opportunities as inducements to inflame and deceive, it results from the nature of democracy, that the ignorant will join, and the ambitious will lead their combination. Who, then, will deny, that the vicious are armed with power, and the virtuous exposed to persecution and peril?

If a sense of their danger compel these latter, at length, to unite also in self-defence, it will be late, probably, too late, without means to animate and cement their union, and with no hope beyond that of protracting, for a short time, the certain catastrophe of their destruction, which, in fact, no democracy has ever yet failed to accomplish.

If, then, all this is to happen, not from accident, not, as the shallow or base demagogues pretend, from the management of monarchists or aristocrats, but from the principles of democracy itself, as we have attempted to demonstrate, ought we not to consider democracy as the worst of all governments, or, if there be a worse, as the certain forerunner of that? What other form of civil rule among men so irresistibly tends to free vice from restraint, and to subject virtue to persecution?

The common supposition is, and it is ever assumed as the basis of argument, that in a democracy the laws have only to command *individuals*, who yield a willing and conscientious obedience; and who would be destitute of the force to resist, if they should lack the disposition to submit. But this supposition, which so constantly triumphs in the newspapers, utterly fails in the trial, in our republick, which we do not denominate a democracy. To collect the tax on Virginia coaches, we have had to exert all the judicial power of the nation; and after that had prevailed, popularity was found a greater treasure than money, and the carriage tax was repealed. The tax on whiskey was enforced by an army, and no sooner had its receipts begun to reimburse the charges of government, and, in some

measure, to equalise the Northern and Southern burdens, but the law is annulled.

With the example of two rebellions against our revenue laws, it cannot be denied, that our republick claims the submission, not merely of weak individuals, but of powerful *combinations*, of those whom distance, numbers, and enthusiasm embolden to deride its authority and defy its arms. A faction is a sort of empire within the empire, which acts by its own magistrates and laws, and prosecutes interests not only unlike, but destructive to those of the nation. The federalists are accused of attempting to impart too much energy to the administration, and of stripping, with too much severity, all such combinations of their assumed importance. Hence it is ridiculously absurd to denominate the federalists, the admirers and disciples of Washington, a faction.

But we shall be told, in defiance both of fact and good sense, that factions will not exist, or will be impotent, if they do; for the majority have a right to govern, and certainly will govern by their representatives. Let their right be admitted, but they certainly will *not* govern, in either of two cases, both fairly supposeable, and likely, nay sure to happen in succession: that a section of country, a combination, party, or faction, call it what you will, shall prove daring and potent enough to obstruct the laws and to exempt itself from their operation; or, growing bolder with impunity and success, finally by art, deceit, and perseverance to force its chiefs into power, and thus, instead of submitting to the government, to bring the government into submission to a faction. Then the forms and the names of a republick will be used, and used more ostentatiously than ever; but its principles will be abused, and its ramparts and defences laid flat to the ground.

There are many, who, believing that a pen-full of ink can impart a deathless energy to a constitution, and having seen, with pride and joy, two or three skins of parchment added, like new walls about a fortress, to our own, will be filled with astonishment, and say, is not our legislature divided? our executive single? our judiciary independent? Have we not

amendments and bills of rights, excelling all compositions in prose? Where, then, can our danger lie? Our government, so we read, is constructed in such a manner as to defend itself, and the people. We have the greatest political security, for we have adopted the soundest principles.

To most grown children, therefore, the existence of faction will seem chimerical. Yet did any free state ever exist without the most painful and protracted conflicts with this foe? or expire any otherwise than by his triumph? The spring is not more genial to the grain and fruits than to insects and vermin. The same sun that decks the fields with flowers, thaws out the serpent in the fen, and concocts his poison. Surely, *we* are not the people to contest this position. Our present liberty was born into the world under the knife of this assassin, and now limps a cripple from his violence.

As soon as such a faction is known to subsist in force, we shall be told, the people may, and because they may, they surely *will* rally to discomfit and punish the conspirators. If the whole people in a body are to do this as often as it may be necessary, then it seems our political plan is to carry on our government by successive, or rather incessant *revolutions*. When the people deliberate and act in person, laying aside the plain truth, that it is impossible they should, all delegated authority is at an end: the representatives would be nothing in the presence of their assembled constituents. Thus falls or stops the machine of a regular government. Thus a faction, hostile to the government, would ensure their success by the very remedy that is supposed effectual to disappoint their designs.

Men of a just way of thinking will be ready to renounce the opinions we have been considering, and to admit, that liberty is lost, where faction domineers; that some security must be provided against its attacks; and that no elective government can be secure or orderly, unless it be invested by the constitution itself with the means of self-defence. It is enough for the people to approve the lawful use of them. And this for a *free* government must be the easiest thing in the world.

Now, the contrary of this last opinion is the truth. By a *free* government this difficulty is nearly or quite insuperable ; for the audaciousness and profligacy of faction is ever in proportion to the liberty of the political constitution. In a tyranny individuals are nothing. Conscious of their nothingness, the spirit of liberty is torpid or extinct. But in a free state there is, necessarily, a great mass of power left in the hands of the citizens, with the spirit to use and the desire to augment it. Hence will proceed an infinity of clubs and associations, for purposes often laudable or harmless, but not unfrequently factious. It is obvious, that the combination of some hundreds or thousands for political ends will produce a great aggregate stock or mass of power. As by combining they greatly augment their power, for that very reason they will combine ; and, as magistrates would seldom like to devolve their authority upon volunteers, who might offer to play the magistrate in their stead, there is almost nothing left for a band of combined citizens to do, but to discredit and obstruct the government and laws. The possession of power by the magistrate is not so sure to produce respect as to kindle envy; and to the envious it is a gratification to humble those who are exalted. But the ambitious find the publick discontent a passport to office—then they must breed or inflame discontent. We have the example before our eyes.

Is it not evident, then, that a free government must exert a great deal *more* power to obtain obedience from an extensive combination or faction, than would be necessary to extort it from a much larger number of uncombined individuals ? If the regular government has that degree of power, which, let it be noted, the jealousy of a free people often inclines them to withhold ; and if it should exercise its power with promptness and spirit, a supposition not a little improbable, for such governments frequently have more strength than firmness, then the faction may be, for that time, repressed and kept from doing mischief. It will, however, instantly change its pretexts and its means, and renew the contest with more art and caution, and with the advantage of all the discontents, which every consi-

erable popular agitation is sure to multiply and to embitter. This immortal enemy, whom it is possible to bind, though only for a time, and in flaxen chains, but not to kill ; who may be baffled, but cannot be disarmed ; who is never weakened by defeat, nor discouraged by disappointment, again tries and wears out the strength of the government and the temper of the people. It is a game which the factious will never be weary of playing, because they play for an empire, yet on their own part hazard nothing. If they fail, they lose only their ticket, and say, draw your lottery again ; if they win, as in the end they must and will, if the constitution has not provided *within*, or unless the people will bring, which they will not long, from *without*, some energy to hinder their success, it will be complete ; for conquering parties never content themselves with half the fruits of victory. Their power once obtained can be and will be confirmed by nothing but the terrour or weakness of the real people. Justice will shrink from the bench, and tremble at her own bar.

As property is the object of the great mass of every faction, the rules that keep it sacred will be annulled, or so far shaken, as to bring enough of it within the grasp of the dominant party to reward their partisans with booty. But the chieftains, thirsting only for dominion, will search for the means of extending or establishing it. They will, of course, innovate, till the vestiges of private right, and of restraints on publick authority, are effaced ; until the real people are stripped of all privilege and influence, and become even more abject and spiritless than weak. The many may be deluded, but the success of a faction is ever the victory of a few ; and the power of the few can be supported by nothing but force. This catastrophe is fatal.

The people, it will be thought, will see their errour, and return. But there is no return to liberty. What the fire of faction does not destroy, it will debase. Those, who have once tasted of the cup of sovereignty, will be unfitted to be subjects ; and those, who have not, will scarcely form a wish beyond the unmolested ignominy of slaves.

But will those who scorn to live at all, unless they can live free, will these noble spirits abandon the publick cause? Will they not break their chains on the heads of their oppressors? Suppose they attempt it, then we have a civil war; and when political diseases require the sword, the remedy will kill. Tyrants may be dethroned, and usurpers expelled and punished; but the sword, once drawn, cannot be sheathed. Whoever holds it, must rule by it; and that rule, though victory should give it to the best men and the honestest cause, cannot be liberty. Though painted as a goddess, she is mortal, and her spirit, once severed by the sword, can be evoked no more from the shades.

Is this catastrophe too distant to be viewed, or too improbable to be dreaded? I should not think it so formidably near as I do, if in the short interval of impending fate, in which alone it can be of any use to be active, the heart of every honest man in the nation, or even in New-England, was penetrated with the anxiety that oppresses my own *. Then the subversion of the public liberty would at least be delayed, if it could not be prevented. Her maladies might be palliated, if not cured. She might long drag on the life of an invalid, instead of soon suffering the death of a martyr.

The soft, timid sons of luxury love liberty as well as it is possible they should, to love pleasure better. They desire to sleep in security, and to enjoy protection, without being molested to give it. While all, who are not devoted to pleasure, are eager in the pursuit of wealth, how will it be possible to rouse such a spirit of liberty, as can alone secure, or prolong its possession? For if in the extraordinary perils of the republick, the citizens will not kindle with a more than ordinary, with a heroick flame, its cause will be abandoned without effort, and lost beyond redemption. But if the faithful votaries of liberty, uncertain what counsels to follow, should, for the present,

* This short paragraph explains the writer's motive for presenting such a gloomy picture of the affairs of our country. He hoped, by alarming the honest part of our citizens, to defer, or mitigate our fate.

withhold their exertions, will they not at least bestow their attention? Will they not fix it, with an unusual intensity of thought, upon the scene; and will they not fortify their nerves to contemplate a prospect that is shaded with horrour, and already flashes with tempest?

If the positions laid down as theory could be denied, the brief history of the federal administration would establish them. It was first confided to the truest, and purest patriot that ever lived. It succeeded a period, dismal and dark, and, like the morning sun, lighted up a sudden splendour, that was gratuitous, for it consumed nothing, but its genial rays cherished the powers of vegetation, while they displayed its exuberance. There was no example, scarcely a pretence of oppression; yet faction, basking in those rays, and sucking venom from the ground, even then cried out, "O sun, I tell thee, how I hate thy beams." Faction was organized sooner than the government.

If the most urgent publick reasons could ever silence or satisfy the spirit of faction, the adoption of the new constitution would have been prompt and unanimous. The government of a great nation had barely revenue enough to buy stationary for its clerks, or to pay the salary of the door-keeper. Publick faith and publick force were equally out of the question, for as it respected either authority or resources, the corporation of a college, or the missionary society were greater potentates than congress. Our federal government had not merely fallen into imbecility and, of course, into contempt, but the oligarchical factions in the large states had actually made great advances in the usurpation of its powers. The king of New-York levied imposts on Jersey and Connecticut; and the nobles of Virginia bore with impatience their tributary dependence on Baltimore and Philadelphia. Our discontents were fermenting into civil war; and that would have multiplied and exasperated our discontents.

Impending publick evils, so obvious and so near, happily roused all the patriotism of the country; but they roused its ambition too. The great state chieftains found the sovereign power unoccupied, and, like the lieutenants of Alexander, each em-

ployed intrigue, and would soon have employed force, to erect his province into a separate monarchy or aristocracy. Popular republican names would, indeed, have been used, but in the struggles of ambition they would have been used only to cloak usurpation and tyranny. How late, and with what sourness and reluctance did New-York and Virginia renounce the hopes of aggrandizement, which their antifederal leaders had so passionately cherished! The opposition to the adoption of the federal constitution was not a controversy about principles; it was a struggle for power. In the great states, the ruling party, with that sagacity which too often accompanies inordinate ambition, instantly discerned, that, if the new government should go into operation with all the energy that its letter and spirit would authorize, they must cease to rule—still worse, they must submit to be ruled, nay, worst of all, they must be ruled by their equals, a condition of real wretchedness and supposed disgrace, which our impatient tyrants anticipated with instinctive and unspeakable horrour.

To prevent this dreaded result of the new constitution, which, by securing a real legal equality to all the citizens, would bring *them* down to an equality, their earliest care was to bind the ties of their factious union more closely together; and by combining their influence and exerting the utmost malignity of their art, to render the new government odious and suspected by the people. Thus, conceived in jealousy and born in weakness and dissension, they hoped to see it sink, like its predecessor, the confederation, into contempt. Hence it was, that in every great state a faction arose with the fiercest hostility to the federal constitution, and active in devising and pursuing every scheme, however unwarrantable or audacious, that would obstruct the establishment of any power in the state superiour to its own.

It is undeniably true, therefore, that faction was organized sooner than the new government. We are not to charge this event to the accidental rivalships or disgusts of leading men, but to the operation of the invariable principles that preside

over human actions and political affairs. Power had slipped out of the feeble hands of the old congress; and the world's power, like its wealth, can never lie one moment without a possessor. The states had instantly succeeded to the vacant sovereignty; and the leading men in the great states, for the small ones were inactive from a sense of their insignificance, engrossed their authority. Where the executive authority was single, the governour, as, for instance, in New-York, felt his brow encircled with a diadem; but in those states where the governour is a mere cypher, the men who influenced the assembly governed the state, and there an oligarchy established itself. When has it been seen in the world, that the possession of sovereign power was regarded with indifference, or resigned without effort? If all that is ambition in the heart of man had slept in America, till the era of the new constitution, the events of that period would not merely have awakened it into life, but have quickened it into all the agitations of frenzy.

Then commenced an active struggle for power. Faction resolved, that the new government should not exist at all, or, if that could not be prevented, that it should exist without energy. Accordingly, the presses of that time teemed with calumny and invective. Before the new government had done any thing, there was nothing oppressive or tyrannical which it was not accused of meditating; and when it began its operations, there was nothing wise or fit that it was not charged with neglecting; nothing right or beneficial that it did, but from an insidious design to delude and betray the people. The cry of usurpation and oppression was louder then, when all was prosperous and beneficent, than it has been since, when the judiciary is violently abolished, the judges dragged to the culprit's bar, the constitution changed to prevent a change of rulers, and the path plainly marked out and already half travelled over for the ambition of those rulers to *reign* in contempt of the people's votes and on the ruins of their liberty.

He is certainly a political novice or a hypocrite, who will pretend, that the antifederal opposition to the government is to be ascribed to the concern of the people for their liberties, rather than to the profligate ambition of their demagogues, eager for power, and suddenly alarmed by the imminent danger of losing it; demagogues, who, leading lives like Clodius, and with the maxims of Cato in their mouths, cherishing principles like Catiline, have acted steadily on a plan of usurpation like Cesar. Their labour for twelve years was to inflame and deceive; and their recompense, for the last four, has been to degrade and betray.

Any person who considers the instability of all authority, that is not only derived from the multitude, but wanes or increases with the ever changing phases of their levity and caprice, will pronounce, that the federal government was from the first, and from its very nature and organization, fated to sink under the rivalship of its state competitors for dominion. Virginia has never been more federal than it was, when, from considerations of policy, and, perhaps, in the hope of future success from its intrigues, it adopted the new constitution; for it has never desisted from obstructing its measures and urging every scheme that would reduce it back again to the imbecility of the old confederation. To the dismay of every true patriot, these arts have at length fatally succeeded; and our system of government now differs very little from what it would have been, if the impost proposed by the old congress had been granted, and the new federal constitution had never been adopted by the states.* In that case, the states being left to their natural inequality, the small states would have been, as they now are, nothing, and Virginia, potent in herself, more potent by her influence and intrigues, and uncontrolled by a superiour federal head, would, of course, have been every thing. Baltimore, like Antium, and Philadelphia, like Capua, would have bowed their proud necks to

* This was written in January, 1805, when the judicial power was removed, and other dilapidations of the federal edifice in progress.

a new Roman yoke. If any of her more powerful neighbours had resisted her dominion, she would have spread her factions into their bosoms, and, like the Marsi and the Samnites, they would, at last, though, perhaps, somewhat the later for their valour, have graced the pomp of her triumphs, and afterwards assisted to maintain the terrour of her arms.

So far as state opposition was concerned, it does not appear, that it has been overcome in any of the great states by the mild and successful operation of the federal government. But if states had not been its rivals, yet the matchless industry and close combination of the factious individuals who guided the antifederal presses would, in the end, though, perhaps, not so soon as it has been accomplished by the help of Virginia, have disarmed and prostrated the federal government. We have the experience of France before our eyes to prove, that, with such a city as Paris, it is utterly impossible to support a free republican system. A profligate press has more authority than morals; and a faction will possess more energy than magistrates or laws.

On evidence thus lamentably clear, I found my opinion, that the federalists can never again become the dominant party; in other words, the publick reason and virtue cannot be again, as in our first twelve years, and never will be again the governing power, till our government has passed through its revolutionary changes. Every faction that may happen to rule will pursue but two objects, its vengeance on the fallen party, and the security of its own power against any new one that may rise to contest it. As to the glory that wise rulers partake, when they obtain it for their nation, no person of understanding will suppose, that the gaudy, ephemeral insects, that bask and flutter no longer than while the sun of popularity shines without a cloud, will either possess the means or feel the passion for it. What have the Condorcets and Rolands of to-day to hope or to enjoy from the personal reputation or publick happiness of to-morrow? Their objects are all selfish, all temporary. Mr. Jefferson's

letters to Mazzei or Paine, his connexion with Callender, or his mean condescensions to France and Spain, will add nothing to the weight of his disgrace with the party that shall supplant him. To be their enemy will be disgrace enough, and so far a refuge for his fame, as it will stop all curiosity and inquiry into particulars. Every party that has fallen in France has been overwhelmed with infamy, but without proofs or discrimination. If time and truth have furnished any materials for the vindication of the ex-rulers, there has, nevertheless, been no instance of the return of the publick to pity, or of the injured to power. The revolution has no retrograde steps. Its course is onward from the patriots and statesmen to the hypocrites and cowards, and onward still through successive committees of ruffians, till some one ruffian happens to be a hero. Then chance no longer has a power over events, for this last inevitably becomes an emperour.

The restoration of the federalists to their merited influence in the government supposes two things, the slumber or extinction of faction, and the efficacy of publick morals. It supposes an interval of calm, when reason will dare to speak, and prejudice itself will incline to hear. Then, it is still hoped by many, *Nova progenies cælo demittitur alto*, the genuine publick voice would call wisdom into power; and the love of country, which is the morality of politicks, would guard and maintain its authority.

Are not these the visions that delight a poet's fancy, but will never revisit the statesman's eyes? When will faction sleep? Not till its labours of vengeance and ambition are over. Faction, we know, is the twin brother of our liberty, and born first; and, as we are told in the fable of Castor and Pollux, the only one of the two that is immortal. As long as there is a faction in full force, and possessed of the government too, the publick will and the publick reason must have power to compel, as well as to convince, or they will convince without reforming. Bad men, who rise by intrigue, may be dispossessed by worse men, who rise over their heads by

deeper intrigue; but what has the publick reason to do, but to deplore its silence or to polish its chains? This last we find is now the case in France. All the talent of that country is employed to illustrate the virtues and exploits of that chief, who has made a nation happy by putting an end to the agitations of what they called their liberty, and who naturally enough insist, that they enjoy more glory than any other people, because they are more terrible to all.

The publick reason, therefore, is so little in a condition to re-establish the federal cause, that it will not long maintain its own. Do we not see our giddy multitude celebrate with joy the triumphs of a party over some essential articles of our constitution, and recently over one integral and independent branch of our government? When our Roland falls, our Danton will be greeted with as loud a peal and as splendid a triumph. If federalism could by a miracle resume the reins of power, unless political virtue and pure morals should return also, those reins would soon drop or be snatched from its hands.

By political virtue is meant that love of country diffused through the society and ardent in each individual, that would dispose, or rather impel every one to do or suffer much for his country, and permit no one to do any thing against it. The Romans sustained the hardships and dangers of military service, which fell not, as amongst modern nations, on the dregs of society, but, till the time of Marius, exclusively on the flower of the middle and noble classes. They sustained them, nevertheless, both with constancy and alacrity, because the excellence of life, every Roman thought, was glory, and the excellence of each man's glory lay in its redounding to the splendour and extent of the empire of Rome.

Is there any resemblance in all this to the habits and passions that predominate in America? Are not our people wholly engrossed by the pursuit of wealth and pleasure? Though grouped together into a society, the propensities of the individual still prevail; and if the nation discovers the

rudiments of any character, they are yet to be developed. In forming it, have we not ground to fear, that the sour, dissocial, malignant spirit of our politicks will continue to find more to dread and hate in party, than to love and reverence in our country? What foundation can there be for that political virtue to rest upon, while the virtue of the society is proscribed, and its vice lays an exclusive claim to emolument and honour? And as long as faction governs, it must look to all that is vice in the state for its force, and to all that is virtue for its plunder. It is not merely the choice of faction, though, no doubt, base agents are to be preferred for base purposes, but it is its necessity also, to keep men of true worth depressed by keeping the turbulent and worthless contented.

How, then, can love of country take root and grow in a soil, from which every valuable plant has thus been plucked up and thrown away as a weed? How can we forbear to identify the government with the country? and how is it possible, that we should at the same time lavish all the ardour of our affection, and yet withhold every emotion either of confidence or esteem? It is said, that in republicks majorities invariably oppress minorities. Can there be any real patriotism in a state, which is thus filled with those who exercise and those who suffer tyranny? But how much less reason has any man to love that country, in which the voice of the majority is counterfeited, or the vicious, ignorant, and needy are the instruments, and the wise and worthy are the victims of oppression?

When we talk of patriotism as the theme of declamation, it is not very material, that we should know with any precision what we mean. It is a subject on which hypocrisy will seem to ignorance to be eloquent, because all of it will be received and well received as flattery. If, however, we search for a principle or sentiment, general and powerful enough to produce national effects, capable of making a people act with constancy, or suffer with fortitude, is there any

thing in our situation that could have produced, or that can cherish it? The straggling settlements of the Southern part of the union, which now is the governing part, have been formed by emigrants from almost every nation of Europe. Safe in their solitudes alike from the annoyance of enemies and of government, it is infinitely more probable, that they will sink into barbarism than rise to the dignity of national sentiment and character. Patriotism, to be a powerful or steady principle of action, must be deeply imbued by education and strongly impressed both by the policy of the government and the course of events. To love our country with ardour, we must often have some fears for its safety; our affection will be exalted in its distress; and our self-esteem will glow on the contemplation of its glory. It is only by such diversified and incessant exercise, that the sentiment can become strong in the individual, or be diffused over the nation.

But how can that nation have any such affinities, any sense of patriotism, whose capacious wilderness receives and separates from each other the successive troops of emigrants from all other nations, men who remain ignorant, or learn only from the newspapers, that they are countrymen, who think it their *right* to be exempted from all tax, restraint, or control, and, of course, that they have nothing to do with or for their country, but to make rulers for it, who, after they are made, are to have nothing to do with their makers—a country too, which they are sure will not be invaded, and cannot be enslaved? Are not the wandering Tartars or Indian hunters at least as susceptible of patriotism as these stragglers in our Western forests, and infinitely fonder of glory? It is difficult to conceive of a country, which, from the manner of its settlement, or the manifest tendencies of its politicks is more destitute or more incapable of being inspired with political virtue.

What foundation remains, then, for the hopes of those who expect to see the federalists again invested with power?

Shall we be told, that, if the nation is not animated with publick spirit, the individuals are at least fitted to be good citizens by the purity of their *morals?* But what are morals without restraints? and how will merely voluntary restraints be maintained? How long will sovereigns, as the people are made to fancy they are, insist more upon checks than prerogatives? Ask Mr. *** and judge Chase.

Besides, in political reasoning it is generally overlooked, that, if the existence of morals should encourage a people to prefer a democratick system, the operation of that system is sure to destroy their morals. Power in such a society cannot long have any regular control; and, without control, it is itself a vice. Is there in human affairs an occasion of profligacy more shameless or more contagious than a general election? Every spring gives birth and gives wings to this epidemick mischief. Then begins a sort of tillage, that turns up to the sun and air the most noxious weeds in the kindliest soil; or to speak still more seriously, it is a mortal pestilence, that begins with rottenness in the marrow. A democratick society will soon find its morals the incumbrance of its race, the surly companion of its licentious joys. It will encourage its demagogues to impeach and persecute the magistracy, till it is no longer disquieted. In a word, there will not be morals without justice; and though justice might possibly support a democracy, yet a democracy cannot possibly support justice.

Rome was never weary of making laws for that end, and failed. France has had nearly as many laws as soldiers, yet never had justice or liberty for one day. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt, that the ruling faction has often desired to perpetuate its authority by establishing justice. The difficulties, however, lie in the nature of the thing; for in democratick states there are ever more volunteers to destroy than to build; and nothing that is restraint can be erected, without being odious, nor maintained, if it is. Justice her-

self must be built on a loose foundation, and every villain's hand is, of course, busy to pluck out the underpinning. Instead of being the awful power that is to control the popular passions, she descends from the height of her temple, and becomes the cruel and vindictive instrument of them.

Federalism was, therefore, manifestly founded on a mistake, on the supposed existence of sufficient political virtue, and on the permanency and authority of the publick morals.

The party now in power committed no such mistake. They acted on the knowledge of what men actually are, not what they ought to be. Instead of enlightening the popular understanding, their business was to bewilder it. They knew, that the vicious, on whom society makes war, would join them in their attack upon government. They inflamed the ignorant; they flattered the vain; they offered novelty to the restless; and promised plunder to the base. The envious were assured, that the great should fall; and the ambitious, that *they* should become great. The federal power, propped by nothing but opinion, fell, not bacause it deserved its fall, but because its principles of action were more exalted and pure than the people could support.

It is now undeniable, that the federal administration was blameless. It has stood the scrutiny of time, and passed unharmed through the ordeal of its enemies. With all the evidence of its conduct in their possession, and with servile majorities at their command, it has not been in their power, much as they desired it, to fix any reproach on their predecessors.

It is the opinion of a few, but a very groundless opinion, that the cause of order will be re-established by the splitting of the reigning jacobins; or, if that should not take place soon, the union will be divided, and the Northern confederacy compelled to provide for its own liberty. Why, it is said, should we expect, that the union of the bad will be perfect, when that of the Washington party, though liberty and property were at stake, has been broken? And why should

it be supposed, that the Northern states, who possess so prodigious a preponderance of white population, of industry, commerce, and civilization over the Southern, will remain subject to Virginia? Popular delusion cannot last, and as soon as the opposition of the federalists ceases to be feared, the conquerors will divide into new factions, and either the federalists will be called again into power, or the union will be severed into two empires.

By some attention to the nature of a democracy, both these conjectures, at least so far as they support any hopes of the publick liberty, will be discredited.

There is no society without jacobins; no free society without a formidable host of them; and no democracy, whose powers they will not usurp, nor whose liberties, if it be not absurd to suppose a democracy can have any, they will not destroy. A nation must be exceedingly well educated, in which the ignorant and the credulous are few. Athens, with all its wonderful taste and literature, poured them into her popular assemblies by thousands. It is by no means certain, that a nation, composed wholly of scholars and philosophers, would contain less presumption, political ignorance, levity, and extravagance than another state, peopled by tradesmen, farmers, and men of business, without a metaphysician or speculatist among them. The opulent in Holland were the friends of those French who subdued their country, and enslaved them. It was the well-dressed, the learned, or, at least, the conceited mob of France that did infinitely more than the mere rabble of Paris, to overturn the throne of the Bourbons. The multitude were made giddy with projects of innovation, before they were armed with pikes to enforce them.

As there is nothing really excellent in our governments, that is not novel in point of institution, and which faction has not represented as old in abuse, the natural vanity, presumption, and restlessness of the human heart have, from the first, afforded the strength of a host to the jacobins of our country. The ambitious desperadoes are the natural leaders of this host.

Now, though such leaders may have many occasions of jealousy and discord with one another, especially in the division of power and booty, is it not absurd to suppose, that any set of them will endeavour to restore both to the right owners? Do we expect a self-denying ordinance from the sons of violence and rapine? Are not those remarkably inconsistent with themselves, who say, our republican system is a government of justice and order, that was freely adopted in peace, subsists by morals, and whose office it is to ask counsel of the wise and to give protection to the good, yet who console themselves in the storms of the state with the fond hope, that order will spring out of confusion, because innovators will grow weary of change, and the ambitious will contend about their spoil. Then we are to have a new system exactly like the old one, from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, from the crash and jumble of all that is precious or sacred in the state. It is said, the popular hopes and fears are the gales that impel the political vessel. Can any disappointment of such hopes be greater than their folly?

It is true, the men now in power may not be united together by patriotism, or by any principle of faith or integrity. It is also true, that they have not, and cannot easily have, a military force to awe the people into submission. But on the other hand, they have no need of an army; there is no army to oppose them. They are held together by the ties, and made irresistible by the influence of party. With the advantage of acting as the government, who can oppose them? Not the federalists, who neither have any force, nor any object to employ it for, if they had. Not any subdivision of their own faction, because the opposers, if they prevail, will become the government, so much the less liable to be opposed for their recent victory; and if the new sect should fail, they will be nothing. The conquerors will take care, that an unsuccessful resistance shall strengthen their domination.

Thus it seems, in every event of the division of the ruling party, the friends of true liberty have nothing to hope. Tyrants may thus be often changed, but the tyranny will remain.

A DEMOCRACY cannot last. Its nature ordains, that its next change shall be into a military despotism, of all known governments, perhaps, the most prone to shift its head, and the slowest to mend its vices. The reason is, that the tyranny of what is called the people, and that by the sword, both operate alike to debase and corrupt, till there are neither men left with the spirit to desire liberty, nor morals with the power to sustain justice. Like the burning pestilence that destroys the human body, nothing can subsist by its dissolution but vermin.

A MILITARY government may make a nation great, but it cannot make them free. There will be frequent and bloody struggles to decide who shall hold the sword; but the conqueror will destroy his competitors and prevent any permanent division of the empire. Experience proves, that in all such governments there is a continual tendency to *unity*.

SOME kind of balance between the two branches of the Roman government had been maintained for several ages, till at length every popular demagogue, from the two Gracchi to Cesar, tried to gain favour, and by favour to gain power by flattering the multitude with new pretensions to power in the state. The assemblies of the people disposed of every thing; and intrigue and corruption, and often force disposed of the votes of those assemblies. It appears, that Catulus, Cato, Cicero, and the wisest of the Roman patriots, and perhaps wiser never lived, kept on, like the infatuated federalists, hoping to the last, that the people would see their errour and return to the safe old path. They laboured incessantly to re-establish the commonwealth; but the deep corruption of those times, not more corrupt than our own, rendered that impossible. Many of the friends of liberty were slain in the civil wars; some, like Lucullus, had retired to their farms; and most of the others, if not banished by the people, were without commands in the army, and, of course, without power in the state. Catiline came near being chosen consul, and Piso and Gabinius, scarcely less corrupt, *were* chosen. A people so degenerate could not maintain liberty; and do we find bad morals or dangerous designs any obstruction to the election of

any favourite of the reigning party? It is remarkable, that when by a most singular concurrence of circumstances, after the death of Cesar, an opportunity was given to the Romans to re-establish the republick, there was no effective disposition among the people to concur in that design. It seemed as if the republican party, consisting of the same class of men as the Washington federalists, had expired with the dictator. The truth is, when parties rise and resort to violence, the moment of calm, if one should happen to succeed, leaves little to wisdom and nothing to choice. The orations of Cicero proved feeble against the arms of Mark Antony. Is not all this apparent in the United States? Are not the federalists as destitute of hopes as of power? What is there left for them to do? When a faction has seized the republick, and established itself in power, can the true federal republicans any longer subsist? After having seen the republick expire, will it be asked, why they are not immortal?

But the reason why such governments are not severed by the ambition of contending chiefs, deserves further consideration.

As soon as the Romans had subdued the kingdoms of Perseus, Antiochus, and Mithridates, it was necessary to keep on foot great armies. As the command of these was bestowed by the people, the arts of popularity were studied by all those, who pretended to be the friends of the people, and who really aspired to be their masters. The greatest favourites became the most powerful generals; and, as at first there was nothing which the Roman assemblies were unwilling to give, it appeared very soon that they had nothing left to withhold. The armies disposed of all power in the state, and of the state itself; and the generals of course assumed the control of the armies.

It is a very natural subject of surprise, that, when the Roman empire was rent by civil war, as it was, perhaps, twenty times from the age of Marius and Sylla to that of Constantine, some competitor for the imperial purple did not maintain himself with his veteran troops in his province; and found a new

dynasty on the banks of the Euphrates or the Danube, the Ebro or the Rhine. This surprise is augmented by considering the distractions and weakness of an elective government, as the Roman was; the wealth, extent, and power of the rebellious provinces, equal to several modern first rate kingdoms; their distance from Italy; and the resource that the despair, and shame, and rage of so many conquered nations would supply on an inviting occasion to throw off their chains and rise once more to independence; yet the Roman power constantly prevailed, and the empire remained one and indivisible. Sertorius was as good a general as Pompey; and it seems strange that he did not become emperour of Spain. Why were not new empires founded in Armenia, Syria, Asia Minor, in Gaul or Britain? Why, we ask, unless because the very nature of a military democracy, such as the Roman was, did not permit it? Every civil war terminated in the re-union of the provinces, that a rebellion had for a time severed from the empire. Britain, Spain, and Gaul, now so potent, patiently continued to wear their chains, till they dropped off by the total decay of the Western empire.

THE first conquests of the Romans were made by the superiority of their discipline. The provinces were permitted to enjoy their municipal laws, but all political and military power was exercised by persons sent from Rome. So that the spirit of the subject nations was broken or rendered impotent, and every contest in the provinces was conducted, not by the provincials, but by Roman generals and veteran troops. These were all animated with the feelings of the Roman democracy. Now a democracy, a party, and an army bear a close resemblance to each other: they are all creatures of emotion and impulse. However discordant all the parts of a democracy may be, they all seek a centre, and that centre is the single arbitrary power of a chief. In this we see how exactly a democracy is like an army: they are equally governments by downright force.

A MULTITUDE can be moved only by their passions; and these, when their gratification is obstructed, instantly impel

them to arms. *Furor arma ministrat.* The club is first used, and then, as more effectual, the sword. The *disciplined* is found by the leaders to be more manageable than the *mobbish* force. The rabble at Paris that conquered the bastile were soon formed into national guards. But, from the first to the last, the nature, and character, and instruments of power remain the same. A *ripe* democracy will not long want sharp tools and able leaders: in fact, though not in name, it is an army. It is true, an army is not constituted as a deliberative body, and very seldom pretends to deliberate; but, whenever it does, it is a democracy in regiments and brigades, somewhat the more orderly as well as more merciful for its discipline. It always will deliberate, when it is suffered to feel its own power, and is indiscreetly provoked to exert it. At those times, is there much reason to believe it will act with less good sense, or with a more determined contempt for the national interest and opinion, than a giddy multitude managed by worthless leaders? Now though an army is not indulged with a vote, it cannot be stripped of its feelings, feelings that may be managed, but cannot be resisted. When the legions of Syria or Gaul pretended to make an emperour, it was as little in the power as it was in the disposition of Severus to content himself with Italy, and to leave those fine provinces to Niger and Albinus. The military town meeting must be satisfied; and nothing could satisfy it but the overthrow of a rival army. If Pompey before the battle of Pharsalia had joined his lieutenants in Spain, with the design of abandoning Italy, and erecting Spain into a separate republick, or monarchy, every Roman citizen would have despised, and every Roman soldier would have abandoned him. After that fatal battle, Cato and Scipio never once thought of keeping Africa as an independent government; nor did Brutus and Cassius suppose, that Greece and Macedonia, which they held with an army, afforded them more than the means of contesting with Octavius and Antony the dominion of Rome. No hatred is fiercer than such as springs up among those who are closely allied and nearly resemble each other. Every common soldier would be easily made to feel the personal

insult and the intolerable wrong of another army's rejecting his emperour and setting up one of their own—not only so, but he knew it was both a threat and a defiance. The shock of the two armies was therefore inevitable. It was a sort of duel, and could no more stop short of destruction, than the combat of Hector and Achilles. We greatly mistake the workings of human nature, when we suppose the soldiers in such civil wars are mere machines. Hope and fear, love and hatred, on the contrary, exalt their feelings to enthusiasm. When Otho's troops had received a check from those of Vitellius, he resolved to kill himself. His soldiers, with tears, besought him to live, and swore they would perish, if necessary, in his cause. But he persisted in his purpose, and killed himself; and many of his soldiers, overpowered by their grief, followed his example. Those, whom false philosophy makes blind, will suppose, that national wars will justify, and, therefore, will excite all a soldier's ardour; but that the strife between two ambitious generals will be regarded by all men with proper indifference. National disputes are not understood, and their consquences not foreseen, by the multitude; but a quarrel that concerns the life, and fame, and authority of a military favourite takes hold of the heart, and stirs up all the passions.

A DEMOCRACY is so like an army, that no one will be at a loss in applying these observations. The great spring of action with the people in a democracy, is their fondness for one set of men, the men who flatter and deceive, and their outrageous aversion to another, most probably those who prefer their true interest to their favour.

A MOB is no sooner gathered together, than it instinctively feels the want of a leader, a want that is soon supplied. They may not obey him as long, but they obey him as implicitly, and will as readily fight and burn, or rob and murder, in his cause, as the soldiers will for their general.

As the Roman provinces were held in subjection by Roman troops, so every American state is watched with jealousy, and ruled with despotick rigour by the partisans of the faction that may happen to be in power. The successive struggles,

to which our licentiousness may devote the country, will never be of state against state, but of rival factions diffused over our whole territory. Of course, the strongest army, or that which is best commanded will prevail, and we shall remain subject to one indivisible bad government.

This conclusion may seem surprising to many; but the event of the Roman republick will vindicate it on the evidence of history. After faction, in the time of Marius, utterly obliterated every republican principle that was worth any thing, Rome remained a military despotism for almost six hundred years; and, as the re-establishment of republican liberty in our country after it is once lost, is a thing not to be expected, what can succeed its loss but a government by the sword? It would be certainly easier to prevent than to retrieve its fall.

The jacobins are indeed ignorant or wicked enough to say, a *mixed monarchy* on the model of the British will succeed the failure of our republican system. Mr. Jefferson in his famous letter to Mazzei has shewn the strange condition both of his head and heart, by charging this design upon Washington and his adherents. It is but candid to admit, that there are many weak-minded democrats, who really think a *mixed monarchy* the next stage of our politicks. As well might they promise, that, when their factious fire has burned the plain dwelling-house of our liberty, her temple will rise in royal magnificence and with all the proportions of Grecian architecture from the ashes. It is impossible sufficiently to elucidate, yet one could never be tired of elucidating the matchless absurdity of this opinion. An *unmixed* monarchy, indeed, there is almost no doubt awaits us; but it will not be called a monarchy. Cesar lost his life by attempting to take the name of *king*. A president, whose election cannot be hindered, may be well content to wear that title, which inspires no jealousy, yet disclaims no prerogative that party can usurp to confer. Old forms may be continued, till some inconvenience is felt from them; and then the same faction that has made them *forms*, can make them less, and substitute some new *organick decree* in their stead.

But a mixed monarchy would not only offend fixed opinions and habits, but provoke a most desperate resistance. The people, long after losing the substance of republican liberty, maintain a reverence for the name; and would fight with enthusiasm for the tyrant, who has left them the name, and taken from them every thing else. Who, then, are to set it up? and how are they to do it? Is it by an army? Where are their soldiers? Where are their resources and means to arm and maintain them? Can it be established by free popular consent? Absurd. A people once trained to republican principles, will feel the degradation of submitting to a king. It is far from certain, that their opposition would be soothed, by restricting the powers of such a king to the one half of what are now enjoyed by Mr. Jefferson. That would make a difference, but the many would not discern it. The aversion of a republican nation to kingship is sincere and warm, even to fanaticism; yet it has never been found to exact of a favourite demagogue, who aspired to reign, any other condescension than an ostentatious scrupulousness of regard to names, to appearances, and forms. Augustus, whose despotism was not greater than his cunning, professed to be the obsequious minister of his slaves in the senate; and Roman pride not only exacted, but enjoyed to the last, the pompous hypocrisy of the phrase, the majesty of the Roman *commonwealth*.

To suppose, therefore, a monarchy established by vote of the people, by the free consent of a majority, is contrary to the nature of man and the uniform testimony of his experience. To suppose it introduced by the disciples of Washington, who are with real or affected scorn described by their adversaries as a fallen party, a despicable handful of malecontents, is no less absurd than inconsistent. The federalists cannot command the consent of a majority, and they have no consular or imperial army to extort it. Every thing of that sort is on the side of their foes, and, of course, an unsurmountable obstacle to their pretended enterprise.

It will weigh nothing in the argument with some persons, but with men of sense it will be conclusive, that the mass of

the federalists are the owners of the commercial and monied wealth of the nation. Is it conceivable, that such men will plot a revolution in favour of monarchy, a revolution that would make them beggars as well as traitors, if it should miscarry; and, if it should succeed ever so well, would require a century to take root and acquire stability enough to ensure justice and protect property? In these convulsions of the state property is shaken, and in almost every radical change of government actually shifts hands. Such a project would seem audacious to the conception of needy adventurers who risk nothing but their lives; but to reproach the federalists of New-England, the most independent farmers, opulent merchants, and thriving mechanicks, as well as pious clergy, with such a conspiracy, requires a degree of impudence that nothing can transcend. As well might they suspect the merchants of a plot to choak up the entrance of our harbours by sinking hulks, or that the directors of the several banks had confederated to blow up the money vaults with gunpowder. The Catos and the Ciceros are accused of conspiring to subvert the commonwealth—and who are the accusers? *The Clodii, the Antonies, and the Catilines.*

Let us imagine, however, that by some miracle a *mixed* monarchy is established, or rather put into operation; and surely no man will suppose an *unmixed* monarchy can possibly be desired or contemplated by the federalists. The charge against them is, that they like the British monarchy too well. For the sake of argument, then, be it the British monarchy. To-morrow's sun shall rise and gild it with hope and joy, and the dew of to-morrow's evening shall moisten its ashes. Like the golden calf, it would be ground to powder before noon. Certainly, the men, who prate about an American monarchy copied from the British, are destitute of all sincerity or judgment. What could make such a monarchy? Not parchment—We are beginning to be cured of the insane belief, that an engrossing clerk can make a constitution. Mere words, though on parchment, though sworn to, are wind, and worse than wind, because they are perjury. What could give effect to

such a monarchy? It might have a right to command, but what could give it power? Not an army, for that would make it a military tyranny, of all governments the most odious, because the most durable. The British monarchy does not govern by an army, nor would their army suffer itself to be employed to destroy the national liberties. It is officered by the younger sons of noble and wealthy parents, and by many distinguished commanders who are in avowed opposition to the ministry. In fact, democratick opinions take root and flourish scarcely less in armies than in great cities, and infinitely more than they are found to do, or than it is possible they should in the cabals of any ruling party in the world.

Great Britain, by being an island, is secured from foreign conquest; and by having a powerful enemy within sight of her shore is kept in sufficient dread of it to be inspired with patriotism. That virtue, with all the fervour and elevation that a society which mixes so much of the commercial with the martial spirit can display, has other kindred virtues in its train; and these have had an influence in forming the habits and principles of action, not only of the English military and nobles, but of the mass of the nation. There is much, therefore, there is every thing in that island to blend self-love with love of country. It is impossible, that an Englishman should have fears for the government without trembling for his own safety. How different are these sentiments from the immovable apathy of those citizens, who think a constitution no better than any other piece of paper, nor so good as a blank on which a more perfect one could be written!

Is *our* monarchy to be supported by the national habits of subordination and implicit obedience? Surely, when they hold out this expectation, the jacobins do not mean to answer for themselves. Or do we really think it would still be a monarchy, though we should set up, and put down at pleasure, a town meeting king?

By removing or changing the relation of any one of the pillars that support the British government, its identity and excellence would be lost, a revolution would ensue. When the

house of commons voted the house of peers useless, a tyranny of the committees of that body sprang up. The English nation have had the good sense, or, more correctly, the good fortune, to alter nothing, till time and circumstances enforced the alteration, and then to abstain from speculative innovations. The evil spirit of metaphysicks has not been conjured up to demolish, in order to lay out a new foundation by the line, and to build upon plan. The present happiness of that nation rests upon old foundations, so much the more solid, because the meddlesome ignorance of professed builders has not been allowed to new lay them. We may be permitted to call it a *matter of fact* government. No correct politician will presume to engage, that the same form of government would succeed equally well, or even succeed at all, any where else, or even in England under any other circumstances. Who will dare to say, that their monarchy would stand, if this generation had raised it? Who, indeed, will believe, if it did stand, that the weakness produced by the novelty of its institution would not justify and, even from a regard to self preservation, compel an almost total departure from its essential principles?

Now is there one of those essential principles, that it is even possible for the American people to adopt for their monarchy? Are old habits to be changed by a vote, and new ones to be established without experience? Can we have a monarchy without a peerage? or shall our governours supply that defect by giving commissions to a sufficient number of nobles of the quorum? Where is the American hierarchy? Where, above all, is the system of English law and justice, which would support liberty in Turkey, if Turkey could achieve the impossibility of supporting such justice?

It is not recollected, that any monarchy in the world was ever introduced by consent; nor will any one believe, on reflection, that it could be maintained by any nation, if nothing but consent upheld it. It is a rare thing, for a people to choose their government; it is beyond all credibility, that they will enjoy the still rarer opportunity of changing it by choice.

THE notion, therefore, of an American *mixed monarchy* is supremely ridiculous. It is highly probable, our country will be eventually subject to a monarchy, but it is demonstrable that it cannot be such as the British ; and, whatever it may be, that the votes of the citizens will not be taken to introduce it.

IT cannot be expected, that the tendency towards a change of government, however obvious, will be discerned by the multitude of our citizens. While demagogues enjoy their favour, their passions will have no rest, and their judgment and understanding no exercise. Otherwise, it might be of use to remind them, that more essential breaches have been made in our constitution within four years than in the British in the last hundred and forty. In that *enslaved* country, every executive attempt at usurpation has been spiritedly and perseveringly resisted, and substantial improvements have been made in the constitutional provisions for liberty. Witness the habeas corpus, the independence of the judges, and the perfection, if any thing human is perfect, of their administration of justice, the result of the famous Middlesex election, and that on the right of issuing general search-warrants. Let every citizen who is able to think, and who can bear the pain of thinking, make the contrast at his leisure.

THEY are certainly blind who do not see, that we are descending from a supposed orderly and stable republican government into a licentious democracy, with a progress that baffles all means to resist, and scarcely leaves leisure to deplore its celerity. The institutions and the hopes that Washington raised are nearly prostrate ; and his name and memory would perish, if the rage of his enemies had any power over history. But they have not—history will give scope to her vengeance, and posterity will not be defrauded.

BUT, if our experience had not clearly given warning of our approaching catastrophe, the very nature of democracy would inevitably produce it.

A GOVERNMENT by the passions of the multitude, or, no less correctly, according to the vices and ambition of their leaders, is a democracy. We have heard so long of the inde-

feasible sovereignty of the people, and have admitted so many specious theories of the rights of man, which are contradicted by his nature and experience, that few will dread at all, and fewer still will dread as they ought, the evils of an American democracy. They will not believe them near, or they will think them tolerable or temporary. Fatal delusion!

When it is said, there may be a tyranny of the *many* as well as of the *few*, every democrat will yield at least a cold and speculative assent; but he will at all times act, as if it were a thing incomprehensible, that there should be any evil to be apprehended in the uncontrolled power of the people. He will say, arbitrary power may make a tyrant, but how can it make its possessor a slave?

In the first place, let it be remarked, the power of individuals is a very different thing from their liberty. When I vote for the man I prefer, he may happen not to be chosen; or he may disappoint my expectations, if he is; or he may be out-voted by others in the publick body to which he is elected. I may, then, hold and exercise all the power that a citizen can have or enjoy, and yet such laws may be made and such abuses allowed as shall deprive me of all liberty. I may be tried by a jury, and that jury may be culled and picked out from my political enemies by a federal marshal. Of course, my life and liberty may depend on the good pleasure of the man who appoints that marshal. I may be assessed arbitrarily for my faculty, or upon conjectural estimation of my property, so that all I have shall be at the control of the government, whenever its displeasure shall exact the sacrifice. I may be told, that I am a federalist, and, as such, bound to submit, in all cases whatsoever, to the will of the majority, as the ruling faction ever pretend to be. My submission may be tested by my resisting or obeying commands that will involve me in disgrace, or drive me to despair. I may become a fugitive, because the ruling party have made me afraid to stay at home; or, perhaps, while I remain at home, they may, nevertheless, think fit to inscribe my name on the list of emigrants and proscribed persons.

All this was done in France, and many of the admirers of French examples are impatient to imitate them. All this time the people may be told, they are the freest in the world; but what ought my opinion to be? What would the threatened clergy, the *aristocracy* of wealthy merchants, as they have been called already, and thirty thousand more in Massachusetts, who vote for governour Strong, and whose case might be no better than mine, what would they think of their condition? Would they call it liberty? Surely, here is oppression sufficient in extent and degree to make the government that inflicts it both odious and terrible; yet this and a thousand times more than this was practised in France, and will be repeated, as often as it shall please God in his wrath to deliver a people to the dominion of their licentious passions.

The people, as a body, cannot deliberate. Nevertheless, they will feel an irresistible impulse to act, and their resolutions will be dictated to them by their demagogues. The consciousness, or the opinion, that they possess the supreme power, will inspire inordinate passions; and the violent men, who are the most forward to gratify those passions, will be their favourites. What is called the government of the people is in fact too often the arbitrary power of such men. Here, then, we have the faithful portrait of democracy. What avails the boasted *power* of individual citizens? or of what value is the will of the majority, if that will is dictated by a committee of demagogues, and law and right are in fact at the mercy of a victorious faction? To make a nation free, the crafty must be kept in awe, and the violent in restraint. The weak and the simple find their liberty arise not from their own individual sovereignty, but from the power of law and justice over all. It is only by the due restraint of others, that I am free.

Popular sovereignty is scarcely less beneficent than awful, when it resides in their courts of justice; there its office, like a sort of human providence, is to warn, enlighten, and protect; when the people are inflamed to seize and exercise it in their assemblies, it is competent only to kill and destroy. Tem-

perate liberty is like the dew, as it falls unseen from its own heaven; constant without excess, it finds vegetation thirsting for its refreshment, and imparts to it the vigour to take more. All nature, moistened with blessings, sparkles in the morning ray. But democracy is a water spout, that bursts from the clouds, and lays the ravaged earth bare to its rocky foundations. The labours of man lie whelmed with his hopes beneath masses of ruin, that bury not only the dead, but their monuments.

It is the almost universal mistake of our countrymen, that democracy would be mild and safe in America. They charge the horrid excesses of France not so much to human nature, which will never act better, when the restraints of government, morals, and religion are thrown off, but to the characteristick cruelty and wickedness of Frenchmen.

The truth is, and let it humble our pride, the most ferocious of all animals, when his passions are roused to fury and are uncontrolled, is man; and of all governments, the worst is that which never fails to excite, but was never found to restrain those passions, that is, democracy. It is an illuminated hell, that in the midst of remorse, horrour, and torture, rings with festivity; for experience shews, that one joy remains to this most malignant description of the damned, the power to make others wretched. When a man looks round and sees his neighbours mild and merciful, he cannot feel afraid of the abuse of their power over him: and surely if they oppress me, he will say, they will spare their own liberty, for that is dear to all mankind. It is so. The human heart is so constituted, that a man loves liberty as naturally as himself. Yet liberty is a rare thing in the world, though the love of it is so universal.

Before the French revolution, it was the prevailing opinion of our countrymen, that other nations were not free, because their despotick governments were too strong for the people. Of course, we were admonished to detest all existing governments, as so many lions in liberty's path; and to expect by their downfal the happy opportunity that every emancipated people would embrace to secure their own equal rights

for ever. France is supposed to have had this opportunity, and to have lost it. Ought we not, then, to be convinced, that something more is necessary to preserve liberty than to love it? Ought we not to see, that, when the people have destroyed all power but their own, they are the nearest possible to a despotism, the more uncontrolled for being new, and tenfold the more cruel for its hypocrisy?

The steps by which a people must proceed to change a government, are not those to enlighten their judgment or to sooth their passions. They cannot stir without following the men before them, who breathe fury into their hearts and banish nature from them. On whatever grounds and under whatever leaders the contest may be commenced, the revolutionary work is the same, and the characters of the agents will be assimilated to it. A revolution is a mine that must explode with destructive violence. The men who were once peaceable like to carry firebrands and daggers too long. Thus armed, will they submit to salutary restraint? How will you bring them to it? Will you undertake to reason down fury? Will you satisfy revenge without blood? Will you preach banditti into habits of self-denial? If you can, and in times of violence and anarchy, why do you ask any other guard than sober reason for your life and property in times of peace and order, when men are most disposed to listen to it? Yet even at such times, you impose restraints; you call out for your defence the whole array of law with its instruments of punishment and terrour; you maintain ministers to strengthen force with opinion, and to make religion the auxiliary of morals. With all this, however, crimes are still perpetrated; society is not any too safe or quiet. Break down all these fences; make what is called law an assassin; take what it ought to protect, and divide it; extinguish by acts of rapine and vengeance the spark of mercy in the heart; or, if it should be found to glow there, quench it in that heart's blood; make your people scoff at their morals, and unlearn an education to virtue; displace the christian sabbath by a profane one, for a respite once in ten days from the toils of murder, because men, who first shed blood for revenge,

and proceed to spill it for plunder, and in the progress of their ferocity, for sport, want a festival—what sort of society would you have? Would not rage grow with its indulgence? The coward fury of a mob rises in proportion as there is less resistance; and their inextinguishable thirst for slaughter grows more ardent as more blood is shed to slake it. In such a state is liberty to be gained or guarded from violation? It could not be kept an hour from the daggers of those who, having seized despotick power, would claim it as their lawful prize.—I have written the history of France. Can we look back upon it without terrour, or forward without despair?

The nature of arbitrary power is always odious; but it cannot be long the arbitrary power of the multitude. There is, probably, no form of rule among mankind, in which the progress of the government depends so little on the particular character of those who administer it. Democracy is the creature of impulse and violence; and the intermediate stages towards the tyranny of one are so quickly passed, that the vileness and cruelty of men are displayed with surprising uniformity. There is not time for great talents to act. There is no sufficient reason to believe, that we should conduct a revolution with much more mildness than the French. If a revolution find the citizens lambs, it will soon make them carnivorous, if not cannibals. We have many thousands of the Paris and St. Domingo assassins in the United States, not as fugitives, but as patriots, who merit reward, and disdain to take any but power. In the progress of our confusion, these men will effectually assert their claims and display their skill. There is no governing power in the state but party. The moderate and thinking part of the citizens are without power or influence; and it must be so, because all power and influence are engrossed by a factious combination of men, who can overwhelm uncombined individuals with numbers, and the wise and virtuous with clamour and fury.

It is indeed a law of politicks as well as of physicks, that a body in action must overcome an equal body at rest. The attacks that have been made on the constitutional barriers pro-

claim in a tone that would not be louder from a trumpet, that party will not tolerate any resistance to its will. All the supposed independent orders of the commonwealth must be its servile instruments, or its victims. We should experience the same despotism in Massachusetts, New-Hampshire, and Connecticut, but the battle is not yet won. It will be won; and they who already display the temper of their Southern and French allies, will not linger or reluct in imitating the worst extremes of their example.

What, then, is to be our condition?

Faction will inevitably triumph. Where the government is both stable and free, there may be parties. There will be differences of opinion, and the pride of opinion will be sufficient to generate contests, and to inflame them with bitterness and rancour. There will be rivalships among those whom genius, fame, or station have made great, and these will deeply agitate the state without often hazarding its safety. Such parties will excite alarm, but they may be safely left, like the elements, to exhaust their fury upon each other.

The object of their strife is to get power *under* the government; for, where that is constituted as it should be, the power *over* the government will not seem attainable, and, of course, will not be attempted.

But in democratick states there will be *factions*. The sovereign power being nominally in the hands of all, will be effectively within the grasp of a few; and, therefore, by the very laws of our nature, a few will combine, intrigue, lie, and fight to engross it to themselves. All history bears testimony, that this attempt has never yet been disappointed.

Who will be the associates? Certainly not the virtuous, who do not wish to control the society, but quietly to enjoy its protection. The enterprising merchant, the thriving tradesman, the careful farmer will be engrossed by the toils of their business, and will have little time or inclination for the unprofitable and disquieting pursuits of politicks. It is not the industrious, sober husbandman, who will plough that barren field; it is the lazy and dissolute bankrupt, who has no other to

plough. The idle, the ambitious, and the needy will band together to break the hold that law has upon them, and then to get hold of law. Faction is a Hercules, whose first labour is to strangle this lion, and then to make armour of his skin. In every democratick state the ruling faction will have law to keep down its enemies; but it will arrogate to itself an undisputed power over law. If our ruling faction has found any impediments, we ask, which of them is now remaining? And is it not absurd to suppose, that the conquerors will be contented with half the fruits of victory?

We are to be subject, then, to a *despotick* faction, irritated by the resistance that has delayed, and the scorn that pursues their triumph, elate with the insolence of an arbitrary and uncontrollable domination, and who will exercise their sway, not according to the rules of integrity or national policy, but in conformity with their own exclusive interests and passions.

This is a state of things, which admits of progress, but not of reformation: it is the beginning of a revolution, which must *advance*. Our affairs, as first observed, no longer depend on counsel. The opinion of a majority is no longer invited or permitted to control our destinies, or even to retard their consummation. The men in power may, and, no doubt, will give place to some other faction, who will succeed, because they are abler men, or, possibly, in candour we say it, because they are worse. Intrigue will for some time answer instead of force, or the mob will supply it. But by degrees force only will be relied on by those who are *in*, and employed by those who are *out*. The vis major will prevail, and some bold chieftain will *conquer* liberty, and triumph and reign in her name.

Yet, it is confessed we have hopes, that this event is not very near. We have no cities as large as London or Paris; and, of course, the ambitious demagogues may find the ranks of their STANDING ARMY too thin to rule by them alone. It is also worth remark, that our mobs are not, like those of Europe, excitable by the cry of *no bread*. The dread of famine is every where else a power of political electricity, that

glides through all the haunts of filth, and vice, and want in a city with incredible speed, and in times of insurrection rives and scorches with a sudden force, like heaven's own thunder. Accordingly, we find the sober men of Europe more afraid of the despotism of the rabble than of the government.

But, as in the United States we see less of this description of low vulgar, and as, in the essential circumstance alluded to, they are so much less manageable by their demagogues, we are to expect, that our affairs will be long guided by courting the mob, before they are violently changed by employing them. While the passions of the multitude can be conciliated to confer power and to overcome all impediments to its action, our rulers have a plain and easy task to perform. It costs them nothing but hypocrisy. As soon, however, as rival favourites of the people may happen to contend by the practice of the same arts, we are to look for the sanguinary strife of ambition. Brissot will fall by the hand of Danton, and *he* will be supplanted by Robespiere. The revolution will proceed in exactly the same way, but not with so rapid a pace, as that of France.

HINTS AND CONJECTURES

CONCERNING

THE INSTITUTIONS OF LYCURGUS.

WRITTEN IN 1805.

THE institutions of Lycurgus have engrossed, and, perhaps, have deserved the praises of all antiquity. Even the Athenians, the rivals and enemies of Sparta, do not withhold or stint their admiration of the sublime genius and profound wisdom of this legislator. Such a general concurrence of opinions, and for so many ages, in favour of the laws of Lycurgus, can scarcely be imagined to proceed from errour, accident, or caprice.

WHEN to this we add, that for seven hundred years the Lacedæmonian state continued to respect, if not rigidly to observe, these laws, we are not permitted at this late day to arraign their wisdom, especially by attempting to ridicule their singularity. We are the less authorized to pronounce their condemnation, as the ancients have taken more pains to make them appear admirable than intelligible. A complete and satisfactory view of the Spartan policy, if any such were exhibited of old, has not reached our times. Besides, so unlike are our manners and institutions to those of Greece, and particularly of Sparta, that the representations of Xenophon, Aristotle, Polybius, and Plutarch, though amply sufficient for the information of their countrymen, cannot fail to appear defective and obscure to us.

THE chief articles of the system of Lycurgus seem so much more extraordinary than any thing else that has happened in the world, except their political consequences, that we should be induced to deny the facts, if the historical evidence of them were not complete. As we are not permitted to do this, we submit to the authority of history, with a sort of vague and uninstructed astonishment at the strangeness of its testimony.

Sparta or Lacedæmon, ancient writers tell us, was rent with factions, one of the two kings being at the head of each, without laws, and so deeply corrupted, that neither morals nor manners could supply their place. In this exigency Lycurgus appeared, and by his genius took the ascendant over the kings and demagogues, and, indeed, over all the men of his age and nation, as the pasture oak towers above the shrubs, or like a giant among dwarfs. The oracle of Delphi gave him, moreover, all the authority that superstition can maintain over ignorance. Thus far all is easy of comprehension.

But, when we are required to believe, that a whole people readily submitted to give up their property to be divided anew; that they renounced luxury, ostentation, and pleasure, and even the use of money, except iron; that they were obliged, under severe penalties, from which their kings were not exempted, to dine in publick and on wretched fare; that their children were taken from them and exposed to death, if adjudged weakly and infirm, or, if permitted to live, placed under the tutelage of publick officers; and that such was the intolerable rigour of their regulations, that actual service in camp was a welcome relaxation—when we read all this, surely, if there is nothing to justify our doubts, there is nothing that can suppress our wonder. We yield our faith at once, that the Lacedæmonians immediately became a nation of heroes, who had extinguished nature, and silenced appetite and passion, save only the passion to live and die for their country.

By this expedient we make the Spartan story somewhat more credible. As we can know nothing of what demigods would do, we may imagine just what we please. But *men* nowadays, we are sure, would not be brought to adopt such laws, nor, if they did, long to observe them.

Nevertheless, we know, that the success of the system of Lycurgus did not arise from the superiority of his race of Spartans. On the contrary, so far were they from being superiour to other men, that he found them, we are told, worse. This we are forced to believe; for he found them factious—and faction, we know, is as sure to degrade and corrupt the

citizens as to bewilder and inflame them. Indeed he left them as he found them, and as they are represented by all antiquity, faithless, ferocious, and cruel, yet loving their country with an ardour of passion and with a disregard of justice, that made it hateful and terrible to the rest of mankind.

We are driven back, then, to consider how *men*, and very bad men, could be prevailed on to establish, and, what is still more surprising, for many hundred years to maintain such self-denying and odious institutions. It would be absurd to suppose, that the enthusiasm kindled by Lycurgus spread so far and lasted so long. This sort of fire, which seldom catches any thing but light combustibles, only flashes and expires. We find, on the contrary, that the institutions of Lycurgus had a sort of awful authority to fix the popular caprice and overcome their disgust, to charm their sages and animate their heroes, to form the manners and control the policy of the nation for many ages. The mere popularity of his system would not have lasted for a year; and though superstition might do much, nature in the end would do more, and resume her violated rights. So many painful exercises, such endless and unsufferable privations and constraints would soon exhaust the patience of the most passive wretches that ever existed. It was said, with almost as much truth as wit, by the Athenian Alcibiades: "no wonder the Spartans cheerfully encounter death—it is a welcome relief to them from such a life as they are obliged to lead."

It is, therefore, after all, extremely difficult to conceive, that the discipline of this famous legislator was intended for the body of the inhabitants of the city of Lacedæmon, much less for the whole country of Laconia, or that it was ever so applied. Human nature has not changed for the worse by the lapse of twenty six hundred years; and we may venture to say, that there is no people now on the face of the earth, who could be persuaded or forced to submit to such a discipline.

The Jews, it is true, adopted a very singular body of laws; but it is equally true, that they were infinitely less obnoxious to the sentiments and feelings of nature than those of Lycur-

gus. It is also true, that, under the immediate government of God himself, manifested by signs and wonders, by awful warnings and signal punishments, the Hebrews repeatedly yielded to their natural repugnance, and departed from the law of Moses. Yet Lycurgus, without any divine, and even without the regal authority in Sparta, is commonly supposed, not only to have wielded the political power of the state, a thing not in the least difficult to suppose, but to have changed or extinguished the inclinations of every Lacedæmonian heart, and to have substituted in their stead a passion for self-denial, restraint, and suffering.

Yet all the writers of antiquity represent the discipline of Lycurgus, no less than his political constitution, as being in full force over all the citizens; that food, dress, sports, conversation, and even the intercourse of the sexes, were restricted by law; in short, that a system of regulations unspeakably more minute, vexatious, disgusting, and tyrannical than we find prescribed for the fraternity of La Trappe, or the monks of the order of St. Francis, was inflexibly imposed on a nation, and quietly obeyed for many ages. All this may, possibly, be true; and we must yield our belief, if we cannot help it; but it would be almost as hard to command our faith in this extent of the story, as our obedience to the laws of Sparta.

In this exigency, and with this hard alternative before us, it is hoped, that those who are profoundly versed in classick learning will not deem it treason against the ancients, if we propose some HINTS AND CONJECTURES tending to throw light upon the subject, and which, if well grounded, may somewhat better reconcile the long-unquestioned miracles of Spartan legislation with common sense and the unchangeable uniformity of the human character.

Now, though it is inconceivable, that a whole nation should submit to the numberless, endless, intolerable vexations and rigours of the Spartan discipline, it is by no means incredible, that two or three thousand of them should. The wandering Tartars who live encamped in tents might, possibly, be subjected to a pretty strict military regulation; although it is

certain, that they are not ; but a people dispersed over a whole territory, living in houses, and cherishing, as from their situation they must, the delights that a fixed home affords, cannot be made monks, and be cut off from society, while they are suffered to remain warm in its bosom.

WHY, then, are we not permitted to suppose, that the system of Lycurgus, so far as it regulated the meals, education, dress, and indifferent actions of the citizens, was made for a *particular class*, and enforced only upon them, and not upon the mass of the free inhabitants ; that this class was formed exclusively of the *Spartan*, or noble families ; that the object of this system was not, as is generally believed, by changing or expelling human nature, to raise a whole nation above it, but to raise a governing aristocracy above that nation. To illustrate the conjecture, may we not imagine these *Spartans* to have been to the rest of the free citizens of the state in point of rank, privilege, power, and numbers, what the knights of St. John lately were to the people of Malta. It is probable, there was a system of *education* extremely rigid for the nobles ; and a system of *discipline* for the national militia quite distinct from the former. Lycurgus distributed the lands to these latter in thirty nine thousand lots, or shares, of which less than five thousand were assigned to the citizens of Sparta. Now, as we read of no education of the youth according to the rules of Lycurgus out of that city, we can scarcely refrain from adopting both the before mentioned conjectures, viz. that the famous plan of Spartan education was only for the nobles or their sons who were in the city ; and that the military system, if there was one, which we cannot doubt, was distinct from it, and embraced the whole feudal tenants or national militia.

ADMITTING these suppositions to be well grounded, our difficulties disappear at once.

THE rules for a patrician academy, and for a fixed militia, though severe, might be enforced by the publick authority. The former had power and rank, and the latter had lands to stimulate and reward their obedience. The very circumstance of setting apart a class of young men for the noblest of all pro-

fessions, the profession of arms, would naturally inspire the young *Spartans* with the esprit du corps, with the lofty pride that would more cheerfully seek than shun the occasions to make efforts and sacrifices. In framing the rules for the education and discipline of this *noble* class, there was ample scope for the genius of Lycurgus, and for the display of his deep insight into the secrets of the human heart. Instead of extinguishing nature, and acting, as it is generally thought he did, without means, or, at least, without any that we can believe to be adequate, he had only to act with the aid of one of the strongest passions, and to apply that love of distinction, which is one of the most powerful agents in the transactions of mankind. Hence it was, that every *Spartan* thought it better not to live at all than live a coward. Hence, Leonidas and his little troop, at Thermopylæ, did all that human nature could do—but they did no more ; no more than British sailors do now ; no more than American sailors are capable of doing, and will certainly do, whenever our government shall feel somewhat of their spirit. The military character, which causes a generous devotion of life to honour, is no prodigy : it is the familiar business of every day of modern warfare.

On examining these conjectures of the restricted, instead of the universal, application of the discipline of Lycurgus, their conformity with the known laws of human action, will afford ground to admit them, as at least plausible. Let us review the history of the Lacedæmonians, and see, if we cannot find matter of corroboration.

Less than one hundred years after the war of Troy, the descendants of Hercules, who had been exiled, and in a long course of years had greatly increased in numbers, renewed the attempt to recover possession of the Peloponnesus. With the assistance of a body of Dorians, then the most ferocious barbarians in all Greece, they succeeded, expelled most of the inhabitants, who took refuge in Attica and on the coast of Asia Minor, as well as in the islands of the Ionian sea. The Heraclidæ subverted the thrones of the princes of the Peloponnesian states, seized on the lands for themselves and such of

their Dorian allies as chose to remain with them, and reduced to slavery such of the old stock of inhabitants as did not betake themselves to flight. Two sons of Aristodemus, of the race of Hercules, were placed on the throne of Lacedæmon.

It is well known, that Hercules for his exploits was deified; and, as long as paganism was the popular religion of Greece, which it continued to be fifteen hundred years after this event, his name was adored with the most enthusiastick devotion. He was most emphatically the hero and the deity of the Greeks. Now, as the return of the Heraclidæ caused one of the most thorough and sweeping revolutions recorded in all history, so complete as in a great measure to change the inhabitants, and entirely to change the governing classes, and as they came back to Peloponnesus with the double claim of being conquerors and the progeny of a god, it is plain, there was a patrician, heaven-descended class existing in the state long before the age of Lycurgus, engrossing to themselves a great part of the lands, and all the powers and advantages of the government.

It is impossible to say positively, whether this class consisted only of the race of Hercules, or whether it included also some of the chiefs of the Dorians. As Lycurgus is said to be only the tenth in descent from Hercules, the Heraclidæ, though sufficiently numerous for an order of nobility, could have been scarcely numerous enough to keep the remains of a conquered people in subjection. It is probable, that a large part of the holders of the conquered lands were not of that heroick race. This is the more readily to be supposed, as Laconia is represented in very early times as a populous country, and containing a hundred cities. These, no doubt, were inconsiderable towns; yet, after allowing for a very great emigration in consequence of the conquest, we may believe, that the native inhabitants still outnumbered their conquerors. The descendants of Hercules, being princes, were exclusively allowed the command of the armies, the exercise of all the powers of government, and their hereditary rank as an order of nobles, afterwards called, by way of distinction, *Spartans*. The rest

of the citizens, who became distinguished by the appellation of Lacedæmonians, were the conquering soldiery, to whom lands were assigned in reward for their past services, and as a pledge of their future obedience. Thus, we may believe, a governing aristocracy and a national militia, in subordination to that body, were called into existence at the time and by the circumstances of the conquest.

It is also to be remembered, that all the governments of Greece were originally formed by the confederacy of cities; and in all of them the capital city aspired to the chief, and in every case where it was practicable, to the sole authority over the rest. In several of the confederacies this ambitious project was resisted with success. But in the earliest antiquity and immediately after the return of the Heraclidæ, we learn, that Sparta was chosen as the residence of the kings and seat of government, and that the domination of that city was stretched over all the towns of Laconia. Helos alone resisted and was subdued; and its inhabitants were reduced to a sort of qualified slavery, by which they were fixed to the soil as peasants to labour for their Spartan landlords. Now, as Sparta governed the state, and the aristocracy governed Sparta, for the kings, except in time of war, were cyphers, we cannot hesitate to admit, that these nobles were chiefly collected as residents in the city of Sparta. The very fact, that there were two kings, must have annihilated their authority, if any had been intrusted to them. That circumstance and every other that has been transmitted to us by history proves, that the government was in the hands of an aristocracy.

Hence we discern the best reasons in the world, why Lycurgus did, and Solon did not establish an aristocracy. Neither of them could create or annihilate the materials of their respective governments. The people of Attica, who called themselves with no little vanity, ἀυτόχθονες, or the original people, constituted a democracy, which could not be forced, and would not be persuaded to establish a body of governing nobles. Lycurgus, on the contrary, found a numerous and powerful race of the first conquerors, outnumbered by slaves who were

kept in subjection by an aristocracy with two kings at their head. Accordingly, it seems to have been the utmost extent of his undertaking, to new model the government rather than the nation. The aristocracy was itself in danger of degenerating into an oligarchy, and was exposed to perish by its own inevitable factions, as well as by the silent growth and consequent encroachments of the unprivileged classes of the citizens. Already the extreme disorders of the state portended convulsions and revolution.

In this emergency he devised such expedients as would give, not liberty to the people, which seems not to have been in the least degree his concern, but stability and perpetuity to the aristocracy. He formed, or, perhaps, only revived a senate of twenty eight members, elected for life by the numerous body of the noble Spartans. These *Spartans* had also their assemblies monthly, in which they exercised very important functions of the government. Thus two bodies were formed, who may be thought to bear some resemblance to the houses of lords and commons in England.

Having thus placed the government in the hands of the *Spartans*, much was still necessary to enable them to maintain it. In that age pre-eminence could neither be gained, nor secured by commerce or arts, but only by arms. Here, then, we see the obvious necessity of the case, that Lycurgus should, by his system of education and his discipline, make these *Spartans* really superiour to the men they governed. This was the more necessary, as we are informed by ancient writers, that they were detested by the rest of the inhabitants.

This being admitted, and it can scarcely be denied, we can no longer so much as conceive, that it was the policy or any part of the plan of Lycurgus to include all the free citizens of Laconia, or even of the city of Sparta, in his great system of education. It was his object to establish an incontestible superiority in favour of the *Spartans*. By infusing into the other citizens the pride and desperate fanaticism of the nobles, the former, being also perfectly well trained to arms, would

have been as incapable of submission and as capable of rule as their superiours.

Admitting that nothing is so much for the interest of a class of men as power, and they are very apt to think that nothing is, then surely nothing could be more for the interest of the aristocracy than the laws of Lycurgus, for in consequence of them they maintained their authority over the state for many ages. The power of the Roman patricians was from the first balanced, imperfectly enough we confess, by the people; but the whole power of the Lacedæmonian state was engrossed by the *Spartans*. Until the establishment of the ephori, one hundred and thirty years after Lycurgus, it does not appear, that, in respect to political power, there was any other people: the rest of the inhabitants of Laconia and Sparta were nothing.

If Lycurgus met with infinite difficulty in getting his laws established, it is certain he had vast means of influence in the pride and ambition of the nobles, who were so greatly interested in their adoption. In so great a length of time as had elapsed since the return of the Heraclidæ, many of these nobles, and probably still more of the soldiery, had diminished or alienated their original lots of land. The poor members of the aristocracy and of the militia would, of course, insist upon *restoring* the ancient division of lands by a new assignment. Lycurgus, knowing that power follows property, and especially property in lands, and intending to prevent all rivalship with the aristocracy by giving to that body and their military dependants a monopoly of the lands, was inclined and enabled to *restore* the original division.

It cannot be believed, that, without such reasons and helps, he could have *originated* a plan for an arbitrary assignment of the territory. On the contrary, it may be fairly presumed, that very few, and those great proprietors, were dispossessed, and very many were accommodated. By thus creating a stock of popularity with one class of men, and those the most numerous, he could use it to compel the submission of another and the most refractory. This, we are informed, is precisely what

he did. Thus he established a perpetual fund for the support of this ruling aristocracy.

That it might be perpetual, he made the lands unalienable, though inheritable; he proscribed all trade, manufactures, and luxury, and even gold and silver coins. He foresaw, that industry and trade would bring in wealth; and that wealth would confer distinction. In this event the military spirit would decline, and the unprivileged orders of the state would rise into importance. To guard against this disturbance of the operation of his system, he exerted all his great abilities to provide every political expedient possible to keep Sparta poor and warlike.

It will never be imagined, when he gave the purse to one set of men, or, in other words, all the lands to the aristocracy and the military, that he gave the sword to another set. On the contrary, we shall find, that he established a complete monopoly of power and property in favour of the *Spartans*. It has been already observed, that this governing order resided chiefly *in the city;* and that we no where read of a Spartan education out of it. The inhabitants of Laconia, we are told, were deemed inferiour to those of the city, *not having the same education*.

Are we to suppose, that the inhabitants of even the city of Sparta, or all such as were free, were indiscriminately fed at the publick tables, and daily subjected to the whole discipline of Lycurgus? Even this is incredible. It cannot be imagined, that the landholders, of whom the number in Sparta and its immediate territory was at first nine thousand, were thus assembled and fed. If we take half that number for the city alone, we shall not readily admit, that they were educated and trained in this manner.

We should confine our calculation to the noble Spartans only; for Sparta was undoubtedly a great city, though we know not the extent of its population. But, as it contained inhabitants enough, though wholly unfortified and without walls, twice to repulse Epaminondas with his victorious army, we may reckon Sparta to be equal to Thebes or Athens. It

was accounted one of the great cities of Greece, and might have fifty or sixty thousand inhabitants, certainly ten times too many to be fed in the publick halls or in the barracks. As the landholders were a militia, and not a regular standing army, it is on that account the less to be admitted, that they were daily drawn out, exercised, and fed. Xenophon says, he has seen five thousand Lacedæmonians assembled together, and was scarcely able to pick out thirty *Spartans*. The Lacedæmonian armies often marched on expeditions with less than one hundred of this order.

This distinction was not merely nominal; if it had been, it would have soon disappeared from its frivolousness; and it must have been frivolous to the last degree, if these Spartans had not received a different sort of education, and claimed a very superiour rank and authority in the state. When one hundred and thirty *Spartans* were shut up and besieged in the little island of Sphacteria, the government was extremely agitated, and offered to make the most extraordinary concessions to Athens to procure the release of these men. To the aristocracy, their destruction seemed like a dismemberment of their body.

This governing class, being also the fighting class, was continually diminishing. On the defeat of the Lacedæmonians at Leuctra, the government was thrown into the deepest consternation, because so unusual a number of *Spartans* and the king Cleombrotus were slain. They saw with pain and terrour the reduction of the numbers, and the proportionate reduction of the influence and power of their order.

It may after all be said, although these facts prove, that all the free inhabitants of Sparta were not *Spartans*, yet it still remains a question, whether all the former did not receive the strict education prescribed by Lycurgus.

It is true, there is no express evidence to that point; but we may take these facts as evidence of the spirit of the government, and conclusive evidence, that from its very nature it could have no other spirit. That being premised, it would be truly surprising, that the strict discipline and education of the

great legislator should be enforced upon all the citizens. As a common education makes *men*, could it be, that a Spartan education, which made *heroes*, was lavished upon the tradesmen of the city; (for the necessary trades were allowed from the first, and, no doubt, many more had got footing there,) upon the strangers, who might happen to reside in the city; and, above all, upon the numerous description of the sons of Helots, who had been made free for their services to the state?

As a mortal hatred subsisted between those freedmen and the nobles, it cannot be allowed, that these latter had permitted, much less required, an exact *equality* as to the use of arms and every admired accomplishment that could be derived from education. On that supposition, ten or twenty thousand base-born heroes would have snatched the sway from the hands of less than one thousand heaven-descended heroes of the blood of Hercules. The education that conferred glory and distinction, for its chief object was to make every thing else seem vile, would have made power tempting, too tempting to remain for ages within reach, yet untouched.

On these grounds we seem to be authorized to conclude, that the Spartan education and discipline were not imposed on *all* the free inhabitants, although the language used by all the ancient writers on the subject scarcely admits of their restriction to the noble and military classes. Polybius, who is as remarkable for his gravity as for his good sense, warmly exclaims in praise of Lycurgus, as a sort of divinity, who had created a nation anew by his system of education.

We may conjecture, that the noble class, being the only one that attracted much notice, was put for the nation; or it might be, that, while the sons of the nobles were educated by the state, great numbers of an inferiour order were trained as soldiers; and these distinctions being known to every body in the time of Xenophon, were not deemed to require a minute explanation. However that may be, Herodotus, whose notion of the universality of the Spartan system seems to be like that of all succeeding writers, uses an expression, that will coun-

tenance our restriction of it, as we have before suggested. Giving an account of the dignity of the Spartan kings, he says: "if they dine at the publick feasts, as they are obliged to do, unless specially excused, they are allowed a double portion of the food, *as also if they are feasted by a private citizen.*" How could a private citizen invite a Spartan king to dine with him, if he were himself obliged to dine in the publick hall? May we not, then, infer from this passage of Herodotus, that the citizens of Sparta dined and supped in their own houses?

That the regulations of Lycurgus for the education of youth, and for convening the citizens at the publick meals, were not extended to *all* the inhabitants of the city of Sparta and its territory, may be inferred from some of the facts transmitted to us by Xenophon and Plutarch. When a male child was born, and, after being examined by publick officers, pronounced sound and worth the bringing up, one of the nine thousand lots was immediately assigned to him. Now, if a tradesman's, a slave's, or a stranger's son should happen to be born of as good a shape as a noble Spartan's, is it to be supposed, a lot would be given to the former and refused to the latter, who might come into the world the day after they were all disposed of. A populous city, like Sparta, would have more healthy male children than lots. But supposing the distribution confined to the continually diminishing military class of Spartans, there would be more lots than children; and this was in fact the case. The lands assigned as a fund for the military class, proved more than sufficient for the number of *Spartans*. Supposing it liable to be absorbed by other children, it would not only have proved insufficient, but it would have been employed to defeat its original use and destination, to raise the degraded classes, and to stint or starve the military class.

Another fact is worth observation. At the messes or tables of the publick meals, which, we are told, admitted fifteen, no person was received without the consent of the whole company. Can we, then, suppose for a moment, the law required every inhabitant to eat at these tables, and yet

authorized every citizen to exclude him? Where was he to dine? And where, let it be asked, were those persons to dine, who, having lost their arms, or turned their backs in battle, were stigmatized and shunned by all citizens?

Again, we are told, the very children were obliged to attend those meals, because they heard only wise and solid discourse on such occasions. If the ignorant, sordid rabble of a great city were really seated at those tables, will any man think, that Lycurgus himself, if he had lived as long as his institutions, could have kept order? or that, without a miraculous inspiration, as often as the tables were spread, the conversation could have been edifying? It is incredible and absurd.

The sons of noble Spartans were, no doubt, educated by the state, were kept in an academy, dined and supped together, and, probably, it was the official duty of the kings to superintend their education. They were trained, not as citizens, but as rulers; not simply as soldiers, but as generals. To perpetuate the aristocracy, the government took care to exclude accident, caprice, and folly as much as possible from all influence on the young nobles. It is obvious, that the stability of the government depended on its transmitting its peculiar identity of perfection from generation to generation. All this makes it natural, that the rulers should be educated by the state, and that the citizens who had only to obey, should not be. This idea derives some further force from the observation of Plutarch, who says: "the chief object of Lycurgus being a system of *education*, and to establish habits and manners, he would not permit his laws to be reduced to writing." This can hardly be supposed, if they were intended for a whole nation. The class of Spartans, though amounting to several thousands originally, were reduced in the time of Xenophon to about seven hundred; and even of these the greater part were in a state of poverty. Agis and Cleomenes, two kings of Lacedæmon, successively attempted to restore the strict discipline of Lycurgus. Plutarch informs us, that Cleomenes, when attempting to enforce a new division of the lands, alleged in recommendation of the measure, that it would provide means for admitting

foreigners of merit to citizenship. The state in that case, he said, would no longer want defenders, alluding to the reduced number of *Spartans*. This government had ever been to the last degree averse from granting citizenship, precisely because the exclusive possessors of power are ever unwilling to admit partners. Now, if there were many thousand able-bodied brave men in Sparta, as Cleomenes knew there were, for he led a gallant army of them into the field, why did he lament the want of defenders of the state? Why did he speak of admitting foreigners to take lands and become citizens, when it was so easy a thing to raise Lacedæmonians to be Spartans, especially too if they had received the same publick education? It is however evident from this passage of Plutarch, that they had not received such an education, that they did not hold so high a rank in the state, and that it could not be gratuitously conferred upon them. *Noble* foreigners might be made citizens without any degradation of the Spartan pride; but the admission of the plebeian inhabitants of Sparta to a higher rank would be a source both of individual mortification and of publick disorder: the partition between ranks would be broken down.

We shall be further confirmed in our opinion of the exclusive aristocratical policy of the Spartan government by a closer observation of its effects.

In the Lacedæmonian state there were two descriptions of slaves, the *Helots*, who were an oppressed, degraded peasantry, the cultivators of the soil on a fixed rent for their Spartan landlords; and the *domestick slaves*, who were treated with still greater rigour. These two classes are supposed to have amounted to nearly one half the population. The free citizens may be also placed in two classes, the Spartans and the Lacedæmonians. These latter must at all times have greatly exceeded the Spartans in number, yet by the original plan of Lycurgus their political power was next to nothing.

The kings and their wives, the senators and all magistrates, except the ephori, and it is believed all military officers of high rank, must have been *Spartans*. The Spartans were electors also of the senators for life; but, as the choice was

determined by a computation of the number of suffrages by the noise of the acclamations, in favour of a candidate, it may be conjectured, the senate in effect filled up the vacancies in its own body. A Spartan assembly was held once a month. Thus, we see, the powers of government were engrossed by a senate, and its dignities and privileges by an hereditary aristocracy.

There was indeed a general assembly of the Lacedæmonian nation to determine on peace, war, and alliances. To this assembly deputies from the several cities and from the allied states were admitted. Yet, as it was convened at Sparta, as its objects concerned chiefly the external policy, and as the effective government was in the hands of the aristocracy, it was not found to disturb or divide their monopoly of power.

To perpetuate this order of things, Lycurgus was not more solicitous by his institutions to elevate one class, than to depress and disarm every other. We must repeat it, for this reason it was, he forbad all arts, except such as could not be dispensed with; even learning itself was denied its honours; he did not allow his Spartans to travel into foreign countries, nor foreigners to be admitted to Sparta; he interdicted trade, luxury, and gold and silver; he would have his Spartans wholly intent on military distinction: arms and only arms should confer glory. His Spartans did not labour themselves, but the Helots laboured for them. Not only was the monopoly of power complete, but the roots and seeds of future rivalship by the depressed classes of the society seemed to be exterminated.

Here let us pause to make a reflection. For more than two thousand years the world has been loud and violent in its panegyrick of Spartan *virtue*, because Lycurgus had bestowed all possible care to make his nobles brave, without having employed the least to make them honest; because he had made them love power better than labour; because they loved their country, while they owned and governed it; and because, when riches did not command honour, and titled poverty did, they sought honour in the only way in which it was to be had, and held that preferable which every body in that age actually preferred. Spartan virtue did not, most certainly, include

morals. The Roman Cincinnatus was proud of his birth, and, probably, much the prouder for his poverty. It is not at this degenerate day at all essential to the glory of a great general, that he should have a great estate.

Effectual as for some ages this policy of Lycurgus was, time and the revolution of human affairs at length gradually subverted it. The depressed classes of the state slowly rose from the ground, and from the feet of the aristocracy, and claimed and took their station in society.

It may be supposed, the Spartans exacted at first from the Helots who cultivated the soil as large a part of the produce as they possibly could. It was easier to require than to get much; indeed, by requiring too much, they would get nothing. Despair would baffle rapacity. It is also to be conceded, that the proportion once fixed must remain fixed. This, ancient writers inform us, was the case. Now, as the Spartans were a body continually diminishing, their power to extort must have declined with their numbers. Time also must have made great changes in the value of the rents, though payable in kind. Accordingly, we are told, that most of the Spartan families fell into poverty, and many of the Helots became very rich. Their rise to some share of political and personal importance was the necessary consequence.

It was only one hundred and thirty years after Lycurgus, that the operation of these principles was made manifest, and their progress accelerated, by the establishment of the ephori. These five annual magistrates resembled the Roman tribunes of the people, were elected by the mass of the nation, and in fact were often selected from the dregs of the people. At first their power and their pretensions were moderate; but, as the aristocracy continued to decline, and the democracy, whose favourites and champions they were, made haste to raise itself, they gradually subverted the original system of the government, and engrossed its powers.

They deposed kings, and exercised the functions of sovereignty themselves.

Hence it is, that all antiquity bewails the decay of Spartan virtue. The citizens had not declined from virtue, for the Spartan morals were ever bad; but the aristocracy had fallen from power. Polybius assures us, that the institutions of Lycurgus were admirably adapted to Sparta, while it was content to remain a small state, and refrained from ambitious wars to conquer Greece and Asia. Their degeneracy is dated from the time when Lysander took Athens, and when Agesilaus made his expedition against the Persian king. Sparta was then filled with rich spoils, and corruption entered, they say, with riches. The labouring classes had always loved property, but were deprived, as much as possible, by Lycurgus of all chances to amass it. The governing class had not, until these wars, enjoyed many opportunities to get it, nor had it then become an object of personal influence and consideration.

But too much influence seems to be allowed to these victories. In a very early age, the Lacedæmonians, after an obstinate and long protracted contest, had subdued Messene, a state little less considerable than their own, and made slaves of the people. The property was the booty of the conquerors; yet they maintained their laws for many hundred years after that event. The Romans were conquerors from the days of Romulus, if we except the peaceful reign of Numa; yet the greatest boasts of Roman simplicity and virtue, of love of country and contempt of wealth, are made in the very crisis of their most dangerous wars with Pyrrhus and the Samnites, which gave them the dominion of Italy.

Had the Lacedæmonians abstained from wars of ambition, they would have changed, or, as it is the fashion to term it, degenerated. The wars of Lysander and Agesilaus furnished the occasions, but were not the causes of the change. When property and power, once a Spartan monopoly, had passed into other hands, the change was inevitable.

Spartan *equality* has been the everlasting boast of declamation. It was not Lycurgus's view to make his nobles better, but to raise them higher than other men; and that they might to the end of time be sustained at that point of elevation, he contrived to sink all other classes to servitude or insignificance. The nobles were a sort of perpetual garrison for Sparta. Lycurgus did not intend to train all the inhabitants to be nobles.

Having made this accurate distinction of orders in the state, and removed, as far as human wisdom could do it, all the causes that might revive their rivalships and struggles, he may be pronounced the friend of the independence and of the tranquillity of his country, but without excessive absurdity, he cannot be allowed to be the founder of equal liberty. The Lacedæmonians had all the liberty, and most of the virtues and vices of a camp, which is always quiet, and generally has reason to be, as long as subordination is maintained.

Is it wonderful, then, that a state, thus admirably organized for its own peculiar purposes, was able, for so many centuries, to preserve itself unsubdued by its hostile neighbours? or that the aristocracy, who engrossed all political power, as well as the command of armies, should be able so long to hinder the excluded orders of the state from obtaining a share in the government of it?

AMERICAN LITERATURE.

FEW speculative subjects have exercised the passions more or the judgment less, than the inquiry, what rank our country is to maintain in the world for genius and literary attainments. Whether in point of intellect we are equal to Europeans, or only a race of degenerate creoles; whether our artists and authors have already performed much and promise every thing; whether the muses, like the nightingales, are too delicate to cross the salt water, or sicken and mope without song, if they do, are themes upon which we Americans are privileged to be eloquent and loud. It might, indeed, occur to our discretion, that, as the only admissible proof of literary excellence is the measure of its effects, our national claims ought to be abandoned as worthless the moment they are found to need asserting.

NEVERTHELESS, by a proper spirit and constancy in praising ourselves, it seems to be supposed, the doubtful title of our vanity may be quieted, in the same manner as it was once believed, the currency of the continental paper could, by a universal agreement, be established at par with specie. Yet, such was the unpatriotick perverseness of our citizens, they preferred the gold and silver for no better reason than because the paper bills were not so good. And now it may happen, that, from spite or envy, from want of attention or the want of our sort of information, foreigners will dispute the claims of our pre-eminence in genius and literature, notwithstanding the great convenience and satisfaction we should find in their acquiescence.

IN this unmanageable temper or indocile ignorance of Europe, we may be under the harsh necessity of submitting our pretensions to a scrutiny; and, as the world will judge of the matter with none of our partiality, it may be discreet to

anticipate that judgment, and to explore the grounds upon which, it is probable, the aforesaid world will frame it. And after all we should suffer more pain than loss, if we should in the event be stripped of all that does not belong to us; and, especially, if by a better knowledge of ourselves we should gain that modesty, which is the first evidence, and, perhaps, the last of a real improvement. For no man is less likely to increase his knowledge than the coxcomb, who fancies he has already *learned out*. An excessive national vanity, as it is the sign of mediocrity, if not of barbarism, is one of the greatest impediments to knowledge.

It will be useless and impertinent to say, a greater proportion of our citizens have had instruction in schools, than can be found in any European state. It may be true, that neither France nor England can boast of so large a portion of their population, who can read and write, and who are versed in the profitable mystery of the rule of three. This is not the footing upon which the inquiry is to proceed. The question is not, what proportion are stone blind, or how many can see, when the sun shines, but what geniuses have arisen among us, like the sun and stars to shed life and splendour on our hemisphere.

This state of the case is no sooner made, than all the fire-fly tribe of our authors perceive their little lamps go out of themselves, like the flame of a candle when lowered into the mephitick vapour of a well. Excepting the writers of two able works on our politicks, we have no authors. To enter the lists in single combat against Hector, the Greeks did not offer the lots to the nameless rabble of their soldiery; all eyes were turned upon Agamemnon and Ajax, upon Diomed and Ulysses. Shall we match Joel Barlow against Homer or Hesiod? Can Thomas Paine contend against Plato? Or could Findley's history of his own insurrection vie with Sallust's narrative of Catiline's? There is no scarcity of spelling-book-makers, and authors of twelve cent pamphlets; and we have a distinguished few, a sort of literary nobility, whose

works have grown to the dignity and size of an octavo volume. We have many writers, who have read, and who have the sense to understand what others have written. But a right perception of the genius of others is not genius : it is a sort of business talent, and will not be wanting where there is much occasion for its exercise. Nobody will pretend, that the Americans are a stupid race ; nobody will deny, that we justly boast of many able men, and exceedingly useful publications. But has our country produced one great original work of genius ? If we tread the sides of Parnassus, we do not climb its heights : we even creep in our path, by the light that European genius has thrown upon it. Is there one luminary in our firmament that shines with unborrowed rays? Do we reflect, how many constellations blend their beams in the history of Greece, which will appear bright to the end of time, like the path of the zodiack, bespangled with stars.

If, then, we judge of the genius of our nation by the success with which American authors have displayed it, our country has certainly hitherto no pretensions to literary fame. The world will naturally enough pronounce its opinion, that what we have not performed we are incapable of performing.

It is not intended to proceed in stripping our country's honours off, till every lover of it shall turn with disgust from the contemplation of its nakedness. Our honours have not faded—they have not been worn. Genius, no doubt, exists in our country, but it exists, like the unbodied soul on the stream of Lethe, unconscious of its powers, till the causes to excite and the occasions to display it shall happen to concur.

What were those causes, that have for ever consecrated the name of Greece ? We are sometimes answered, she owes her fame to the republican liberty of her states. But Homer, and Hesiod, to say nothing of Linus, Orpheus, Musæus, and many others, wrote while kings governed those states. Anacreon and Simonides flourished in the court of Pisistratus, who

had overthrown the democracy of Athens. Nor, we may add in corroboration, did Roman genius flourish, till the republick fell. France and England are monarchies, and they have excelled all modern nations by their works of genius. Hence we have a right to conclude, the form of government has not a decisive, and certainly not an exclusive influence on the literary eminence of a people.

If climate produces genius, how happens it, that the great men who reflected such honour on their country appeared only in the period of a few hundred years before the death of Alexander? The melons and figs of Greece are still as fine as ever; but where are the Pindars?

In affairs that concern morals, we consider the approbation of a man's own conscience as more precious than all human rewards. But, in the province of the imagination, the applause of others is of all excitements the strongest. This excitement is the cause; excellence, the effect. When every thing concurs, and in Greece every thing did concur, to augment its power, a nation wakes at once from the sleep of ages. It would seem as if some Minerva, some present divinity, inhabited her own temple in Athens, and by flashing light and working miracles had conferred on a single people, and almost on a single age of that people, powers that are denied to other men and other times. The admiration of posterity is excited and overstrained by an effulgence of glory, as much beyond our comprehension as our emulation. The Greeks seem to us a race of giants, Titans, the rivals, yet the favourites of their gods. We think their apprehension was quicker, their native taste more refined, their prose poetry, their poetry musick, their musick enchantment. We imagine they had more expression in their faces, more grace in their movements, more sweetness in the tones of conversation than the moderns. Their fabulous deities are supposed to have left their heaven to breathe the fragrance of their groves, and to enjoy the beauty of their landscapes. The monuments of heroes must have excited to heroism; and the fountains,

which the muses had chosen for their purity, imparted inspiration.

It is, indeed, almost impossible to contemplate the bright ages of Greece, without indulging the propensity to enthusiasm.

We are ready to suspect the delusion of our feelings, and to ascribe its fame to accident, or to causes which have spent their force. Genius, we imagine, is for ever condemned to inaction by having exhausted its power, as well as the subjects upon which it has displayed itself. Another Homer or Virgil could only copy the Iliad and Æneid; and can the second poets, from cinders and ashes, light such a fire as still glows in the writings of the first. Genius, it will be said, like a conflagration on the mountains, consumes its fuel in its flame. Not so—It is a spark of elemental fire that is unquenchable, the contemporary of this creation, and destined with the human soul to survive it. As well might the stars of heaven be said to expend their substance by their lustre. It is to the intellectual world what the electrick fluid is to nature, diffused every where, yet almost every where hidden, capable by its own mysterious laws of action and by the very breath of applause, that like the unseen wind excites it, of producing effects that appear to transcend all power, except that of some supernatural agent riding in the whirlwind. In an hour of calm we suddenly hear its voice, and are moved with the general agitation. It smites, astonishes, and confounds, and seems to kindle half the firmament.

It may be true, that some departments in literature are so filled by the ancients, that there is no room for modern excellence to occupy. Homer wrote soon after the heroick ages, and the fertility of the soil seemed in some measure to arise from its freshness: it had never borne a crop. Another Iliad would not be undertaken by a true genius, nor equally interest this age, if he executed it. But it will not be correct to say, the field is reduced to barrenness from having been over-cropped. Men have still imagination and passions, and

they can be excited. The same causes that made Greece famous, would, if they existed here, quicken the clods of our vallies, and make our Bœotia sprout and blossom like their Attica.

In analyzing genius and considering how it acts, it will be proper to inquire, how it is acted upon. It feels the power it exerts, and its emotions are contagious, because they are fervid and sincere. A single man may sit alone and meditate, till he fancies he is under no influence but that of reason. Even in this opinion, however, he will allow too little for prejudice and imagination ; and still more must be allowed when he goes abroad and acts in the world. But masses and societies of men are governed by their passions.

The passion that acts the strongest, when it acts at all, is fear; for, in its excess, it silences all reasoning and all other passions. But that which acts with the greatest force, because it acts with the greatest constancy, is the desire of consideration. There are very few men who are greatly deceived with respect to their own measure of sense and abilities, or who are much dissatisfied on that account; but we scarcely see any who are quite at ease about the estimate that other people make of them. Hence it is, that the great business of mankind is to fortify or create claims to general regard. Wealth procures respect, and more wealth would procure more respect. The man who, like Midas, turns all he touches into gold, who is oppressed and almost buried in its superfluity, who lives to get, instead of getting to live, and at length belongs to his own estate and is its greatest incumbrance, still toils and contrives to accumulate wealth, not because he is deceived in regard to his wants, but because he knows and feels, that one of his wants, which is insatiable, is that respect which follows its possession. After engrossing all that the seas and mountains conceal, he would be still unsatisfied, and with some good reason, for of the treasures of esteem who can ever have enough? Who would mar or renounce one half his reputation in the world?

At different times, the opinions of men in the same country will vary with regard to the objects of prime consideration, and in different countries there will ever be a great difference; but that which is the first object of regard will be the chief object of pursuit. Men will be most excited to excel in that department which offers to excellence the highest reward in the respect and admiration of mankind. It was this strongest of all excitements that stimulated the literary ages of Greece.

In the heroick times, it is evident, violence and injustice prevailed. The state of society was far from tranquil or safe. Indeed, the traditional fame of the heroes and demigods is founded on the gratitude that was due for their protection against tyrants and robbers. Thucydides tells us, that companies of travellers were often asked, whether they were thieves. Greece was divided into a great number of states, all turbulent, all martial, always filled with emulation, and often with tumult and blood. The laws of war were far more rigorous than they are at present. Each state, and each citizen in the state, contended for all that is dear to man. If victors, they despoiled their enemies of every thing; the property was booty, and the people were made slaves. Such was the condition of the Helots and Messenians under the yoke of Sparta. There was every thing, then, both of terrour and ignominy to rouse the contending states to make every effort to avoid subjugation.

The fate of Platæa, a city that was besieged and taken by the Spartans, and whose citizens were massacred in cold blood, affords a terrible illustration of this remark. The celebrated siege of Troy is an instance more generally known, and no less to the purpose. With what ardent love and enthusiasm the Trojans viewed their Hector, and the Greeks their Ajax and Achilles, is scarcely to be conceived. It cannot be doubted, that to excel in arms was the first of all claims to the popular admiration.

Nor can it escape observation, that in times of extreme danger the internal union of a state would be most perfect. In these days we can have no idea of the ardour of ancient patriotism. A society of no great extent was knit together like one family by the ties of love, emulation, and enthusiasm. Fear, the strongest of all passions, operated in the strongest of all ways. Hence we find, that the first traditions of all nations concern the champions who defended them in war.

This universal state of turbulence and danger, while it would check the progress of the accurate sciences, would greatly extend the dominion of the imagination. It would be deemed of more importance, to rouse or command the feelings of men, than to augment or correct their knowledge.

In this period it might be supposed, that eloquence displayed its power; but this was not the case. Views of refined policy and calculations of remote consequences were not adapted to the taste or capacity of rude warriours, who did not reason at all, or only reasoned from their passions. The business was not to convince, but to animate; and this was accomplished by poetry. It was enough to inspire the poet's enthusiasm, to know beforehand, that his nation would partake it.

Accordingly, the bard was considered as the interpreter and favourite of the gods. His strains were received with equal rapture and reverence as the effusions of an immediate inspiration. They were made the vehicles of their traditions to diffuse and perpetuate the knowledge of memorable events and illustrious men.

We grossly mistake the matter, if we suppose, that poetry was received of old with as much apathy as it is at the present day. Books are now easy of access; and literary curiosity suffers oftener from repletion than from hunger. National events slip from the memory to our records: they miss the heart, though they are sure to reach posterity.

It was not thus the Grecian chiefs listened to Phemius or Demodocus, the bards mentioned by Homer. It was not thus that Homer's immortal verse was received by his countrymen. The thrones of Priam and Agamemnon were both long

ago subverted; their kingdoms and those of their conquerors have long since disappeared, and left no wreck nor memorial behind; but the glory of Homer has outlived his country and its language, and will remain unshaken like Teneriffe or Atlas, the ancestor of history and the companion of time to the end of his course. O! had he in his lifetime enjoyed, though in imagination, but a glimpse of his own glory, would it not have swelled his bosom with fresh enthusiasm, and quickened all his powers? What will not ambition do for a crown? and what crown can vie with Homer's.

Though the art of alphabetick writing was known in the East in the time of the Trojan war, it is no where mentioned by Homer, who is so exact and full in describing all the arts he knew. If his poems were in writing, the copies were few; and the knowledge of them was diffused, not by reading, but by the rhapsodists, who made it a profession to recite his verses.

Poetry, of consequence, enjoyed in that age, in respect to the vivacity of its impressions, and the significance of the applauses it received, as great advantages as have ever since belonged to the theatre. Instead of a cold perusal in a closet, or a still colder confinement, unread, in a bookseller's shop, the poet saw with delight his work become the instructer of the wise, the companion of the brave and the great. Alexander locked up the Iliad in the precious cabinet of Darius, as a treasure of more value than the spoils of the king of Persia.

But though Homer contributed so much and so early to fix the language, to refine the taste, and inflame the imagination of the Greeks, his work, by its very excellence, seems to have quenched the emulation of succeeding poets to attempt the epick. It was not till long after his age, and by very slow degrees, that Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides carried the tragick art to its perfection.

For many hundred years there seems to have been no other literary taste, and, indeed, no other literature than poetry. When there was so much to excite and reward genius, as no rival to Homer appeared, it is a clear proof, that nature did not

produce one. We look back on the history of Greece, and the names of illustrious geniuses thicken on the page, like the stars that seem to sparkle in clusters in the sky. But if with Homer's own spirit we could walk the milky-way, we should find, that regions of unmeasured space divide the bright luminaries that seem to be so near. It is no reproach to the genius of America, if it does not produce ordinarily such men as were deemed the prodigies of the ancient world. Nature has provided for the propagation of men—giants are rare; and it is forbidden by her laws, that there should be races of them.

If the genius of men could have stretched to the giant's size, there was every thing in Greece to nourish its growth and invigorate its force. After the time of Homer, the Olympick and other games were established. All Greece, assembled by its deputies, beheld the contests of wit and valour, and saw statues and crowns adjudged to the victors, who contended for the glory of their native cities as well as for their own. To us it may seem, that a handful of laurel leaves was a despicable prize. But what were the agonies, what the raptures of the contending parties, we may read, but we cannot conceive. That reward, which writers are now little excited to merit, because it is doubtful and distant, "the estate which wits inherit after death," was in Greece a present possession. That publick so terrible by its censure, so much more terrible by its neglect, was then assembled in person, and the happy genius who was crowned victor was ready to expire with the transports of his joy.

There is reason to believe, that poetry was more cultivated in those early ages than it ever has been since. The great celebrity of the only two epick poems of antiquity, was owing to the peculiar circumstances of the ages in which Homer and Virgil lived; and without the concurrence of those circumstances their reputation would have been confined to the closets of scholars, without reaching the hearts and kindling the fervid enthusiasm of the multitude. Homer wrote of war to heroes and their followers, to men, who felt the military passion stronger than the love of life; Virgil, with art at least

equal to his genius, addressed his poem to Romans, who loved their country with sentiment, with passion, with fanaticism. It is scarcely possible, that a modern epick poet should find a subject that would take such hold of the heart, for no such subject worthy of poetry exists. Commerce has supplanted war, as the passion of the multitude; and the arts have divided and contracted the objects of pursuit. Societies are no longer under the power of single passions, that once flashed enthusiasm through them all at once like electricity. Now the propensities of mankind balance and neutralize each other, and, of course, narrow the range in which poetry used to move. Its coruscations are confined, like the northern light, to the polar circle of trade and politicks, or, like a transitory meteor, blaze in a pamphlet or magazine.

The time seems to be near, and, perhaps, is already arrived, when poetry, at least poetry of transcendent merit, will be considered among the lost arts. It is a long time since England has produced a first rate poet. If America has not to boast at all what our parent country boasts no longer, it will not be thought a proof of the deficiency of our genius.

It is a proof that the ancient literature was wholly occupied by poetry, that we are without the works, and, indeed, without the names of any other very ancient authors except poets. Herodotus is called the father of history; and he lived and wrote between four and five hundred years after Homer. Thucydides, it is said, on hearing the applauses bestowed at the publick games on the recital of the work of Herodotus, though he was then a boy, shed tears of emulation. He afterwards excelled his rival in that species of writing.

Excellent, however, as these Grecian histories will ever be esteemed, it is somewhat remarkable, that political science never received much acquisition in the Grecian democracies. If Sparta should be vouched as an exception to this remark, it may be replied, Sparta was not a democracy. Lest that, however, should pass for an evasion of the point, it may be further answered, the constitution of Lycurgus seems to have been adapted to Sparta rather as a camp than a society of citi-

zens. His whole system is rather a body of discipline than of laws, whose sole object it was, not to refine manners or extend knowledge, but to provide for the security of the *camp*. The citizens, with whom any portion of political power was entrusted, were a military cast or class; and the rigour of Lycurgus's *rules and articles* was calculated and intended to make them superiour to all other soldiers. The same strictness, that for so long a time preserved the Spartan government, secures the subordination and tranquillity of modern armies. Sparta was, of course, no proper field for the cultivation of the science of politicks. Nor can we believe, that the turbulent democracies of the neighbouring states favoured the growth of that kind of knowledge, since we are certain it never did thrive in Greece. How could it be, that the assemblies of the people, convened to hear flattery or to lavish the publick treasures for plays and shews to amuse the populace, should be any more qualified, than inclined to listen to political disquisitions, and especially to the wisdom and necessity of devising and putting in operation systematical checks on their own power, which was threatened with ruin by its licentiousness and excess, and which soon actually overthrew it? It may appear bold, but truth and history seem to warrant the assertion, that political science will never become accurate in popular states; for in *them* the most salutary truths must be too offensive for currency or influence.

It may be properly added, and in perfect consistency with the theory before assumed, that fear is the strongest of all passions, that in democracies writers will be more afraid *of* the people than afraid *for* them. The principles indispensable to liberty are not therefore to be discovered, or, if discovered, not to be propagated and established in such a state of things. But where the chief magistrate holds the sword, and is the object of reverence, if not of popular fear, the direction of prejudice and feeling will be changed. Supposing the citizens to have privileges, and to be possessed of influence, or, in other words, of some power in the state, they will naturally wish so to use the power they have, as to be secure against the abuse of that

which their chief possesses; and this universal propensity of the publick wishes will excite and reward the genius that discovers the way in which this may be done. If we know any thing of the true theory of liberty, we owe it to the wisdom, or, perhaps more correctly, to the experience of those nations whose publick sentiment was employed to check rather than to guide the government.

It is, then, little to be expected, that American writers will add much to the common stock of political information.

It might have been sooner remarked, that the dramatick art has not afforded any opportunities for native writers. It is but lately that we have had theatres in our cities; and till our cities become large, like London and Paris, the progress of taste will be slow, and the rewards of excellence unworthy of the competitions of genius.

Nor will it be charged as a mark of our stupidity, that we have produced nothing in history. Our own is not yet worthy of a Livy; and to write that of any foreign nation where could an American author collect his materials and authorities? Few persons reflect, that all our universities would not suffice to supply them for such a work as Gibbon's.

The reasons, why we yet boast nothing in the abstruse sciences, are of a different and more various nature. Much, perhaps all, that has been discovered in these is known to some of our literati. It does not appear, that Europe is now making any advances. But to make a wider diffusion of these sciences, and to enlarge their circle, would require the learned leisure, which a numerous class enjoy in Europe, but which cannot be enjoyed in America. If wealth is accumulated by commerce, it is again dissipated among heirs. Its transitory nature, no doubt, favours the progress of luxury more than the advancement of letters. It has among us no uses to found families, to sustain rank, to purchase power, or to pension genius. The objects on which it must be employed are all temporary, and have more concern with mere appetite or ostentation than with taste or talents. Our citizens have not been accustomed to look on rank or titles, on birth or office

as capable of the least rivalship with wealth, mere wealth, in pretensions to respect. Of course the single passion that engrosses us, the only avenue to consideration and importance in our society, is the accumulation of property: our inclinations cling to gold, and are bedded in it as deeply as that precious ore in the mine. Covered as our genius is in this mineral crust, is it strange that it does not sparkle? Pressed down to earth, and with the weight of mountains on our heads, is it surprising, that no sons of ether yet have spread their broad wings to the sky, like Jove's own eagle, to gaze undazzled at the sun, or to perch on the top of Olympus and partake the banquet of the gods.

At present the nature of our government inclines all men to seek popularity as the object next in point of value to wealth; but the acquisition of learning and the display of genius are not the ways to obtain it. Intellectual superiority is so far from conciliating confidence, that it is the very spirit of a democracy, as in France, to proscribe the aristocracy of talents. To be the favourite of an ignorant multitude, a man must descend to their level; he must desire what they desire, and detest all that they do not approve; he must yield to their prejudices, and substitute them for principles. Instead of enlightening their errours, he must adopt them; he must furnish the sophistry that will propagate and defend them.

Surely we are not to look for genius among demagogues: the man who can descend so low, has seldom very far to descend. As experience evinces, that popularity, in other words, consideration and power, is to be procured by the meanest of mankind, the meanest in spirit and understanding, and in the worst of ways, it is obvious, that at present the excitement to genius is next to nothing. If we had a Pindar, he would be ashamed to celebrate our chief, and would be disgraced, if he did. But if he did not, his genius would not obtain his election for a selectman in a democratick town. It is party that bestows emolument, power, and consideration; and it is not excellence in the sciences that obtains the suffrages of party.

But the condition of the United States is changing. Luxury is sure to introduce want; and the great inequalities between the very rich and the very poor will be more conspicuous, and comprehend a more formidable host of the latter. The rabble of great cities is the standing army of ambition. Money will become its instrument, and vice its agent. Every step, and we have taken many, towards a more complete, unmixed democracy is an advance towards destruction: it is treading where the ground is treacherous and excavated for an explosion. Liberty has never yet lasted long in a democracy; nor has it ever ended in any thing better than despotism. With the change of our government, our manners and sentiments will change. As soon as our emperour has destroyed his rivals and established order in his army, he will desire to see splendour in his court, and to occupy his subjects with the cultivation of the sciences.

If this catastrophe of our publick liberty should be miraculously delayed or prevented, still we shall change. With the augmentation of wealth, there will be an increase of the numbers who may choose a literary leisure. Literary curiosity will become one of the new appetites of the nation; and as luxury advances, no appetite will be denied. After some ages we shall have many poor and a few rich, many grossly ignorant, a considerable number learned, and a few eminently learned. Nature, never prodigal of her gifts, will produce some men of genius, who will be admired and imitated.

REVIEW OF A PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED

PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION HISTORICALLY ILLUSTRATED.—LONDON, 1807. pp. 182.

FROM the size of this pamphlet, and from its title page, it was natural to expect profound investigation and accurate and important results. The design of the work is announced with uncommon parade in an introduction of sixteen pages; but we do not hesitate to say, these are sixteen pages too much; for the object of the writer is sufficiently unfolded in what follows.

THE work is divided into two parts. In the first part, he proposes to discuss the theory of the British constitution, and to examine how the theory differs from the practice. This part extends from the seventeenth to the ninety ninth page, inclusive. It is very verbose, and contains nothing new. After a long display of old historical facts, which he seldom applies, and which are not always applicable to his subject, he abruptly and unexpectedly concludes, that the security of the people under the present British constitution is owing to the freedom of the press. We confess, we have been ready to prove the remarkable strength and stability of that constitution, and, of course, the security of the people, by its having stood so long in spite of the abuses of the press. For where the press is free, it will be abused.

WE ARE, HEART AND SOUL, FRIENDS TO THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. It is, however, the prostituted companion of liberty, and somehow or other, we know not how, its efficient auxiliary. It follows the substance like its shade; but while a man walks erect, he may observe, that his shadow is almost always in the dirt. It corrupts, it deceives, it inflames. It

strips virtue of her honours, and lends to faction its wildfire and its poisoned arms, and in the end is its own enemy and the usurper's ally. It would be easy to enlarge on its evils. They are in England, they are here, they are every where. It is a precious pest and a necessary mischief, and THERE WOULD BE NO LIBERTY WITHOUT IT. We expected, that the author would have attempted profoundly to trace its useful operation; but he has not done it; and this rare task remains for some more acute inquirer into the obscure causes of its salutary influence.

IN the second part he undertakes to prove, that this is the great safeguard of that constitution. For this purpose, he resorts again to history. But in the instances he adduces to shew the influence of a free press, he only demonstrates the power of publick opinion. The nation would have an opinion, if it had not a press; and that opinion would have weight and authority. Before the art of printing was known, bad ministers were crushed by publick odium. The favourites of Edward the second of England were as effectually overpowered by it, as if the press had been used. The freedom of the press cannot hinder its being venal. Had it then existed, those odious favourites would have used it to palliate their crimes. They would have bought the press; and, no doubt, they would have been patriots in type, till they were stripped of the means of corruption; and then again they would have been odious monsters. In our time this boasted luminary vents more smoke than light; so that the circumstances of transactions and the characters of men are to be clearly known only by waiting for the evidence of history in a future age, when it will be of very little comparative importance, whether the subject be understood or mistaken.

THOUGH nobody will deny the influence of publick opinion upon government, still it is a distinct question, what is the boasted salutary influence of the press? It *might* help the cause of truth and liberty; it *might* produce as well as gratify a thirst for inquiry. But who pretend to be the instructers of

the people? men who are themselves instructed, or needy, ignorant profligates? The use of the press must be supposed to lie in helping a nation to discern and to judge. Experience seems to shew, that the press makes every thing more apparent than the truth; and by eternally pretending to judge, the publick opinion is without authority or influence; it is counterfeited by fools, and perverted by knaves. But a plain people, without a press, would know oppression, when they felt it; and there is no government which is not supported by military force that would disregard the complaints of an indignant nation. By the help of the press we see invisible things; we foresee evils in their embryo, and accumulate on the present moment all that is bitter in the past or terrible in the future. A whole people are made sick with the diseases of the imagination. They see a monarch in Washington, and conspirators in their patriots. They turn their best men out of office on the strength of their suspicions; and trust their worst men in spite of their knowledge of them. It is the press that has spoiled the temper of our liberty, and may shorten its life.

Still, we repeat, we would by no means wish to see the liberty of the press abridged. But how it is that we are dieted upon poisons and yet live, we pretend not to say, nor has this author instructed us.

From these deductions we venture to pronounce, that the freedom of the press is not the cause of the security of the British people or of the duration of their constitution. It is not our business to make a theory, but only to expose that of the author, which indeed is scarcely worth confuting. But we should think, that the freedom of that constitution arises rather from the distinct existence and political power of three orders, than from the press. The press could tell of oppression, if it had happened; but the lords and commons could remove and punish it.

But though we cannot possibly discover, how the freedom of the press can secure the constitution of an hereditary government, we can easily see, how in a popular state the *abuse* of

the press may fortify a faction in power. It is not merit, it is not wisdom that in such a state can confer power; it is faction which has an interest in accumulating wealth and privilege upon its members, and persecution on its rivals. We know a country, where the press is successfully used for the concealment of the truth. Newspapers written all on one side are read all on one side; and the truth and argument of the adverse party are as little known, and have less chance of being understood by the other than the language of Hindostan or the religion of Thibet.

LETTERS.

TO MR. ******, AT SPRINGFIELD.

PHILADELPHIA, May 6th, 1794.

DEAR FRIEND,

I SHOULD suffer a fever of the hypo. as severe as the fever and ague, if I could persuade myself congress would sit here till mid-summer. But I think we shall adjourn in three weeks. The heat, weariness, a desire to disperse our mischief-makers, conspire to wind up the session.

IT has been unusually painful and hazardous to peace and good order. My hopes are, however, that we shall escape the threatened danger, which will coincide with the interests and wishes of the people and the sense of a majority of congress. Such are the wishes of a majority of congress, although a number have been duped into a support of measures tending to a war. The desperadoes desire war; and I think they would get the upper hand to manage a war. Whatever kindles popular passions into fury, gives strength to that faction. What fine topicks for calumny would not a war furnish? A moderate or honest man could be stigmatized, mobbed, declared a suspected person, guillotined, and his property might be taken for publick purposes. France might see her bloody exploits rivalled by her pupil, emulous of her glory.

WAR without anarchy is bad enough; but would it not also bring the extreme of confusion.

FEDERAL men come from the Northward to congress with an opinion, that government is as strong as thunder; and that by coaxing and going half way with certain Southern members they might be won. Both these opinions yield very soon to the evidence of their senses. They see government a puny

thing, held up by great exertions and greater good luck, and assailed by a faction who feel an inextinguishable animosity against any debt-compelling government, and whose importance sinks as that of equal laws rises.

YESTERDAY the senators from Virginia moved for leave to bring in a bill, to suspend that part of the treaty with Great Britain which relates to debts. Thus, murder at last is out. Norfolk and Baltimore perform heroick exploits in the tar and feathers line. Here they only dismantled, by force, a schooner, which five British officers, prisoners on parole, had got leave to go to England in, having chartered her. These are violences worthy of Mohawks. Compared with New-England, the multitude in these towns are but half civilized.

WILL our Yankees like a war the better for being mobbed into it, and because also the South will not pay the British debts? Our people have paid; and will they pay in the form of war for their Southern brethren? I do not know, that passion is ever to be reasoned down; but other passions could be reasoned up to resist the prevailing one. I wish our newspapers were better filled with paragraphs and essays to unmask our Catilines.

A LAND tax is likely to be rejected, and the dislike to it will carry along indirect taxes. While war is an event to be provided against, the increase of revenue by excise is an important object.

* * is as he was made. His foes will say, by way of reproach, and his friends by way of vindication, he was born so.

I AM sorry for the failure of the dam, and am in hopes you will profit by the event to make it the stronger. Success to you.

SPEAK of me to friends, as may suit the sentiments with which I am theirs and your's,

FISHER AMES.

TO THE SAME.

PHILADELPHIA, December 12th, 1794.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

I THINK publick life has not chilled my social attachments, nor do I see much in it calculated to draw me off from them.

THE last session, the noise of debate was more deafening than a mill; and this, excepting in one instance, maintains a pouting silence, an armed neutrality, that does not afford the animation of a conflict, nor the security of peace. We sleep upon our arms. To *sink* the publick debt by paying it seems to be the chief business to expedite. That will require some address to get effected, as our anti-funders are used to a more literal *sinking* of debts. To put the debt in train of being paid off, would in a measure disarm faction of a weapon.

EVENTS have shown the falsehood of almost every antifederal doctrine; and the time favours the impression of truth. It is made, and the government stands on better ground than it ever did. But I wish exceedingly, that our sober citizens should weigh matters well. Faction is only baffled, not repenting, not changed. New grounds will be found or invented for stirring up sedition; and unless the country is now deeply sensible of the late danger and of the true characters of our publick men, new troubles will arise. Good fortune may turn her back upon us the next time, and if she had in August last, this union would have been rent. Virginia acted better than could have been expected; and the militia return to all the states full of federalism, and will help to diffuse their feelings among their connections. The spirit of insurrection had tainted a vast extent of country, besides Pennsylvania; and had all the disaffected combined and acted together, the issue would have been long protracted, and doubtful at last.

WILL the people, seing this pit open, approach it again by sending those to congress who led them blindfold to its brink Some exertion, indeed all that can be made, appears to me

worth making, nay more, indispensably necessary, wherever an anti is held up as a candidate. For, I venture to speak as a prophet, if they will send insurgents, they must pay for rebellions. This government is utterly impracticable for any length of time, with such a resisting party to derange its movements. The people must interpose in the appointed way by excluding mobocrats from legislation. I have faith, that very plain dealing with them would work a change, even in Virginia. Ought not these considerations, which concern political life and death, to weigh down all others in New-England? Will not the river men, who are so noted for good principles and habits, give them support in the election which, I hear, is yet undecided between general ******* and *****.

I KNOW, that men breathing the air of New-England cannot credit the state of things in the back country and at the South. They must not judge of others by themselves. They must remember, that for preserving a free government a supine security is next to treachery. If all New-England would move in phalanx, at least we could hold our posts, and a short time will work changes at the South. Our good citizens must consent to be more in earnest in their politicks, or submit to be less secure in their rights and property.

YOUR account of thanksgiving has almost made me homesick—not a pumpkin pye have I seen. A Yankee is supposed to derive his principles from his keeping. Yet when that is changed, he must not flinch.

Your'ꝭ,

FISHER AMES.

TO THE SAME.

PHILADELPHIA, March 9, 1796.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

I SIT now in the house, and, that I may not lose my temper and my spirits, I shut my ears against the sophisms and rant against the treaty, and divert my attention by writing to you.

Never was a time when I so much desired the full use of my faculties, and it is the very moment when I am prohibited even attention. To be silent, neutral, useless, is a situation not to be envied. I almost wish ***** was here, and I at home, sorting squash and pumpkin seeds for planting.

It is a new post for me to be in. I am not a sentry, not in the ranks, not in the staff. I am thrown into the waggon, as part of the baggage. I am like an old gun, that is spiked or the trunnions knocked off, and yet am carted off, not for the worth of the old iron, but to balk the enemy of a trophy. My political life is ended, and I am the survivor of myself, or rather a troubled ghost of a politician, that am condemned to haunt the field of battle where I fell. Whether the government will long outlive me, is doubtful. I know it is sick, and, many of the physicians say, of a mortal disease. A crisis now exists, the most serious I ever witnessed, and the more dangerous, because it is not dreaded. Yet, I confess, if we should navigate the federal ship through this strait, and get out again into the open sea, we shall have a right to consider the chance of our government as mended. We shall have a lease for years—say four or five; not a freehold—certainly not a fee simple.

How will the Yankees feel and act when the day of trial comes? It is not, I fear, many weeks off. Will they let the casuists quibble away the very words and adulterate the genuine spirit of the constitution? When a measure passes by the proper authorities, shall it be stopped by force? Sophistry may change the form of the question, may hide some of the consequences, and may dupe some into an opinion of its moderation when triumphant, yet the fact will speak for itself. The government cannot go to the halves. It would be another, a worse government, if the mob, or the leaders of the mob in congress, can stop the lawful acts of the president, and unmake a treaty. It would be either no government, or instantly a government by usurpation and wrong.

March 12th.

The debate is yet unfinished, and will continue some days longer. I beg you let **** have the paper, after you have done with it.

I think we shall beat our opponents in the end, but the conflict will light up a fierce war.

Your friend,

FISHER AMES.

TO MR. ******, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, AT WASHINGTON.

Dedham, October 26th, 1803.

My Dear Friend,

I had resolved to write to you, before I received any letter from you. For a week this scheme of merit has been formed and postponed, till by your esteemed favour, with the printed copy of *the message*, it has this day failed entirely.

I am glad to hear of your safe, though weary, arrival at the heaven of other men's ambition, your purgatory, where, indeed, you will see good spirits, with *other* spirits conjured by democracy from the vasty deep. Remember what I have often told you, that the scene you are entering upon will form the best characters and display them to the greatest advantage. The furnace of political adversity will separate the dross, but purify the gold. You will have the best society, under circumstances to endear it to you and you to them. To *serve* the people *successfully*, will be out of your power; the attempt to do it will be unpopular. To flatter, inflame, and betray them, will be the applauded work of demagogues, who will dig graves for themselves and erect thrones for their victors, as in France.

The principles of democracy are every where what they have been in France; the materials for them to work upon are not in all places equally favourable. The fire of revolution burnt in Paris like our New-England rum, quick to kindle, not to be quenched, and leaving only a bitter, nauseous, spiritless mass. Our country would burn like its own swamps, only

after a long drought, with much smoke, and little flame; but, when once kindled, it would burrow deep into the soil, search out and consume the roots, and leave, after one crop, a caput mortuum, black and barren, for ages. If it should rain blessings, and keep our soil wet and soaking, it might not take fire in our day.

Our country is too big for union, too sordid for patriotism, too democratick for liberty. What is to become of it, he who made it best knows. Its vice will govern it, by practising upon its folly. This is ordained for democracies; and if morals as *pure* as Mr. Fauchet ascribes to the French republick, did not inspire the present administration, it would have been our lot at this day.

But on reading the message I am edified, as much as if I had heard a methodist sermon in a barn. The men who have the best principles, and those who act from the worst, will talk alike, except only that the latter will exceed the former in fervour. But the language of deceit, though stale and exposed to detection, will deceive as long as the multitude love flattery better than restraints, as long as truth has only charms for the blind, and eloquence for the deaf. Suppose a missionary should go to the Indians and recommend self-denial and the ten commandments, and another should exhort them to drink rum, which would first *convert* the heathen? Yet we are told, the *vox populi* is the *vox dei;* and our demagogues claim a right *divine* to reign over us, deduced no doubt from the pure source I have indicated.

My health is somewhat better. I rode in a chaise to Boston yesterday with Mrs. A. It was a fine day, but in spite of all my precautions, I was caught by several friends, who tired me down in the street. My progress is slow, but I really think I make some.

You shall hear from me as often as I can find a spirit of industry to write, when I am not riding, which is twice a day. But if I should prove negligent, still believe me, as I really am,

Your truly affectionate friend, &c.

FISHER AMES.

TO THE SAME.

DEDHAM, October 31st, 1803.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

I HAVE this morning received by post your delightful treaty, and S. H. Smith's paper, and your esteemed favour, in which you give me a particular account of yourself and your accommodations. This latter is really more interesting to my curiosity and feelings than the rest of the contents under cover.

THERE is little room for hope, almost none for satisfaction, in the contemplation of publick affairs. When *somebody*, a jacobin too, drives, we must go; and we shall go the old and broad road, so smooth, so much travelled, but without any half-way house.

HAVING bought an empire, who is to be emperour? The sovereign people—and what people? all, or only the people of the dominant states, and the dominant demagogues in those states, who call themselves the people? As in old Rome, Marius or Sylla, or Cesar, Pompey, Antony, or Lepidus will vote themselves provinces and triumphs.

I HAVE as loyal and respectful an opinion as possible of the *sincerity in folly* of our rulers. But, surely, it exceeds all my credulity and candour on that head, to suppose even they can contemplate a republican form as practicable, honest, or free, if applied when it is so manifestly inapplicable to the government of one third of God's earth. It could not, I think, even maintain forms; and as to principles, the otters would as soon obey and give them effect as the *Gallo-Hispano-Indian omnium gatherum* of savages and adventurers, whose pure morals are expected to sustain and glorify our republick. Never before was it attempted to play the fool on so great a scale. The game will not, however, be half played; nay, it will not be begun, before it is changed into another, where the knave will turn up trumps and win the odd trick.

PROPERTY at publick disposal is sure to corrupt. Here, to make this result equally inevitable and inveterate, power is

also to be for some ages within the arbitrium of a house of representatives. Before that period, Botany bay will be a bettering-house for our publick men. Our morals, for ever sunning and flyblown, like fresh meat hung up in the election market, will taint the air like a pestilence. Liberty, if she is not a goddess that delights in carnage, will choak in such an atmosphere, fouler than the vapour of death in a mine.

YET I see, that the multitude are told, and it is plain they are told, because they will believe it, that liberty will be a gainer by the purchase. They are deceived on their weak side: they think the purchase a great bargain.—We are to be rich by selling lands. If the multitude was not blind before, their sordid avarice, thus addressed, would blind them.

BUT what say your wise ones? Is the payment of so many millions to a belligerent no breach of neutrality, especially under the existing circumstances of the case, when Great Britain is fighting our battles and the battles of mankind, and France is combating for the power to enslave and plunder us and all the world? Is not the twelve years reserve of a right to navigate, &c. a contravention of our treaty with Great Britain, as all other nations are for twelve years excluded from a participation of this privilege, especially too as the increase of the French and Spanish navigation is avowedly the object of the stipulation?

I HAVE not yet read the treaty. I have only glanced my eye over the seventh article. I am weary and sick of my subject.

MY health is bad, and is to be bad through the winter. I sleep poorly, digest poorly, and often take cold. I persevere in riding on horseback, and shall saw wood in bad weather when I cannot ride. I live like an ostrich or man-monkey, imported from a foreign climate, and pining amidst plenty for want of the native food that would suit his stomach. Mine is as fastidious as a fine lady's, who is afraid of butter on her potatoes, lest it should tinge her complexion.

I INTEND soon to try the lukewarm bath in the evening, not often, but occasionally. A bad digestion is an evil not to be

removed. Its effects I hope may be parried by finding something that I can better digest than my usual food.

My wife and I join in saying, God bless you.

Being your's &c.

FISHER AMES.

TO THE SAME.

DEDHAM, November 29th, 1803.

YOUR letters, my dear friend, afford me so much pleasure and information, that I cannot forbear writing without ingratitude, nor write without making very barren returns. Whether bad health has abated my ardour in every thing, or that the inevitable consequence of having nothing to do with our politicks is, that I cease to care who has, or how the work is done, the fact is certain, I am almost at home *expatriated* from the concerns that once exclusively engrossed my thoughts. In this philosophick, lack-a-daysical temper, I really think my fellow sovereigns participate. Congress-hall is a stage, and by shifting the scenes, or treading the boards in comedy or farce, (for, since the repeal of the judiciary, you do not get up tragedy) you amuse our lazy mornings or evenings as much, or nearly as much, as the other theatres. But in sober truth, the affair is as much theatrical on our part as on that of the honourable members on the floor. You personate the patriot, and we the people affect the sovereign. We beg you to believe on the evidence of the newspapers, that we watch you closely, and lie awake a-nights with our fears for the publick safety.—No such thing. We talk over our drink as much in earnest as we possibly can, and among ourselves, when nobody is a looker-on whose opinion we dread, we laugh in the midst of our counterfeit rage. The fact is, our folks are ten times more weary of their politicks, than anxious about their results. Touch our pockets directly, or our pleasures ever so indirectly, then see our spirit. We flame, we soar on eagles' wings, as high as barn-door fowl, and like them, we light to scratch again in

the muckheap. Alter the constitution; amend it till it is good for nothing; amend it again and again, till it is worse than nothing; violate without altering its letter, it is your sport, not our's. Our apathy is a match for your party spirit. The dead flesh defies your stimulants. We sleep under the operation of your knife, as the Dutchman is said to have gnawed a roasted fowl, while the surgeon cut off his leg. There is no greater imposture than to pretend our people watch, understand, or care a sixpence for these cheap sins, or the distant damnation they will draw down on our heads. If honest men could associate for honest purposes, if we had in short a *party*, which I think federalists have not, or have not had the stuff to make, their steady opposition to the progress of a *faction* towards tyranny, revolutionary tyranny, might be checked. I wave the subject, however, on which I have a thousand times vented my vexations to no purpose. Peace to the dead.

Louisiana excites less interest than our thanksgiving. It is an old story. I am half of Talleyrand's opinion, when he says, we are phlegmatick, and without any passion except that for money-getting.

Mr. Huger, in his speech on the alteration of the clause respecting the votes for president and vice president, pays compliments to the candour and sincerity of the amendment-mongers, when they protest and swear, that they want *no other* amendment. This compliment is not worth much to the receivers, but is a costly one to the bestower. Roland and Condorcet always protested, that they would *stop*. But is a revolution or the lightning to be stopped in midway? Mr. E. has libelled the constitution in a newspaper. The Virginia assembly has voted amendments of the most abominable sort. All the noble lords of Virginia and the South are as much for rotation in office as the senators of Venice. It is the genuine spirit of an oligarchy, eager to *divide* power among themselves, and jealous of the pre-eminence of any one even of their own order.

Mr. R. in his speech on the *constitutionality* of acquiring territory, has risen again in my opinion. I cannot readily as-

sent to the federal argument, that our government is a mere affair of *special pleading*, and to be interpreted in every case as if every thing was written down in a book. Are not certain powers inseparable from the fact of a society's being formed, are they not incident to its being? Besides, as party interprets and amends the constitution, and as we the people care not a pin's point for it, all arguments from that source, however solid, would avail nothing.

One of two things will, I confess, take place: either the advances of the *faction* will create a federal *party*, or their unobstructed progress will embolden them to use their power, as all such gentry will if they dare, in acts of violence on property. In the former case, a federal party, with the spirit which in every other free country political divisions impart to a minority, will retard and obstruct the course of the ruling faction towards revolution; and if they do not move quick, they will not, perhaps, be able long to move at all. In case of a strong *opposition* (I use the term in a qualified and guarded sense) the federalists could *preserve* some portion of *right*, though they might not have strength to re-assume *power*, which I confess I do not look for.

Suppose an attack on property, I calculate on the "sensibilities" of our nation. There is our sensorium. Like a negro's shins, there our patriotism would feel the kicks, and twinge with agonies that we should not be able so much as to conceive of, if we only have our faces spit in. In this case we could wipe off the ignominy, and think no more of the matter. He that robs me of my good name, takes trash. What is it but a little foul breath, tainted from every sot's lungs? But he who takes my purse, robs me of that which enriches him, instead of me, and therefore I will have vengeance.

Hence I am far from despairing of our commonwealth. It is true, our notions are pestilent and silly. But we have been cured already in fourteen years of more of them than a civil war and ten pitched battles would have eradicated from France.

The remainder are, indeed, enough to ensure our destruction; and we should be destroyed, if these silly democratick opinions, which once governed us all, were not now so exclusively claimed and carried to extremes by those whom we so dread and despise, that we in New-England are in a great measure driven out of them. The fool's cap has been snatched from our heads by the Southern demos, who say, this Olympick crown was won by them. Let them wear it.

Connecticut is sound enough perhaps; for if democracy were less in that state, federalism would sink with them as in the other states. But their first men are compelled to come forward in self-defence. They are in the federal army what the *immortals* were in the Persian, or the *sacred band* under Pelopidas. I will not mention Vermont. Rhode-Island is not to be spoken of by any body. But New-Hampshire, old Massachusetts, and Connecticut are too important to be *forced* into a revolution; and at present appearances do not indicate, that they will join in hastening it on willingly.

For these and other reasons I think our condition may not soon be changed so essentially as, in like critical circumstances, it would be in any other country. We shall lose, indeed, almost every thing, but my hope is, that we shall save something and preserve it long.

Thus we may, like a wounded snake, drag our slow length along for twenty years; and time will in that period have more to do in fixing our future destiny than our administration. Events govern us; and probably those of Europe will, as heretofore, communicate an unforeseen and irresistible impulse to our politicks. We are in a gulf stream, which has hitherto swept us along with more force than our sails and oars. I think the government will last my time. For that reason, I will fatten my pigs and prune my trees; nor will I any longer be at the trouble to govern this country. I am no Atlas, and my shoulders ache. No, that irksome task I devolve upon Mr. *****, and Mr. ***** of the house, and Mr. ***** of the senate. You federalists are only lookers on.

You are a polite man, otherwise you would say I have tired you. In that respect I have used you as well as I do myself. In mercy to both, I this moment assure you of the affectionate regard, with which I am, my dear friend,

Your's truly,

FISHER AMES.

TO MR. *********, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, AT WASHINGTON.

DEDHAM, November 27th, 1805.

MY DEAR SIR,

THERE is a good deal of ferment in Boston, and, I suppose, in all our sea-ports, in consequence of some late condemnations by the British. It is hard for people who lose money to believe, that those who get it by their loss can have any justice on their side. When the French and Spaniards take our vessels, we are not very angry, because we do not imagine they have power enough at sea greatly to extend the evil; and we expect from *them* no regard to principles of any sort. But the English captures and condemnations alarm us, because we can scarcely see what there is that they cannot take; and they provoke us, because we discern, or affect to discern, the perversion or evasion of principles, admitted and respected as much by them as by ourselves.

I AM so unlucky as to be a considerable loser in the insurance office where these condemnations are felt.* I am patriot enough to lament any obstruction to the growth of our commerce; and I am not philosopher enough to be indifferent to the reduction of my property. For some time past I have tried, with a good promise of success, to convince myself, that the principles assumed by the British are untenable. My rage has not risen to fever heat, and my faith has gradually sunk down to the freezing point. To drop all metaphor, I am afraid the British are in the right in point of principle.

* The writer was a proprietor to the amount of one third of all his personal property in an office, whose interest was believed to be extremely injured by the principle asserted by the admiralty courts; but his honest heart compelled him to reason against his interest.

Books afford but a dim light on such a subject. I do not pretend, that I have much consulted them.

War is an old condition of mankind, and commerce, as it is now carried on, is a new one. Anciently, the nations depended less on crossing the sea and more on the traffick by land than we do. *Now* the articles of indispensable necessity to most countries are drawn from the East and West Indies. Navies too were, before the invention of the mariner's compass, less used, and less capable of being used, for long cruises, for traversing the wide ocean, and for searching and commanding all its shores than they are at this day.

Hence it is, that the rights of war, in respect to the exercise or restraint of the naval power of states, seem to me more unsettled, than any questions arising from the employment of forces on land. We are obliged to resort to general rules, which every body will admit in their principle, and contest in their application. Scarcely any doubts subsist in regard to military land operations; but almost every thing is considered, or you will find people who affect to consider it, as novel, or dubious, or an abuse in the employment of a naval force, when neutrals are concerned. We hear of a *modern* law of nations, and of the adverse constructions of the maritime law, assumed, varied, and abandoned, as interests and alliances may happen to inspire zeal and sophistry to invent and maintain them.

This leads some persons to say, the maritime law has no principles; an inference altogether unwarranted. The *general* principles are just, and their authority is not contested; but the whole modern system of commerce and naval power *is so recent*, that these principles have not been long enough applied under a great diversity of circumstances to make their application familiar and precise.

Perhaps it may be said, the present position of things in Europe is unlike what has existed there in all former wars, except the last. Prior to the war which ended in 1763, Great Britain was not possessed of the sovereignty of the seas. While something like a naval equilibrium remained, there was neither inducement nor occasion to apply the British principles in re-

gard to an enemy's colonies, as they are to be deduced from the late condemnations. While France could fit out fleets, and take British colonies, and intercept British trade or convoy, and protect her own, she was not obliged to sell her colony products to neutrals to so great an extent as she has been under the necessity of doing ever since 1794 or 1795. The assistance of neutrals has become her only resource for drawing a cent from her colonies. Of course, by the superiority of the British naval arms, the colonies of her enemy are put out of a condition to assist the parent country in war almost as effectually as if they were captured and garrisoned by Britons.

When it is considered, that *all* the means of Great Britain to annoy, exhaust, and subdue her antagonist, and finally to prescribe a peace on terms compatible with her safety and existence are *naval* means, it seems to ensue as a consequence, that she has a right, while in a state of war, to use *them* to the utmost extent that may be necessary for preservation. Certainly she has a better right to exist, than neutrals have to trade. Self-preservation is the paramount law of states as well as individuals. If, therefore, the rights of neutrals happen to interfere with this superiour right of the belligerent, they must yield, and be exercised only so far as may consist with it.

Necessity, I shall be told, is the tyrant's plea. I reply, when that truly exists it is a good one, and for that reason tyrants resort to it when it does not exist.

Before the independence of the United States, Great Britain had it not in her power thus effectually to lock up her enemy's colonies. France then also had fleets to protect them; and she had merchant ships to transport their rich produce to the markets of Europe. Even then, however, Great Britain's maritime principles were enforced against the Dutch and other neutrals. But, since the independence of America, circumstances have changed; and if the change has not given birth to new principles, it affords new light in the application of old ones.

Now France has not even a sloop or schooner employed in her colonial commerce. She is reduced to absolute nullity and impotence by the British navy, as to all the resources she once drew from her colonies. Who will hesitate in admitting, that this use of the British navy is to the last degree important to her, distressing, humbling, enfeebling to her enemy, and perhaps ultimately decisive of the event of the war by its influence on the comparative force of the two nations? Every dollar received by France from her colonies would be employed against England. This is prevented by England. Moreover, the British colonies thrive directly and essentially by the exclusion of their hostile rivals from the European market; and the British commerce is even augmented by the circuitous and expensive supplies, which France ultimately receives.

These, no doubt, are inducements for the British to exercise, and, possibly, to stretch all the maritime rights they have as a belligerent nation. If we hesitate to allow, that the exclusion of neutrals from enemies' colonies is one of those rights, because the admission would too much restrict neutral commerce, let us suppose the British principle unfounded and reject it. If we find, that by its rejection the rights of the belligerent are annihilated, shall we not hesitate still more? Shall we not discern still greater difficulties? Being reduced to choose between two rival doctrines, shall we not endeavour to test them both by their operation, and prefer that which can be best reconciled with reason and justice?

Suppose, then, that Great Britain, with a power to hinder, has no right to hinder the exportation of the products of the French colonies to any European neutral port—of what use or efficacy is her navy in the prosecution of the war, so far as the colonies of her enemy are concerned? America, now independent, full of enterprise and capital, with a million tons of shipping, can buy in the islands, store in the United States, and transport to neutral ports in Europe convenient for the supply of France herself, every hogshead of sugar, and every bag of coffee that can be furnished by the plantations, on such terms that the French colonies shall not feel the war. They shall

not be annoyed by the British naval arms, but shall even flourish the more for their superiority. Depending entirely on neutrals, they shall lose nothing by captures, because, having sold their produce, they risk nothing; while British produce is liable to capture, and, if not captured, to high war premiums of insurance. The French colonist would ultimately, if not immediately, command a price for his crops, the more advantageous by reason of the cheap and safe navigation of American vessels; he would prosper in full peace, while the British colonist would feel the effects of war on his profits. His only market would be England, because he would be undersold on the continent. The seamen withdrawn from the French colonial commerce would be, as in fact they are, on board their men of war, or in the armies; and the resources of the colonies would be steadily and without diminution by capture drawn by France into her own territory, and employed to equip flotillas and array armies of invasion against England.

I CANNOT help observing, if all this be right in principle, it is a principle that will never be of any authority or value in practice. For whoever may happen to have the power to hinder these consequences, will surely employ a superiour fleet to hinder them. It seems, therefore, to be a discouraging labour, to establish such a nugatory interpretation of the maritime law of nations as we are sure from its very nature the powerful must reject.

WE claim a right to trade to the French, Dutch, or Spanish colonies, and to convey their produce to any countries that will receive it. We say, that these nations, though enemies of England, are our friends, with whom we have long been accustomed to trade; that they have adequate authority to adjust with us the terms of our intercourse with all their territories, the colonies as well as the parent countries; and that, as our neutral traffick with these colonies is carried on in consequence of acts or laws of those parent countries, it is a lawful trade, and the interruption of it by the British cruisers has all the qualities of tyranny and injustice.

The British cabinet might, I am afraid, confound our logick by replying: you have a right, as neutrals, to traffick with our enemy to as great extent as you could before the war; and to that extent we do not now disturb your trade. But your trade with the enemy's colonies is not of that description. It is not a privilege you derive from his grant, but from our arms. It is a species of trade you did not enjoy before, and never would have derived from the friendship of our enemy towards you. He makes use of your neutrality to escape from us. By your means the proceeds of his colonies become an effective branch of his force. This we cannot suffer. His concession in opening his colonial ports is valid and legal, as regards the transactions between him and you; but as between us and you, it is a *fraud*, out of which no right can grow. It is a fraud, because it invalidates our belligerent rights; and because, notoriously, our enemy never opens his colonies, till he can no longer resist that reason for opening them Every fraudulent deed or grant is absolutely void, as it respects third persons who have bona fide titles.

If we attempt to answer this argument by ever so loud an invective against the sweeping tyranny of their principle, they would not fail to insist, that no principle can be less chargeable as arbitrary or indefinite than that which they enforce. It is not arbitrary, because it does not depend in the least on Great Britain to open the colonies of her rivals in time of peace; it is not indefinite, because England even now forbears to urge her claim beyond the practice and course of trade before the war.

What then, she might say, do I restrict or abridge of the American liberty of commerce? Surely not your usual intercourse with France, Spain, and Holland. I allow all that they ever allowed, till, in fact, they had nothing left to allow or refuse, having lost all power of protection or control over their colonies by the superiority of my navy. You may supply your own consumption by your direct trade with those colonies. You may trade with such of those colonies as were open to you before the war. I abstain from condemning your cargoes of

colonial produce, if I find it has been landed in the United States, and mixed with the mass of your property. A voyage from those colonies to the United States, as a mere cloak for the prosecution of the voyage to Europe, I consider illegal.

Had this doctrine of the British admiralty been early and publickly known, I cannot but suppose it would have been acquiesced in. Why our administration have neglected or forborne to ask explanations, or to make remonstrances on the subject, is unintelligible, if they comprehend our commercial rights, and care as they ought for our interests.

What remains now to be done, is not for me to decide. Confiscation will be wicked and violent, and a non-intercourse act will be foolish and violent. There is no stopping at such measures—war would ensue. That is not the desire of our rulers. How then can they gratify their own prejudices, and escape the curses of the French party, if they neither confiscate nor stop intercourse? To avow, that they intend to do nothing, is impossible; to do any thing by a *treaty*, they dare not even contemplate. Will they not instruct Munroe to ask explanations, affect *ad interim* to bluster, and secretly resolve to acquiesce in every thing, usurpation or not usurpation, that shall reduce the Yankee merchants to impotence and poverty? Will not the crisis by these means pass away in speeches and smoke? and if Britain should lose her allies and her spirits, will they not then pay court to Buonaparte, by venturing to insist upon her concessions?

It is one of the most consuming curses of heaven, and we deserve it, to commit the affairs of a nation to rulers, who find in their popularity, their rapacity, or their ambition, an interest separate from the interests of the people.

My sentiments are frankly and unreservedly given to you; but as they are hastily conceived and expressed, I may, possibly, on meditation, retract them.

Yours, &c.

FISHER AMES.

TO MR. ******, AT SPRINGFIELD.

DEDHAM, November 29, 1805.
Thanksgiving Evening.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

N. is better. His leg is yet much swelled, but nearly free from pain, and the doctor hopes no suppuration will ensue. You will rejoice with us, for our revived hopes make a truly joyful thanksgiving. In every other respect, it is dull enough.

M. and H. are at my mother's, in search of something more cheerful than my house affords. They have fine spirits, and improve, I make no doubt, by their Medford school. My John W. sits by me at his book, "*the world forgetting*," and enjoying a thanksgiving feast for his mind. It is true, he reads on such occasions for amusement, but I indulge him, for I hope something will stick to him. The habit of literary labour may be ingrafted on the free stock of literary curiosity. I will not defend my metaphor, but I believe my meaning is expressed clearly by it. A passion for books is never inspired, I believe, *late*, in the breasts of those, who, having access to books, do not feel it young. But to apply, to investigate closely, to study, to make the mind *work*, is a very different thing from a passionate fondness for battles and romances. It is by performing tasks, not by choosing books for their amusement, that boys obtain this power to fix and detain attention.

BUT is there encouragement in our country to educate boys for any great degree of usefulness? While faction is forging our fetters, the specious talents are more in demand than the solid. But after a tyranny is settled, perhaps, our Augustus will have a fancy, that learning is an essential thing to his glory. Nero pretends to be an artist himself, and would feel himself eclipsed by the excellence of another.

Every popular despotism is, I believe, in its inception base and tasteless. As great geniuses snatch the sceptre from the hands of great little rascals, the government rises, though liberty rises no more. Ours is gone, never to return. To mitigate a tyranny, is all that is left for our hopes. We cannot maintain justice by the force of our constitution ; yet, I think, the spirit of commerce, which cannot be separated from the Yankee mind, is favourable to justice. To guard property by some good rules, is a necessary of life in every commercial state.

But it is foolish, or rather it is presumptuous, to speculate on the untried state of being that our degraded country has to pass through.

> Vestibulum ante ipsum, primoque in limine Ditis
> Luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia Curæ.

I quote from memory of Virgil's sixth book, perhaps not correctly *. The application seems to me fearfully correct. At the threshold of our new state of being, we are to meet the *Luctus et ultrices Curæ*.

I will leave my letter open till morning, to inform you more of N.

Your affectionate friend,

FISHER AMES.

TO MR. *********, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, AT WASHINGTON.

Dedham, January 28th, 1806.

My Dear Sir,

I HAVE had it in my thoughts to examine the question of our right to trade with the revolted part of St. Domingo, as it is laid down in books. And I well know, that to meddle with it in a loose way is peculiarly improper in a letter to

* Virgil's words are :

> Vestibulum ante ipsum, primisque in faucibus Orci
> Luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia Curæ.
>
> *Just in the gate, and in the jaws of hell,*
> *Revengeful Cares and sullen Sorrows dwell*.....Dryden.

you, who spare no pains to get at truth, and hold every substitute for it in contempt. Nevertheless, as I perceive I shall be occupied on some turnpike business and hindered from reading writers on the law of nations, I feel a desire to communicate such thoughts as rise uppermost.

Nations very properly abstain from assuming the decision of questions of right between any two contending powers. Facts alone are regarded. When, therefore, one state claims from another subjection and obedience, which that other refuses to yield, and maintains its refusal by successful arms, no third power will constitute itself the judge of the legitimacy of its reasons for so refusing. The actual possession of independence is ground enough for holding a state independent of right, as far as third parties are concerned *nationally*. I mean, that the trade to such a self-made new state is not a national offence against the power claiming sovereignty over the revolted country. This intercourse is at the peril of the private individuals concerned, whose cargoes may be seized and confiscated by the cruisers of the offended nation. But their so continuing to trade, seems not obviously to implicate the nation to which the traders belong, unless that nation, or its government, should do some act, whereby such responsibility is assumed. For the greater clearness I will put a case. The Dutch assumed independence in 1570 or 80. While this event was recent, and the contest depending, the Dutch cities suffering sieges, and the armies of Spain superiour in the field in Holland, the supply of *arms* by queen Elizabeth was, of course, an act of aggression. But for a London merchant to send flour or sugar at the risk of capture by the Spaniards, it seems to me, would not amount to an act of intermeddling by the English government; especially, I will add, if the queen had, by proclamation, apprized her subjects, that a civil war raged in Holland, in which she would take no part, and that she forbade her subjects trading with the Dutch, on the peril of capture as aforesaid by the Spaniards, in which case she would not claim restitution,

nor afford protection to the captured. The war would then proceed by Spain against English traders; and the supplies poured into Holland would afford no ground for hostilities against England.

But after the Spanish armies were beaten out of the country, and after the lapse of near thirty years without any effort to subdue the Dutch, the capture of such vessels would be apparently unjust.

Whether the suspension of the efforts of France to recover St. Domingo, merely because of the war with England, amounts to an abandonment of the colony, is questionable. There is, in fact, no doubt she intends to resume the business as soon as the mare clausum becomes once more a mare liberum by a peace with Great Britain. Ad interim any national act of intermeddling on the part of the United States in favour of Dessalines would be an aggression. Permitting the use of force against French captures may possibly be unwarrantable. But the declaring by Mr. Jefferson's proclamation, that traders taken in such commerce will not be protected, in other words, that they traffick with Dessalines at their peril, i. e. the peril of capture by the French, I should think, would exculpate our government and nation, on principle.

For congress to legislate seems to me quite another thing. It is ex abundantia, it is more than France can properly require. If Mr. Jefferson should issue a proclamation, declaring the trade unauthorized and at the peril of the concerned, it would be left to the French to enforce the law *as it now exists* by capturing the vessels, if they can. But for us to *extend* or create rights and remedies for them; to say, you cannot catch these wrong-doers, but we can and will, seems to be journey-work for Buonaparte. As I premised, it quits the ground of matter of fact for perplexing theories. If the power of France is *not* adequate to exclude St. Domingo from the exercise of its independence, it has just the same right, the right of the strongest, to independence, upon

which other nations found their exercise of it. It is already de facto, and, of course, de jure independent.

On the other hand, if France has means to cut off the trade of that island, and to capture the vessels concerned in it, let her use those means. We abandon our traders to capture.

Thus the question is left to work its own peaceable decision, without compromitting the tranquillity, dignity, or rights of either the United States or France. Has the latter any right beyond the foregoing, i. e. to a publick disclaimer by proclamation of all protection to those concerned in trading, and to a faithful forbearance to form treaties or afford any aid, as a government, to the black emperour. Is not the request, or rather insolent claim of more than this an admission, that St. Domingo is lost to France, and that the United States must turn the war into a blockade to starve the blacks into submission? Is it not saying to us, we do not merely ask your forbearance—we insist on your co-operation; you must meddle, but only on our side?

If my ideas are made intelligible, they seem to me of some use to discriminate the line of right and duty in the case, which line, perhaps, is to admit, that the French have rights, and leave them to exercise them as they now exist; but to refuse legislating for extending those rights or enforcing them by *our* power.

As to the line of policy, I can scarcely doubt, that we ought to shun a quarrel with France upon the point, if France contents herself with claiming no more than an existing right, and the enforcing it by capturing the vessels in the trade. If she claims more from the United States as a vassal, our dignity should be temperately asserted, and her demand civilly but firmly refused. We ought by no means to commit ourselves to the discredit of a treaty with Dessalines, or in any way to intermeddle as a government. But we ought to wish most earnestly, that Hayti may maintain its independence; and so much the more, as the colonial systems of all nations may be expected on a peace to abridge our intercourse with the dependent islands.

I HAVE run the risk to write these crude conceptions as fast as I can drive my quill, and I can assure you, I shall feel no mortification, if it should turn out, that I commit several mistakes in the argument.

I am, dear sir,

With unfeigned esteem

Your's, &c.

FISHER AMES.

P. S. IT occurs to me to add, that there is some, though, I am aware, not a close analogy between the case of our trade with Hayti and the revenue laws of foreign nations. To enforce these, one state never asks legislative or any other aid from another. Yet smuggling is an evil. I know it has been said, that the reason for this mutual forbearance is, that revenue laws are merely municipal, and create neither right nor obligation out of the territory for which they were made.

BUT, as a matter of *right*, we equally abstain from the question depending in arms between the two emperours, Dessalines and Napoleon. The fact, that St. Domingo once acknowledged, and now refuses to acknowledge the supreme authority of France, is all that we know or will, if we are wise, concern ourselves to know. The rights claimed by France are merely, that we shall not intermeddle in the contest; not that we shall help her.

JUSTICE requires, that I should make it understood, that I claim from you no answers to my communications. I would sooner suppress such of my letters, than have them operate to impose a task on you.

TO MR. ******, AT SPRINGFIELD.

DEDHAM, February 1st, 1806.
Saturday.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

ALL habits grow stronger as we grow older; and I am sorry to find, that the bad habit of neglecting to write to

you becomes more inveterate by indulgence. I condemn myself for it, and go round the beaten circle of resolving to do better in future. But what avail wise *saws* against foolish propensities?

Happening to be in the office, pen and ink before me, and expecting your brother J. this evening, I say to myself, nick the moment, and write, or you will persist in your sins, and aggravate them by your fruitless repentance. Conscience, which will sometimes meddle against old sinners, speaks out, contrary to custom, with some authority, and I obey.

These few lines come to let you know, that I am very well, sickness excepted, as I hope you are, without exception, at this present writing. Want of exercise brings want of appetite, that furs my tongue and dulls my wits. I sleep worse, and yet am a sleepy fellow; and on the whole have ground for two dozen complaints about my health, and not one new apprehension.

Why did you not invite me to visit Springfield? *That* omission, some care of our ever-depending turnpike, the depth of the snow, and its faithless appearance in this thawy weather, banish or retard the project I wish to ripen and execute of going with my one horse cutter to your town. Why should I not? Do I not want some of your large pepper seed? The dry season forbade mine to ripen. Do I not want to see your great bridge? Do I not want to drink your cider, which article is scarce here? How reasons thicken in my catalogue. Yet as they govern me just as little as they do the rest of this stubborn, unreasonable world, I think it probable I shall not go; and that on the aforesaid grounds it is much more proper, that you and your good wife should come here, although you could not find one of the reasons for it that I have urged in my own case.

As you would not come for pepper seed, nor to drink cider, nor to see the Dedham canal up Charles river, which is not to be seen, I will readily admit that you both come to see Mrs. A.

and your humble servant. I will not enlarge on the weight these last motives would have with any other good people, but my vanity stiffly maintains, that they have influence with you. Indeed it founds itself a good deal on such kind of pretensions.

Sir, I was elected president--not of the United States; and do you know why I did not accept? I had no inclination for it. The health I have would have been used up at Cambridge in a year. My old habits are my dear comforts, and these must have been violently changed.

How much I was in a scrape in consequence of the offer, and with what three weeks mystery and address I extricated myself, are themes for conversation when we meet. I have extricated myself, and feel like a truck or stage horse, who is once more allowed to roll in the dirt without his harness. Every body has heard of Mrs. A's. proposing that I should take H. A. if I went to Cambridge, as *she* would neither go nor learn Greek.

Apropos of Hannah Adams. Her abridgement of her history of New-England for the use of schools has, I believe, superiour merit. I have read a chapter, and, after reading more, shall put my name to the recommendation of the work. Young ******* ********* and others, friends to modest merit, have bought the whole of her first edition, and a second is preparing. I wish to see it in use.

Are you sharp shooters of Hampshire ready to get the bounty for Englishmen's scalps? ******'s intemperate folly shews the temper of the ruling party. If a step should be stirred onward in that path, we are plump in a war. I have hoped, that the sacred shield of cowardice, as Junius calls it, would protect our peace. I still hope. Yet this tongue courage is a bad omen. If we assert rights, that we cannot maintain by argument, and that we will not enforce by arms, what follows from our so early putting down our foot; so positively stating, that Britain usurps our rights, and that we never will abandon them? What, I say, but an increased and a very unnecessary propensity on both sides to war; an

indisposition to negotiation, "the only umpire between just nations;" and a tenfold disgrace, if we tamely forbear to enforce our claims, or explicitly renounce them? In point of true dignity or common prudence this *preliminary* engagement of our government to be inflexible seems singularly absurd. Mr. Madison's great pamphlet on the maritime principle of Great Britain, however plausible and ingenious, is an indiscreet pledge of the government and of the publick opinion to maintain what we know England will not concede and we will not enforce.

I COULD subjoin, that the chief labour of Madison is to shew, that Great Britain has no right from old treaties nor from old writers. He might as well shew, that neither Aristotle nor the laws of Solon make any mention of such a principle. A new state of things exists, and a new case requires a new application of old principles. Here I strongly apprehend, the decision will be against us at "*the bar of reason*," where Mr. Jefferson, like the crier, summons Mr. Pitt to appear and answer. How is it possible for Great Britain to defend herself, without the utmost use of her navy? and how can she use her navy with any effect against her deadly enemy, if she leaves his colony trade free to neutrals, and thereby makes that immense fund of wealth cheaply accessible to France? I confess I know not. But why do I bore you with a prize question?

N. continues to mend. We are all well. Thank you for more of Doctor Lathrop. Remember me to all friends, especially to those of your household. A kiss for little Bess.

Your's, &c.

FISHER AMES.

TO MR. *********, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, AT WASHINGTON.

DEDHAM, February 14th, 1806.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE sent your letters to Mr. *****, who, I am sure, will think their contents as interesting as I do. Indeed, "they suit the gloomy habit of my soul," as Young says in his Zanga. I am infinitely dejected with the view of Europe, as well as of our own country; and I begin to consider the utmost extreme of publick evils as more dreadfully imminent than ever I did before. I have long consoled myself with believing, that the germs of political evil as well as of good lie long, like the unnumbered seeds of every species of plants, in the ground without sprouting; and that it was unnecessary and unwise to contemplate the possibilities of national servitude, and, more properly, of universal convulsion and ruin under a French empire as either very near or very probable. Late events, I confess, lessen my confidence in the military capacity of resistance of all the foes of France, England not excepted. A fate seems to sweep the prostrate world along, that is not to be averted by submission, nor retarded by arms. The British navy stands like Briareus, parrying the thunderbolts, but can hurl none back again; and if Buonaparte effects his conquest of the dry land, the empire of the sea must in the end belong to him. That he will reign supreme and alone on the continent is to be disputed by nobody but Russia; and if pride, poverty, distance, false ambition, or fools in his cabinet persuade the emperour Alexander to make a separate peace, France must be Rome, and Russia, Parthia, invincible and insignificant. The second Punick war must terminate in that case, for aught I can see, in the ruin of England; and the world must bow its base neck to the yoke. It will sweat in servitude and grope in darkness, perhaps, another thousand years. For the emulation of the European states, extinguished by the establishment of one empire, will no longer sustain

the arts. They and the sciences will soon become the corrupters of society. It is already doubtful, whether the press is not their enemy.

I MAKE no doubt, Buonaparte will offer almost carte blanche to Russia and Austria, saving only his rights as master; and I greatly fear, that Russia will be lured, as Austria will be forced, to abandon Great Britain. Another peace makes Buonaparte master of Europe.

RUSSIA has soldiers, and they are brave enough; and I should think so vast an augmentation of the French empire would seem to Alexander to demand the exertion of all his vast energies. Without Pitt's gold, this will be a slow and inadequate exertion; and how Pitt is to get money, if neutrals take this *generous* opportunity to quarrel with him, I cannot see.

IF we intend to quarrel and to assert our claims in arms, it may be wise and right to take up our cause as we do; for if England will not recede, we cannot honourably—which last word, I well know, is a mere expletive, of no more import than a semicolon, or rather an interjection. If we resolve, that Great Britain shall fight or yield, and that the United States will sooner fight than yield, it is all of a piece to argue and bluster as we do. But on the hypothesis, that we mean peace in every event, the folly of this prompt assumption of our ultimatum is strange. I am the more ready to think it so, because I expect to hear John Bull say, he is as little convinced as afraid. Like a good citizen, I am silent while our side is argued; but I am far from thinking it impossible, that the question should appear to the candid and intelligent to have another side. If it has, I abstain from all insult and reproach and from all feelings of indignation against Great Britain for her alleged "interpolations."

IT is ever a misfortune for a man to differ from the political or religious creed of his countrymen. You will not fail to perceive, that I am worse than a lingerer in my faith in the conclusiveness of the reasoning of Mr. Madison & Co. This, however, I keep to myself and less than half a dozen friends.

As you seem to be more orthodox than I am on this article, I am the more ready to applaud your generous and just sentiments in favour of the British cause against France.

It has never happened, I believe, for any great length of time, that our American affairs have been much governed either by our policy or blunders. Events abroad have imposed both their character and result; and I see no reason to doubt, that this is to be the case more than ever. If France dictates by land and sea, we fall without an effort. The wind of the cannon-ball that smashes John Bull's brains out, will lay us on our backs with all our tinsel honours in the dirt.

Therefore, I think I may, and I feel that I must return to European affairs.

Two obstacles, and only two, impede the establishment of universal monarchy: Russia and the British navy. The military means of the former are vast, her troops numerous and brave. Of money she has little, but a little goes a great way, for every thing is cheap. This is owing to the barbarism of her inhabitants. Now for revenue a highly civilized state is most favourable. But for arms, I beg leave to doubt, whether men half savage are not best. Not because rude nations have more courage than those that are polished, but because they have not such an invincible aversion to a military life as the sons of luxury and pleasure, and the sons of labour too, in the latter. As society refines, greater freedom of the choice of life is progressively allowed; and the endless variety of employments and arts of life attaches men, and almost all the men, to the occupations of peace. To bring soldiers into the field, the prince must overbid the allurements of these occupations. He exhausts his treasury without filling his camp.

But in Russia *men* are yet *cheap*, as well as provisions. Little is left to the peasantry to choose, whether they will stand in the ranks or at a work-bench; and though the emperour may not incline absolutely to force men into the army, a sum of money, that John Bull would disdain to accept, would allure them in crowds. Russia in Asia is thinly settled. But Russia in Europe is the seat of five-sixths of the inhabitants of the em-

pire, and not very deficient in populousness, if we consider the extent of unimprovable lands, and the little demand for manufacturing labour. With thirty millions in Europe, Russia is surely able to withstand Buonaparte; and the latter will not long forbear to say to ci-devant Poland: "shake off your chains, rise to liberty and fraternity." Prussia and Austria could say nothing against this; but Russia could not and would not acquiesce in it.

I AMUSE myself with inquiring into the existence of physical means to resist France. I seem to forget, though in truth I do not forget, that means twice as great once existed in the hands of the fallen nations. They were divided in counsel, and taken unprepared. Russia, being a single power, and untainted with revolution mania, and plainly seeing her danger, ought to do more than all the rest. Yet, after all, I well know, that, if small minds preside on great occasions, they are sure to temporize, when the worst of all things is to do nothing; and very possibly the Russian cabinet sages partake of this fatal blockheadship.

IT also seems to me, that the science, or, at least, the practice of war has greatly changed since Marlborough's days. In 1702 to 1709 or 1710, he fought a great battle on a plain of six miles extent. On gaining the victory, he besieged a fortress as big as an Indian trading post, mined, scaled, battered, and fought six weeks to take it, and then went into winter quarters. Thus the war went on campaign after campaign, as slowly as the Middlesex canal, which in eight years has been dug thirty miles.

THE French have done with sieges and field battles. Posts are occupied along the whole frontier line of a country. If the line of defence be less extensive, they pass round it; if weakened by extent, through it. An immense artillery, light, yet powerful, rains such a horrible tempest on any point that is to be forced, that the defenders are driven back, before the charge of the bayonet is resorted to. The lines once forced, the defending army falls back, takes new positions, and again loses them as before. Thus a country is taken possession of

The discords of your democratick leaders will raise hopes of good, for the federalists are stubborn *hopers*. ******** no longer the guest of the great man's private board, no longer his earwig, will not be his antagonist. If he is, he will lose his party and his influence. These people may disagree about the manner or even the extent of doing mischief, but to do good they have neither inclination nor understanding. Our disease is democracy. It is not the skin that festers—our very bones are carious, and their marrow blackens with gangrene. Which rogues shall be first, is of no moment—our republicanism must die, and I am sorry for it. But why should we care what sexton happens to be in office at our funeral Nevertheless, though I indulge no hopes, I derive much entertainment from the squabbles in *madam* Liberty's family. After so many liberties have been taken with her, I presume she is no longer a *miss* and a virgin, though she may still be a goddess.

It is a mark of a little mind in a great man, to get such people about him for favourites as our chief is said to prefer. ******** thought himself a Jupiter, and filled his Olympus with buffoons, sots, and blockheads. Is our Jupiter to reign another term of four years? I am at a loss to comprehend his ardent passion for buying territory. Is he land-mad, or is he afflicted with a gun-powder-phobia. Admitting that, we must either buy the Spanish right or take it. Reasons of the day may decide in favour of buying, but a million mischiefs will grow out of this enlargement of our territory, and some of them at no great distance.

I am flattered agreeably by finding, that you and Mr. ****** approve my opinions respecting St. Domingo. I have never seen that gentleman, but I have, as every body here has, a very high respect for his merit and talents. I lament, that they are so much lost to our country, which, you know, is destined to the grasp of all its vice and ambition, the ambition of its *low* tyrants.

Our election will excite at least as much zeal and bustle as ever. We live in the island of Lemnos, and in Vulcan's own shop: it seems as if we had no business but to forge party

thunderbolts. We maintain, that there is as much honour as noise in this happy situation, but surely we cannot deceive ourselves so far as to suppose there ever will be any tranquillity.

How numerous are the foes of order, and how incorrect as well as faint-hearted are its friends!! With respect and unfeigned regard, I am, dear sir,

Your's truly,

FISHER AMES.

TO THE SAME.

DEDHAM, January 12th, 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,

THE man who never flatters cannot avoid furnishing the occasions for his friends to flatter themselves. Indeed, their being his friends will furnish one. Your kind wishes for my health, in your favour of new-year's day will afford another. I was much gratified by the perusal of the other parts of your letter, but *that* part was not the least pleasing. In return, I will wish, that fortune may serve you as well as you serve your country, and that one of your rewards and enjoyments may be to see it escape from the perils to which it is blind, and the administration to which it is now partial.

You describe our dangers and disgraces with so just a discernment of their causes, and with so much feeling for the publick evils that will be their consequences, that I am ready to acquit former republicks from a good deal of the reproach that has survived their ruin, the reproach of wanting sense to see it, when it was obvious and near. Probably, however, we shall yet find evidence enough in the works of their great writers to prove, that the wise and good among their citizens did foresee their fate, and would have resisted it, if they could; bu that a republick tends, experience says, irresistibly, towards licentiousness, and that a licentious republick or democracy is

of all governments that very one in which the wise and good are most completely reduced to impotence. Such men no more deserve the reproach that their republicks fall, than that ships are cast away at sea; or, if I may drop all high metaphor and speak like a farmer, that a fence falls, when it is supported by nothing but white birch stakes. It is the nature of these to fail in two years; and a republick wears out its morals almost as soon as the sap of a white birch rots the wood.

And are we not fated to have our present chief the longer on account of his inefficiency? His whole care is to be where he is, and to do nothing to risk his place. Unless great publick disasters get the multitude angry with this do-nothing policy, they will like it exceedingly. The chiefs of party, of course, cannot get a handle to turn him out; and their inducement to do it is always least, when the squad of the party that is secretly opposed to him is the most clearly convinced of his imbecility. It is not contempt, it is the dread of a really able man at the head of a hostile party, that rouses all the fierceness of political competition.

It is natural to ask, whether we are not hastening to the time when publick disasters will make him obnoxious. It seems to me probable, his election will happen first. Of course, our country must remain unprepared, and be ruined, if it please God to permit the British navy to belong to Buonaparte. The Assyrian will tread us down like the mire of the streets. I have read the tenth chapter of Isaiah, to which you refer me, and I think it strikingly applicable to the French and to the United States. As, however, the British navy may resist for several years, we may be permitted without interruption to finish our destruction ourselves.

I am a little less disposed than most persons, to throw all the blame of delaying to resist France on the king of Prussia. Last fall I stated, that, unless the coalition would consent to make him *great*, they had no right to expect to make him hostile to Buonaparte; that small powers could not now exist in Europe independent; that Prussia would be ruined by France, if he joined against her, and the coalition failed of its object;

that he would as certainly be ruined by his allies, if the coalition succeeded, for he would be little and they great; and that the foresight of this manifest danger would justify him, if he insisted, as a sine qua non, to be made as potent at least as Austria; that he ought to have Hanover, Saxony, Hesse, and Holland added to his kingdom, indemnifying in money or other territory the ousted princes; and thus he would be placed to fight France with only the Rhine for a barrier; but I added, that, probably, neither of the parties to the coalition would agree to his aggrandizement.

It was not long after the disasters of Austria, before the king of England, as elector of Hanover, declared to the king of Prussia, that in no possible event would he alienate his German dominions. Such narrow views, such stiffness, at a time which required yielding to a friend, lest he should have to yield to a foe, still appear to me to merit the reproach of ruining the coalition, and of excluding the king of Prussia when he was willing to reinforce it. His late manifesto alludes darkly to some of these facts. His gallant conduct in meeting Buonaparte in the field of battle was, probably, well and maturely considered beforehand; yet it has turned out wrong, for, if he had led his army to join the Russians, the battle would have been yet to fight, and the event might have been different. It seems as if Frederick thought a defensive system a poor one against the French. In that, no doubt, he was right; still I wish he had waited for the Russians.

I think, I have formerly communicated to you some reflections I had made on the *causes* of the steady superiority maintained in war by the French armies, and that I ascribed them to their superiority in numbers, in cavalry, and in artillery. From hence it follows, that fortified towns are of little significance, and small arms of much less than formerly. On each of these heads I could dilate, but I think it needless to you. But the consequence of this real superiority is, that the defensive system is no longer to be trusted. Nations could formerly spin out a war, and tire down a foe. To *conquer* was, of course, next to impossible. Since, however, the experience of the

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French system has evinced, that absolute conquest is no longer an improbable event of a contest with France, it becomes obvious, that nations, who would be safe, must get the sort of force that gives to France this tremendous superiority. Relying no longer on a frontier of fortified towns, with strong garrisons and a weak army of observation in the field, they must now have numbers, cavalry, and artillery superior to the invader, or make up their minds to submit to him. A navy, if we had one, might hinder this invader from coming over. But if he comes, he will be our master, if we have nothing but militia with small arms to oppose his march. Indeed, his march would be a quiet procession through the centre of the states from Norfolk to New-York, little disturbed, and not at all obstructed by myriads of popping militia. Such an enemy could get horses by stripping the coasts. Our patriots too would, no doubt, supply them for a good price. The light artillery they would bring with them; and as the French stow men as thick in their ships as the Guinea traders do their negro slaves, they could bring over fifty thousand troops and twenty thousand dismounted dragoons. What could we do but join Duane in lamenting, that we had so long suffered anglo-federal presses to provoke the great nation? Apropos of Duane, how audaciously insolent he is on that subject.

THESE are my grounds for shewing, that, unless we prepare, and on a great scale, we must submit whenever the English give out.

I REALLY wish you would examine this, perhaps obscure, sketch of the grounds of my military notions, to convince Mr. Giles how defenceless we are, and how fallacious are his popular ideas. The sing-song of Bunker hill Yankee heroes will not do against the French. They understand their trade. An inferiour army, even of regulars, would be exposed, would be sure to have its flank turned; and thus a victory would be won without a chance to fight. With a numerous hostile cavalry, there would be no chance for running away. Is any country, then, more conquerable than the United States from New-York Southward? Even our Yankee land, though abounding in strong

posts, would be destitute of men and means to occupy and maintain them. My plan would be, that the utmost energies of the United States should be called forth to equip a powerful fleet of ships of the line, and to array a considerable body of artillerists, and a military school of engineers, &c. and regiments enough to supply officers; the complement of men to be small. On the whole, a less number than twelve thousand I should think unsafe to trust to.

If any fears of the danger to liberty should arise from such an army, have a select militia three times as numerous of *yeomanry*, encamped yearly in such numbers as would teach discipline, and let that be perfect. To that end there must be martial law in the camp.

I well know, that all this is moonshine, and that embarrassments in executing so great a plan would arise. The people would think it madness; the federalists would be as much afraid of arming as the democrats. I know too, as a consequence of all this, that we fall when the navy of our unthanked champion is withdrawn. Fifty thousand real soldiers might make us safe; and we might have, and ought to have a navy to block up Cadiz, Brest, and Toulon whenever England makes peace, and our danger from France should make it necessary.

I will ask of Mr. ***** the perusal of your letter to him.

Your's &c.

FISHER AMES.

TO THE SAME.

Dedham, November 6th, 1807.

My dear Sir,

YOUR favour of the 28th October, covering the message and documents referred to, reached me yesterday somewhat unexpectedly. I had supposed you would not go on to Washington before November. Besides, shut up half my time in a sick chamber, and the other half in my parlour, I am unaffectedly sensible of my insignificance. If, however, you and my worthy friend Mr. ****** think fit sometimes to send me in-

telligence, I shall be grateful. I am in the habit of thinking your comments better than the text.

I WAS disgusted about a fortnight since, on reading a short piece tending to shew, that Great Britain had the empire of the sea and Buonaparte of the land; that both obtained it by *force*, which gives them all the rights they have, the one to subjugate the nations, and the other to make and expound the laws of nations. When federal newspapers publish such stuff, are we to wonder at the folly of our people? Have we any security, as long as that folly or worse reigns? I am ready to believe, that we, as great boasters as the ancient Greeks, are the most *ignorant* nation in the world, because we have had the least experience. Fresh from the hands of a political mother, who would not let us fall, we now think it impossible that we should fall. Buonaparte will cure us of our presumption; or if that task should be left to some other rough teacher, we shall learn at last the art, that is, the habits, manners, and prejudices of a nation, especially the *prejudices* which are worth more than philosophy, without which I venture to consider our playing government as a sort of free negro attempt. It would seem as if it were necessary, that we should endure slavery for some ages, till every drop of democratick blood has been got rid of by fermentation or bleeding. I dread to look forward to the dismal scenes, through which my children are to pass. As every nation has been trodden under foot, ground in a mill, and purged in the fire of adversity, I know not why we should hope for all fair weather and sunshine, for peace and gainful commerce and an everlasting futurity of elysium, before we have lived and suffered as others have done. We seem to expect a state of felicity before a state of probation. Of our six millions of people there are scarcely six hundred, who yet look for liberty any where except on paper. Excuse me—I am teazing you with a theme as trite and as tragical as the Children in the Wood.

I THANK you from my heart for the offer of your correspondence. I am an outside passenger, and should like to know what the gentlefolks are doing inside.

My health is exceedingly tender. While I sit by the fire and keep my feet warm, I am not sick. I have heard of a college lad's question, which tolerably describes my case: "Whether bare being, without life or existence, is better than not to be, or not?" I cannot solve so deep a problem; but as long as you are pleased to allow me a place in your esteem, I shall continue to hold better than "not to be" to be,

Dear sir,

Your friend, &c.

FISHER AMES.

THE END.

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
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